THE BṚHADĀRAṆYAKA UPANIṢAD

WITH THE COMMENTRY OF

ŚANKARĀCĀRYA

Translated by

SWĀMĪ MĀDHAVĀNANDA

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA

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Vidyā-vācaspati, Darśana-kalānidhi, Kulapati



ADVAITA ASHRAMA

MAYAVATI, ALMORA, HIMALAYAS

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EXTRACTS FROM THE PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

The long-felt want of a reliable, complete English translation of so important a book as Śaṅkara's Commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad has urged me to venture on this difficult undertaking. Had the long-promised translation by Dr. Gaṅgānāth Jhā, in Mr. Śeshāchāri's series, come out, or had Dr. Röer been living to complete, and revise, his translation, which extends only up to the first chapter of the book and is long out of print, or if Prof. Hiriyānnā of Mysore had completed his admirable edition, which covers only the first three sections of that chapter, there would have been no necessity for another edition. But since the presentation in English of Śaṅkara's longest and greatest commentary on the Upaniṣads seemed to me to be overdue, I have prepared this edition for the use of those students of Vedānta whose knowledge of Sanskrit is not as high as that of English.

Regarding both the text and the commentary care has been taken to make the translation faithful, and as literal as possible consistently with smooth reading. Owing to the difference in structure between Sanskrit and English sentences, great difficulty has been experienced in those portions where Śaṅkara explains the words of the text. As far as possible, I have tried to make these passages read like a connected piece. For this purpose I have avoided the common practice of transliterating the Sanskrit words as they occur in the

original text, to be followed by the translation of the explanatory word or words—a practice which has a very disagreeable jerky effect. Instead I have quoted their equivalents from the running translation of the text, in the order in which they occur there. These have been put in Italics to distinguish them easily from the commentary. The advantage of this direct method will be obvious to every reader.

The text of the Upaniṣad has been given in Devanāgarī characters, and has been moderately punctuated for easy comprehension. This has necessitated the disjoining of some words. I have left the full stops practically undisturbed. The text is followed by the running translation in comparatively large types. Next comes the translation of the commentary in smaller types. I have mainly used Ashtekar's edition, though I have also consulted the Ānandāśrama edition. Words supplied to complete the sense as well as those that are explanatory have been put in brackets. Some passages, of both text and commentary, although possessing a deep spiritual significance, have been omitted in the translation to suit the exigencies of modern taste. Extra space between portions of the commentary indicates that the commentary that follows is introductory to the next paragraph of the text.

The use of capitals in English has presented an additional difficulty. The same word 'self,' for instance, has had to be used sometimes with a capital and sometimes without it, according as it signifies the individual or the Supreme Self. Occasionally both

forms have had to be used in the same sentence, where the popular conception about the self as being limited has been corrected by a presentment of the truth that the two are identical. Those to whom this distinction of capital and small letters appears as puzzling will do well to ignore it altogether. The same remark applies to the question of gender, which in Sanskrit belongs to the word itself. In translation the gender has often had to be varied according to the English idiom, producing sometimes an unpleasant effect owing to a sudden translation.

I have tried my best to make the translation lucid. For this reason I have avoided the repetition of Sanskrit terms as far as possible, and substituted their nearest English equivalents. This has entailed on me the additional labour of finding out the exact sense of a word at a particular place. Lengthy discussions have been split up into paragraphs, differentiating the *prima facie* views from the conclusion. To effect a strict economy of space I have deliberately confined myself to the fewest notes possible. But I believe none that were essential have been omitted. In such a difficult study as this much is necessarily left to the good sense of the reader. My aim throughout has been practical rather than scholastic.

I have generally followed the gloss of Ānandagiri and, wherever necessary, the great *Vārttika* of Sureśvarācārya—two invaluable works on this Upaniṣad. But I must confess that in a few places I have been obliged to depart from them, as a different explanation seemed to me to be more in keeping with the drift of

Śaṅkara and the Upaniṣad. The departures are not so momentous as to require specific mention in every case. With regard to passages that needed further illumination, I have consulted eminent scholars.

References to the quotations occurring in the commentary have been inserted after almost every quotation, as far as they could be traced. In some places they have been purposely omitted, as they have been mentioned a few lines earlier. Where only figures without the name of any book occur, the references are to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, unless there are clear indications to the contrary. The references given are not meant to be exhaustive, except in the case of this Upaniṣad. The references to the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa belong to the Mādhyandina recension, and those of the Mahābhārata to the Kumbakonam edition.

Mahāmahopādhyāyā Prof S. Kuppuswāmi Śāstrī, M.A., I.E.S., of the Presidency College, Madras, a profound scholar and well-known authority on Pūrva-Mīmāṁsa and Vedānta, has written a learned and appreciative Introduction, which considerably enhances the value of the book.

A fairly exhaustive Index has been added, which, I hope, will be found useful. At the top of each page are given references to the opening and closing paragraphs of even and odd pages respectively.

I take this opportunity of expressing my deep indebtedness to all those who have kindly helped me in various ways in preparing this work. Many of them shall be nameless. My special thanks are due to Prof. Kuppuswāmi Śāstrī for giving valuable help in

the interpretation of several difficult passages as well as for writing the Introduction ; to Mahāmahopādhyāya Paṇḍita Lakṣmīpuram Śrīnivāsācār of Mysore for similar assistance in interpretation ; to Paṇḍita P. Śivasubrahmaṇya Śāstrī of Mysore for this as well as for tracing a number of references ; to Professor Hanns Oertel of Munich and Paṇḍita Rādhāprasāda Śāstrī of the Banaras Hindu University for furnishing a few more references ; to Paṇḍita P. Nārāyana Śāstrī and Mr. V. Subrahmaṇya Iyer of Mysore for helping in other ways. But for their kindness it would have been almost impossible for me to fulfil my task with any degree of satisfaction.

It is scarcely necessary to add that the present translation is meant only to facilitate the study of the original commentary, and should better be read along with it. I shall be glad to have any inaccuracies pointed out and the untraced quotations located. It is earnestly hoped that the book in its present form will supply a much-needed want and help people of both Vedānta philosophy and Śaṅkara's unique contribution to it.

July, 1934 MĀDHAVĀNANDA

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The first edition being exhausted within a comparatively short period, a second edition is being brought out. In this edition very little change has been made except a slight revision and the addition of a few notes. Diacritic marks have been used in the Sanskrit words, and a key to the transliteration and pronounciation has been added.

February, 1941 MĀDHAVĀNANDA

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

The third edition is coming out after a long delay owing to paper control. In this edition this book has been further revised at a few places.

April, 1950 MĀDHAVĀNANDA

INTRODUCTION

In compliance with the wishes of the learned translator of *Śrī Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, Swāmī Śrī Mādhavānandaji* of the Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa Mission, I have much pleasure in writing this short introduction to this English rendering of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya.*

I should first congratulate the translator on the large measure of success which he has achieved in his endeavour to produce a faithful and readable English rendering of the greatest of the *Upaniṣad-bhāṣyas* written by *Śrī Śaṅkarācārya.* Such of the students of the *bhāṣyas* of *Śrī Śaṅkara* as may know English better than Sanskrit will find in this English translation a reliable help to the understanding of the contents of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya.*

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is the *greatest* of the *Upaniṣads ;* and *Śrī Śaṅkara's bhāṣya* on this *Upaniṣad* is the *greatest* of his commentaries on the *Upaniṣads.* The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is the greatest not only in extent ; but it is also the greatest in respect of its substance and theme. It is the greatest *Upaniṣad* in the sense that the illimitable, all-embracing, absolute, self-luminous, blissful reality—the *Bṛhat* or *Brahman,* identical with *Ātman,* constitutes its theme. And, according to *Śrī Śaṅkara,* it may be said to be the greatest *Upaniṣad,* also for the reason that it comprehends both the *upadeśa* or revelation of the true nature of the mystic

experience of the *Brahman-Ātman* identity and the *upapatti* or logical explanations of that great doctrine of *advaita* through the employment of the dialectic modes of argumentation known as *jalpa* (arguing constructively as well as destructively for victory) and *vāda* (arguing for truth). *Śrī Śaṅkara's Bṛhad-āraṇyaka-bhāṣya* is the greatest of his commentaries on the *Upaniṣads* in the sense that the great *Ācārya* shows in this *bhāṣya,* in a very telling manner, how the great truth of *Brahman-Ātman* identity forms the main purport of all the Vedāntic texts in general and this great *Upaniṣad* in particular, and maintains by means of his powerful dialectics that the interpretations and views of others are unsound and untenable—those advanced by the Vedistic realists (*Mīmāṁsakas*), the creationistic realists (*Vaiśeṣikas* and *Naiyāyikas*) and the advocates of the doctrine of *bhedābheda* (difference-cum-identity) like *Bhartṛprapañca.* *Śrī Śureśvara* describes *Śrī Śaṅkara's Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya* in these terms in the second verse of his great *Vārttika* on his *Bhāṣya*:—

"यां काण्वोपनिषच्छलेन सकलाम्नायार्थसंशोधिनीं ।
संचक्रुर्गुरवोऽनुवृतगुरवो वृत्तिं सतां शान्तये ॥"

The older meaning of the term *Upaniṣad* is 'Secret word' or 'Secret import' or 'Secret doctrine.' As long as it was understood in this sense, the emphasis was on the mystic and ultra-rational aspect of philosophical thought. When, however, *Śrī Dramiḍācārya,* one of the Pre-Śaṅkara thinkers who commented upon the *Upaniṣads,* and *Śrī Śaṅkara,* following *Śrī Dramiḍa,*

interpreted the term *Upaniṣad* as standing for the realisation of *Brahman-Ātman* identity (*Brahmavidyā*), which annihilates the beginningless nescience called *avidyā*, or as standing for the ancient text helpful in that realisation, the emphasis was shifted to the harmony between the inner *mystic* vision of the unity and universality of *Ātman* as the absolute *being-spirit-bliss saccidānanda*) and the philosophical conclusion that may be reached by a proper use of logic and dialectics. It is necessary to bear this in mind in endeavouring to appraise justly the philosophical and exegetic worth of *Śrī Śaṅkara's* commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*.

This great *Upaniṣad* consists of three *kāṇḍas*—the first being called the *Madhu-kāṇḍa*, the second the *Yājñavalkya-kāṇḍa* or the *Muni-kāṇḍa*, and the third the *Khila-kāṇḍa*. The first *kāṇḍa* conveys the main teaching of the *advaita* doctrine and is of the nature of *upadeśa*; the second embodies the logical argument and explanation showing the soundness of the *upadeśa*; and the third deals with certain *upāsanās* or modes of meditation. The first two chapters of the *Madhu-kāṇḍa* deal with the Vedic rite, *Pravargya*, which forms a part of the ritualistic section (*karma-kāṇḍa*) of the *Veda*; and according to *Śrī Śaṅkara*, the *Upaniṣad* really begins with the third chapter of the *Madhu-kāṇḍa*. In this chapter, the phenomenal superimposition of the world on *Brahman* is set forth and its origin, its full reach and its acme are indicated; and all this is presented as *adhyāropa* or supposititious positing. The fourth or the concluding chapter of the *Madhu-kāṇḍa*

exhibits in a telling manner the sublation which follows and stultifies the supposititious positing of the world in the preceding chapter, and elucidates the nature of the *Brahman-Ātman* realisation which is invariably and synchronously concomitant with the sublation ; and all this is *apavāda* or sublation through the stultifying realisation of truth. According to *Śrī Śaṅkara adhyāropa* and *apavāda* constitute the chief means of fully realising the absolute reality called *Śuddhaṁ Brahma*. All the details of Vedic rituals, all the forms of meditation associated with them, even the greatest of them—the horse-sacrifice (*aśvamedha*) and the meditation associated with it, and all the results accruing from them—all these constitute the province of nescience (*avidyā*) and even the highest achievement of the *Hiraṇyagarbha-loka* or *Brahma-loka* is but a part, though the acme, of the immense cycle of trnsmigration (*saṁsāra*). This is the substance of the account of *adhyāropa* in the third chapter of the *Madhu-kāṇḍa*. In the fourth *Brāhmaṇa* of this chapter, the great rewards of activities and meditation are described, so that a pure and disciplined mind may see their impermanence and detach itself from them ; the undifferentiated *Brahman* (*avyākṛta*) representing the meaning of *Tat*. and the differentiated spirit (*vyākṛta*) representing the meaning of *Tvam* are then described ; and after showing how, in the condition of nescience (*avidyā*), one sees difference in the multifarious non-spirit, the nature of the *vidyā* or knowledge of the absolute spirit, which is the *Ātman-vidyā* or *Brahma-vidyā* and brings about the realisation of *the allness and the wholeness of*

Ātman, is indicated in the *vidyā-sūtra*—" आत्मेत्येवोपासीत."
This is introduced at the end of the description of *adhyāropa,* so that one may not lose oneself in it and may find one's way further to the stage of *apavāda.* Here *Śrī Śaṅkara* discusses the import of the *vidyā-sūtra.* It has to be considered whether this text should be taken as a complementarily restrictive injunction (*niyamavidhi*), or as an injunction of something not got at in any other way (*apūrvavidhi*), or as an exclusively restrictive injunction (*parisaṁkhya-vidhi*). From *Śrī Śaṅkara's* discussion of the import of the *vidyā-sūtra* in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya* and from his observations about the import of similar texts in the *Samanvayādhikaraṇa-bhāṣya,* it may be gathered that this text should be understood as setting forth the great truth that the *absolute Brahman* indirectly indicated by the word *Ātman,* and not any form of matter, gross or subtle, or any of its functions, should be realised as the only *reality ;* and, as a matter of fact, there is no scope for any kind of injunction directly with reference to such reality. Such apparent injunctions look like injunctions at the initial stages of the quest for truth ; but they ultimately turn out to be valid statements of the one great truth for which the *advaita* system stands. The fourth chapter of the *Madhu-kāṇḍa,* or the second chapter of the *bhāṣya,* is devoted to *apavāda* and to an elucidation of the purport of the *vidyā-sūtra.* After describing in an elaborate manner the corporeal and incorporeal forms of the corpus of the material universe superimposed on *Brahman,* this chapter proceeds to convey the great

teaching embodied in the words of the oft-quoted text—"अथात आदेशो नेति नेति" and emphatically avers that *Brahman* is not *śūnya* and can never be brought within the scope of any affirmation, but one may only glimpse it indirectly through negations of eliminable factors—"*Not this, Not this*" 'इति न इति न'). The fourth *Brāhmaṇa* of the fourth chapter introduces *Yājñavalkya* as offering to divide all his earthly possessions between his two wives—*Kātyāyanī* and *Maitreyī*. *Maitreyī* asks if she can free herself from death by possessing the whole world filled with wealth, and *Yājñavalkya* says 'no'. *Maitreyī* refuses all the riches of the world, saying "If I am not thereby free from death, what are these to me?" *Yājñavalkya* commends the spiritual fitness of his wife's mind and proceeds to teach her the great truth of *the Vedāntas*. *Śrī Śaṅkara* draws pointed attention, here, to the value of renunciation (*saṁnyāsa*) as the means of true knowledge (*jñāna*). There are two kinds of *saṁnyāsa*—that which the seeker for knowledge (*jijñāsu*) resorts to for the sake of knowledge, and that which the person who has realised the truth (*jñānin*) resorts to for realising, without any hitch, the blissfulness of the condition of liberation while living (*jīvanmukti*). King *Janaka*, the greatest of *Yājñavalkya's* disciples, continued to be a householder (*gṛhastha*) and served the world in perfect detachment as a *jīvanmukta*; but *Yājñavalkya*, who was also a *jīvanmukta*, after making momentous contributions to the educating and uplifting of the world in the sphere of spirituality, desired to renounce his life as a householder (*gārhasthya*) and to become a

saṁnyāsin. The ideal of a *jīvanmukta* continuing to serve in society is not really opposed to the ideal of *saṁnyāsa* and is beautifully synthesised with it in the relation between *Janaka* and *Yājñavalkya* in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka ;* and similarly through the delightful *liaison* furnished by Maitreyī, the life of a *gṛhastha* is unified in the fourth *Brāhmaṇa* of this chapter with the life of a *saṁnyāsin*. *Yājñavalkya* conveys to *Maitreyī* the great truth that the *pure spirit—Ātman—* is the ultimate object of all forms of love and is therefore to be understood as the *eternal bliss* ; and *Ātman* should be realised through the duly regulated scheme of *śravaṇa, manana* and *nididhyāsana*—knowing the truth from the *Upaniṣads*, investigating and discussing it, and constant contemplation upon it ("आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ")

The *upadeśa* in the *Madhu-kāṇḍa* is appropriately followed by the *upapatti* or argumentative and expository discourse in the *Yājñavalkya-kānda*. The latter *kāṇḍa* consists of the fifth and sixth chapters of the *Upaniṣad*. In the fifth chapter, the dialectic mode of argumentation known as *jalpa*, or arguing constructively as well as destructively for victory, is employed. *Yājñavalkya* is presented here as the stalwart dialectician in *Janaka's* assembly of learned philosophers and he fights his way to victory in the interest of philosophical truth. The most important *Brāhmaṇa* in this chapter is the eighth, in which *Brahmatattva* is elucidated in answer to the questions raised by *Gārgī*, the lady philosopher who stands out as the most outstanding personality among the philo-

sophical interlocutors opposing *Yājñavalkya*. In the sixth chapter, King *Janaka* plays the rôle, not of a controversialist, but of one desirous of completely knowing the truth (*tattvabubhutsu*) and the discourse proceeds on the lines of argumentation for truth (*vāda*). In the third and fourth *Brāhmaṇas* of this chapter, an illustrative exposition of *paraloka* and *mokṣa* is given. The fifth *Brāhmaṇa* repeats the dialogue between *Yājñavalkya* and *Maitreyī* and explains the means of self-realisation in the highest sense (*ātmabodha*). In commenting upon the concluding sentence of this *Brāhmaṇa*—("एतावदरे खल्वमृतत्वमिति होक्त्वा याज्ञवल्क्यो विजहार") as also in commenting upon the text ("तस्माद्ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य") etc. at the end of the fifth *Brāhmaṇa* of the previous chapter and upon VI. iv. 22 of the sixth chapter, *Śrī Śaṅkara* discusses the place of *saṁnyāsa* and its value in the advaitic scheme of life and liberation, and emphasises the necessity for renunciation as providing special facilities for unhampered realisation ; and in this connection, as elsewhere, he is not in favour of any kind of accommodation, in practice or theory, with the advocates of the *karma-mārga*.

The third division of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is known as the *Khila-kāṇḍa* and deals with certain modes of meditation. The messages of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* ontology are conveyed in the texts—("अहं ब्रह्मास्मि"; "आत्मेत्येवोपासीत" ; "अथात आदेशो नेति नेति"). The pragmatic message of this *Upaniṣad* is embodied in the text ("अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि"). The discipline of this *Upaniṣad* and its aim are embodied in the soul-elevating *abhyārohamantra*—'From non-being, lead me to being;

from darkness, lead me to light; from death, lead me to deathlessness'—("असतो मा सद्गमय ; तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय ; मृत्योर्माऽमृतं गमय"). All the teachings of this *Upaniṣad* are summed up in the first *mantra* of the *Khila-kāṇḍa*—*'That is the whole;* the *whole* is *this* : from the *whole* rises up the *whole ;* and having seized the *whole* of the *whole,* the *whole* alone remains'—"ओं पूर्णमदः पुर्णमिदं पूर्णात्पूर्णमुदच्यते । पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ॥" Such as are able to see the defects of the *holism* of General Smuts may find comfort in the unimpeachable *wholism* embodied in this *mantra* at the beginning of the *Khila-kāṇḍa.* This *holism* of General Smuts may have, indeed, a chance of meeting with the approval of advaitic dialectics, only if it links itself up, as an ancillary, to the *wholism* of the absolute monism of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* The most striking message of this *Upaniṣad* on the ethical side is embodied in the lesson which every meditator is asked to read in the dental rumblings of the three *da's* (द-द-द) of a thunder-clap, which are suggestive of *self-restraint* (दम) *self-sacrifice* (दान) and *merciful benevolence* (दया). This great ethical teaching is embodied in the text—"तदेतत्त्रयं शिक्षेद्दमं दानं दयामिति" and *Prajāpati* conveys it to his three classes of children—the *devas,* the *manuṣyas,* and the *asuras.* Such of the men as are godly in their nature and are tossed about by *kāma,* though otherwise good, should be understood, according to *Śrī Śaṅkara,* as *gods* (देवाः) among men ; such of them as are grasping and greedy and actuated by *lobha,* should be taken as men (मनुष्याः) among men; and cruel men, demonised by *krodha,* should be taken

as demons (असुराः). All men should constantly practise *dama, dāna* and *dayā* to exorcise the monsters of *kāma, lobha* and *krodha.*

Some alien and alien-minded scholars are not inclined to see any systematic presentation of a philosophical doctrine in the *Upaniṣads* and believe that the *Upaniṣads,* including even the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* form a spiritual conglomerate of several things of varying value belonging to different stages—of thaumaturgic pebbles, dualistic and pluralistic toys and monistic gems. Those who carefully study the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* and *Śrī Śaṅkara's* great *bhāṣya* thereon, cannot easily resist the feeling that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* thought is an *integral whole* which is *rooted* on the *advaita doctrine* and has it as its precious *fruit,* which uses a sound system of exposition and dialectics easily lending themselves to being expressed in the terms of the *Gautamīya* logic, and which refuses to accommodate itself in a satisfactory manner to any form of pluralistic realism or to any kind of the timid spiritual and metaphysical compromises involved in the *bhedā-bheda* (difference-cum-identity) phases of monistic thought belonging to the *Pre-Śaṅkara* or *Post-Śaṅkara* stage in the history of *Vedānta*

"ओं नमो ब्रह्मादिभ्यो ब्रह्मविद्यासंप्रदायकर्तृभ्यो वंशऋषिभ्यो नमो गुरुभ्यः।"

"श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणानामालयं करुणालयम्
नमामि भगवत्पादं शंकरं लोकशंकरम् ॥

S. Kuppuswāmi Śāstrī

NOTE

The Vedas, which are the oldest religious literature of the world, and are the highest authority with the Hindus in matters religious, consist of two main divisions—the Mantras and the Brāhmaṇas. Though the latter are a sort of commentary on the former, both have equal authority. A Mantra may be in verse, with fixed feet and syllables, when it is called Ṛc, or it may not have any fixity of feet and syllables, when it is called Yajus. A Ṛc that can be sung is called a Sāman. These three classes of Mantras have been grouped into four compilations or Saṁhitās, which are called the Ṛg-Veda, the Yajur-Veda, the Sāma-Veda and the Atharva-Veda Samhitā. The common name for the first three is Trayī, which means a triad. The Vedas are also called Śrutis, as distinguished from the Smṛtis, under which comes all other sacred literature, and which derive their authority from the Śrutis.

The Vedas are claimed to be eternal. They are not the creation of man. Only they were revealed to certain highly spiritual persons, called Ṛṣis.

Each Saṁhitā had one or more Brāhmaṇas, only a few of which are extant. The Yajur-Veda, which has two forms, Dark and White, has the Taittirīya and Śatapatha Brāhmaṇas respectively. The White Yajur-Veda was revealed to Yājñavalkya through the grace of the Sun, who appeared to him in an equine form. Hence, by a derivative meaning, it is also called the

Vājasaneyī Samhitā, and the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa the Vājasaneyī Brāhmaṇa.

Some of the Brāhmaṇas have a portion called Āraṇyaka, in which, oftener than elsewhere, are found one or more Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣads constitute the Jnāna-Kāṇḍa, as treating of philosophy, while the rest of the Vedas is called Karma-Kāṇḍa, as dealing with rituals.

The Saṁhitās as well as the Brāhmaṇas had *various recensions or Śākhās according to their original teachers, after whom they were named. The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa has the Kāṇva and Mādhyandina recensions, which differ greatly from each other in content as well as the number and arrangement of their* books and chapters, the former having seventeen Kāṇḍas or books, and the latter only fourteen. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad forms the concluding portion of the last book, named 'Āraṇyaka,' of both recensions. But while the bulk of matter in both versions is the same, there are marked discrepancies too. Śaṅkara has commented upon the Kāṇva recension.

It may be mentioned in passing that this recension of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa is not only not in print, but is also not easily accessible in its entirety even in a manuscript form. This is all the more true of Sāyanācārya's great commentary on this Brāhmaṇa.

CONTENTS

KEY TO THE TRANSLITERATION AND PRONUNCIATION

		Sounds like
अ	a	o in *son*
आ	ā	ah
इ	i	i short
ई	ī	ee
उ	u	u in *full*
ऊ	ū	oo in *boot*
ऋ	ṛ	ri
ए	e	e in *bed*
ऐ	ai	y in *my*
ओ	o	oh
औ	au	ow in *now*
क	k	k
ख	kh	ckh in *blockhead*
ग	g	g hard
घ	gh	gh in *log-hut*
ङ	ṅ	ng
च	c	ch (not k)
छ	ch	chh in *catch him*
ज	j	j
झ	jh	dgeh in *hedgehog*
ञ	ñ	n (somewhat)
ट	ṭ	t
ठ	ṭh	th in *ant-hill*

		Sounds like
ड	ḍ	d
ढ	ḍh	dh in *godhood*
ण	ṇ	n
त	t	French t
थ	th	th in *thumb*
द	d	th in *then*
ध	dh	theh in *breathe her*
न	n	n
प	p	p
फ	ph	ph in *loop-hole*
ब	b	b
भ	bh	bh in *abhor*
म	m	m
य	y	y
र	r	r
ल	l	l
व	v	w
श	ś	sh
ष	ṣ	sh (almost)
स	s	s
ह	h	h
ं	ṁ	ng
ः	ḥ	half h

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Ai.	... Aitareya Upaniṣad
Āp.	... Āpastamba Dharma-Sūtras
Ba.	... Bahvṛca Brāhmaṇa
Bau.	... Baudhāyana Dharma-Sūtras
Ch.	... Chāndogya Upaniṣad
G.	... Bhagavad-Gītā
Gau.	... Gautama Dharma-Sūtras
Gau. N.	... Gautama Nyāya-Sūtras
Īś.	... Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad
Jā.	... Jābāla Upaniṣad
Ka.	... Kaṭha Upaniṣad
Kau.	... Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad
Ke.	... Kena Upaniṣad
Kr.	... Kaṭharudra Upaniṣad
Kś.	... Kaṭhaśruti Upaniṣad
M.	... Manu Saṁhita
Mā.	... Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad
Mbh.	... Mahābhārata
Mn.	... Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad
Mu.	... Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
Np.	... Nārada-Parivrājaka Upaniṣad
Nṛ. Pū.	... Nṛsiṁha Pūrvatāpanī Upaniṣad
Nṛ. Ut.	... Nṛsiṁha Uttaratāpanī Upaniṣad
Pr.	... Praśna Upaniṣad
Ṛ.	... Ṛg-Veda
Ś.	... Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa
Śi.	... Śiva Purāṇa
Śv.	... Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad

Tā.	...	Tāṇḍya-Mahābrāhmaṇa
Tai.	...	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
Tai. Ā.	...	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka
Tai. B.	...	Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa
Tai. S.	...	Taittirīya Saṁhitā
Va.	...	Vasiṣṭha-Smṛti
Vā.	...	Vāyu Purāṇa
Viṣ.	...	Viṣṇu Purāṇa

CORRIGENDA

Page	*Line*	*For*	*Read*
84	8—23	correct sound	gold
84	19	a good tone	correct sound
133	18	vi	v
133	19	19	19 ; Mā. 2
153	6	19	,, ,,
303	3-4	exterior' ....'This	exterior. This
528	23-24	,, ,,	,, ,,
528	22	texts	too
528	24	Ibid.	II. v. 19

THE PEACE CHANT

ॐ । पूर्णमदः पूर्णमिदं पूर्णात्पूर्णमुदच्यते ।
पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ॥
ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ।

Om. That (Brahman) is infinite, and this (universe) is infinite. The infinite proceeds from the infinite. (Then) taking the infinitude of the infinite (universe), it remains as the infinite (Brahman) alone.

Om Peace! Peace! Peace!

THE BṚHADĀRAṆYAKA UPANIṢAD

CHAPTER I

SECTION I

Om. Salutation to Brahman (Hiraṇyagarbha[1]) and the other sages forming the line of teachers who have handed down the knowledge of Brahman. Salutation to our own teacher.

With the words, ' The head of the sacrificial horse is the dawn,' etc. begins the Upaniṣad connected with the Vājasaneyi-Brāhmaṇa. This concise commentary is being written on it to explain to those who wish to turn away from this relative world (Saṁsāra), the knowledge of the identity of the individual self and Brahman, which is the means of eradicating the cause of this world (ignorance). This knowledge of Brahman is called ' Upaniṣad ' because it entirely removes this relative world together with its cause from those who betake themselves to this study, for the root ' sad ' prefixed by 'upa' and 'ni' means that. Books also are called Upaniṣads as they have the same end in view.

This Upaniṣad consisting of six chapters is called 'Āraṇyaka' as it was taught in the forest (Araṇya). And because of its large size it is called Bṛhadāraṇyaka. Now we are going to describe its relation to the ceremonial portion of the Vedas. The whole of the Vedas is devoted to setting forth the means of attaining what is good and avoiding what is evil, in so far as these

[1] The being identified with the cosmic mind.

are not known through perception and inference, for all people naturally seek these two ends. In matters coming within the range of experience, a knowledge of the means of attaining the good and avoiding the evil ends is easily available through perception and inference. Hence the Vedas are not to be sought for that. Now, unless a person is aware of the existence of the self in a future life, he will not be induced to attain what is good and avoid what is evil in that life. For we have the example of the materialists. Therefore the scriptures proceed to discuss the existence of the self in a future life and the particular means of attaining the good and avoiding the evil in that life. For we see one of the Upaniṣads starts with the words, 'There is a doubt among men regarding the life after death, some saying that the self exists, and others that it does not' (Ka. I. 20), and concludes, 'It is to be realised as existing indeed' (Ka. VI. 13), and so on. Also, beginning with, 'How (the self remains) after death' (Ka. V. 6), it ends with, 'Some souls enter the womb to get a new body, while others are born as stationary objects (plants etc.), all according to their past work and knowledge' (Ka. V. 7). Elsewhere beginning with, 'The man (self) himself becomes the light' (IV. iii. 9), it ends with, 'It is followed by knowledge, work' (IV. iv. 2). Also, 'One becomes good through good work and evil through evil work' (III. ii. 13). Again beginning with, 'I will instruct you' (II. i. 15), the existence of the extracorporeal self is established in the passage, 'Full of consciousness (i.e. identified with the mind),' etc. (II. i. 16-17).

Objection : Is it not a matter of perception?

Reply : No, for we see the divergence of opinion among different schools. Were the existence of the self in a future body a matter of perception, the materialists and Buddhists would not stand opposed to us, saying that there is no self. For nobody disputes regarding an object of perception such as a jar, saying it does not exist.

Objection : You are wrong, since a stump, for instance, is looked upon as a man and so on.

Reply : No, for it vanishes when the truth is known. There are no more contradictory views when the stump, for instance, has been definitely known as such through perception. The Buddhists, however, in spite of the fact that there is the ego-consciousness, persistently deny the existence of the self other than the subtle body.[1] Therefore, being different from objects of perception, the existence of the self cannot be proved by this means. Similarly inference too is powerless.

Objection : No, since the Śruti (Veda) points out certain grounds of inference[2] for the existence of the self, and these depend on perception, (these two are also efficient means of the knowledge of the self).

Reply : Not so, for the self cannot be perceived as having any relation to another life. But when its existence has been known from the Śruti and from

[1] The five elements, ten organs, vital force (with its fivefold function) and mind (in its fourfold aspect). Or the ten organs, five vital forces, Manas and intellect.

[2] Such as desires etc., which must have a basis, and this is the self.

certain empirical grounds of inference cited by it, the Mīmāṁsakas and logicians, who follow in its footsteps, fancy that those Vedic grounds of inference such as the ego-consciousness are the products of their own mind, and declare that the self is knowable through perception and inference.

In any case, a man who believes that there is a self which gets into relation with a future body, seeks to know the particular means of attaining the good and avoiding the evil in connection with that body. Hence the ceremonial portion of the Vedas is introduced to acquaint him with these details. But the cause of that desire to attain the good and avoid the evil, viz. ignorance regarding the Self, which expresses itself as the idea of one's being the agent and experiencer, has not been removed by its opposite, the knowledge of the nature of the self as being identical with Brahman. Until that is removed, a man prompted by such natural defects of his as attachment or aversion to the fruits of his actions, proceeds to act even against the injunctions and prohibitions of the scriptures, and under the powerful urge of his natural defects accumulates in thought, word and deed a good deal of work known as iniquity, producing harm, visible and invisible. This leads to degradation down to the state of stationary objects. Sometimes the impressions made by the scriptures are very strong, in which case he accumulates in thought, word and deed a great deal of what is known as good work which contributes to his well-being. This work is twofold: *that attended with meditation, and that which is mechanical. Of these, the latter results in the attain-*

ment of the world of the Manes and so on; while work coupled with meditation leads to worlds beginning with that of the gods and ending with the world of Hiraṇyagarbha.[1] The Śruti says on the point, 'One who sacrifices to the Self is better than one who sacrifices to the gods,' etc. (Ś. XI. ii. 6. 13, adapted). And the Smṛti: 'Vedic work is twofold,' etc. (M. XII. 88). When the good work balances the evil, one becomes a man. Thus the transmigration beginning with the state of Hiraṇyagarbha and the rest and ending with that of stationary objects, which a man with his natural defects of ignorance etc. attains through his good and bad deeds, depends on name, form and action. This manifested universe, consisting of means and ends, was in an undifferentiated state before its manifestation. That relative universe, without beginning and end like the seed and the sprout etc., created by ignorance and consisting in a superimposition of action, its factors and its results on the Self, is an evil. Hence for the removal of the ignorance of a man who is disgusted with this universe, this Upaniṣad is being commenced in order to inculcate the knowledge of Brahman which is the very opposite of that ignorance.

The utility of this meditation concerning the horse sacrifice is this: Those who are not entitled to this sacrifice will get the same result through this meditation itself. Witness the Śruti passages: 'Through meditation or through rites' (Ś. X. iv. 3. 9), and 'This (meditation on the vital force) certainly wins the world' (I. iii. 28).

[1] *The being identified with the sum total of all minds.*

Objection : This meditation is just a part of the rite.

Reply : No, for the following Śruti passage allows option: 'He who performs the horse sacrifice, or who knows it as such' (Tai. S. V. iii. 12. 2). Since it occurs in a context dealing with knowledge, and since we see the same kind of meditation based on resemblance being applied to other rites[1] also, we understand that meditation will produce the same result. Of all rites the greatest is the horse sacrifice, for it leads to identity with Hiraṇyagarbha in his collective and individual aspects. And its mention here at the very beginning of this treatise on the knowledge of Brahman is an indication that all rites fall within the domain of relative existence. It will be shown later on that the result of this meditation is identification with Hunger or Death.

Objection : But the regular (Nitya) rites are not productive of relative results.

Reply : Not so, for the Śruti sums up the results of all rites together. Every rite is connected with the wife. In the passage, 'Let me have a wife. . . . . . This much indeed is desire' (I. iv. 17), it is shown that all action is naturally prompted by desire, and that the results achieved through a son, through rites and through meditation are this world, the world of the Manes and that of the gods respectively (I. v. 16), and the conclusion arrived at will be that everything consists of the three kinds of food: 'This (universe) indeed consists of three things: name, form and

[1] As in the passage, 'This world, O Gautama, is fire' (VI. ii. 11).

action' (I. vi. 1). The manifested result of all action is nothing but the relative universe. It is these three which were in an undifferentiated state before manifestation. That again is manifested owing to the resultant of the actions of all beings, as a tree comes out of the seed. This differentiated and undifferentiated universe, consisting of the gross[1] and subtle worlds and their essence, falls within the category of ignorance, and has been superimposed by it on the Self as action, its factors and its results as if they were Its own form. Although the Self is different from them, has nothing to do with name, form and action, is one without a second and is eternal, pure, enlightened and free by nature, yet It appears as just the reverse of this, as consisting of differences of action, its factors and its results, and so on. Therefore for the removal of ignorance, the seed of defects such as desire and of action—like the removal of the idea of a snake from a rope—with regard to a man who is disgusted with this universe of means and ends, consisting of actions, their factors and their results—having realised that they are just so much, the knowledge of Brahman is being set forth.

The first two sections beginning with, 'The head of the sacrificial horse is the dawn,' will be devoted to the meditation regarding the horse sacrifice. The meditation about the horse is described, as the horse is the most important thing in this sacrifice. Its importance is indicated by the fact that the sacrifice is named

[1] Earth, water and fire are the gross world, and air and the ether the subtle world. Their essence is the simple form of each, before its combination with the other four elements.

after it, and its presiding deity is Prajāpati (Hiraṇya-garbha).

ॐ । उषा वा अश्वस्य मेध्यस्य शिरः । सूर्यश्चक्षुः, वातः प्राणः, व्यात्तमग्निर्वैश्वानरः, संवत्सर आत्माश्वस्य मेध्यस्य । द्यौः पृष्ठम्, अन्तरिक्षमुदरम्, पृथिवी पाजस्यम्, दिशः पार्श्वे, अवान्तरदिशः पर्शवः, ऋतवोऽङ्गानि, मासाश्चार्धमासाश्च पर्वाणि, अहोरात्राणि प्रतिष्ठाः, नक्षत्राण्यस्थीनि, नभो मांसानि । ऊवध्यं सिकताः, सिन्धवो गुदाः, यकृच्च क्लोमानश्च पर्वताः, ओषधयश्च वनस्पतयश्च लोमानि, उद्यन् पूर्वार्धः निम्लोचञ्जघनार्धः, यद्विजृम्भते तद्विद्योतते, यद्विधूनुते तत्स्तनयति, यन्मेहति तद्वर्षति, वागेवास्य वाक् ॥ १ ॥

1. Om. The head of the sacrificial horse is the dawn, its eye the sun, its vital force[1] the air, its open mouth the fire called Vaiśvānara, and the body of the sacrificial horse is the year. Its back is heaven, its belly the sky, its hoof the earth, its sides the four quarters, its ribs the intermediate quarters, its members the seasons, its joints the months and fortnights, its feet the days and nights, its bones the stars and its flesh the clouds. Its half-digested food is the sand, its blood-vessels the rivers, its liver and spleen the mountains, its hairs the herbs and trees. Its forepart is the ascending sun, its hind part the descending sun, its yawning is lightning, its

[1] Represented by the breath.

shaking the body is thundering, its making water is raining, and its neighing is voice.

The head of the sacrificial horse, i.e. one fit for a sacrifice, *is the dawn,* a period of about three quarters of an hour just before sunrise. The particle 'vai' recalls something well-known, here, the time of dawn. The similarity is due to the importance of each. The head is the most important part of the body (and so is the dawn of the day). The horse which is a part of the sacrifice has to be purified ; hence its head and other parts of its body are to be looked upon as certain divisions of time etc. (and not *vice versa*). And it will be raised to the status of Prajāpati by being meditated upon as such. In other words, the horse will be deified into Prajāpati if the ideas of time, worlds and deities be superimposed on it, for Prajāpati comprises these. It is like converting an image etc. into the Lord Viṣṇu or any other deity. *Its eye the sun,* for it is next to the head (as the sun is next to, or rises just after the dawn), and has the sun for its presiding deity. *Its vital force the air,* because as the breath it is of the nature of air. *Its open mouth the fire called Vaiśvānara.* The word 'Vaiśvānara' specifies the fire. The mouth is fire, because that is its presiding deity. *The body of the sacrificial horse is the year* consisting of twelve or thirteen[1] months. The word 'Ātman' here means the body. The year is the body of the divisions of time ; and the body is called Ātman, as we see it in the Śruti passage, 'For the Ātman (trunk) is the centre of these limbs' (Tai. Ā. II.

[1] Including the intercalary month.

iii. 5). The repetition of the phrase 'of the sacrificial horse' is intended to show that it is to be connected with all the terms. *Its back is heaven,* because both are high. *Its belly the sky,* because both are hollow. *Its hoof the earth :* 'Pājasya' should be 'Pādasya' by the usual transmutation of letters, meaning a seat for the foot. *Its sides the four quarters,* for they are connected with the quarters. It may be objected that the sides being two and the quarters four in number, the parallel is wrong. The answer to it is that since the head of the horse can be in any direction, its two sides can easily come in contact with all the quarters. So it is all right. *Its ribs the intermediate quarters* such as the south-east. *Its members the seasons*: The latter, being parts of the year, are its limbs, which brings out the similarity. *Its joints the months and fortnights,* because both connect (the latter connect the parts of the year as joints do those of the body). *Its feet the days and nights.* The plural in the latter indicates that those[1] pertaining to Prajāpati, the gods, the Manes and men are all meant. 'Pratiṣṭhā literally means those by which one stands ; hence feet. The deity representing time stands on the days and nights, as the horse does on its feet. *Its bones the stars,* both being white. *Its flesh the clouds*: The word used in the text means the sky, but since this has been spoken of as the belly, here it denotes the clouds which float in it. They are flesh, because they shed water as the

[1] A month of ours makes a day and night of the Manes. A year of ours makes a day and night of the gods ; and twenty-four million years of the latter make a day and night of Prajāpati, equivalent to two Kalpas or cycles of ours.

flesh sheds blood. *Its half-digested food* in the stomach *is the sand,* because both consist of loose parts. *Its blood-vessels the rivers,* for both flow. The word in the text, being plural, denotes blood-vessels here. *Its liver and spleen the mountains,* both being hard and elevated. 'Yakṛt' and 'Kloman' are muscles below the heart on the right and left. The latter word, though always used in the plural, denotes a single thing. *Its hairs the herbs and trees :* These, being small and large plants respectively, should be applied to the short and long hairs according to fitness. *Its forepart,* from the navel onward, *is the ascending* (lit. 'rising') *sun,* up to noon. *Its hind part the descending* (lit. 'setting') *sun,* from noon on. The similarity consists in their being the anterior and posterior parts respectively in each case. *Its yawning* or stretching or jerking the limbs *is lightning,* because the one splits the cloud, and the other the mouth. *Its shaking the body is thundering,* both producing a sound. *Its making water is raining,* owing to the similarity of moistening. *And its neighing is voice* or sound—no fancying is needed here.

अहर्वा अश्वं पुरस्तान्महिमान्वजायत, तस्य पूर्वे समुद्रे योनिः ; रात्रिरेनं पश्चान्महिमान्वजायत, तस्यापरे समुद्रे योनिः ; एतौ वा अश्वं महिमानावभितः संबभूवतुः। हयो भूत्वा देवानवहत्, वाजी गन्धर्वान्, अर्वासुरान्, अश्वो मनुष्यान्; समुद्र एवास्य बन्धुः, समुद्रो योनिः ॥ २ ॥
इति प्रथमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

2. The (gold) vessel called Mahiman in front of the horse, which appeared about it (i.e. point-

ing it out), is the day. Its source is the eastern sea. The (silver) vessel called Mahiman behind the horse, which appeared about it, is the night. Its source is the western sea. These two vessels called Mahiman appeared on either side of the horse. As a Haya it carried the gods, as a Vājin the celestial minstrels, as an Arvan the Asuras, and as an Aśva men. The Supreme Self is its stable and the Supreme Self (or the sea) its source.

The vessel called Mahiman, etc. Two sacrificial vessels called Mahiman, made of gold and silver respectively, are placed before and behind[1] the horse. This is a meditation regarding them. The gold vessel is the day, because both are bright. How is it that the vessel *in front of the horse, which appeared about* (lit. 'after') *it, is the day?* Because the horse is Prajāpati. And it is Prajāpati consisting of the sun etc. who is pointed out by the vessel that we are required to look upon as the day.—The preposition 'anu' here does not mean 'after,' but points out something.—So the meaning is, the gold vessel (Mahiman) appeared pointing out the horse as Prajāpati, just as we say lightning flashes pointing out (Anu) the tree. *Its source,* the place from which the vessel is obtained, *is the eastern sea.* Literally translated, it would mean, 'is *in* the eastern sea,' but the locative case-ending should be changed into the

[1] That is, before and after the horse is killed.

nominative to give the required sense. Similarly *the* silver *vessel behind the horse, which appeared about it, is the night,* because both ('Rājata' and 'Rātri') begin with the same syllable (Rā),[1] or because both are inferior to the previous set. *Its source is the western sea.* The vessels are called Mahiman, because they indicate greatness. It is to the glory of the horse that a gold and a silver vessel are placed on each side of it. *These two vessels called Mahiman,* as described above, *appeared on either side of the horse.* The repetition of the sentence is to glorify the horse, as much as to say that for the above reasons it is a wonderful horse. The words *'As a Haya'* etc. are similarly eulogistic. 'Haya' comes from the root 'hi,' meaning, to move. Hence the word means 'possessing great speed.' Or it may mean a species of horse. *It carried the gods,* i.e. made them gods, since it was Prajāpati ; or literally carried them. It may be urged that this act of carrying is rather a reproach. But the answer is that carrying is natural to a horse ; so it is not derogatory. On the contrary, the act, by bringing the horse into contact with the gods, was a promotion for it. Hence the sentence is a eulogy. Similarly 'Vājin' and the other terms mean species of horses. *As a Vājin* it carried *the celestial minstrels ;* the ellipsis must be supplied with the intermediate words. Similarly *as an Arvan* (it carried) *the Asuras, and as an Aśva* (it carried) *men. The Supreme Self*—'Samudra' here means that—*is its stable,* the place

[1] Ānandagiri takes 'Varṇa' in the sense of colour or lustre, instead of syllable, in which case the night must be supposed to be a moon-lit one.

where it is tied. *And the Supreme Self its source,* the cause of its origin. Thus it has sprung from a pure source and lives in a pure spot. So it is a tribute to the horse. Or 'Samudra' may mean the familiar sea, for the Śruti says, 'The horse has its source in water' (Tai. S. II. iii. 12).

SECTION II

नैवेह किंचनाग्र आसीत्, मृत्युनैवेदमावृतमासीत्— अशनायया, अशनाया हि मृत्युः; तन्मनोऽकुरुत, आत्मन्वी स्यामिति। सोऽर्चन्नचरत्, तस्यार्चत आपोऽजायन्त; अर्चते वै मे कमभूदिति, तदेवार्कस्यार्कत्वम्; कं ह वा अस्मै भवति य एवमेतदर्कस्यार्कत्वं वेद ॥ १ ॥

1. There was nothing whatsoever here in the beginning. It was covered only by Death (Hiraṇyagarbha), or Hunger, for hunger is death. He created the mind, thinking, 'Let me have a mind.'[1] He moved about worshipping (himself). As he was worshipping, water was produced. (Since he thought), 'As I was worshipping, water sprang up,' therefore Arka (fire) is so called. Water (or happiness) surely comes to one who knows how Arka (fire) came to have this name of Arka.

Now the origin of the fire that is fit for use in the horse sacrifice is being described. This story of its

[1] The word used here is 'Ātman,' which among other things means the body, Manas, intellect, individual self and Supreme Self. The correct meaning at each place, as here, is to be determined from the context. The word occurs again in paragraph 4, where it means the body.

origin is meant as a eulogy in order to prescribe a meditation concerning it. *There was nothing whatsoever* differentiated by name and form *here,* in the universe, *in the beginning,* i.e. before the manifestation of the mind etc.

Question : Was it altogether void?

Nihilistic view : It must be so, for the Śruti says, 'There was nothing whatsoever here.' There was neither cause nor effect. Another reason for this conclusion is the fact of origin. A jar, for instance, is produced. Hence before its origin it must have been non-existent.

The logician objects : But the cause cannot be non-existent, for we see the lump of clay, for instance (before the jar is produced). What is not perceived may well be non-existent, as is the case with the effect here. But not so with regard to the cause, for it is perceived.

The nihilist : No, for before the origin nothing is perceived. If the non-perception of a thing be the ground of its non-existence, before the origin of the whole universe neither cause nor effect is perceived. Hence everything must have been non-existent.

Vedāntin's reply : Not so, for the Śruti says, '*It was covered only by Death.*' Had there been absolutely nothing either to cover or to be covered, the Śruti would not have said, 'It was covered by Death.' For it never happens that a barren woman's son is covered with flowers springing from the sky. Yet the Śruti says, 'It was covered only by Death.' Therefore on the authority of the Śruti we conclude that the

cause which covered, and the effect which was covered, were both existent before the origin of the universe. Inference also points to this conclusion. We can infer the existence of the cause and effect[1] before creation. We observe that a positive effect which is produced takes place only when there is a cause and does not take place when there is no cause. From this we infer that the cause of the universe too must have existed before creation, as is the case with the cause of a jar, for instance.

Objection : The cause of a jar also does not pre-exist, for the jar is not produced without destroying the lump of clay. And so with other things.

Reply : Not so, for the clay (or other material) is the cause. The clay is the cause of the jar, and the gold of the necklace, and not the particular lump-like form of the material, for they exist without it. We see that effects such as the jar and the necklace are produced simply when their materials, clay and gold, are present, although the lump-like form may be absent. Therefore this particular form is not the cause of the jar and the necklace. But when the clay and the gold are absent, the jar and the necklace are not produced, which shows that these materials, clay and gold, are the cause, and not the roundish form. Whenever a cause produces an effect, it does so by destroying another effect it produced just before, for the same cause cannot produce more than one effect at a time. But the cause, by destroying the previous effect, does not destroy itself. Therefore the fact that

[1] These will be taken up one by one.

an effect is produced by destroying the previous effect, the lump, for instance, is not a valid reason to disprove that the cause exists before the effect is produced.

Objection : It is not correct, for the clay etc. cannot exist apart from the lump and so on. In other words, you cannot say that the cause, the clay, for example, is not destroyed when its previous effect, the lump or any other form, is destroyed, but that it passes on to some other effect such as the jar. For the cause, the clay or the like, is not perceived apart from the lump or jar, and so on.

Reply : Not so, for we see those causes, the clay etc., persist when the jar and other things have been produced, and the lump or any other form has gone.

Objection : The persistence noticed is due to similarity, not to actual persistence of the cause.

Reply : No. Since the particles of clay or other material which belonged to the lump etc. are perceptible in the jar and other things, it is unreasonable to imagine similarity through a pseudo-inference. Nor is inference valid when it contradicts perception, for it depends on the latter, and the contrary view will result in a general disbelief. That is to say, if everything perceived as 'This is that' is momentary, then the notion of 'that' would depend on another notion regarding something else, and so on, thus leading to a *regressus in infinitum ;* and the notion of 'This is like that' being also falsified thereby, there would be no certainty anywhere. Besides the two notions of 'this' and 'that' cannot be connected, since there is no abiding subject.

Objection: They would be connected through the similarity between them.

Reply: No, for the notions of 'this' and 'that' cannot be the object of each other's perception, and (since according to you there is no abiding subject like the Self), there would be no perception of similarity.

Objection: Although there is no similarity, there is the notion of it.

Reply: Then the notions of 'this' and 'that' would also, like the notion of similarity, be based on nonentities.

Objection (by the Yogācāra school): Let all notions be based on nonentities. (What is the harm?)

Reply: Then your view that everything is an idea would also be based on a nonentity.

Objection (by the nihilist): Let it be.

Reply. If all notions are false, your view that all notions are unreal cannot be established. Therefore it is wrong to say that recognition takes place through similarity. Hence it is proved that the cause exists before the effect is produced.

The effect too exists before it is produced.

Question: How?

Reply: Because its manifestation points out its pre-existence. Manifestation means coming within the range of perception. It is a common occurrence that a thing, a jar for instance, which was hidden by darkness or any other thing and comes within the range of perception when the obstruction is removed by the appearance of light or in some other way, does

not preclude its previous existence. Similarly this universe too, we can understand, existed before its manifestation. For a jar that is non-existent is not perceived even when the sun rises.

Objection: No, it must be perceived, for you deny its previous non-existence. According to you, any effect, say a jar, is never non-existent. So it must be perceived when the sun rises. Its previous form, the lump of clay, is nowhere near, and obstructions like darkness are absent; so, being existent, it cannot but appear.

Reply: Not so, for obstruction is of two kinds. Every effect such as a jar has two kinds of obstruction. When it has become manifest from its component clay, darkness and the wall etc. are the obstructions; while before its manifestations from the clay the obstruction consists in the particles of clay remaining as some other effect such as a lump. Therefore the effect, the jar, although existent, is not perceived before its manifestation, as it is hidden. The terms and concepts 'destroyed,' 'produced,' 'existence' and 'non-existence' depend on this twofold character of manifestation and disappearance.

Objection: This is incorrect, since the obstructions represented by particular forms such as the lump or the two halves of a jar are of a different nature. To be explicit: Such obstructions to the manifestation of a jar as darkness or the wall, we see, do not occupy the same space as the jar, but the lump or the two halves of a jar do. So your statement that the jar, although present in the form of the lump or the two

halves, is not perceived because it is hidden, is wrong, for the nature of the obstruction in this case is different.

Reply : No, for we see that water mixed with milk occupies the same space as the milk which conceals it.

Objection : But since the component parts of a jar such as its two halves or pieces are included in the effect, the jar, they should not prove obstructions at all.

Reply : Not so, for being separated from the jar they are so many different effects, and can therefore serve as obstructions.

Objection : Then the effort should be directed solely to the removal of the obstructions. That is to say, if, as you say, the effect, the jar for instance, is actually present in the state of the lump or the two halves, and is not perceived because of an obstruction, then one who wants that effect, the jar, should try to remove the obstruction, and not make the jar. But as a matter of fact, nobody does so. Therefore your statement is wrong.

Reply : No, for there is no hard and fast rule about it. It is not always the case that a jar or any other effect manifests itself if only one tries to remove the obstruction ; for when a jar, for instance, is covered *with darkness etc., one tries to light a lamp.*

Objection : That too is just for destroying the darkness. This effort to light a lamp is also for removing the darkness, which done, the jar is automatically perceived. Nothing is added to the jar.

Reply: No, for the jar is perceived as covered with light when the lamp is lighted. Not so before the lighting of the lamp. Hence this was not simply for removing the darkness, but for covering the jar with light, for it is since perceived as covered with light. Sometimes the effort is directed to the removal of the obstruction, as when the wall, for instance, is pulled down. Therefore it cannot be laid down as a rule that one who wants the manifestation of something must simply try to remove the obstruction. Besides, one should take such steps as will cause the manifestation for the efficacy of the established practice regarding it. We have already said that an effect which is patent in the cause serves as an obstruction to the manifestation of other effects. So if one tries only to destroy the previously manifested effect such as the lump or the two halves which stand between it and the jar, one may also have such effects as the potsherds or tiny pieces. These too will conceal the jar and prevent its being perceived; so a fresh attempt will be needed. Hence the necessary operation of the factors of an action has its utility for one who wants the manifestation of a jar or any other thing. Therefore the effect exists even before its manifestation.

From our divergent notions of the past and future also we infer this. Our notions of a jar that was and one that is yet to be cannot, like the notion of the present jar, be entirely independent of objects. For one who desires to have a jar not yet made sets oneself to work for it. We do not see people strive for things which they know to be non-existent. Another reason

for the pre-existence of the effect is the fact that the knowledge of (God and) the Yogins concerning the past and future jar is infallible. Were the future jar non-existent, His (and their) perception of it would prove false. Nor is this perception a mere figure of speech. As to the reasons for inferring the existence of the jar, we have already stated them.

Another reason for it is that the opposite view involves a self-contradiction. If on seeing a potter, for instance, at work on the production of a jar one is certain in view of the evidence that the jar will come into existence, then it would be a contradiction in terms to say that the jar is non-existent at the very time with which, it is said, it will come into relation. For to say that the jar that will be is non-existent, is the same thing as to say that it will not be. It would be like saying, 'This jar does not exist.' If, however, you say that before its manifestation the jar is non-existent, meaning thereby that it does not exist exactly as the potter, for instance, exists while he is at work on its production (i.e. as a ready-made jar), then there is no dispute between us.

Objection : Why?

Reply : Because the jar exists in its own future (potential) form. It should be borne in mind that the present existence of the lump or the two halves is not the same as that of the jar. Nor is the future existence of the jar the same as theirs. Therefore you do not contradict us when you say that the jar is non-existent before its manifestation while the activity of the potter, for instance, is going on. You will be

doing this if you deny to the jar its own future form as an effect. But you do not deny that. Nor do all things undergoing modification have an identical form of existence in the present or in the future.

Moreover, of the four kinds[1] of negation relating to, say, a jar, we observe that what is called mutual exclusion is other than the jar: The negation of a jar is a cloth or some other thing, not the jar itself. But the cloth, although it is the negation of a jar, is not a nonentity, but a positive entity. Similarly the previous non-existence, the non-existence due to destruction, and absolute negation must also be other than the jar; for they are spoken of in terms of it, as in the case of the mutual exclusion relating to it. And these negations must also (like the cloth, for instance) be positive entities. Hence the previous non-existence of a jar does not mean that it does not at all exist as an entity before it comes into being. If, however, you say that the previous non-existence of a jar means the jar itself, then to mention it as being '*of* a jar' (instead of as 'the jar itself') is an incongruity. If you use it merely as a fancy, as in the expression, 'The body of the stone roller,'[2] then the phrase 'the previous non-existence of a jar' would only mean that it is the imaginary non-existence that is mentioned in terms of the jar, and not the jar itself. If, on the other hand, you say that

[1] Mutual exclusion, between things of different classes, as, 'A jar is not cloth'; previous non-existence, as of a jar before it is made; the non-existence pertaining to destruction, as of a jar when it is broken; and absolute negation, as, 'There is no jar.'

[2] The stone roller has no body, it *is* the body.

the negation of a jar is something other than it, we have already answered the point. Moreover, if the jar before its manifestation be an absolute nonentity like the proverbial horns of a hare, it cannot be connected either with its cause or with existence (as the logicians hold), for connection requires two positive entities.

Objection : It is all right with things that are inseparable.

Reply : No, for we cannot conceive of an inseparable connection between an existent and a non-existent thing. Separable or inseparable connection is possible between two positive entities only, not between an entity and a nonentity, nor between two nonentities. Therefore we conclude that the effect does exist before it is manifested.

By what sort of Death was the universe covered? This is being answered: By *Hunger,* or the desire to eat, which is a characteristic of death. How is hunger death? The answer is being given: *For hunger is death.* The particle 'hi' indicates a well-known reason. He who desires to eat kills animals immediately after. Therefore 'hunger' refers to death. Hence the use of the expression. 'Death' here means Hiraṇyagarbha as identified with the intellect, because hunger is an attribute of that which is so identified. This effect, the universe, was covered by that Death, just as a jar etc. would be covered by clay in the form of a lump. *He created the mind.* The word 'Tat' (that) refers to the mind. That Death of whom we are talking, intending to project the effects which will be presently mentioned, created the inner organ called mind, characterised by deliberation etc. and possessing the power to reflect on

those effects. What was his object in creating the mind? This is being stated: *Thinking, 'Let me have a mind*—through this mind (Ātman) let me be possessed of a mind.' This was his object. *He,* Prajāpati, being possessed of a mind after it was manifested, *moved about worshipping* himself, thinking he was blessed. *As he was worshipping, water,* an all-liquid substance forming an accessory of the worship, *was produced.* Here we must supply the words, 'After the manifestation of the ether, air and fire,' for another Śruti (Tai. II. i. I) says so, and there can be no alternative in the order of manifestation. Since Death thought, *'As I was worshipping, water sprang up,' therefore Arka,* the fire that is fit for use in the horse sacrifice, *is so called.* This is the derivation of the name 'Arka' given to fire. It is a descriptive epithet of fire derived from the performance of worship leading to happiness, and the connection with water. *Water* or happiness *surely comes to one who knows*[1] *how Arka* (fire) *came to have this name of Arka.* This is due to the similarity of names. The particles 'ha' and 'vai' are intensive.

आपो वा अर्कः ; तद्यदपां शर आसीत्तत्समहन्यत । सा पृथिव्यभवत् ; तस्यामश्राम्यत् ; तस्य श्रान्तस्य तप्तस्य तेजो रसो निरवर्तताग्निः ॥ २ ॥

2. Water is Arka. What was there (like) froth on the water was solidified and became this earth. When that was produced, he was tired.

[1] Meditates on the fact till one becomes identified with the idea. So also elsewhere. See pp. 65, 80, 90, etc.

While he was (thus) tired and distressed, his essence, or lustre, came forth. This was Fire.

What is this Arka? *Water,* that accessory of worship, *is Arka,* being the cause of fire. For, it is said, fire rests on water. Water is not directly Arka, for the topic under discussion is not water, but fire. It will be said later on, 'This fire is Arka' (I. ii. 7). *What was there* like *froth on the water,* like the coagulated state of curds, *was solidified,* being subjected to heat internally and externally. Or the word 'Śara' may be the nominative (instead of a complement), if we change the gender of the pronoun 'Yad' (that). That solid thing *became this earth.* That is to say, out of that water came the embryonic state of the universe, compared to an egg. *When that* earth *was produced, he,* Death or Prajāpati, *was tired.* For everyone is tired after work, and the projection of the earth was a great feat of Prajāpati. What happened to him then? *While he was* (thus) *tired and distressed, his essence, or lustre, came forth* from his body. What was that? *This was Fire,* the first-born Virāj,[1] also called Prajāpati, who sprang up within that cosmic egg, possessed of a body and organs. As the Smṛti says, 'He is the first embodied being' (Śi. V. i. 8. 22).

स त्रेधात्मानं व्यकुरुत, आदित्यं तृतीयम्, वायुं तृतीयम्; स एष प्राणस्त्रेधा विहितः। तस्य प्राची दिक् शिरः, असौ चासौ चेर्मौ। अथास्य प्रतीची दिक् पुच्छम्, असौ चासौ च सक्थ्यौ, दक्षिणा चोदीची च पार्श्वे, द्यौः

[1] The being identified with the sum total of all bodies.

पृष्ठम्, अन्तरिक्षमुदरम्; इयमुरः, स एषोऽप्सु प्रतिष्ठितः; यत्र क्व चैति तदेव प्रतितिष्ठत्येवं विद्वान् ॥ ३ ॥

3. He (Virāj) differentiated himself in three ways, making the sun the third form, and air the third form. So this Prāṇa (Virāj) is divided in three ways. His head is the east, and his arms that (north-east) and that (south-east). And his hind part is the west, his hip-bones that (north-west) and that (south-west), his sides the south and north, his back heaven, his belly the sky, and his breast this earth. He rests on water. He who knows (it) thus gets a resting place wherever he goes.

He, the Virāj who was born, himself *differentiated* or divided *himself,* his body and organs, *in three ways.* How? *Making the sun the third form,* in respect of fire and air. The verb 'made' must be supplied. *And air the third form,* in respect of fire and the sun. Similarly we must understand, 'Making fire the third form,' in respect of air and the sun, for this also can equally make up the number three. *So this Prāṇa* (Virāj), although the self, as it were, of all beings, *is* specially *divided* by himself as Death *in three ways* as fire, air and the sun, without, however, destroying his own form of Virāj. Now the meditation on this Fire, the first-born Virāj, the Arka fit for use in the horse sacrifice and kindled in it, is being described, like that on the horse. We have already said that the previous account of its origin is all for its eulogy, indicating

that it is of such pure birth. *His head is the east,* both being the most important. *And his arms that and that,* the north-east and south-east. The word Irma' (arm) is derived from the root 'ir,' meaning motion. *And his hind part is the west,* because it points to that direction when he faces the east. *His hip-bones that and that,* the north-west and south-west, both forming angles with the back. *His sides the south and north,* both being so related to the east and west. *His back heaven, his belly the sky,* as in the case of the horse. *And his breast this earth,* both being underneath. *He,* this fire consisting of the worlds, or Prajāpati, *rests on water,* for the Śruti says, 'Thus do these worlds lie in water.' (Ś. X. v. 4. 3). *He gets a resting place wherever he goes.* Who? *Who knows* that fire rests on water, *thus,* as described here. This is a subsidiary result.[1]

सोऽकामयत, द्वितीयो म आत्मा जायेतेति ; स मनसा वाचं मिथुनं समभवदशनाया मृत्युः ; तद्यद्रेत आसीत्स संवत्सरोऽभवत् । न ह पुरा ततः संवत्सर आस ; तमेतावन्तं कालमबिभः, यावान्संवत्सरः ; तमेतावतः कालस्य परस्तादसृजत । तं जातमभिव्याददात् ; स भाणकरोत्, सैव वागभवत् ॥ ४ ॥

4. He desired, 'Let me have a second form[2] (body).' He, Death or Hunger, brought about

[1] The main result will be stated in paragraph 7.

[2] The word used is Ātman. It is translated as 'form' for convenience. See footnote on p. 15.

the union of speech (the Vedas) with the mind. What was the seed there became the Year (Virāj). Before him there had been no year. He (Death) reared him for as long as a year, and after this period projected him. When he was born, (Death) opened his mouth (to swallow him). He (the babe) cried 'Bhāṇ!' That became speech.

It has been stated that Death, in the order of water and the rest, manifested himself in the cosmic egg as the Virāj or Fire possessed of a body and organs, and divided himself in three ways. Now by what process did he manifest himself? This is being answered: *He,* Death, *desired, 'Let me have a second form* or body, through which I may become embodied.' Having desired thus, *he brought about the union of speech,* or the Vedas, *with the mind* that had already appeared. In other words, he reflected on the Vedas, that is, the order of creation enjoined in them, with his mind. Who did it? *Death* characterised by *hunger.* It has been said that hunger is death. The text refers to him lest someone else (Virāj) be understood. *What was the seed,* the cause of the origin of Virāj, the first embodied being, viz. the knowledge and resultant of work accumulated in past lives, which Death visualised in his reflection on the Vedas, *there,* in that union, *became the Year,* the Prajāpati of that name who makes the year. Death (Hiraṇyagarbha), absorbed in these thoughts, projected water, entered it as the seed and, transformed into the embryo, the cosmic egg, became

the year. *Before him,* the Virāj who makes the year, *there had been no year,* no period of that name. Death *reared him,* this Virāj who was in embryo, *for as long as a year,* the well-known duration of time among us, i.e. for a year. What did he do after that? *And after this period,* i.e. a year, *projected him,* i.e. broke the egg. *When he,* the babe, Fire, the first embodied being, *was born,* Death *opened his mouth* to swallow him, because he was hungry. *He,* the babe, being frightened, as he was possessed of natural ignorance, *cried 'Bhāṇ'*—made this sound. *That became speech* or word.

स ऐक्षत, यदि वा इममभिमंस्ये, कनीयोऽन्नं करिष्य इति ; स तया वाचा तेनात्मनेदं सर्वमसृजत यदिदं किंच—ऋचो यजूंषि सामानि छन्दांसि यज्ञान् प्रजाः पशून्। स यद्यदेवासृजत तत्तदत्तुमध्रियत ; सर्वं वा अत्तीति तददितेर-दितित्वम् ; सर्वस्यैतस्यात्ता भवति, सर्वमस्यान्नं भवति, य एवमेतददितेरदितित्वं वेद ॥ ५ ॥

5. He thought, 'If I kill him, I shall be making very little food.' Through that speech and that mind he projected all this, whatever there is—the Vedas Ṛc, Yajus and Sāman, the metres, the sacrifices, men and animals. Whatever he projected, he resolved to eat. Because he eats everything, therefore Aditi (Death) is so called. He who knows how Aditi came to have

this name of Aditi, becomes the eater of all this, and everything becomes his food.

Seeing the babe frightened and crying, *he,* Death, *thought,* although he was hungry, *'If I kill him,* this babe, *I shall be making very little food.'*—The root 'man' with the prefix 'abhi' means to injure or kill.—Thinking thus he desisted from eating him, for he must make not a little food, but a great quantity of it, so that he might eat it for a long time ; and if he ate the babe, he would make very little food as there is no crop if the seeds are eaten up. Thinking of the large quantity of food necessary for his purpose, *through that speech,* the Vedas already mentioned, *and that mind,* uniting them, that is, reflecting on the Vedas again and again, *he projected all this,* the movable and immovable (animals, plants, etc. etc.), *whatever there is.* What is it? *The Vedas Ṛc, Yajus and Sāman, the* seven *metres,* viz. Gāyatrī and the rest, i.e. the three kinds of Mantras (sacred formulæ) forming part of a ceremony, viz. the hymns (Stotra), the praises (Śastra)[1] and the rest, composed in Gāyatrī and other metres, *the sacrifices,* which are performed with the help of those Mantras, *men,* who perform these, *and animals,* domestic and wild, which are a part of the rites.

Objection : It has already been said that Death

[1] The hymns are Rces that are sung by one class of priests, the Udgātṛ etc. The Śastras are those very hymns, but only recited by another class of priests, the Hotṛ etc., not sung. There are other Ṛces too, which are used in a different way by a third class of priests, the Adhvaryu etc., in the sacrifices. These are the third group of Mantras.

projected Virāj through the union of speech (the Vedas) with the mind. So how can it now be said that he projected the Vedas?

Reply : It is all right, for the previous union of the mind was with the Vedas in an unmanifested state, whereas the creation spoken of here is the manifestation of the already existing Vedas so that they may be applied to the ceremonies. Understanding that now the food had increased, *whatever he,* Prajāpati, *projected,* whether it was action, its means or its results, *he resolved to eat. Because he eats everything, therefore Aditi* or Death *is so called.* So the Śruti says, 'Aditi is heaven, Aditi is the sky, Aditi is the mother, and he is the father,' etc. (Ṛ. I. lix. 10). *He who knows how Aditi,* Prajāpati or Death, *came to have this name of Aditi,* because of eating everything, *becomes the eater of all this* universe, which becomes his food—that is, as identified with the universe, otherwise it would involve a contradiction ; for nobody, we see, is the sole eater of everything. Therefore the meaning is that he becomes identified with everything. *And* for this very reason *everything becomes his food,* for it stands to reason that everything is the food of an eater who is identified with everything.

सोऽकामयत, भूयसा यज्ञेन भूयो यजेयेति। सोऽश्राम्यत्, स तपोऽतप्यत ; तस्य श्रान्तस्य तप्तस्य यशो वीर्यमुदक्रामत् । प्राणा वै यशो वीर्यम् ; तत्प्राणेषूत्क्रान्तेषु शरीरं श्वयितुमध्रियत ; तस्य शरीर एव मन आसीत् ॥ ६ ॥

6. He desired, 'Let me sacrifice again with the great sacrifice.' He was tired, and he was

distressed. While he was (thus) tired and distressed, his reputation and strength departed. The organs are reputation and strength. When the organs departed, the body began to swell, (but) his mind was set on the body.

He desired, etc. This and part of the next paragraph are introduced to give the derivation of the words 'Aśva' (horse) and 'Aśvamedha' (horse sacrifice). *'Let me sacrifice again with the great sacrifice.'* The word 'again' has reference to his performance in the previous life. Prajāpati had performed a horse sacrifice in his previous life, and was born at the beginning of the cycle imbued with those thoughts. Having been born as identified with the act of horse sacrifice, its factors and its results, he desired, 'Let me sacrifice again with the great sacrifice.' Having desired this great undertaking, *he was tired,* like other men, *and he was distressed. While he was* (thus) *tired and distressed*—these words have already been explained (in par. 2)—*his reputation and strength departed.* The Śruti itself explains the words: *The organs are reputation,* being the cause of it, for one is held in repute as long as the organs are in the body ; likewise, *strength* in the body. No one can be reputed or strong when the organs have left the body. Hence these are the reputation and strength in this body. So the reputation and strength consisting of the organs departed. *When the organs* forming reputation and strength *departed, the body* of Prajāpati *began to swell,* and became impure or unfit for a sacrifice. (But) although

Prajāpati had left it, *his mind was set on the body,* just as one longs for a favourite object even when one is away.

सोऽकामयत, मेध्यं म इदं स्यात्, आत्मन्व्यनेन स्यामिति। ततोऽश्वः समभवत्, यदश्वत्; तन्मेध्यमभूदिति, तदेवाश्वमेधस्याश्वमेधत्वम्। एष ह वा अश्वमेधं वेद य एनमेवं वेद। तमनवरुध्यैवामन्यत। तं संवत्सरस्य परस्तादात्मन आलभत। पशून्देवताभ्यः प्रत्यौहत्। तस्मात्सर्वदेवत्यं प्रोक्षितं प्राजापत्यमालभन्ते। एष ह वा अश्वमेधो य एष तपति, तस्य संवत्सर आत्मा; अयमग्निरर्कः, तस्येमे लोका आत्मानः। तावेतावर्काश्वमेधौ। सो पुनरेकैव देवता भवति मृत्युरेव; अप पुनर्मृत्युं जयति, नैनं मृत्युराप्नोति, मृत्युरस्यात्मा भवति, एतासां देवतानामेको भवति ॥ ७ ॥
इति द्वितीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥ ७ ॥

7. He desired, 'Let this body of mine be fit for a sacrifice, and let me be embodied through this,' (and entered it). Because that body swelled (Aśvat), therefore it came to be called Aśva (horse). And because it became fit for a sacrifice, therefore the horse sacrifice came to be known as Aśvamedha. He who knows it thus indeed knows the horse sacrifice. (Imagining himself as the horse and) letting it remain free, he reflected (on it). After a year he sacrificed it to himself, and dispatched the (other) animals to the gods. Therefore (priests to this day) sacrifice to Prajāpati the sanctified (horse) that is

dedicated to all the gods. He who shines yonder is the horse sacrifice; his body is the year. This fire is Arka; its limbs are these worlds. So these two (fire and the sun) are Arka and the horse sacrifice. These two again become the same god, Death. He (who knows thus) conquers further death, death cannot overtake him, it becomes his self, and he becomes one with these deities.

What did he (Hiraṇyagarbha) do with his mind attached to that body? *He desired.* How? *'Let this body of mine be fit for a sacrifice, and let me be embodied through this.'* And he entered it. *Because that body,* bereft in his absence of its reputation and strength, *swelled* (Aśvat), *therefore it came to be called Aśva* (horse). Hence Prajāpati[1] himself is named Aśva. This is a eulogy on the horse. *And because* on account of his entering it, the body, although it had become unfit for a sacrifice by having lost its reputation and strength, again *became fit for a sacrifice, therefore the horse sacrifice came to be known as Aśvamedha.* For a sacrifice consists of an action, its factors and its results. And that it is no other than Prajāpati is a tribute to the sacrifice.

The horse that is a factor of the sacrifice has been declared to be Prajāpati in the passage, 'The head of the sacrificial horse is the dawn,' etc. (I. i. 1). The present paragraph is introduced to enjoin a collective meditation on that sacrificial horse which is Prajāpati,

[1] Hiraṇyagarbha.

and the sacrificial fire which has already been described (as such)—viewing both as the result of the sacrifice. That this is the import of this section we understand from the fact that in the previous section no verb denoting an injunction has been used, and one such is necessary. The words, *He who knows it thus indeed knows the horse sacrifice,* mean: 'He only, and none else, knows the horse sacrifice, who knows the horse and the Arka or fire, described above, as possessed of the features, to be presently mentioned, which are here shown collectively.' Therefore one must know the horse sacrifice thus—this is the meaning. How? First the meditation on the animal is being described. Prajāpati, desiring to sacrifice again with the great sacrifice, imagined himself as the sacrificial animal, and *letting it,* the consecrated animal, *remain free* or unbridled, *reflected* (on it). *After a* complete *year he sacrificed it to himself,* i.e. as dedicated to Prajāpati (Hiraṇyagarbha), *and dispatched the* other *animals,* domestic and wild, *to the gods,* their respective deities. And because Prajāpati reflected like this, therefore others also should likewise fancy themselves, in the manner described above, as the sacrificial horse and meditate: 'While being sanctified (with the Mantras), I am dedicated to all the gods; but while being killed, I am dedicated to myself. The other animals, domestic and wild, are sacrificed to their respective deities, the other gods, who are but a part of myself.' *Therefore* priests to this day similarly *sacrifice to Prajāpati the sanctified* horse *that is dedicated to all the gods.*

He who shines yonder is the horse sacrifice. The sacrifice which is thus performed with the help of the animal is being directly represented as the result. Who is he? The sun who illumines the universe with his light. *His body,* the body of the sun, who is the result of the sacrifice, *is the year,* that period of time. The year is called his body, as it is made by him. Now, since the sun, as the horse sacrifice, is performed with the help of fire, (the latter also is the sun). Here the result of the sacrifice is being mentioned as the sacrifice itself: *This* terrestrial *fire is Arka,* the accessory of the sacrifice. *Its limbs,* the limbs of this Arka, the fire that is kindled at the sacrifice, *are these* three *worlds.* So it has been explained in the passage, 'His head is the east,' etc. (I. ii. 3). *So these two,* fire and the sun, *are Arka and the horse sacrifice,* as described above—the sacrifice and its result respectively. Arka, the terrestrial fire, is directly the sacrifice, which is a rite. Since the latter is performed with the help of fire, it is here represented as fire. And the result is achieved through the performance of the sacrifice. Hence it is represented as the sacrifice in the statement that the sun is the horse sacrifice. *These two,* fire and the sun, the means and the end, the sacrifice and its result, *again become the same god.* Who is it? *Death.* There was but one deity before, who later was divided into action, its means and its end. So it has been said, 'He differentiated himself in three ways' (I. ii. 3). And after the ceremony is over, he again becomes one deity, Death, the result of the ceremony. *He* who knows this one deity, horse

sacrifice or Death, as, 'I alone am Death, the horse sacrifice, and there is but one deity identical with myself and attainable through the horse and fire'—*conquers further death,* i.e. after dying once he is not born to die any more. Even though conquered, death may overtake him again. So it is said, *death cannot overtake him.* Why? Because *it becomes his self,* the self of one who knows thus. Further, being Death,[1] the result, *he becomes one with these deities.* This is the result such a knower attains.

[1] Hiraṇyagarbha. See Par. 1.

SECTION III

How is this section related to the preceding one? The highest result of rites combined with meditation has been indicated by a statement of the result of the horse sacrifice, viz. identity with Death or Hiraṇṇyagarbha. Now the present section, devoted to the Udgītha, is introduced in order to indicate the source of rites and meditation, which are the means of attaining identity with Death.

Objection : In the previous section the result of rites and meditation has been stated to be identity with Death. But here the result of rites and meditation on the Udgītha will be stated to be the transcendence of identity with death. Hence, the results being different, this section cannot be meant to indicate the source of the rites and meditation that have been dealt with in the previous section.

Reply : The objection does not hold, for the result of meditation on the Udgītha is identity with fire and the sun. In the previous section too this very result was mentioned, 'He becomes one with these deities' (I. ii. 7).

Objection : Do not such statements as, 'Having transcended death,' etc. (I. iii. 12-16) clash with what has been said before?

Reply : No, for here the transcendence is of the natural attachment to evil (not of Hiraṇyagarbha). What is this natural attachment to evil, called death? What is its source? By what means is it transcended?

And how?—these are the things which are sought to be explained by the following allegory:

द्वया ह प्राजापत्याः, देवाश्चासुराश्च । ततः कानीयसा एव देवाः, ज्यायसा असुराः ; त एषु लोकेष्वस्पर्धन्त ; ते ह देवा ऊचुः, हन्तासुरान्यज्ञ उद्गीथेनात्ययामेति ॥ १ ॥

1. There were two classes of Prajāpati's sons, the gods and the Asuras.[1] Naturally,[2] the gods were fewer, and the Asuras more in number. They vied with each other for (the mastery of) these worlds. The gods said, 'Now let us surpass the Asuras in (this) sacrifice through the Udgītha.'

There were two classes: 'Two' here means two classes. The particle 'ha' is an expletive referring to a past incident. It is here used to recall what happened in the past life of the present Prajāpati. *Of Prajāpati's sons,* in his past incarnation. Who are they? *The gods and the Asuras,* the organs, that of speech and the rest, of Prajāpati himself. How can they be the gods and Asuras? They become gods when they shine under the influence of thoughts and actions as taught by the scriptures. While those very organs become Asuras when they are influenced by their natural thoughts and actions, based only on perception and inference, and directed merely to visible (secular) ends. They are called Asuras, because they delight only in their own lives (Asu) or because they are other than

[1] For the story compare Chhāndogya Up. I. ii. 1-9.
[2] Lit. 'therefore.'

the gods (Sura). And because the Asuras are influenced by thoughts and actions directed to visible ends, therefore *the gods were fewer, and the Asuras more in number.*—The lengthened form of the two adjectives due to the addition of a vowel augment makes no change of meaning.—The organs, as we know, have a stronger tendency to thoughts and actions that are natural, than to those that are recommended by the scriptures, for the former serve visible ends. Hence the gods are fewer, for the tendency that is cultivated by the scriptures is rare ; it is attainable with great effort. *They,* the gods and the Asuras living in Prajāpati's body, *vied with each other for* (the mastery of) *these worlds,* which are attainable through thoughts and actions prompted by one's natural inclinations as well as those cultivated by the scriptures. The rivalry of the gods and the Asuras here means the emergence and subsidence of their respective tendencies. Sometimes the organs manifest the impressions of thoughts and actions cultivated by the scriptures ; and when this happens, the impressions, manifested by those very organs, of the thoughts and actions based on perception and inference, and producing visible results only—those tendencies characteristic of the Asuras—subside. That is the victory of the gods and the defeat of the Asuras. Sometimes the reverse happens. The characteristic tendencies of the gods are overpowered, and those of the Asuras emerge. That is the victory of the Asuras and the defeat of the gods. Accordingly, when the gods win, there is a preponderance of merit, and the result is elevation up to the status of Prajāpati. And when the Asuras triumph, demerit prevails, and

the result is degradation down to the level of stationary objects, while if there be a draw, it leads to human birth.

What did the gods do when, being fewer, they were overwhelmed by the Asuras who outnumbered them? *The gods,* being overwhelmed by the Asuras, *said* to one another, *'Now let us surpass the Asuras in* this *sacrifice,* Jyotiṣṭoma, *through the Udgītha,* that is, through identity with (the vital force), the chanter of this accessory of a sacrifice called the Udgītha. By overcoming the Asuras we shall realise our divinity as set forth in the scriptures.' This identity with the vital force is attained through meditation and rites. The rites consist of the repetition of Mantras that will be presently enjoined: 'These Mantras are to be repeated,' etc. (I. iii. 28). The meditation is what is being described.

Objection : This is a part of an injunction on the repetition of certain Mantras leading to the attainment of divinity, and is a mere eulogy ; it has nothing to do with meditation.

Reply : No, for there occur the words, 'He who knows thus.'

Objection : Since the text narrates an old story in this treatment of the Udgītha, it must be a part of an injunction on the latter.

Reply : No, for it is a different context. The Udgītha has been enjoined elsewhere (in the ceremonial portion), and this is a section on knowledge. Besides, the repetition of those Mantras for the attainment of identity with the gods is not an independent act, for it is to be practised (only) by one who medi-

tates on the vital force as described in this section, and this meditation on the vital force is represented as being independent. And a separate result is mentioned for it in the passage, 'This (meditation on the vital force) certainly wins the world' (I. iii. 28). Moreover, the vital force has been stated to be pure, and the organs impure. This implies that the vital force is enjoined as an object of meditation, for otherwise there would be no sense in calling it pure and the organs such as that of speech, mentioned along with it, impure, nor in extolling it, as is evident, by the condemnation of the organ of speech, etc. The same remarks apply to the enunciation of the result of meditation on it, '(That fire) having transcended death shines,' etc. (I. iii. 12). For the identification of the organ of speech etc. with fire and so on is the result of attaining oneness with the vital force.

Objection : Granted that the vital force is to be meditated upon, but it cannot possess the attributes of purity etc.

Reply : It must, for the Śruti says so.

Objection : No, for the vital force being an object of meditation, the attributes referred to may just be a eulogy.

Reply : Not so, for in scriptural, as in secular matters, correct understanding alone can lead to our well-being. In common life one who understands things correctly attains what is good or avoids what is evil—not if one understands things wrongly. Similarly here also one can attain well-being if only *one correctly understands the meaning of scriptural* passages, and not otherwise. Besides there is nothing

to disprove the truth of objects corresponding to notions conveyed by the words of the scriptures enjoining a meditation. Nor is there any exception in the Śrutis to meditation on the vital force as pure etc. Since that meditation, we see, is conducive to our well-being, we accept it as true. And we see that the opposite course leads to evil. We notice in life that one who misjudges things—takes a man, for instance, for a stump, or an enemy for a friend—comes to grief. Similarly, if the Self, God, the deities and so forth, of whom we hear from the scriptures, prove fictitious, then the scriptures, like secular things, would be a veritable source of evil ; but this is acceptable to neither of us. Therefore we conclude that the scriptures present, for purposes of meditation, the Self, God, the deities and so on, as real.

Objection : What you say is wrong, for the name and other things are represented as Brahman. That is to say, the name and other things are obviously not Brahman, but the scriptures, we find, ask us, in direct opposition to fact, to look upon them as Brahman, which is analogous to regarding a stump etc. as a man. Hence it is not correct to say that one attains well-being by understanding things as they are from the scriptures.

Reply : Not so, for the difference is obvious, as in the case of an image. You are wrong to say that the scriptures ask us, in the face of fact, to look upon the name and other things, which are not Brahman, as Brahman, analogous to regarding a stump etc. as a man.

Objection : How?

Reply : Because the scriptures enjoin meditation on the name etc. as Brahman for one who clearly knows that those things are different from Brahman ; it is like meditation on the image etc. as Viṣṇu. Just like the image etc., the name and other things are used merely as aids to meditation ; it is not meant that they *are* Brahman. So long as one does not know a stump as a stump, one mistakes it for a man. But meditation on the name etc. as Brahman is not of that erroneous nature.

Objection[1]. There is only that meditation on the name etc. as Brahman, but no Brahman. Regarding an image as Viṣṇu and other gods, and a Brāhmaṇa as the Manes and so forth belongs to the same category.

Reply : No, for we are advised to look upon the Ṛc (hymn) etc. as the earth and so on. Here we see only a superimposition on the Ṛc etc. of the notions of actually existing things such as the earth. Therefore on the analogy of that we conclude that viewing the name etc. as Brahman and so forth is based on actually existing Brahman and the rest. This also proves that viewing an image as Viṣṇu and other gods, and a Brāhmaṇa as the Manes and so forth, has a basis in reality. Moreover, a figurative sense depends on a primary one. Since the five fires, for instance, are only figuratively such, they imply the existence of the real fire. Similarly, since the name and other things

[1] By the Mīmāṁsaka.

are Brahman only in a figurative sense, they merely prove that Brahman in a real sense must exist.

Besides, matters pertaining to knowledge are akin to those pertaining to rites. That rites like the new and full moon sacrifices produce such and such results, and have to be performed in a certain definite way, with their parts following each other in a particular order, is a supersensuous matter beyond the range of our perception and inference, which we nevertheless understand as true solely from the words of the Vedas. Similarly it stands to reason that entities like the Supreme Self, God, the deities, etc., of which we learn, also from the words of the Vedas, as being characterised by the absence of grossness etc., being beyond hunger and the like, and so on, must be true, for they are equally supersensuous matters. There is no difference between texts relating to knowledge and those relating to rites as regards producing an impression. Nor is the impression conveyed by the Vedas regarding the Supreme Self and other such entities indefinite or contrary to fact.

Objection: Not so, for there is nothing to be done. To be explicit: The ritualistic passages mention an activity which, although relating to supersensuous matters, consist of three parts[1] to be performed. But in the knowledge of the Supreme Self, God, etc., there is no such activity to be performed. Hence it is not correct to say that both kinds of passages are alike.

Reply: Not so, for knowledge is of things that already exist. The activity to which you refer is real,

[1] What? Through what? And how?—denoting respectively the result, the means and the method of a rite.

not because it is to be performed, but because it is known through proper testimony (the Vedas). Nor is the notion concerning it real because it relates to something to be performed, but solely because it is conveyed by Vedic sentences. When a thing has been known to be true from the Vedas, a person will perform it, should it admit of being performed, but will not do it if it is not a thing to be done.

Objection : If it is not something to be done, then it will cease to have the support of Vedic testimony in the form of sentences. We do not understand how words in a sentence can be construed unless there is something to be done. But if there is something to be done, they are construed as bringing out that idea. A sentence is authoritative when it is devoted to an action—when it says that a certain thing is to be done through such and such means in a particular way. But hundreds of such words denoting the object, means and method would not make a sentence unless there is one or other of such terms as the following, 'Should do, should be done, is to be done, should become and should be.' Hence such entities as the Supreme Self and God have not the support of Vedic testimony in the form of sentences. And if they are denoted by Vedic words (instead of sentences), they become the objects of other means[1] of knowledge. Therefore this (the fact of Brahman being the import of the Vedas) is wrong.

Reply : Not so, for we find sentences like, 'There

[1] *Such as perception. Isolated words do not add to our knowledge, but only serve to call up the things they denote, if we happen to know them already.*

is Mt. Meru,[1] which is of four colours,' which relate to things other than an action. Nor has anyone, on hearing such sentences, the idea that Meru and the rest are something to be done. Similarly, in a sentence containing the verb 'to be,' what is there to prevent the construing of its words denoting the Supreme Self, God, etc., as substantives and their qualifying words?

Objection : This is not correct, for the knowledge of the Supreme Self etc. serves no useful purpose like that of Meru and so forth.

Reply : Not so, for the Śruti mentions such results as, 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest' (Tai. II. i. 1), and 'The knot of the heart (intellect) is broken,' etc. (Mu. II. ii. 8). We also find the cessation of ignorance and other evils which are the root of relative existence. Besides, since the knowledge of Brahman does not form part of anything else (e.g. an action), the results rehearsed about it cannot be a mere eulogy as in the case of the sacrificial ladle.[2]

Moreover, it is from the Vedas that we know that a forbidden act produces evil results; and it is not something to be done. A man who is about to do a forbidden act has (on recollecting that it is forbidden) nothing else to do except desisting from it. In fact,

[1] A fabulous mountain round which the sun and the planets are said to revolve. The directions east, west, etc., vary according to the relative position of the dwellers around this mountain, the east being that in which they see the sun rise. But the direction overhead is obviously constant to all of them.

[2] The passage, 'He whose ladle is made of Palāśa (Butea Frondosa) wood never hears an evil verse' (Tai. S. III. v. 7. 2), is a eulogy, because it is subsidiary to an enjoined rite.

prohibitions have just that end in view, viz. to create an idea that the acts in question must not be done. When a hungry man who has been chastened by a knowledge of prohibited acts comes across something not to be eaten in any way, such as Kalañja (the meat of an animal killed with a poisoned weapon), or food coming from a person under a curse, his first notion is that the food can be eaten, but it is checked by the recollection that it is a forbidden food, as one's first notion that one can drink from a mirage is checked by the knowledge of its true nature. When that natural erroneous notion is checked, the dangerous[1] impulse to eat that food is gone. That impulse, being due to an erroneous notion, automatically stops ; it does not require an additional effort to stop it. Therefore prohibitions have just the aim of communicating the real nature of a thing ; there is not the least connection of human activity with them. Similarly here also, the injunction on the true nature of the Supreme Self etc. cannot but have that one aim. And a man who has been chastened by that knowledge knows that his impulses due to an erroneous notion are fraught with danger, and those natural impulses automatically stop when their cause, the false notion, has been exploded by the recollection of the true nature of the Supreme Self and the like.

Objection : Granted that the dangerous impulse to eat Kalañja and the like may stop when the natural erroneous notion about their edibility has been removed by the recollection of their true nature as harm-

[1] From the spiritual standpoint. The physical danger is too patent to need a scriptural warning.

ful things ; but the tendency to do acts enjoined by the scriptures should not stop in that way, for they are not prohibited.

Reply : Not so, for both are due to erroneous notions and produce harmful effects. Just as the tendency to eat Kalañja etc. is due to a false notion and productive of harm, so is the tendency to do acts enjoined by the scriptures. Therefore, for a man who has a true knowledge of the Supreme Self, the tendency to do these acts, being equally due to a false notion and productive of harm, will naturally cease when that false notion has been removed by the knowledge of the Supreme Self.

Objection : Let it be so with regard to those acts (which are done for material ends), but the regular rites,[1] which are performed solely in obedience to the scriptures and produce no harmful effects, should on no account stop.

Reply : Not so, for they are enjoined on one who has defects such as ignorance, attachment and aversion. As the rites with material ends (Kāmya), such as the new and full moon sacrifices are enjoined on one who has the defect of desiring heaven etc., so are the regular rites enjoined on one who has the root of all evils, ignorance etc., and the consequent defects of attachment and aversion, manifesting themselves as the quest of what is good and the avoidance of what is evil, etc., and who being equally prompted by these

[1] There are three kinds of actions, viz. the regular (Nitya), the occasional (Naimittika) and those done for material ends (Kāmya). Of these, the first two are obligatory and the third optional.

tries to seek good and avoid evil; they are not performed solely in obedience to the scriptures. Nor are rites such as the Agnihotra, the new and full moon sacrifices, Cāturmāsya, Paśubandha and Somayāga intrinsically either rites with material ends or regular rites. They come under the former category only because the man who performs them has the defect of desiring heaven and so forth. Similarly the regular rites performed by a man who has the defects of ignorance etc., and who out of natural promptings seeks to attain what is good and avoid what is evil, are intended for that purpose alone, for they are enjoined on him. On one who knows the true nature of the Supreme Self, we do not find any other work enjoined except what leads to the cessation of activities. For Self-knowledge is inculcated through the obliteration of the very cause of rites, viz. the consciousness of all its means such as the gods. And one whose consciousness of action, its factors and so forth has been obliterated cannot presumably have the tendency to perform rites, for this presupposes a knowledge of specific actions, their means and so on. One who thinks that he is Brahman unlimited by space, time, etc., and not-gross and so on, has certainly no room for the performance of rites.

Objection : He may, as he has for the inclination to eat and so on.

Reply : No, for the inclination to eat and so on is solely due to the defects of ignorance etc., and are not supposed to be compulsory. But the regular rites cannot be uncertain like that ; they cannot be sometimes done and sometimes omitted (according to one's whim). Acts like eating, however, may be irregular,

as they are solely due to one's defects, and these have no fixed time for appearing or disappearing, like desires for rites with material ends. But the regular rites, although they are due to defects, cannot be uncertain, for they depend on specific times etc. prescribed by the scriptures, just as the Kāmya Agnihotra (which is a rite with material ends) depends on such conditions as the morning and evening, because it is enjoined by the scriptures.

Objection : As the inclination to eat etc. (although due to defects) is regulated by the scriptures, so the restrictions about that Agnihotra too may apply to the sage.

Reply : No, for restrictions are not action, nor are they incentives to action. Hence they are not obstacles to the attainment of knowledge (even by an aspirant). Therefore the Vedic dicta inculcating the true nature of the Supreme Self, because they remove the erroneous notions about Its being gross, dual and so on, automatically assume the character of prohibitions of all action, for both imply a cessation of the tendency to action. As is the case with prohibited acts (such as the eating of forbidden food). Hence we conclude that like the prohibitions, the Vedas delineate the nature of realities and have that ultimate aim.

ते ह वाचमूचुः, त्वं न उद्गायेति ; तथेति, तेभ्यो वागुद्गायत् । यो वाचि भोगस्तं देवेभ्य आगायत्, यत्कल्याणं वदति तदात्मने । ते विदुरनेन वै न उद्गात्रात्येष्यन्तीति, तमभिद्रुत्य पाप्मनाविध्यन् ; स यः स पाप्मा, यदेवेदमप्रतिरूपं वदति स एव स पाप्मा ॥ २ ॥

2. They said to the organ[1] of speech, 'Chant (the Udgītha) for us.' 'All right,' said the organ of speech and chanted for them. The common good that comes of the organ of speech, it secured for the gods by chanting, while the fine speaking it utilised for itself. The Asuras knew that through this chanter the gods would surpass them. They charged it and struck it with evil. That evil is what we come across when one speaks improper things.

They, the gods, after deciding thus, *said to the organ of speech*, i.e. the deity identified with the organ, '*Chant* (the Udgītha), or perform the function of the priest called Udgātṛ, *for us*.' That is, they thought that this function belonged to the deity of the organ of speech, and that it was the deity referred to by the Mantra for repetition, 'From evil lead me to good' (I. iii. 28). Here the organ of speech and the rest are spoken of as the agents of meditation and work. Why? Because in reality all our activities in the field of meditation and work are done by them and belong to them. That they are not done by the Self will be stated at length in the fourth chapter, in the passage, 'It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were,' etc. (IV. iii. 7). Here too, at the end of the chapter it will be concluded that the whole universe of action, its factors and its results, beginning with the Undifferentiated, comes within the category of ignorance: 'This (universe) indeed consists of these three: name, form

[1] In this and the succeeding paragraphs the organ refers to the deity identified with it.

and action' (I. vi. 1). And the Supreme Self, which is beyond the Undifferentiated, does not consist of name, form and action, and is the subject-matter of knowledge, will be concluded separately by the denial of things other than the Self with the words, 'Not this, not this.' While the transmigrating self, which is conjured up by the limiting adjunct (Upādhi) of the aggregate of the organ of speech etc., will be shown as falling under the category of that aggregate in the passage, '(The Self) comes out (as a separate entity) from these elements, and (this separateness) is destroyed with them' (II. iv. 12 ; IV. v. 13). Therefore it is but proper to speak of the organ of speech etc. as being the agents of meditation and work and receiving their fruits.

'All right, so be it,' *said the organ of speech,* when requested by the gods, *and chanted for them,* for the sake of the gods who wanted it done. What was the particular effect of the chanting done by the organ of speech for the sake of the gods? This is being stated: It is *the common good* of all the organs *that comes* through the instrumentality *of the organ of speech,* on account of the activities of speaking etc., for this is the fruit shared by all of them. That *it secured for the gods by chanting* the three hymns called Pavamāna.[1] *While* the result produced by chanting the remaining nine, which, as we know from the scriptures,[2] accrues to the

[1] In the sacrifice called Jyotiṣṭoma twelve hymns are chanted by the Udgātṛ. The fruits of chanting the first three of these, called Pavamāna, go to the sacrificer, and those of the rest to the chanting priest.

[2] 'Then through the remaining hymns (the chanter) should secure eatable food for himself by chanting' (I. iii. 28).

priest—*the fine* or articulated *speaking—it utilised for itself*. Perfect enunciation of syllables is the special function of the deity of speech ; hence that is specified by the expression, 'fine speaking.' While the effect of speaking that helps the body and organs in general belongs to the sacrificer as his share. Now, finding a loophole in the attachment of the deity in utilising its power of fine speaking for itself, *the Asuras knew—what?—that through this chanter the gods would surpass them*, overcome the natural thoughts and actions by the light of those acquired through the scriptures, as represented by the chanter. Knowing this *they charged it*, the chanter, *and struck*, i.e. touched, *it with evil*, their own attachment. *That evil* which was injected into the vocal organ of Prajāpati in his former incarnation, *is* visible even to-day. What is it? *What we come across when one speaks improper things*, or what is forbidden by the scriptures ; it is that which prompts one to speak, even against one's wishes, what is inelegant, dreadful, false and so on. That it still persists in the vocal organ of people who have descended from Prajāpati is inferred from this effect of improper speaking. This evil that is so inferred is the one that got into the vocal organ of Prajāpati, for an effect conforms to its cause.

अथ ह प्राणमूचुः, त्वं न उद्गायेति ; तथेति, तेभ्यः प्राण उदगायत् ; यः प्राणे भोगस्तं देवेभ्य आगायत्, यत् कल्याणं जिघ्रति तदात्मने । ते विदुरनेन वै न उद्गात्रात्येष्यन्तीति, तमभिद्रुत्य पाप्मनाविध्यन् ; स यः स पाप्मा, यदेवेदमप्रतिरूपं जिघ्रति स एव स पाप्मा ॥ ३ ॥

3. Then they said to the nose 'Chant (the Udgītha) for us.' 'All right,' said the eye and chanted for them. The common good that comes of the nose, it secured for the gods by chanting, while the fine smelling it utilised for itself. The Asuras knew that through this chanter the gods would surpass them. They charged it and struck it with evil. That evil is what we come across when one smells improper things.

अथ ह चक्षुरूचुः, त्वं न उद्गायेति; तथेति, तेभ्य-
श्चक्षुरुदगायत्। यश्चक्षुषि भोगस्तं देवेभ्य आगायत्,
यत्कल्याणं पश्यति तदात्मने। ते विदुरनेन वै न उद्गा-
त्रात्येष्यन्तीति, तमभिद्रुत्य पाप्मनाविध्यन्; स यः स
पाप्मा, यदेवेदमप्रतिरूपं पश्यति स एव स पाप्मा ॥ ४ ॥

4. Then they said to the eye, 'Chant (the Udgītha) for us.' 'All right,' said the eye and chanted for them. The common good that comes of the eye, it secured for the gods by chanting, while the fine seeing it utilised for itself. The Asuras knew that through this chanter the gods would surpass them. They charged it and struck it with evil. That evil is what we come across when one sees improper things.

अथ ह श्रोत्रमूचुः, त्वं न उद्गायेति; तथेति, तेभ्यः
श्रोत्रमुदगायत्; यः श्रोत्रे भोगस्तं देवेभ्य आगायत्,

यत्कल्याणं शृणोति तदात्मने। ते विदुरनेन वै न उद्गात्रात्येष्यन्तीति, तमभिद्रुत्य पाप्मनाविध्यन्; स यः स पाप्मा, यदेवेदमप्रतिरूपं शृणोति स एव स पाप्मा ॥ ५ ॥

5. Then they said to the ear, 'Chant (the Udgītha) for us.' 'All right,' said the ear and chanted for them. The common good that comes of the ear, it secured for the gods by chanting, while the fine hearing it utilised for itself. The Asuras knew that through this chanter the gods would surpass them. They charged it and struck it with evil. That evil is what we come across when one hears improper things.

अथ ह मन ऊचुः, त्वं न उद्गायेति; तथेति, तेभ्यो मन उदगायत्; यो मनसि भोगस्तं देवेभ्य आगायत, यत्कल्याणं संकल्पयति तदात्मने। ते विदुरनेन वै न उद्गात्रात्येष्यन्तीति, तमभिद्रुत्य पाप्मनाविध्यन्; स यः स पाप्मा यदेवेदमप्रतिरूपं संकल्पयति स एव स पाप्मा; एवमु खल्वेता देवताः पाप्मभिरुपासृजन्, एवमेनाः पाप्मनाविध्यन् ॥ ६ ॥

6. Then they said to the mind, 'Chant (the Udgītha) for us.' 'All right,' said the mind and chanted for them. The common good that comes of the mind, it secured for the gods by chanting, while the fine thinking it utilised for itself. The Asuras knew that through this chanter the gods would surpass them. They charged it

and struck it with evil. That evil is what we come across when one thinks improper things. Likewise they also touched these (other) deities with evil—struck them with evil.

Likewise they tried one by one the deities of the nose etc., thinking that they were each the deity referred to by the Mantra enjoined for repetition and were to be meditated upon, since they too chanted the Udgītha. And the gods came to this conclusion that the deities of the organ of speech and the rest, whom they tried one by one, were incapable of chanting the Udgītha, because they contracted evil from the Asuras owing to their attachment to utilising their power of doing fine performances for themselves. Hence none of them was the deity referred to by the Mantra, 'From evil lead me to good,' etc. (I. iii. 28), nor were they to be meditated upon, since they were impure and did not include the others. *Likewise,* just as in the case of the organ of speech etc., *they also touched these* (other) *deities* that have not been mentioned, the skin and the rest, *with evil,* that is to say, *struck them with evil.*

The gods, even after approaching one by one the deities of speech etc., were helpless as regards transcending death.

अथ हेममासन्यं प्राणमूचुः, त्वं न उद्गायेति ; तथेति, तेभ्य एष प्राण उद्गायत् ; ते विदुरनेन वै न उद्गात्रात्येष्यन्तीति, तमभिद्रुत्य पाप्मनाविध्यन् ; स यथाश्मानमृत्वा

लोष्टो विध्वंसेत, एवं हैव विध्वंसमाना विष्वञ्चो विनेशुः, ततो देवा अभवन्, पराऽसुराः ; भवत्यात्मना, परास्य द्विषन्भ्रातृव्यो भवति य एवं वेद ॥ ७ ॥

7. Then they said to this vital force in the mouth, 'Chant (the Udgītha) for us.' 'All right,' said the vital force and chanted for them. The Asuras knew that through this chanter the gods would surpass them. They charged it and wanted to strike it with evil. But as a clod of earth, striking against a rock, is shattered, so were they shattered, flung in all directions, and perished. Therefore the gods became (fire etc.), and the Asuras were crushed. He who knows thus becomes his true self, and his envious kinsman is crushed.

Then they said to this—pointing it out—*vital force in the mouth,* having its seat in the oral cavity, *'Chant* (the Udgītha) *for us.' ''All right,' said the vital force* to the gods who sought its protection, *and chanted,* etc. All this has been explained. The Asuras *wanted to strike it,* the vital force in the mouth, which was free from taint, *with evil,* the taint of their own attachment. Having succeeded with the organ of speech etc., they, through the persistence of that habit, desired to contaminate it too, but *perished,* were routed. How? This is being illustrated: *As* in life *a clod of earth, striking against a rock,* hurled at it with the intention of crushing it, *is* itself *shattered* or crushed to atoms, *so were they shattered, flung in all directions, and perished.*

Because it so happened, *therefore,* owing to this destruction of the Asuras—i.e. dissociation from the evils due to natural attachment, which checked the manifestation of their divinity—by virtue of taking refuge in the vital force in the mouth, which is ever unattached, *the gods,* the organs that are under consideration, *became*—what?—their own divine selves, fire and so forth, to be mentioned later on. Formerly also they had been fire and so on, but with their knowledge covered by natural evil, they had identified themselves with the body alone. On the cessation of that evil they gave up their identification with the body ; and the organ of speech and the rest realised their identity with fire and so on, as taught by the scriptures. *And the Asuras,* their enemies, *were crushed.*

The sacrificer of a past age who is mentioned in the story, coming across this Vedic allegory, tested in the same order the deity of speech and the rest, discarded them as stricken with the taint of attachment, identified himself with the taintless vital force in the mouth, and thereby giving up his limited identification with the body only, as represented by the organ of speech and the rest, identified himself with the body of Virāj, his present status of Prajāpati, which, as the scriptures say, represents the identification of the organ of speech etc. with fire and so on. Similarly the sacrificer of to-day, by the same procedure, *becomes his true self,* as Prajāpati. *And his envious kinsman,* the evil that opposes his attainment of the status of Prajāpati, *is crushed.* A kinsman is sometimes friendly,

as, for instance, Bharata.[1] But the evil due to attachment to sense-objects is an envious kinsman, for it hides one's real nature as the Self. It is crushed like the clod of earth by one's union with the vital force. Who gets this result? *He who knows thus,* i.e. like the ancient sacrificer realises his identity with the vital force described above.

Having finished with the result (of meditation on the vital force) the Śruti resumes its allegorical form and goes on. Why should the vital force in the mouth be resorted to as one's self, to the exclusion of the organ of speech and the rest? To explain this by stating reasons, the Śruti points out through the story that it is because the vital force is the common self of the organ of speech etc. as well as of the body.

ते होचुः, क नु सोऽभूद्यो न इत्थमसक्तेति ; अयमास्ये-ऽन्तरिति ; सोऽयास्य आङ्गिरसः, अङ्गानां हि रसः ॥ ८ ॥

8. They said, 'Where was he who has thus restored us (to our divinity)?' (and discovered): 'Here he is within the mouth.' The vital force is called Ayāsya Āṅgirasa, for it is the essence of the members (of the body).

They, the organs of Prajāpati, which were restored to their divinity by the vital force in the mouth, and thus attained their goal, *said, 'Where was he who has thus restored us* to our divinity?' The particle 'nu'

[1] The half-brother of Rāma in the Rāmāyaṇa.

indicates deliberation. People who have been helped by somebody generally remember their benefactor. The organs likewise remembered, and thinking on who it might be, realised the vital force within themselves, in the aggregate of body and organs. How? *'Here he is within the mouth,* is visibly present within the ether that is in the mouth.' People decide after deliberation ; so did the gods. Since the vital force was perceived by them as being present in the internal ether without assuming any particular form like that of the organ of speech etc., therefore *the vital force is called Ayāsya.* And since it did not assume any particular form, it restored the organ of speech etc. to their real status. Hence it is *Āṅgirasa,* the self of the body and organs. How? *For it is,* as is well-known, *the essence,* i.e. the self, *of the members,* i.e. of the body and organs. And how is it the essence of the members? Because, as we shall say later on, without it they dry up. Since, being the self of the members and not assuming any particular form, the vital force is the common self of the body and organs and pure, therefore it alone, to the exclusion of the organ of speech etc., should be resorted to as one's self—this is the import of the passage. For the Self alone should be realised as one's self, since correct notions lead to well-being, and erroneous notions, as we find, lead to evil.

सा वा एषा देवता दूर्नाम, दूरं ह्यस्या मृत्युः ; दूरं ह वा अस्मान्मृत्युर्भवति य एवं वेद ॥ ९ ॥

9. This deity is called Dūr, because death is far from it. Death is far from one who knows thus.

Objection : One may think that the purity of the vital force is not a proved fact.

Reply : Has this not been refuted by the statement that the vital force is free from the attachment that the organ of speech and the rest betray by utilising their power of fine speaking etc. for themselves?

Objection : True, but since as Āṅgirasa it is spoken of as the self of the organ of speech etc., it may be impure through contact with the latter, just as one touched by another who has touched a corpse is impure.

Reply : No, the vital force is pure. Why? Because *this deity is called Dūr*. 'This' refers to the vital force, reaching which the Asuras were shattered like a clod of earth hitting a rock. It is the deity within the present sacrificer's body whom the gods concluded as their saviour saying, 'Here he is within the mouth.' And the vital force may well be called a deity, being a part[1] of the act of meditation as its object. Because the vital force is called Dūr, i.e. is well known as Dūr —to be 'called' is synonymous with being 'celebrated as'—therefore its purity is well known, from this name of Dūr. Why is it called Dūr? *Because Death,* the evil of attachment, *is far from it,* this deity, vital force. Death, although it is close to the vital force, is away from it, because the latter is ever unattached. There-

[1] Just as a god is a part of a sacrifice distinct from the offerings etc. A sacrifice consists of the offerings and deities.

fore the vital force is well-known as Dūr. Thus its purity is conspicuous. The results accruing to a knower of this are being stated: *Death is far from one who knows thus,* that is, who meditates upon the vital force endowed with purity, which is the topic of the section. Meditation is mentally approaching the form of the deity or the like as it is presented by the eulogistic portions of the Vedas relating to the objects of meditation, and concentrating on it, excluding conventional notions, till one is as completely identified with it as with one's body, conventionally regarded as one's self. Compare such Śruti passages as, 'Being a god, he attains the gods' (IV. i. 2), and 'What deity are you identified with in the east?' (III. ix. 20).

It has been stated, 'This deity is called Dūr . . . Death is far from one who knows thus.' How is death far from one who knows thus? Being incongruous with this knowledge. In other words, the evil due to the attachment of the organs to contact with the sense-objects is incongruous with one who identifies oneself with the vital force, for it is caused by the identification with particular things such as the organ of speech, and by one's natural ignorance ; while the identification with the vital force comes of obedience to the scriptures. Hence, owing to this incongruity, it is but proper that the evil should be far from one who knows thus. This is being pointed out:

सा वा एषा देवतैतासां देवतानां पाप्मानं मृत्युमपहत्य

यत्रासां दिशामन्तस्तद्गमयांचकार, तदासां पाप्मनो विन्यद्धात्; तस्मान्न जनमियात्, नान्तमियात्, नेत्पाप्मानं मृत्युमन्ववायानीति ॥ १० ॥

10. This deity took away death, the evil of these gods, and carried it to where these quarters end. There it left their evils. Therefore one should not approach a person (of that region), nor go to that region beyond the border, lest one imbibe that evil, death.

This deity—already explained—*took away death, the evil of these gods* such as the god of speech, identified with the vital force. Everybody dies because of the evil due to the attachment of the organs to contact with the sense-objects, prompted by his natural ignorance. Hence this evil is death. The vital force is here spoken of as taking it away from the gods, simply because they identified themselves with the vital force. As a matter of fact, evil keeps away from this knower just because it is out of place there. What did the vital force do after taking away death, the evil of the gods? It *carried it to where these quarters,* east and so forth, *end.* One may question how this was done, since the quarters have no end. The answer is that it is all right, for the quarters are here conceived as being that stretch of territory which is inhabited by people possessing Vedic knowledge; hence 'the end of the quarters' means the country inhabited by people who hold opposite views, as a forest is spoken of as the end of the country.[1] Carrying them, *there it,* the deity,

[1] That is, inhabited country.

vital force, *left their evils,* the evils of these gods.—The word 'Pāpmanah' is accusative plural.—'Left,' lit. placed in various humiliating ways, and, as is understood from the sense of the passage, among the inhabitants of that region beyond the border who do not identify themselves with the vital force. That evil is due to the contact of the senses (with their objects); hence it must reside in some living being. *Therefore one should not approach,* i.e. associate with by addressing or seeing, *a person* of the region beyond the border. Association with him would involve contact with evil, for it dwells in him. *Nor go to that region beyond the border,* where such people live, called 'the end of the quarters,' although it may be deserted; and the implication is, nor to any man out of that land. *Lest one imbibe that evil, death,* by coming into contact with such people. Out of this fear one should neither approach these people nor go to that region. 'Ned' (lest) is a particle denoting apprehension.

सा वा एषा देवतैतासां देवतानां पाप्मानं मृत्युमपहत्याथैना मृत्युमत्यवहत् ॥ ११ ॥

11. This deity after taking away death, the evil of these gods, next carried them beyond death.

Now the result of this act of meditation on the vital force as one's own self, viz. the identification of the organ of speech etc. with fire and so on, is being stated. *This deity next carried them beyond death.* Because death, or the evil that limits one to the body,

is removed by the identification with the vital force, therefore the latter is the destroyer of the evil of death. Hence that vital force carried these gods, that of speech and the rest, beyond death, the evil which is being discussed, and made them realise their respective unlimited divine forms as fire and so on.

स वै वाचमेव प्रथमामत्यवहत्; सा यदा मृत्युमत्यमुच्यत सोऽग्निरभवत्; सोऽयमग्निः परेण मृत्युमतिक्रान्तो दीप्यते ॥ १२ ॥

12. It carried the organ of speech, the foremost one, first. When the organ of speech got rid of death, it became fire. That fire, having transcended death, shines beyond its reach.

It, the vital force, *carried the organ of speech, the foremost one, first.* Its importance consists in being a better instrument in the chanting of the Udgītha than the other organs. What was its form after it was carried beyond death? *When the organ of speech got rid of death, it became fire.* Formerly also it was fire, and being dissociated from death it became fire itself, with only this difference: *That fire, having transcended death, shines beyond its reach.* Before its deliverance it was hampered by death and, as the organ of speech pertaining to the body, was not luminous as now ; but now, being freed from death, it shines beyond its reach.

अथ प्राणमत्यवहत्; स यदा मृत्युमत्यमुच्यत स वायुरभवत्; सोऽयं वायुः परेण मृत्युमतिक्रान्तः पवते॥१३॥

13. Then it carried the nose. When it got rid of death, it became air. That air, having transcended death, blows beyond its reach.

Similarly *the nose became air.* It, *having transcended death, blows beyond its reach.* The rest has been explained.

अथ चक्षुरत्यवहत्; तद्यदा मृत्युमत्यमुच्यत स आदित्योऽभवत्; सोऽसावादित्यः परेण मृत्युमतिक्रान्तस्तपति ॥ १४ ॥

14. Then it carried the eye. When the eye got rid of death, it became the sun. That sun, having transcended death, shines beyond its reach.

Likewise *the eye became the sun.* He *shines.*

अथ श्रोत्रमत्यवहत्; तद्यदा मृत्युमत्यमुच्यत ता दिशोऽभवन्; ता इमा दिशः परेण मृत्युमतिक्रान्ताः ॥ १५ ॥

15. Then it carried the ear. When the ear got rid of death, it became the quarters. Those quarters, having transcended death, remain beyond its reach.

Similarly *the ear became the quarters.* The *quarters remain,* divided into the east and so forth.

अथ मनोऽत्यवहत्; तद्यदा मृत्युमत्यमुच्यत स चन्द्रमा अभवत्; सोऽसौ चन्द्रः परेण मृत्युमतिक्रान्तो भाति; एवं ह वा एनमेषा देवता मृत्युमतिवहति य एवं वेद ॥ १६ ॥

16. Then it carried the mind. When the mind got rid of death, it became the moon. That moon, having transcended death, shines beyond its reach. So does this deity carry one who knows thus beyond death.

The mind became the moon and *shines.* As the vital force carried the ancient sacrificer beyond death by transforming the organ of speech etc. into fire and so on, *so does this deity carry one,* the sacrificer of to-day, *who knows thus* the vital force as including the five organs, that of speech etc. For the Śruti says, 'One becomes exactly as one meditates upon Him' (Ś. X. v. 2. 20).

अथात्मनेऽन्नाद्यमागायत्; यद्धि किंचान्नमद्यतेऽनेनैव तदद्यते, इह प्रतितिष्ठति ॥ १७ ॥

17. Next it secured eatable food for itself by chanting, for whatever food is eaten, is eaten by the vital force alone, and it rests on that.

As the organ of speech and the rest had chanted for their own sake, so the vital force in the mouth, after securing, by chanting the three hymns called Pavamāna, the result to be shared by all the organs, viz. identity with Virāj, *next secured eatable food for itself by chanting* the remaining nine hymns. We have already said that according to the Vedas the priests get the results of a sacrifice.[1] How do we know that the

[1] This although they officiate in the sacrifice on behalf of the sacrificer. The latter afterwards purchases them on payment of a fee to the priests.

vital force secured that eatable food for itself by chanting? The resaon is being stated: *For whatever food* —food in general is meant—*is eaten* by creatures in the world *is eaten by the vital force* (Ana) *alone*. The particle 'hi' (for) denotes a reason. 'Ana' is a well-known name of the vital force. There is another word 'Anas'[1] ending in *s*, which means a cart, but this word ends in a vowel and is a synonym of the vital force. Besides, the vital force not only eats the eatable food, *it also rests on that* food, when it has been transformed into the body. Therefore the vital force secured the eatable food for itself by chanting, in order that it might live in the body. Although the vital force eats food, yet, because it is only in order that it might live in the body, there is no question of its contracting the evil due to attachment to fine performance, as was the case with the organ of speech and the rest.

ते देवा अब्रुवन्, एतावद्वा इदं सर्वं यदन्नम्, तदात्मन आगासीः, अनु नोऽस्मिन्नन्न आभजस्वेति ; ते वै माऽभिसंविशतेति ; तथेति, तं समन्तं परिण्यविशन्त । तस्माद्यदनेनान्नमत्ति तेनैतास्तृप्यन्ति ; एवं ह वा एनं स्वा अभिसंविशन्ति, भर्ता स्वानां श्रेष्ठः पुर एता भवत्यन्नादोऽधिपतिर्य एवं वेद ; य उ हैवंविदं स्वेषु प्रति प्रतिर्बुभूषति न हैवालं भार्येभ्यो भवति ; अथ य एवैतमनु भवति, यो वैतमनु भार्यान्बुभूर्षति, स हैवालं भार्येभ्यो भवति ॥ १८ ॥

[1] The nominative singular of both is 'Anaḥ.' Hence the explanation. It should be noted that the word 'Anena' is also the instrumental singular of the pronoun 'Idam' (this or it).

18. The gods said, ' Whatever food there is, is just this much, and you have secured it for yourself by chanting. Now let us have a share in this food.' 'Then sit around facing me,' (said the vital force). ' All right,' (said the gods and) sat down around it. Hence whatever food one eats through the vital force satisfies these. So do his relatives sit around facing him who knows thus, and he becomes their support, the greatest among them and their leader, a good eater of food and the ruler of them. That one among his relatives who desires to rival a man of such knowledge is powerless to support his dependants. But one who follows him, or desires to maintain one's dependants being under him, is alone capable of supporting them.

Is it not wrong to assert that all food 'is eaten by the vital force alone,' since the organ of speech and the rest are also benefited by the food? The answer is: No, for that benefit comes through the vital force. How the benefit done to the organ of speech etc. by the food comes through the vital force, is being explained: *The gods,* the organ of speech etc., called gods because they bring their respective objects to light, *said* to the vital force in the mouth, '*Whatever food there is,* is eaten in the world to sustain life, *is just this much,* and no more.—The particle 'vai' recalls what is well known.—*And you have secured it* all *for yourself by chanting,* i.e. have appropriated it

through chanting for your own use ; and we cannot live without food. Therefore *now let us have a share in this food* that is for yourself.'—The absence of the causative suffix in the verb is a Vedic licence.—The meaning is, make us also sharers of the food. The other said, '*Then,* if you want food *sit around facing me.*' When the vital force said this, the gods said, '*All right,*' and *sat down around it,* i.e. encircling the vital force. As they sit thus at the command of the vital force, the food eaten by it, while sustaining life, also satisfies them. The organ of speech and the rest have no independent relation to food. Therefore the assertion that all food 'is eaten by the vital force alone' is quite correct. This is what the text says: *Hence,* because the gods, the organ of speech etc., at the command of the vital force, sat around facing it, being under its protection, therefore *whatever food one eats through the vital force satisfies these,* the organ of speech etc.

So, as the organ of speech and the rest did with the vital force, *do his relatives* also *sit around facing him who knows thus.* knows the vital force as the support of the organ of speech etc.—knows that the five organs such as that of speech rest on the vital force ; that is, he becomes the refuge of his relatives. *And* with his food *he becomes* the *support* of his relatives who sit around facing him, as the vital force was of the organ of speech etc. Also, *the greatest among them and their leader,* as the vital force was of the organs. Further, *a good eater of food,* i.e. free from disease, *and the ruler of them,* an absolute protector, or independent master, just as the vital force

was of the organ of speech etc. All this result comes to one who knows the vital force in the above way. Moreover *that one among his relatives who desires to rival a man of such knowledge,* i.e. the knower of the vital force, *is powerless to support his dependants,* like the Asuras who had rivalry with the vital force. *But,* among his relatives, *one who follows him,* this knower of the vital force, as the organ of speech and the rest did the vital force, *or* who *desires to maintain one's dependants being under him,* just as the organs desired to support themselves by following the vital force, *is alone capable of supporting them,* and none else who is independent. All this is described as the result of knowing the attributes of the vital force.

In order to demonstrate that the vital force is the self of the body and organs, it has been introduced as Āṅgirasa, 'It is Ayāsya Āṅgirasa' (par. 8). But it has not been specifically stated why it is called Āṅgirasa. The following paragraph is introduced to furnish that reason. If that reason is valid, then only will the vital force be admitted to be the self of the body and organs. It has next been stated that the organ of speech and the rest depend on the vital force. To show how that can be proved the text says:

सोऽयास्य आङ्गिरसः, अङ्गानां हि रसः ; प्राणो वा अङ्गानां रसः, प्राणो हि वा अङ्गानां रसः ; तस्माद्यस्मात्क-

स्माद्यस्माद्‌ङ्गात्प्राण उत्क्रामति तदेव तच्छुष्यति, एष हि वा अङ्गानां रसः ॥ १९ ॥

19. It is called Ayāsya Āṅgirasa, for it is the essence of the members (of the body). The vital force is indeed the essence of the members. Of course it is their essence. (For instance), from whichever member the vital force departs, right there it withers. Therefore this is of course the essence of the members.

It is called Ayāsya Āṅgirasa, etc.—This is repeated here as it is (from paragraph 8) for the sake of the answer. The passage ending with, 'The vital force is indeed the essence of the members,' reminds us of what has already been explained. How? *The vital force is indeed the essence of the members. Of course it is their essence.* The particle 'hi' denotes a well-known fact. Everybody knows that the vital force, and not the organ of speech etc., is the essence of the members. Therefore it is right to remind us of this fact with the words, 'The vital force is indeed.' How is it well-known? *From whichever member*—any part of the body without distinction is meant—*the vital force departs, right there it,* that member, *withers* or dries up. The word 'therefore,' signifying conclusion, is construed with the last sentence. *Therefore this is of course the essence of the members,* is the conclusion. Hence it is proved that the vital force is the self of the body and organs. Because when the self departs, withering or death (of the body) takes place. Hence

all creatures live through that. Therefore, leaving out the organ of speech and the rest, the vital force alone should be meditated upon. This is the sense of the whole passage.

The vital force is the self not only of the body and organs, which represent form and action respectively, but also of the Vedas, Ṛc, Yajus and Sāman, which consist of name. Thus the Śruti magnifies the vital force, extolling it as the self of all, to show that it is a fit object of meditation.

एष उ एव बृहस्पतिः ; वाग्वै बृहती, तस्या एष पतिः, तस्मादु बृहस्पतिः ॥ २० ॥

20. This alone is also Bṛhaspati (lord of the Ṛc). Speech is indeed Bṛhatī (Ṛc) and this is its lord. Therefore this is also Bṛhaspati.

This alone, the vital force in question called Āṅgirasa, *is also Bṛhaspati.* How? *Speech is indeed Bṛhatī,* the metre with thirty-six syllables. The metre Anuṣṭubh is speech. How? For the Śruti says, 'Speech is indeed Anuṣṭubh' (Tai. S. V. i. 3. 5). And this speech called Anuṣṭubh is included in the metre Bṛhatī. Hence it is right to say, 'Speech is indeed Bṛhatī,' as a well-known fact. And in Bṛhatī all Ṛces are included, for it is extolled as the vital force. For another Śruti says, 'Bṛhatī is the vital force.' (Ai. Ā. II. i. 6) ; 'One should know the Ṛces as the vital force' (Ibid. II. ii. 2). The Ṛces are included in the vital force, as they consist of speech. How this is so is

being explained: *And this* vital force *is its lord,* the lord of speech, i.e. of the Ṛces in the form of Bṛhatī. For it gives rise to speech, since the Ṛces are recited through the air which is propelled by the fire in the stomach. Or the vital force may be the lord of speech, being its protector, for speech is protected by the vital force, since a dead man has no power to utter words. *Therefore this is also Bṛhaspati,* i.e. the vital force is the self of the Ṛces.

एष उ एव ब्रह्मणस्पतिः ; वाग्वै ब्रह्म, तस्या एष पतिः, तस्मादु ब्रह्मणस्पतिः ॥ २१ ॥

21. This alone is also Brahmaṇaspati (lord of the Yajus.) Speech is indeed Brahman (Yajus), and this is its lord. Therefore this is also Brahmaṇaspati.

Similarly the self of the Yajuses. How? *This alone is also Brahmaṇaspati. Speech is Brahman* or Yajus, which is a kind of speech. *And this is its lord,* the lord of that Yajus. *Therefore this is indeed Brahmaṇaspati,* as before.

How is it known that the words 'Bṛhatī' and 'Brahman' mean the Ṛc and the Yajus respectively, and nothing else? Because at the end (of this topic, in the next paragraph) the word 'speech' is used as co-ordinate with 'Sāman,' 'Speech is indeed Sāman.' Similarly in the sentences, 'Speech is indeed Bṛhatī' and 'Speech is indeed Brahman,' the words 'Bṛhatī,' and 'Brahman', which are co-ordinate with 'speech', ought to mean the Ṛc and the Yajus respectively. On the principle of the residuum also this is correct. When

the Sāman is mentioned, the Ṛc and the Yajus alone remain. Another reason is that they are both forms of speech. The Ṛc and the Yajus are particular kinds of speech. Hence they can well be co-ordinated with speech. Moreover, unless they are taken in that sense, there will be no difference between the two terms of each sentence. (In the next two paragraphs) 'Sāman' and 'Udgītha' clearly denote specific objects. Similarly the words 'Bṛhatī' and 'Brahman' ought to denote specific objects. Otherwise, not conveying any specific object, they would be useless, and if that specific object be mere speech, both sentences would be tautological. And lastly, the words Ṛc, Yajus, Sāman and Udgītha occur in the Vedas in the order here indicated.

एष उ एव साम ; वाग्वै सा, अमैषः, सा चामश्चेति तत्साम्नः सामत्वम् । यद्वेव समः प्लुषिणा, समो मशकेन, समो नागेन, सम एभिस्त्रिभिर्लोकैः, समोऽनेन सर्वेण, तस्माद्वेव साम ; अश्नुते साम्नः सायुज्यं सलोकतां य एव-मेतत्साम वेद ॥ २२ ॥

22. This alone is also Sāman. Speech is indeed Sā, and this is Ama. Because it is Sā (speech) and Ama (vital force), therefore Sāman is so called. Or because it is equal to a white ant, equal to a mosquito, equal to an elephant, equal to these three worlds, equal to this universe, therefore this is also Sāman. He who knows this Sāman (vital force) to be such attains union with it, or lives in the same world as it.

This alone is also Sāman. How? This is being explained: *Speech is indeed Sā,* whatever is denoted by feminine words is speech, for the pronoun Sā (she) refers to all objects denoted by them. Similarly *this* vital force *is Ama.* The word 'Ama' refers to all objects denoted by masculine words. For another Śruti says, 'How do you get my masculine names? He should reply: Through the vital force. And how my feminine names? Through speech' (Kau. I. 7). So this word 'Sāman' denotes speech and the vital force. Again, the word 'Sāman' denotes a chant consisting only of a combination of tones etc. that are produced by the vital force. Hence there is nothing called Sāman except the vital force and speech, for the tone, syllables, etc. are produced by the vital force and depend on it. 'This' vital force 'alone is also Sāman,' because what is generally known as Sāman is a combination of speech and the vital force, Sā and Ama. *Therefore Sāman,* the chant consisting of a combination of tones etc., *is so called,* wellknown in the world.

Or because it is equal in all those respects to be presently mentioned, *therefore this is also Sāman.* This is the construction. The word 'or' is gathered on the strength of the alternative reason indicated for the derivation of the word 'Sāman.' In what respects is the vital force equal? This is being answered: *Equal to* the body of *a white ant, equal to* the body of *a mosquito, equal to* the body of *an elephant, equal to these three worlds,* i.e. the body of Virāj, *equal to this universe,* i.e. the form of Hiraṇyagarbha. The vital force is equal to all these bodies such as that of the

white ant in the sense that it is present in its entirety in them, as the essential characteristics of a cow (Gotva) are present in each individual cow. It cannot be merely of the size of these bodies, for it is formless and all-pervading. Nor does the equality mean just filling up those bodies by contraction or expansion like lamp-light in a jar, a mansion, etc. For the Śruti says, 'These are all equal, and all infinite' (I. v. 13). And there is nothing inconsistent in an all-pervading principle assuming in different bodies their particular size. *He who knows this Sāman,* i.e. the vital force called Sāman because of its equality, whose glories are revealed by the Vedas, *to be such,* gets this result: *attains union with it,* identification with the same body and organs as the vital force, *or lives in the same world as it,* according to the difference in meditation. This is meant to be the result of meditation continued till identity with the vital force is established.

एष उ वा उद्गीथः ; प्राणो वा उत्, प्राणेन ह्मीदं सर्वमुत्त-ब्धम्, वागेव गीथा, उच्च गीथा चेति स उद्गीथः ॥ २३ ॥

23. This indeed is also Udgītha. The vital force is indeed Ut, for all this is held aloft by the vital force, and speech alone is Gīthā. This is Udgītha, because it is Ut and Gīthā.

This indeed is also Udgītha. The Udgītha is a particular division of the Sāman, not chanting, for the topic under discussion is Sāman. How is the vital force Udgītha? *The vital force is indeed Ut, for all this* universe *is held aloft* or supported *by the vital*

force. This prefix 'ut,' meaning holding aloft, denotes a characteristic of the vital force. Therefore the vital force is Ut. *Speech alone is Gīthā,* for the division of Sāman called Udgīthā is a variety of sound. 'Gīthā,' coming from the root 'gai,' denoting sound, is nothing but speech. The Udgītha cannot be conceived of as having any other form but sound. Hence it is right to assert that speech is Gīthā. The vital force is Ut, and Gīthā is speech dependent on the vital force; hence the two together are denoted by one word: *This is Udgītha.*

तद्धापि ब्रह्मदत्तश्चैकितानेयो राजानं भक्षयन्नुवाच, अयं त्यस्य राजा मूर्धानं विपातयतात्, यदितोऽयास्य आङ्गिरसोऽन्येनोद्गायदिति ; वाचा च ह्येव स प्राणेन चोद्गायदिति ॥ २४ ॥

24. Regarding this (there is) also (a story): Brahmadatta, the great-grandson of Cikitāna, while drinking Soma, said, 'Let this Soma strike off my head if I say that Ayāsya Āṅgirasa chanted the Udgītha through any other than this (vital force and speech).' Indeed he chanted through speech and the vital force.

Regarding this subject described above a story is *also* narrated in the Śruti. *Brahmadatta, the great-grandson*[1] *of Cikitāna, while drinking Soma* in a sacrifice, *said, 'Let this Soma* in the bowl that I am drinking *strike off my head* for being a liar, i.e. if I have

[1] Whose great-grandfather (i.e. Cikitāna) at least was living. This is implied by the suffix. See Pāṇini IV. i. 163.

told a lie.'—The suffix of the verb is a substitute for an imperative suffix and expresses a wish.[1]—How can he become a liar? This is being explained: *'If I say that Ayāsya Āṅgirasa chanted the Udgītha through any other* deity *than this* vital force combined with speech, which is being discussed.' The term 'Ayāsya Āṅgirasa,' denoting the vital force in the mouth, refers to the priest who chanted in the sacrifice of the ancient sages who projected this world. 'If I say like this, I shall be a liar, and for entertaining this false notion let that deity strike off my head.' The mention of his taking this oath shows that one must have a firm conviction of this knowledge.[2] This purport of the story the Śruti concludes in its own words: *He,* that chanter, called here Ayāsya Āṅgirasa, *chanted through speech,* which is subordinate to the vital force, *and the vital force,* which is his own self, meaning this is the significance of the oath.

तस्य हैतस्य साम्नो यः स्वं वेद भवति हास्य स्वम् ; तस्य वै स्वर एव स्वम् , तस्मादार्त्विज्यं करिष्यन्वाचि स्वरमिच्छेत, तया वाचा स्वरसंपन्नयार्त्विज्यं कुर्यात् ; तस्माद्यज्ञे स्वरवन्तं दिदृक्षन्त एव, अथो यस्य स्वं भवति ; भवति हास्य स्वं य एवमेतत्साम्नः स्वं वेद ॥ २५ ॥

25. He who knows the wealth of this Sāman (vital force) attains wealth. Tone is indeed its wealth. Therefore one who is going to officiate

[1] Pāṇini VII. i. 35.
[2] That the vital force is the deity of the Udgītha.

as a priest should desire to have a rich tone in his voice, and he should do his priestly duties through that voice with a fine tone. Therefore in a sacrifice people long to see a priest with a good voice, like one who has wealth. He who knows the wealth of Sāman to be such attains wealth.

He who knows the wealth of this Sāman, the vital force under consideration, denoted by the word 'Sāman,' which is here pointed out as being the one in the mouth—what happens to him?—he *attains wealth.* Having drawn his attention by tempting him with (a mention of) the result, the scripture tells the listener: *Tone is indeed its wealth.* 'Tone' is sweetness of the voice ; that is its wealth or ornament. For chanting, when attended with a good tone, appears as magnificent. Because this is so, *therefore one who is going to officiate as a priest,* i.e. a chanter, *should desire to have a rich tone in his voice,* in order to enrich the Sāman with that tone. This is an incidental injunction ; for if the vital force (identified with the chanter) is to be realised as having a good tone through the fact of Sāman possessing it, a mere wish will not effect this, and therefore, it is implied, appropriate means such as cleaning the teeth and sipping oil should be adopted. *And he should do his priestly duties through that* cultured *voice with a fine tone.* Because tone is the wealth of Sāman and the latter is embellished by it, *therefore in a sacrifice people long to see a priest with a good voice,* as they do a rich man. It is a well-known fact that people want to see *one who*

has wealth. The result, already declared, of the meditation on this characteristic of the vital force is repeated as a conclusion: *He who knows the wealth of Sāman to be such attains wealth.*

तस्य हैतस्य साम्नो यः सुवर्णं वेद, भवति हास्य सुवर्णम्; तस्य वै स्वर एव सुवर्णम्; भवति हास्य सुवर्णं य एवमेतत्साम्नः सुवर्णं वेद ॥ २६ ॥

26. He who knows the correct sound of this Sāman (vital force) obtains gold. Tone is indeed its correct sound. He who knows the correct sound of Sāman to be such obtains gold.

Now meditation on another attribute, viz. possessing correct sound, is being enjoined. That too is having a good tone, but there is this difference: The previous one was sweetness of the voice; whereas this, denoted by the word 'Suvarṇa,' is correct articulation according to the laws of phonetics. *He who knows the correct sound of this Sāman obtains gold,* for the word 'Suvarṇa' means both a good tone and gold. That is to say, the result of meditating upon this attribute is the obtaining of gold, which is the common meaning of the word 'Suvarṇa.' *Tone is indeed its correct sound. He who knows the correct sound of Sāman to be such obtains gold.* All this has been explained.

तस्य हैतस्य साम्नो यः प्रतिष्ठां वेद प्रति ह तिष्ठति;

तस्य वै वागेव प्रतिष्ठा, वाचि हि खल्वेष एतत्प्राणः प्रतिष्ठितो गीयते ; अन्न इत्यु हैक आहुः ॥ २७ ॥

27. He who knows the support of this Sāman (vital force) gets a resting place. Speech (certain parts of the body) is indeed its support. For resting on speech is the vital force thus chanted. Some say, resting on food (body).

Similarly, in order to enjoin meditation on another feature of the vital force, viz. its support, the text says: *He who knows the support of this Sāman,* i.e. speech, on which the Sāman rests, *gets a resting place.* The result is aptly in accordance with the meditation, for the Śruti says, '(One becomes) exactly as one meditates upon Him' (Ś. X. v. 2. 20). As before, when one has been tempted by a mention of the result and wants to hear what that support is, the scripture says: *Speech is indeed* the *support* of the Saman. 'Speech' here means the different parts of the body such as the root of the tongue ; those are the support. This is explained by the text: *For resting on speech,* i.e. the root of the tongue and other places, *is the vital force thus chanted,* assumes the form of a chant. Therefore speech is the support of the Sāman. *Some say,* it is chanted *resting on food.* It is but proper to say that the vital force rests on this. Since this latter view is also unexceptionable, one should meditate at his option upon either speech or food as the support of the vital force.

अथातः पवमानानामेवाभ्यारोहः ; स वै खलु प्रस्तोता साम प्रस्तौति, स यत्र प्रस्तुयात्तदेतानि जपेत्—असतो मा सद्गमय, तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय, मृत्योर्मामृतं गमयेति ; स यदाहासतो मा सद्गमयेति, मृत्युर्वा असत्, सदमृतम्, मृत्योर्मामृतं गमय, अमृतं मा कुर्वित्येवैतदाह ; तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमयेति, मृत्युर्वै तमः, ज्योतिरमृतम्, मृत्योर्मामृतं गमय, अमृतं मा कुर्वित्येवैतदाह ; मृत्योर्मामृतं गमयेति नात्र तिरोहितमिवास्ति । अथ यानीतराणि स्तोत्राणि तेष्वात्मनेऽन्नाद्यमागायेत्, तस्मादु तेषु वरं वृणीत यं कामं कामयेत तम् ; स एष एवंविदुद्गातात्मने वा यजमानाय वा यं कामं कामयते तमागायति ; तद्धैतल्लोकजिदेव ; न हैवालोक्यताया आशास्ति य एवमेतत्साम वेद ॥ २८ ॥

इति तृतीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

28. Now therefore the edifying repetition (Abhyāroha) only of the hymns called Pavamānas. The priest called Prastotṛ indeed recites the Sāman. While he recites it, these Mantras *are to be repeated*: From evil lead me to good. From darkness lead me to light. From death lead me to immortality. When the Mantra says, 'From evil lead me to good,' 'evil' means death, and 'good' immortality; so it says, 'From death lead me to immortality, i.e. make me immortal.' *When it says,* 'From darkness *lead me to light,*' 'darkness' *means death,* and 'light,' immortality; so it says, 'From death lead me to immortality,

or make me immortal.' In the dictum, 'From death lead me to immortality,' the meaning does not seem to be hidden. Then through the remaining hymns (the chanter) should secure eatable food for himself by chanting. Therefore, while they are being chanted, the sacrificer should ask for a boon—anything that he desires. Whatever objects this chanter possessed of such knowledge desires, either for himself or for the sacrificer, he secures them by chanting. This (meditation) certainly wins the world (Hiraṇyagarbha). He who knows the Sāman (vital force) as such has not to pray lest he be unfit for this world.

A repetition of Mantras is being prescribed for one who knows the vital force as such. The meditation by knowing which one is entitled to this repetition of Mantras has been mentioned. *Now,* because this repetition of Mantras by one possessed of such knowledge produces the result of elevation to divinity, *therefore* it is being described here. This repetition, being connected with chanting, may be thought applicable to every chant ; so it is restricted by the mention of the Pavamānas. But since one may think that it should be done with all the three Pavamānas, the time is being further restricted: *The priest called Prastotṛ* indeed *recites the Sāman. While he recites it,* i.e. when he begins to chant the Sāman, *these Mantras are to be repeated.* And this repetition of Mantras is called

'Abhyāroha,' because through this repetition one possessed of such knowledge 'advances towards' the realisation of one's innate divinity. The plural in 'these' indicates that there are three Yajus Mantras. The use of the accusative case and the fact that these Mantras occur in a Brāhmaṇa or explanatory portion of the Vedas, indicate that the usual accent should be used in these words, and not the special intonation[1] used in the hymns. This repetition of Mantras is to be done by the sacrificer.

These are the Yajus Mantras in question: *From evil lead me to good. From darkness lead me to light. From death lead me to immortality.* The meaning of the Mantras is hidden. So the Brāhmaṇa itself explains them: *When the Mantra says, 'From evil lead me to good,'* what is the meaning? *'Evil' means death,* i.e. our natural actions and thoughts; 'evil,' because they degrade us very much; *and 'good,'* i.e. actions and thoughts as they are regulated by the scriptures, means *immortality,* because they lead to it. Therefore the meaning is, 'From evil actions and ignorance lead me to actions and thoughts that are regulated by the scriptures, i. e. help me to identify myself with those things that lead to divinity.' The import of the sentence is being stated: *So it says, 'Make me immortal.'* Similarly, *when it says, 'From darkness lead me to light,' 'darkness' means death.* All ignorance, being of the nature of a veil, is darkness; and it again is death, being the cause of it. And

[1] Which is indicated by the use of the instrumental case in the directions.

'light' means *immortality,* the opposite of the above, one's divine nature. Knowledge, being luminous, is called light ; and it again is immortality, being of an imperishable nature. *So it says, 'From death lead me to immortality, or make me immortal,'* as before. i. e. help me to realise the divine status of Virāj. The first Mantra means, help me to identify myself with the means of realisation, instead of with things that are not such ; while the second one means, help me to go beyond that even—for it is a form of ignorance —and attain identity with the result. The third Mantra, *'From death lead me to immortality,'* gives the combined meaning of the first two, and is quite clear. In this *the meaning does not seem to be hidden* as in the first two, i. e. it should be taken literally.

Then, after chanting for the sacrificer with the three Pavamānas, *through the remaining hymns* the chanter who knows the vital force and has become identified with it, *should secure eatable food for himself by chanting,* just like the vital force. Because this chanter knows the vital force as above described, therefore he is able to obtain that desired object. *Therefore, while they are being chanted, the sacrificer should ask for a boon—anything that he desires.* Because *whatever objects this chanter possessed of such knowledge desires, either for himself or for the sacrificer, he secures them by chanting.* This sentence should precede the one before it (for the sake of sense).

Thus it has been stated that meditation and rites

together lead to identification with Hiraṇyagarbha. There is no possibility of a doubt regarding this. Therefore a doubt is being raised as to whether, in the absence of rites, meditation alone can lead to that result or not. To remove it, the text says: *This* meditation on the vital force *certainly wins the world* (Hiraṇyagarbha[1]), even if it is disjoined from the rites. *He has not to pray lest he be unfit for this world,* for one who has already realised his identity with Hiraṇyagarbha cannot possibly pray for the attainment of him. A man who is already in a village is not eager about when he will reach it, as a man who is in a forest is. Expectation is always about something remote, something other than one's self; it is impossible with regard to one's own self. Therefore there is no chance of his fearing lest he should ever miss identity with Hiraṇyagarbha.

Who gets this result? He *who knows this Sāman as such,* meditates upon the vital force whose glories have been described above, till he realises his identity with it in the following way: 'I am the pure vital force, not to be touched by the evils characteristic of the Asuras, viz. the attachment of the senses to their objects. The five organs such as that of speech have, by resting on me, been freed from the defects of these evils, which spring from one's natural thoughts, and have become fire and so forth; and they are connected with all bodies by partaking of the eatable food that belongs to me. Being Āṅgirasa, I am the self of all

[1] Who is the cosmic form of the vital force.

beings. And I am the self of speech manifesting itself as Ṛc, Yajus, Sāman and Udgītha, for I pervade it and produce it. I am transformed into a chant as Sāman, and have the external wealth or embellishment of a good voice ; and I also have a more intimate treasure, consisting of fine articulation according to phonetics. And when I become the chant, the throat and other parts of the body are my support. With these attributes I am completely present in all bodies beginning with that of a white ant, being formless and all-pervading.'

SECTION IV

आत्मैवेदमग्र आसीत्पुरुषविधः, सोऽनुवीक्ष्य नान्य-
दात्मनोऽपश्यत्, सोऽहमस्मीत्यग्रे व्याहरत्, ततोऽहंनामा-
भवत्; तस्मादप्येतर्ह्यामन्त्रितोऽहमयमित्येवाग्र उक्त्वाथा-
न्यन्नाम प्रब्रूते यदस्य भवति; स यत्पूर्वोऽस्मात्सर्वस्मा-
त्सर्वान्पाप्मन औषत् तस्मात्पुरुषः; ओषति ह वै स तं
योऽस्मात्पूर्वो बुभूषति य एवं वेद ॥ १ ॥

1. In the beginning, this (universe) was but the self (Virāj) of a human form. He reflected and found nothing else but himself. He first uttered, 'I am he.' Therefore he was called Aham (I). Hence, to this day, when a person is addressed, he first says, 'It is I,' and then says the other name that he may have. Because he was first and before this whole (band of aspirants) burnt all evils, therefore he is called Puruṣa. He who knows thus indeed burns one who wants to be (Virāj) before him.

It has been explained that one attains the status of Hiraṇyagarbha through a combination of meditation and rites. That the same result is attained only through meditation on the vital force has also been stated in the passage, 'This certainly wins the world,' etc. (I. iii. 28). The present section is introduced in order to describe the excellent results of Vedic medita-

tions and rites by setting forth the independence and other powers of Hiraṇyagarbha, who is himself the result of his past actions, in the projection, maintenance and dissolution of the universe. The meditations and rites that are prescribed in the ceremonial portion[1] of the Vedas would thereby be extolled by implication. The import, however, is this: The sum total of these results of meditation and rites belongs to the relative world, for *Virāj*[2] has been described as possessing fear, dissatisfaction, etc., has a body and organs, and consists of gross, differentiated and transient objects. This prepares the ground for what follows, since the knowledge of Brahman alone, which is going to be described, can lead to liberation. For one who is not disgusted with things of the world consisting of a variety of means and ends is not entitled to cultivate the knowledge of the unity of the Self, as one who is not thirsty has no use for a drink. Therefore the delineation of the excellent results of meditation and rites is meant to introduce the succeeding portion. It will also be said later on, 'Of all these, this Self alone should be realised' (I. iv. 7), 'This Self is dearer than a son' (I. iv. 8), and so on.

In the beginning, before the manifestation of any other body, *this* universe of different bodies *was but the self,* was undifferentiated from the body of Virāj,

[1] Including the previous sections of this book.

[2] The word used here is 'Prajāpati,' which means both Hiraṇyagarbha and Virāj, the subtle and gross forms, respectively, of the same being. Śaṅkara often uses these two terms almost interchangeably. This should be borne in mind to avoid confusion.

the first embodied being born out of the cosmic egg, who is here meant by the word 'self.' He is the product of Vedic meditations and rites. And this self was *of a human form,* with a head, hands, etc., i. e. Virāj. *He,* who was born first, *reflected* on who he was and what his features were, *and found nothing else but himself,* consisting of the body and organs. He found only himself, the self of all. And as he had been purified by Vedic knowledge in his past life, *he first uttered, 'I am he,'* the Virāj who is the self of all. And because owing to his past impressions he first declared himself as Aham, *therefore he was called Aham* (I). That this is his name as given out by the Śruti will be mentioned later: 'His secret name is Aham' (V. v. 4). *Hence,* because this happened with Virāj, the cause, therefore, *to this day,* among men, his effects, *when a person is addressed* as, 'Who are you?' *he first says, 'It is I,'* describes himself as identified with his cause, Virāj, *and then says,* to one who inquires about his particular name, *the other name,* the name of his particular body, such as Devadatta or Yajñadatta, *that he may have,* as given to that particular body by his parents.

And *because he,* Virāj, in his past incarnation when he was an aspirant, by an adequate practice of meditation and rites *was* the *first* of those who wanted to attain the status of Virāj by the same method, *and before this whole* band of aspirants *burnt*—what?—*all evils,* viz. attachment and ignorance, which obstructed his attainment of the status of Virāj—because *it* was so, *therefore he is called Puruṣa,* i. e. one who burnt first. As this Virāj became Puruṣa and Virāj by

burning all the obstructing evils, so another person, by the fire of his practice of meditation and rites, or by virtue of meditation alone, *burns one*—whom?—*who wants to be* Virāj *before him,* this sage. The text points him out in the words, *'Who knows thus.'* It is implied that he has perfected himself in the practice of meditation.

Objection : The desire to attain the status of Virāj must be dangerous, if one is burnt by a sage possessing this knowledge.

Reply : There is nothing wrong in it, for burning here means only the failure to attain the status of Virāj first, due to a deficiency in the practice of meditation. The man who uses the best means attains it first, and the man who is deficient in his means does not. This is spoken of as the former burning the latter. It is not that one who uses the best means actually burns the other. As in the world, when several people are having a running contest, the man who first reaches the destination may be said to burn the others, as it were, for they are shorn of their strength, so is the case here.

In order to show that the results, meant to be extolled here, of meditation and rites enjoined in the ceremonial portion of the Vedas, are not beyond the range of transmigratory existence, the text goes on:

सोऽबिभेत्, तस्मादेकाकी बिभेति ; स हायमीक्षां चक्रे, यन्मदन्यन्नास्ति, कस्मान्नु बिभेमीति, तत एवास्य भयं वीयाय, कस्माद्ध्यभेष्यत्? द्वितीयाद्वै भयं भवति ॥ २ ॥

2. He was afraid. Therefore people (still) are afraid to be alone. He thought, 'If there is nothing else but me, what am I afraid of?' From that alone his fear was gone, for what was there to fear? It is from a second entity that fear comes.

He, Virāj, who has been presented as the first embodied being of a human form, *was afraid*, just like us, says the text. Because this being with a human form, possessing a body and organs, was afraid owing to a false notion about his extinction, *therefore*, being similarly situated, *people* to this day *are afraid to be alone*. And the means of removing this false notion that caused the fear, was, as in our case, the right knowledge of the Self. *He*, Virāj, *thought*, *'If there is nothing else but me*, no other entity but myself to be my rival, *what am I afraid of*, for there is nothing to kill me?' *From that* right knowledge of the Self *alone his*, Virāj's *fear was* clean *gone*. That fear of Virāj, being due to sheer ignorance, was inconsistent with the knowledge of the Supreme Self. This is what the text says: *For what was there to fear?* That is, why was he afraid, since there could be no fear when the truth was known? Because *it is from a second entity that fear comes;* and that second entity is merely projected by ignorance. A second entity that is not perceived at all cannot certainly cause fear, for the Śruti says, 'Then what delusion and what grief can there be for one who sees unity?' (Iś. 7). That his fear was removed by the knowledge of unity

was quite proper. Why? Because fear comes of a second entity, and that notion of a second entity was removed by the knowledge of unity; it was non-existent.

Here some object: What was Virāj's knowledge of unity due to? And who instructed him? If it came without any instruction, the same might also be true of us. If, however, it was due to the impressions of his past life, then the knowledge of unity would be useless. As Virāj's knowledge of unity acquired in his past life, although it was present, did not remove the cause of his bondage, ignorance—for being born with that ignorance, he was afraid—so the knowledge of unity would be useless in the case of everybody. Should it be urged that the knowledge prevailing at the last moment only removes ignorance, our answer is that it cannot be laid down as a rule, since ignorance may appear again just as it did before. Therefore we conclude that the knowledge of unity serves no useful purpose.

Reply: Not so, for, as in the world, his knowledge sprang from his perfected birth. That is to say, as we see that when a person has been born with a select body and organs as a result of his past merits, he excels in knowledge, intelligence and memory, similarly Virāj, having burnt all his evils which produce qualities the very opposite of righteousness, knowledge, dispassion and lordship, had a perfected birth in which he was possessed of a pure body and organs; hence he might well have the knowledge of unity even without any instruction. As the Smṛti says, 'The Lord of the universe is born with these four

virtues—infallible knowledge, dispassion, lordship and righteousness' (Vā. I. i. 3).

Objection : If he was born with those virtues, he could not have fear. Darkness never appears with the sun.

Reply : Not so, for the expression, 'He is born with these virtues,' means that he is not instructed about them by others.

Objection : In that case qualities like faith, devotion and prostration (to the teacher) cease to be the means of knowledge. The Gītā, for instance, says, 'One who has faith and devotion and controls one's senses attains knowledge' (G. IV. 39), and 'Know it through prostration' (G. IV. 34). There are other texts from the Śrutis as well as Smṛtis which prescribe similar means for knowledge. Now, if knowledge is due to the merits of one's past life, as you say was the case with Virāj, then the above means become useless.

Reply : No, for there may be differences as regards the means such as their alternation or combination, efficacy or inefficacy. We observe in life that effects are produced from various causes, which may operate singly or in combination. Of these causes operating singly or in combination, some may be more efficacious than others. Let us take a single instance of an effect produced from various causes, say, the perception of form or colour: In the case of animals that see in the dark, the connection of the eye with the object alone suffices, even without the help of light, to cause the perception. In the case of Yogins the mind alone is the cause of it. While with us,

there is a combination of causes such as the connection of the eye with the object, and light, which again may vary according as it is sunlight or moonlight, and so on. Similarly there would be differences due to that light being of a particular character, strong or feeble, and so on. Exactly in the same way with the knowledge of the unity of the Self. Sometimes the actions of one's past life are the cause, as in the case of Virāj. Sometimes it is reflection, for the Śruti says, 'Desire to know Brahman through reflection' (Tai. III. iii-v. 1). Sometimes faith and other things are the only causes of attaining knowledge, as we learn from such Śruti and Smṛti texts as the following: 'He only knows who has got a teacher' (Ch. VI. xiv. 2), 'One who has faith . . . attains knowledge' (G. IV. 39), 'Know it through prostration' (G. IV. 34), '(Knowledge received) from the teacher alone (is best)' (Ch. IV. ix. 3), '(The Self) is to be realised through hearing,' etc. (II. iv. 5; IV. v. 6). For the above causes remove obstacles to knowledge such as demerit. And the hearing, reflection and meditation on Vedānta texts have a direct relation to Brahman which is to be known, for they are naturally the causes to evoke the knowledge of Reality when the evils, connected with the body and mind, that obstruct it have been destroyed. Therefore faith, prostration and the like never cease to be the means of knowledge.

स वै नैव रेमे, तस्मादेकाकी न रमते ; स द्वितीय-
मैच्छत्। स हैतावानास यथा स्त्रीपुमांसौ संपरिष्वक्तौ ;

स इममेवात्मानं द्वेधापातयत्, ततः पतिश्च पत्नी चाभवताम्; तस्मादिदमर्धबृगलमिव स्व इति ह स्माह याज्ञवल्क्यः, तस्मादयमाकाशः स्त्रिया पूर्यत एव; तां समभवत्, ततो मनुष्या अजायन्त ॥ ३ ॥

3. He was not at all happy. Therefore people (still) are not happy when alone. He desired a mate. He became as big as man and wife embracing each other. He parted this very body into two. From that came husband and wife. Therefore, said Yājñavalkya, this (body) is one-half of oneself, like one of the two halves of a split pea. Therefore this space is indeed filled by the wife. He was united with her. From that men were born.

Here is another reason why the state of Virāj is within the relative world, because *he,* Virāj, *was not at all happy,* i. e. was stricken with dissatisfaction, just like us. Because it was so, *therefore,* on account of loneliness etc., even to-day *people are not happy,* do not delight, *when alone.* Delight is a sport due to conjunction with a desired object. A person who is attached to it feels troubled in mind when he is separated from his desired object; this is called dissatisfaction. To remove that dissatisfaction, *he desired a mate,* able to take away that dissatisfaction, i. e. a wife. And as he thus longed for a wife, he felt as if he was embraced by his wife. Being of an

infallible will, through that idea *he became as big*—as what?—*as man and wife,* in the world, *embracing each other* to remove their dissatisfaction. He became of that size. *He parted this very body,* of that size, *into two.* The emphatic word 'very' used after 'this' is for distinguishing between the new body and its cause, the original body of Virāj. Virāj did not become of this size by wiping out his former entity, as milk turns into curd by wholly changing its former substance. What then? He remained as he was, but being of an infallible resolve, he projected another body of the size of man and wife together. He remained the same Virāj, as we find from the sentence, 'He became as big as,' etc., where 'he' is co-ordinate with the complement. *From that* parting *came husband* (Pati) *and wife* (Patnī). This is the derivation of terms denoting an ordinary couple. And because the wife is but one-half of oneself separated, *therefore this* body *is one-half, like one of the two halves of a split pea,* before one marries a wife. Whose half? *Of oneself.* Thus *said Yājñavalkya,* the son of Yajñavalka, lit. the expounder of a sacrifice, i. e. the son of Devarāta. Or it may mean a descendant of Hiraṇyagarbha (who is the expounder). Since one-half of a man is void when he is without a wife representing the other half, *therefore this space is indeed* again *filled by the wife* when he marries, as one-half of a split pea gets its complement when again joined to the other half. *He,* the Virāj called Manu, *was united with her,* his daughter called Śatarūpā, whom he conceived of as his wife. *From that* union *men were born.*

सा हेयमीक्षां चक्रे, कथं नु मात्मन एव जनयित्वा संभवति ? हन्त तिरोऽसानीति ; सा गौरभवत्, ऋषभ इतरः, तां समेवाभवत्, ततो गावोऽजायन्त ; वडवेतराभवत्, अश्ववृष इतरः, गर्दभीतरा, गर्दभ इतरः, तां समेवाभवत्, तत एकशफमजायत ; अजेतराभवत्, वस्त इतरः, अविरितरा, मेष इतरः, तां समेवाभवत्, ततोऽजावयोऽजायन्त ; एवमेव यदिदं किंच मिथुनम्, आ पिपीलिकाभ्यः, तत्सर्वमसृजत ॥ ४ ॥

4. She thought, 'How can he be united with me after producing me from himself? Well, let me hide myself.' She became a cow, the other became a bull and *was* united with her; from that cows were born. The one became a mare, the other a stallion; the one became a she-ass, the other became a he-ass and was united with her; from that one-hoofed animals were born. The one became a she-goat, the other a he-goat; the one became a ewe, the other became a ram and was united with her; from that goats and sheep were born. Thus did he project everything that exists in pairs, down to the ants.

Remembering the prohibition made in the Smṛtis of union with one's daughter, *she* Śatarūpā, *thought, 'How can he* do this vile thing—*be united with me after producing me from himself?* Although he has no abhorrence, *well, let me hide myself* by changing into another species.' Thinking thus *she became a*

cow. Impelled by the past work of the creatures that were to be produced, Śatarūpā and Manu had the same thought over and over again. Then *the other became a bull and was united with her.* The latter portion has been explained. *From that cows were born.* Similarly *the one became a mare, the other a stallion ;* likewise *the one became a she-ass, the other became a he-ass. From that union one-hoofed animals,* viz. the three species, horses, mules and asses, *were born.* Similarly *the one became a she-goat, the other* became *a he-goat ;* likewise *the one became a ewe, the other became a ram and was united with her.* The word 'her' is to be repeated so as to apply to both she-goat and ewe. *From that goats and sheep were born. Thus,* through this process, *did he project everything that exists in pairs,* as male and female, *down to the ants,* i. e. the whole (animate) world.

सोऽवेत्, अहं वाव सृष्टिरस्मि, अहं हीदं सर्वमसृक्षीति ;
ततः सृष्टिरभवत्; सृष्ट्यां हास्यैतस्यां भवति य एवं वेद ॥५॥

5. He knew, 'I indeed am the creation, for I projected all this.' Therefore he was called Creation. He who knows this as such becomes (a creator) in this creation of Virāj.

He, Virāj after projecting this whole world *knew, 'I indeed am the creation,* i. e. the projected world. The world I have projected not being different from me, I myself am that ; it is not something over and above myself. How? *For I projected all this,* the whole world.' Because Virāj designated himself by

the word 'creation', *therefore he was called Creation.* Like Virāj, *he becomes* a creator of a world not different from himself, *in this creation of Virāj,* i. e. in this world. Who? He *who,* like Virāj, *knows this,* the world described above, in its threefold division relating to the body, the elements and the gods, *as such,* as identical with himself.

अथेत्यभ्यमन्थत्, स मुखाच्च योनेर्हस्ताभ्यां चाग्निमसृजत ; तस्मादेतदुभयमलोमकमन्तरतः, अलोमका हि योनिरन्तरतः । तद्यदिदमाहुः, अमुं यजामुं यजेति, एकैकं देवम्, एतस्यैव सा विसृष्टिः, एष उ ह्येव सर्वे देवाः । अथ यत्किंचेदमार्द्रं तद्रेतसोऽसृजत, तदु सोमः ; एतावद्वा इदं सर्वम्, अन्नं चैवान्नादश्च ; सोम एवान्नम्, अग्निरन्नादः ; सैषा ब्रह्मणोऽतिसृष्टिर्यच्छ्रेयसो देवानसृजत, अथ यन्मर्त्यः सन्नमृतानसृजत तस्मादतिसृष्टिः ; अतिसृष्ट्यां हास्यैतस्यां भवति य एवं वेद ॥ ६ ॥

6. Then he rubbed back and forth thus, and produced fire from its source, the mouth and the hands. Therefore both these are without hair at the inside. When they talk of particular gods, saying, 'Sacrifice to him,' 'Sacrifice to the other one,' (they are wrong, since) these are all his projection, for he is all the gods. Now all this that is liquid, he produced from the seed. That is Soma. This universe is indeed this much—food and the eater of food. Soma is food, and fire the eater of food. This is the super-creation

of Virāj that he projected the gods, who are even superior to him. Because he, although mortal himself, projected the immortals, therefore this is a super-creation. He who knows this as such becomes (a creator) in this super-creation of Virāj.

Then, having thus projected this world consisting of pairs, *he,* Virāj, desiring to project the gods controlling the Brāhmaṇa and other castes, first *rubbed back and forth thus.* The words 'then' and 'thus' show the process by a gesture. Putting his hands into his mouth he went on rubbing back and forth. Having rubbed the mouth with his hands, he *produced fire,* the benefactor of the Brāhmaṇa caste, *from its source, the mouth and the hands.* Because the mouth and the hands are the source of fire, which burns, *therefore both these are without hair.* Is it all over? No, only *at the inside.* Similarly the Brāhmaṇa also was born from the mouth of Virāj. Because both have sprung from the same source, the Brāhmaṇa is favoured by fire, as a younger brother is by his elder brother. Therefore it is wellknown from the Śrutis and Smṛtis that the Brāhmaṇas have fire as their deity, and their strength lies in their mouth. Similarly from his arms, which are the abode of strength, he manifested Indra and other gods who control the Kṣatriya caste, as well as that caste itself. Therefore we know from the Śrutis and Smṛtis that the Kṣatriyas and physical strength are presided over by Indra. Similarly from his thighs, which are the source of effort, he manifested the Vasus and other gods who control

the Vaiśyas, as well as that caste itself. Therefore the Vaiśyas are devoted to agriculture and other such pursuits, and have the Vasus etc. as their deities. Similarly from his feet he manifested Pūṣan, the deity of the earth, and the Śūdras, who have the capacity to serve—as we know from the Śrutis and Smṛtis. The manifestation of the deities of the Kṣatriya etc. has not been described here; it will be described later on.[1] But the text concludes as if they were described, in order to deal with creation as a whole. The real aim of the text is (not to describe creation, but) to indicate that all the gods are but Virāj, as stated here, for manifested objects are not different from the manifestor, and the gods have been manifested by Virāj.

Now, this being the import of the section, the views of some ignorant people are being put forward as a eulogy on that. The criticism of one serves as a tribute to another. *When*, in discussing ceremonials, the priests, who know only mechanical rites, *talk of particular gods, saying* at the time of performing a sacrifice, *'Sacrifice to him*, viz. Fire,' *'Sacrifice to the other one*, viz. Indra,' and so on, thinking, on account of differences regarding name, type of hymns recited or sung, function, and the like, that they are separate gods, it should not be understood that way, because *these* different gods *are all his projection*, manifestation of Virāj, *for he*, Virāj,[2] the (cosmic) vital force, *is all the gods*.

Here there is a difference of opinion. Some say

[1] In I. iv. 11-13.

[2] See footnote 2 on p. 93.

that Hiraṇyagarbha is the Supreme Self, others that he is the transmigrating individual self. The first group says: He must be the Supreme Self, for the Śruti says so, as for instance in the passage, 'They call It Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa and Fire' (Ṛ. I. clxiv. 46), and also in, 'It is Hiraṇyagarbha, It is Indra, It is Virāj and all these gods' (Ai. V. 3). And the Smṛti too, 'Some call It Fire, others Manu and Virāj' (M. XII. 123), and 'That (Supreme Self) which is beyond the organs, imperceptible, subtle, undifferentiated, eternal, consisting of all beings, and unthinkable, manifested Itself' (M. I. 7). Or, according to the second group: He must be the individual self, for the Śruti says, 'He burnt all evils' (I. iv. 1). There can be no question of the burning of evils in the case of the Supreme Self. The Śruti also mentions his having fear and dissatisfaction, and also, 'That he, although mortal himself, projected the immortals' (this text), and 'Behold Hiraṇyagarbha as he is being born' (Śv. IV. 12 ; Mn. X. 3). Further, the Smṛti treating of the results of rites says, 'Sages are of opinion that the attainment of oneness with Virāj, the world-projectors (Manu and others), Yama (the god of justice), Hiraṇyagarbha and the Undifferentiated is the highest result produced by Sattva or pure materials (rites coupled with meditation)' (M. XII. 50).

Should it be urged that such contradictory statements being inadmissible, the scriptures lose their authority, the answer is: Not so, for they can be harmonised on the ground that different conceptions are possible. That is to say, through his relation to

particular limiting adjuncts he can be conceived of as different. That the transmigratory character of Hiraṇyagarbha is not real, but due to limiting adjuncts, is known from such Śruti texts as the following: 'Sitting, It roams far, and lying, It goes everywhere. Who else but me can know that effulgent entity which is endowed with joy and its absence as well?' (Ka. II. 21). Essentially he is but the Supreme Self. So Hiraṇyagarbha is one as well as many. The same is the case with all beings, as the Śruti says, 'Thou art That' (Ch. V. viii. 7 etc.). But Hiraṇyagarbha, possessing limiting adjuncts of extraordinary purity, is described by the Śrutis and Smṛtis mostly as the Supreme Self, and seldom as the transmigratory self. While ordinary individuals, owing to an excess of impurity in their limiting adjuncts, are mostly spoken of as the transmigratory self. But when divested of all limiting adjuncts, everyone is spoken of by the Śrutis and Smṛtis as the Supreme Self.

The rationalists, however, who discard the authority of Revelation and rely on mere argument, say all sorts of conflicting things such as that the self exists or does not exist, that it is the agent or is not the agent, and mystify the meaning of the scriptures. This makes it extremely difficult to find out their real import. But those who only follow the scriptures and have overcome their pride find the meaning of the scriptures regarding the gods etc. as definite as objects of perception.

Now the Śruti wishes to tell of one and the same god, Virāj, being differentiated as food and so forth.

Fire, which is the eater of food, has already been described. Now Soma, the food, is being described: *Now all this that is liquid* in the world, *he produced from* his *seed,* for the Śruti says, 'From the seed water' (Ai. I. 4), and Soma is liquid. Therefore whatever liquid was produced out of Virāj's seed *is Soma. This universe is indeed this much,* and no more. What is it? *Food,* i.e. Soma, which being liquid is appeasing, *and the eater of food,* i.e. fire, because it is hot and dry. Now follows a decision on the point: *Soma is food,* i.e. whatever is eaten is Soma. (*And fire the eater of food*)—whoever eats is fire. This decision is based on sense. Sometimes fire too is offered as an oblation, when it falls into the category of Soma (food). And when a sacrifice is made to Soma, it too becomes fire, being the eater. One who thus regards the universe consisting of fire and Soma as oneself is not touched by evil, and becomes Virāj. *This is the super-creation of Virāj,* i.e. one that is even superior to him. What is it? *That he projected the gods, who are even superior to him.* This is why this manifestation of the gods is called a super-creation. How is this creation even superior to him? This is being explained: *Because he, although mortal himself, projected the immortals,* the gods, by burning all his evils with the fire of meditation and rites, *therefore this is a super-creation,* i.e. the result of superior knowledge (and rites). Hence *he who knows this* super-creation of Virāj which is identical with him (i.e. identifies himself with Virāj, who projected the gods), *becomes* like him *in this super-creation of Virāj,* i.e. becomes a creator like Virāj himself.

तद्धेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत्, तन्नामरूपाभ्यामेव व्याक्रियत, असौनामायमिदंरूप इति ; तदिदमप्येतर्हि नामरूपाभ्यामेव व्याक्रियते, असौनामायमिदंरूप इति ; स एष इह प्रविष्ट आ नखाग्रेभ्यः, यथा क्षुरः क्षुरधानेऽवहितः स्यात्, विश्वंभरो वा विश्वंभरकुलाये ; तं न पश्यन्ति । अकृत्स्नो हि सः, प्राणन्नेव प्राणो नाम भवति, वदन् वाक्, पश्यंश्चक्षुः, शृण्वन् श्रोत्रम्, मन्वानो मनः ; तान्यस्यैतानि कर्मनामान्येव । स योऽत एकैकमुपास्ते न स वेद, अकृत्स्नो ह्येषोऽत एकैकेन भवति ; आत्मेत्येवोपासीत, अत्र ह्येते सर्व एकं भवन्ति । तदेतत्पदनीयमस्य सर्वस्य यदयमात्मा, अनेन ह्येतत्सर्वं वेद । यथा ह वै पदेनानुविन्देदेवम् ; कीर्तिं श्लोकं विन्दते य एवं वेद ॥ ७ ॥

7. This (universe) was then undifferentiated. It differentiated only into name and form—it was called such and such, and was of such and such form. So to this day it is differentiated only into name and form—it is called such and such, and is of such and such form. This Self has entered into these bodies up to the tip of the nails—as a razor may be put in its case, or as fire, which sustains the world, may be in its source. People do not see It, for (viewed in Its aspects) It is incomplete. When It does the function of living, It is called the vital force; when It speaks, the organ of speech; when It sees, the eye;

when It hears, the ear; and when It thinks, the mind. These are merely Its names according to functions. He who meditates upon each of this totality of aspects does not know, for It is incomplete, (being divided) from this totality by possessing a single characteristic. The Self alone is to be meditated upon, for all these are unified in It. Of all these, this Self alone should be realised, for one knows all these through It, just as one may get (an animal) through its foot-prints. He who knows It as such obtains fame and association (with his relatives).

All Vedic means consisting of meditation and rites, which depend on several factors such as the agent and culminate in identity with Hiraṇyagarbha, a result achieved through effort, are but co-extensive with this manifested, relative universe. Now the Śruti wishes to indicate the causal state of this manifested universe consisting of means and ends, the state which existed before its manifestation, as the existence of a tree in a seed-form is inferred from its effects such as the sprout, in order that the tree of relative existence, which has one's actions as its seed and ignorance as the field where it grows, may be pulled up together with its roots. For in the uprooting of it lies the perfection of human achievement. As it has been said in the Upaniṣad as well as the Gītā, 'With its roots above (i.e. the Undifferentiated) and branches below (Hiraṇyagarbha etc.)' (Ka. VI. 1 ; G. XV. 1). And in the Purāṇa also, 'The eternal tree of Brahman'

(Mbh. XIV. xlvii. 14; Śi. V. i. 10, 76). *This was then :* 'Tat' (that) refers to the seed-form of the universe before its manifestation. Being remote, it is indicated by a pronoun denoting an object not directly perceived, for the universe that was to emanate from the Undifferentiated is related to past time. The particle 'ha' denoting tradition is used to make the meaning easily understood. When it is said, 'It was then like this,' one easily comprehends the causal state of the universe, although it is not an object of perception, just as when it is said, 'There was a king named Yudhiṣṭhira.' 'This' refers to the universe differentiated into name and form, consisting of means and ends, as described above. The co-ordination of the two words 'that' and 'this,' denoting respectively the remote and present states of the universe, indicates an identity of the universe in these two states, meaning that which was this, and this which was that was *undifferentiated.* From this it is clear that a non-existent effect is not produced, nor an existent effect lost. *It,* this sort of universe, having been undifferentiated, *differentiated into name and form.* The neuter-passive form of the verb indicates that it differentiated of itself, i.e. manifested itself till it could be clearly perceived in terms of name and form. (Since no effect can be produced without a cause) it is implied that this manifestation took place with the help of the usual auxiliaries, viz. the controller, the agent and the operation of the means. *It was called such and such.* The use of a pronoun not specifying any particular name indicates that it got some name such as Devadatta

or Yajñadatta. *And was of such and such form :* No particular form such as white or black is mentioned. It had some form, say white or black. *So to this day it,* an undifferentiated thing, *is differentiated into name and form—it is called such and such, and is of such and such form.*

This Self, which it is the aim of all scriptures to teach, on which differences of agent, action and result have been superimposed by primordial ignorance, which is the cause of the whole universe, of which name and form consist as they pass from the undifferentiated to the differentiated state, like foam, an impurity, appearing from limpid water, and which is distinct from that name and form, being intrinsically eternal, pure, enlightened and free by nature—this Self, while manifesting undifferentiated name and form, which are a part of It, *has entered into these bodies* from Hiraṇyagarbha down to a clump of grass, which are the support of the results of people's actions, and are characterised by hunger etc.

Objection : It was stated before that the undifferentiated universe differentiated of itself. How then is it now stated that the Supreme Self, while manifesting that universe, has entered into it?

Reply : There is nothing wrong in it, for really the Supreme Self was meant as being identical with the undifferentiated universe. We have already said that that universe was necessarily manifested with the help of the controller, the agent and the operation (of the means). This is also borne out by the fact that the word 'undifferentiated' has been used co-ordinatively

with 'this.' Just as this differentiated universe has several distinguishing features like the controller and other factors, which serve as its causes, similarly that undifferentiated universe also must not be without a single one of these distinguishing features. The only difference between them is that the one is differentiated and the other is not. Moreover, we see in the world that people use expressions according to their wish, as for instance, 'The village has come,' and 'The village is deserted.' Sometimes they mean only a habitation, as when they use the latter expression. Sometimes they mean the inhabitants, as when they use the former expression. Sometimes again the word 'village' is used in both the senses, as in the sentence, 'And one must not enter (Praviś) the village.' Similarly here too, this universe is spoken of as both differentiated and undifferentiated to indicate the identity of the Self and not-Self. Likewise only the (manifested) universe is meant when it is said that this universe is characterised by origin and dissolution. Again, only the Self is meant in such expressions as, '(That) great, birthless Self' (IV. iv. 22, 24, 25), 'Not gross, not minute' (III. viii. 8, adapted), 'This (self) is That which has been described as "Not this, not this," etc.' (III. ix. 26; IV. ii. 4; IV. iv. 22; IV. v. 15).

Objection: The manifested universe is always completely pervaded by the Supreme Self, its manifestor. So how is It conceived of as entering into it? Only a limited thing can enter into a space that is not occupied by it, as a man can enter into a village etc. But the ether cannot enter into anything, since it is ever present in it.

Tentative answer[1]*:* The entrance in question may be the assumption of a different feature, as in the case of a snake born in a rock. To explain: The Supreme Self did not enter into the universe in Its own form, but, while in it, appeared under a different feature[2]; hence It is metaphorically spoken of as having entered it, like the snake that is born in a rock and is within it, or like the water in a cocoanut.

Objection : Not so, for the Śruti says, 'After projecting it, the Self entered into it' (Tai. II. vi. 1). This text says that the Creator, after projecting the effect, entered into it unchanged. When it is said, 'After eating he goes,' the acts of eating and going, belonging to earlier and later periods, are separate from each other, but the agent is the same. This is an analogous case. It would not be possible if the Self remains in the universe and changes at the same time. Nor is an entity that has no parts and is unlimited ever seen to enter into something in the sense of leaving one place and being connected with another.

Tentative answer : Well, then, the Self has parts, for the Śruti speaks of Its entrance.

Objection : No, for there are Śruti texts like the following: 'The Supreme Being is resplendent, formless' (Mu. II. i. 2), and 'Without parts, devoid of activity' (Śv. VI. 19). Also there are Śruti texts denying all particular namable attributes to the Self.

Tentative answer : The entrance may be like that of a reflection.

[1] From now on a set of *prima facie* views will be presented. The decision will come later.

[2] That is, as the individual self.

Objection : No, for it cannot be admitted that the Self is ever removed from anything.

Tentative answer : May it not be like the entrance of an attribute in a substance?

Objection : No, for the Self is not supported by anything. An attribute, which is always dependent on and supported by something else (the substance), is metaphorically spoken of as entering it. But Brahman cannot enter like that, for the Śrutis describe It as independent.

Tentative answer : Suppose we say that the Self has entered into the universe in the same sense as a seed enters into a fruit?

Objection : No, for then It would be subject to such attributes as being possessed of parts, growth and decay, birth and death. But the Self has no such attributes, for it is against such Śruti texts as 'Birthless, undecaying' (IV. iv. 25, adapted) as well as against reason.

Tentative answer : Well then, let us say some other entity that is relative and limited has entered into the universe.

Reply (by the Advaitin) : Not so, for we find in the Śruti that beginning with, 'That deity (Existence) thought' (Ch. VI. iii. 2), and ending with, 'And let me manifest name and form' (Ibid.), the same deity is spoken of as the agent of entering as well as manifesting the universe. Similarly, 'After projecting it, the Self entered into it' (Tai. II. vi. 1), 'Piercing this dividing line (of the head), It entered through that gate' (Ai. III. 12), 'The Wise One, who after projecting all forms names them, and goes on uttering those

names' (Tai. Ā. III. xii. 7), 'Thou art the boy, and Thou art the girl, Thou art the decrepit man trudging on his staff' (Śv. IV. 3), 'He made bodies with two feet' (II. v. 18), 'He transformed Himself in accordance with each form' (II. v. 19 ; Ka. V. ix. 10)—these Śruti texts show that none other than the Supreme Self entered into the universe.

Objection : Since the objects It has entered into mutually differ, the Supreme Self (being identical with them) must be many.

Reply : No, for there are such Śruti texts as the following: 'The same Lord resides in various ways' (Tai. Ā. III. xiv. 1), 'Although one, It roamed in many ways' (Ibid. III. xi. 1), 'Although one, Thou hast penetrated diverse things' (Ibid. III. xiv. 3), 'The one Lord is hidden in all beings, all-pervading and the Self of all' (Śv. VI. 11).

Objection : Leaving aside the question whether the Supreme Self can or cannot consistently enter, since those objects that have been entered into are *subject to transmigration, and the Supreme Self is identical with them, It too comes under transmigration.*

Reply : No, for the Śrutis speak of It as being beyond hunger etc.

Objection : It cannot be, for we see that It is happy or miserable, and so on.

Reply : Not so, for the Śruti says, 'It is not affected by human misery, being beyond it' (Ka. V. 11).

Objection : This is not correct, for it conflicts with perception etc.

Reply : No, perception and the like have for their object only the particular form (the apparent self) that It takes owing to Its being the support of Its limiting adjunct (mind). Such Śruti texts as, 'One cannot see the seer of sight' (III. iv. 2), 'Through what, O Maitreyī, should one know the knower?' (II. iv. 14 ; IV. v. 15), 'It is never known, but is the Knower' (III. viii. 11), show that the consciousness in question is not of the Self, but that such perceptions as that one is happy or miserable, concern only the reflection of the Self in limiting adjuncts like the intellect, for in the perception, 'I am this,' the subject is metaphorically spoken of as co-ordinate with the object (body). Besides, any other self is refuted by the statement, 'There is no other witness but This' (III. viii. 11). Happiness or misery, being related to parts of the body, are attributes of the object.

Objection : This is wrong, for the Śruti speaks of their being for the satisfaction of the self, in the words, 'But it is for one's own sake (that all is loved), (II. iv. 5 ; IV. v. 6).

Reply : Not so, for in the words, 'When there is something else, as it were' (IV iii. 31), it is taken for granted that the happiness, misery, etc. are for the satisfaction of the self while it is in a state of ignorance. They are not attributes of the Self, for they are denied of the enlightened self, as in such passages as, 'Then what should one see and through what?' (II. iv. 14 ; IV. v. 15), 'There is no difference whatsoever in It' (IV. iv. 19 ; Ka. IV. 11), 'Then what delusion and what grief can there be for one who sees unity?' (Īś. 7).

Objection : It is wrong, for it clashes with the system of logic.[1]

Reply : No ; from the standpoint of reason too the Self cannot be miserable. For misery, being an object of perception, cannot affect the Self, which is not an object of perception.

Objection : The Self may have misery as the ether has the attribute of sound.

Reply : No, for the two cannot be objects of the same consciousness. The consciousness that perceives happiness and deals with objects of perception only, cannot certainly be supposed to cognise the Self, which is ever to be inferred.[2] If It were so cognised, there would be no subject left, since there is only one Self.

Objection : Suppose we say that the same Self is both subject and object, like a lamp?

Reply : No, for It cannot be both simultaneously. Besides the Self cannot be supposed to have parts.[3] This also refutes the (Buddhist) view that the same consciousness is both subject and object. Moreover, we have no reason to infer that happiness and the Self, which are the objects of perception and inference respectively, stand to each other in the relation of attribute and substance ; for misery is always an object of perception and abides in the same substance (body) that has form or colour. Even if the misery of the Self is said to be due to Its contact with the mind,[4]

[1] In which the self is supposed to possess fourteen attributes, viz. intelligence, happiness, misery, and so on.

[2] The view of the old school of Nyāya as also the Sāṁkhyas.

[3] As a lamp has, the flame illumining the rest of it.

[4] Vaiśeṣika view.

it would make the Self a thing which has parts, is changeful and transitory, for no attribute is ever seen to come or go without making some change in the substance connected with it. And a thing which has no parts is never seen to change, nor is an eternal entity seen to possess transitory attributes. The ether is not accepted as eternal by those who believe in the Vedas, and there is no other illustration.

Objection : Although a thing may change, yet, since the notion of its identity abides, it is eternal.

Reply : No, for change in a thing implies that its parts become otherwise.

Objection : Suppose we say that the same Self is eternal.

Reply : Not so, for a thing that has parts is produced by their combination, hence they may divide again.

Objection : It is wrong, for we do not see this in thunder, for instance.

Reply : Not so, for we can easily infer that it must have been preceded by a combination. Therefore the Self cannot be proved to have transitory attributes like misery.

Objection : If the Supreme Self has no misery, and there is no other entity to be miserable, then it is useless for the scriptures to try to remove misery.

Reply : Not so, for they are meant to remove the false notion of misery superimposed by ignorance. And the Self being admitted to imagine Itself as miserable, the scriptures help to remove that error, as in the

case of the failure to count the tenth man, although he was there.[1]

Like the reflection of the sun etc. in water, the entrance of the Self means only Its being perceived like a reflection in the differentiated universe. Before the manifestation of the latter the Self is not perceived, but after it is manifested, the Self is perceived within the intellect, like the reflection of the sun etc. in water and the like. Because It is thus perceived as having entered, as it were, into the universe after manifesting it, It is indicated in such terms as the following: 'This Self has entered into these bodies' (this text), 'After projecting it, the Self entered into it' (Tai. II. vi. 1), 'Piercing this dividing line (of the head), It entered through that gate' (Ai. III. 12), and 'That deity (Existence) thought: Well, let me enter into these three gods (fire, water and earth) as this individual self' etc. (Ch. VI. iii. 2). The all-pervading Self, which is without parts, can never be supposed to enter in the sense of leaving a certain quarter, place or time and being joined to new ones. Nor is there, as we have said, any other seer but the Supreme Self, as is testi-

[1] Ten rustics swam across a stream, and one of them counted their number to see if everyone had safely crossed. To their dismay one was found missing. Then everyone took his turn at counting, but the result was the same. So they began to lament, when a kind passer-by inquired what it was all about. On being told what had happened, he readily understood the situation, and asked one of them to count again. When he stopped at nine, the new-comer said to him, 'You are the tenth man.' This he repeated with the rest of them. Then they saw their mistake and went away happy. Everyone had left himself out in the counting!

fied by such Śruti texts as, 'There is no other witness but This, no other hearer but This' etc. (III. viii. 11). The passages delineating the projection of the universe and the entrance of the Self into it as well as its continuance and dissolution, serve only as aids to the realisation of the Self, for this is described in the Śrutis as the highest end of man. Witness such texts as the following: 'It knew only Itself. . . . Therefore It became all' (I. iv. 10), 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest' (Tai. II. i. 1), 'He who knows that Supreme Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. III. ii. 9), 'He only knows who has got a teacher' (Ch. VI. xiv. 2), 'It takes him only so long (as he does not give up the body),' etc. (Ch. VI. xiv. 2). And the Smṛtis, 'Then knowing Me truly, he enters into Me' (G. XVIII. 55), 'That (Self-knowledge) is the chief of all knowledge, for it leads to immortality' (M. XII. 85). Besides, since duality has been repudiated, the passages delineating the manifestation etc. of the universe can have the sole aim of helping the realisation of the unity of the Self. Therefore we conclude that the entrance of the Self into the universe is but a metaphorical way of stating that It is perceived in the midst of the latter.

Up to the tip of the nails is the intelligence of the Self perceived. How has the Self entered? This is being explained: *As* in the world *a razor may be put in its case,* the barber's instrument-bag—is perceived as being within it—*or as fire, which sustains the world, may be in its source,* wood etc.—the predicate is to be repeated with 'fire' where it is perceived through friction. As a razor lies in one part of the case, or as

fire lies in wood pervading it, so does the Self reside in the body pervading it in a general and particular way. There It is perceived as doing the functions of living as well as sight etc. Therefore *people do not see It,* realise the Self[1] that has thus entered into the body and does the above functions.

It may be urged that this statement, 'People do not see It,' repudiates something for which there was no occasion, for the vision of It is not the topic under consideration. The answer to it is: There is nothing wrong in it, for since the passages delineating the projection etc. of the universe are meant as aids to the realisation of the unity of the Self, the vision of the Self is the subject under consideration. Compare the Śruti, 'He transformed Himself in accordance with each form; that form of His was for the sake of making Him known' (II. v. 19). Now the reason is being given why people see It only as doing the functions of the vital force etc. (but not as a whole): *For It is incomplete* when It does the above functions. Why incomplete? *When It does the function of living, It is called the vital force.* Because of doing this function only, and none other, the Self is called the vital force, from the derivative meaning of the term, as one is called a cutter or a cook. Therefore, not combining the other aspects doing other functions, It is incomplete. Similarly, *when It speaks, the organ of speech* (or speaker); *when It sees, the eye,* or seer; *when It hears, the ear,* or listener. In the two sentences, 'When It does the function of living, It is

[1] As It is in reality, although they see Its conditioned aspect.

the vital force,' and 'When It speaks, the organ of speech,' the manifestation of its power of action is indicated. While the two sentences, 'When It sees, the eye' and 'When It hears, the ear,' indicate the manifestation of Its power of knowledge, for this is concerned with name and form. The ear and the eye are the instruments of knowledge, which has name and form as its material, for there is nothing to be known except these two, and the ear and the eye are the instruments to perceive them. And action has name and form as its auxiliaries and inheres in the vital force; the organ of speech is the instrument to manifest this action inherent in the vital force. Likewise the Self is called the hand, the foot and the organs of excretion and generation, which are all suggested by the organ of speech. The whole differentiated universe is this much. It will be said later on, 'This (universe) indeed consists of three things: name, form and action' (I. vi. 1). *And when It thinks, the mind,* that which thinks. The word 'mind' also means the common instrument of the different manifestations of the power of knowledge. But here it denotes the Self, the agent who thinks.

These, the vital force etc., *are merely Its names according to functions,* not describing the Self as It is. Hence they do not express the entity of the Self as a whole. Thus the Self is differentiated by the activities of living etc. into name and form such as the vital force, which are engendered by those different activities, and is manifested at the same time (but not realised as a whole). *He who meditates* through his mind *upon each of this totality of aspects* doing the

functions of living etc., qualified as the vital force or the eye, without combining the other aspects doing particular functions—meditates that this is the Self, *does not know* Brahman. Why? *For It,* this Self, *is incomplete,* being divided *from this totality* of aspects doing the functions of living etc. *by possessing a single characteristic,* and not including the other characteristics. As long as the man knows the Self as such, as possessed of the natural functions, and thinks that It sees, hears or touches, he does not really know the whole Self.

Through what kind of vision can he know It? This is being explained: *The Self alone is to be meditated upon.* That which possesses the characteristics such as living that have been mentioned—includes them—is the Self.[1] Combining all the characteristics, It then becomes the whole. It is as the Reality that It includes those characteristics due to the functions of particular limiting adjuncts such as the vital force. As it will be said later on, 'It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were' (IV. iii. 7). Therefore the Self alone is to be meditated upon. When perceived thus as the Reality, It becomes complete. How is It complete? This is being answered: *For all these* differences due to the limiting adjuncts such as the vital force, and denoted by names arising from the functions of living etc., as described above, *are unified in It,* become one with the unconditioned Self, as the different reflections of the sun in water become one in the sun.

[1] The root-meaning of the word 'Ātman' is that which pervades everything.

'The Self alone is to be meditated upon'—this is not an original injunction[1] (but a restrictive one), for meditation on the Self is known as a possible alternative.[2] (In fact, neither injunction is necessary on the point, for this meditation is inevitable, in the following way:) The knowledge of the Self has been imparted by such Śruti passages dealing with the subject as, 'The Brahman that is immediate and direct' (III. iv. 1-2; III. v. 1), 'Which is the Self? This (infinite entity) that is identified with the intellect,' etc. (IV. iii. 7). The very knowledge of the nature of the Self removes the ignorance about It, consisting in identification with the non-Self, and the superimposing of action, its factors, principal and subsidiary, and its results (on the Self). When that is removed, evils such as desire cannot exist, and consequently thinking of the non-Self is also gone. Hence on the principle of the residuum thinking of the Self follows as a matter of course. Therefore meditation on It, from this point of view, has not to be enjoined, for it is already known (from other sources).

On this some say: Apart from the question whether meditation on the Self is known as just a

[1] Apūrva-vidhi: It enjoins something totally unknown through any other source. There are two other kinds of injunction. One is the restrictive injunction (Niyama-vidhi), which only specifies which one among the possible known alternatives is to be adopted, and the other is exclusion (Parisaṁkhyā), or limitation to what is expressly mentioned, so that everything else is excluded.

[2] See p. 135.

possible alternative or as something that is always known, the present case must be an original injunction, for knowledge and meditation being the same, this (meditation on the Self) is not something already known. The clause, 'He does not know,' introduces knowledge, and the sentence, 'The Self alone is to be meditated upon,' coming just after that, indicates that the words 'knowledge' and 'meditation' have the same meaning. Such Śruti texts as, 'For one knows all these through It' (this text), and 'It knew only Itself' (I. iv. 10), show that knowledge is meditation. And this, not being familiar to people, requires an injunction. Nor is a man induced to act merely by a statement of the nature of a thing. Therefore this must be an original injunction.

Its similarity to the injunctions about rites also corroborates this view. For instance, 'One should sacrifice,' 'One should offer oblations,' etc., are injunctions about rites, and we do not see any difference between these and the injunctions about meditation on the Self such as, 'The Self alone is to be meditated upon,' and 'The Self, my dear, is to be realised' (II. iv. 5; IV. v. 6). Besides knowledge is a mental act. Just as mental acts are enjoined by such (ritualistic) texts as, 'Just before uttering the invocation ending with 'Vauṣaṭ' (the invoking priest) should meditate upon the deity to whom the offering is to be made' (Ai. B. XI. viii.), similarly cognitive acts are enjoined by such texts as, 'The Self alone is to be meditated upon,' '(The Self) is to be reflected on and meditated upon' (II. iv. 5; IV. v. 6). And we have

said that the words 'knowledge' and 'meditation' are synonymous. Another reason in support of this view is that the requisite effort (in meditation also) should have its three divisions. That is to say, just as in the effort in connection with the injunction, 'One should sacrifice,' we know that in order to satisfy our curiosity about the proposed act, it must have three divisions, viz. 'What is it?' 'Through what means?' and 'In what way?'—similarly, in the effort in connection with the injunction, 'One should meditate,' in answer to one's queries regarding what to meditate upon, through what means to meditate, and in what way to meditate, the scriptures themselves support these three divisions by saying that the Self is to be meditated upon, through the mind, and by the practice of renunciation,[1] continence, equanimity, self-control, self-withdrawal,[2] fortitude etc., and so on. And just as the entire section dealing with the new and full moon sacrifices etc. is used as part of the injunction regarding these sacrifices, similarly the section of the Upaniṣads dealing with meditation on the Self must be used only as part of the injunction regarding this meditation. Such passages as 'Not this, not this' (II. iii. 6), 'Not gross,' (III. viii. 8), 'One only without a second' (Ch. VI. ii. 1), 'Beyond hunger etc.' (III. v. 1, adapted), are to be used as setting forth the particular nature of the Self, the object of meditation. And the result is liberation or the cessation of ignorance.

[1] Giving up forbidden acts as well as rites with material ends.

[2] Giving up the regular and occasional rites.

Others say that meditation generates a new special kind of consciousness regarding the Self, through which the latter is known, and which alone removes ignorance, and not the knowledge due to the Vedic dicta about the Self. And in support of this view they cite such texts as the following: '(The aspirant after Brahman) knowing about this alone, should attain intuitive knowledge' (IV. iv. 21), '(The Self) is to be realised—to be heard of, reflected on and meditated upon' (II. iv. 5 ; IV. v. 6), 'That is to be sought, and That one should desire to realise' (Ch. VIII. vii. 1, 3).

Both views are wrong, for there is no reference to anything else in the passage in question. To be explicit: The sentence, 'The Self alone is to be meditated upon,' is not an original injunction. Why? Because except the knowledge that arises from the dictum setting forth the nature of the Self and refuting the non-Self, there is nothing to be done, either mentally or outwardly. An injunction is appropriate only where, over and above the knowledge that arises immediately from hearing a sentence of the nature of an injunction, an activity on the part of a man is easily understood, as in sentences like, 'One who desires heaven must perform the new and full moon sacrifices.' The knowledge arising from a sentence enjoining these sacrifices is certainly not the performance of them. This depends on considerations such as whether a person is entitled to perform them. But apart from the knowledge arising from such passages delineating the Self as, 'Not this, not this,' there is no scope for human activity as in the case of the new

and full moon sacrifices etc., because that knowledge puts a stop to all activity. For a neutral knowledge cannot initiate any activity, since such passages as, 'One only without a second,' and 'Thou art That' (Ch. VI. vii. 7), merely remove the consciousness of any other entity but the Self or Brahman. And when this is gone, no activity is possible, for they are contradictory to each other.

Objection: The mere knowledge arising from those passages does not suffice to remove the consciousness of entities other than the Self or Brahman.

Reply: Not so, for such passages as, 'Thou art That,' 'Not this, not this,' 'All this is but the Self' (Ch. VII. xxv. 2), 'One only without a second,' 'This universe is but Brahman and immortal' (Mu. II. ii. 11), 'There is no other witness but This' (III. viii. 11), and 'Know that alone to be Brahman' (Ke. I. 5-9), describe the Reality alone.

Objection: Do they not supply the object for the injunction about realising the Self?

Reply: No, for we have already answered that point by saying that there is no reference to anything else in those passages. That is to say, since sentences such as, 'Thou art That,' which only delineate the nature of the Self, immediately lead to Its realisation, there is no further action to be done with regard to the injunction about that realisation.

Objection: A man does not proceed to know the Self immediately on hearing a statement of the nature of the Self, unless there is an injunction to that effect.

Reply : Not so, for the knowledge of the Self is already attained by hearing the dictum about It. So what is the good of doing It over again?

Objection : He may not even proceed to hear about the Self. (So an injunction is necessary.)

Reply : Not so, for it would lead to a *regressus in infinitum.* In other words, just as without an injunction he does not proceed to hear the meaning of a passage about the Self, similarly he would not, in the absence of another injunction, proceed to hear the meaning of a passage enjoining this ; so another injunction is necessary. Similarly with that injunction too. Hence there would be a *regressus in infinitum.*

Objection : Is not the train of remembrance of the knowledge of the Self generated by the passage relating to It something different from the knowledge itself arising from the hearing of It (and hence that is to be prescribed)?

Reply : No, for the remembrance of the Self comes automatically. That is to say, as soon as the knowledge of the Self arises in consequence of hearing a dictum delineating It, it necessarily destroys the false notion about It. It could not arise otherwise. And when this false notion about the Self is gone, memories due to that, which are natural to man and concern the multitude of things other than the Self, cannot last. Moreover, everything else is then known to be an evil. In other words, when the Self is known, things other than It are realised as evils, being full of defects such as transitoriness, painfulness and impurity, while the Self is contrary to them. Therefore the memories of notions about the non-Self die out when

the Self is known. As the only alternative left, the train of remembrance of the knowledge that the Self is one, which comes automatically, is not to be prescribed. Besides, the memory of the Self removes the painful defects such as grief, delusion, fear and effort, for these defects spring from the opposite kind of knowledge. Compare the Śruti texts, 'Then what delusion can there be?' (Īś. 7), 'Knowing (the bliss of Brahman) he is not afraid of anything' (Tai. II. 9), 'You have attained That which is free from fear, O Janaka' (IV. ii. 4), 'The knot of the heart is broken' (Mu. II. ii. 8), and so on.

Objection: Well then, the control of the mind may be something different. In other words, since the control of mental states is something different from the knowledge of the Self arising from the Vedic texts, and since we know this has been prescribed for practice in another system (Yoga), let this be enjoined.

Reply: No, for it is not known as a means of liberation. In the Upaniṣads nothing is spoken of as a means to the attainment of the highest end of man except the knowledge of the identity of the self and Brahman. Witness hundreds of Śruti texts like the following: 'It knew only Itself. . . . Therefore It became all' (I. iv. 10), 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest' (Tai. II. i. 1), 'He who knows that Supreme Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. III. ii. 9), 'He only knows who has got a teacher. It takes him only so long (as he does not give up the body)' (Ch. VI. xiv. 2), 'He who knows it as such indeed becomes the fearless Brahman' (IV. iv. 25; Nṛ. Ut.

VIII). Besides there is no other means for the control of mental states except the knowledge of the Self and the train of remembrance about it. We have said this as a tentative admission ; really we know of no other means of liberation except the knowledge of Brahman.

Moreover, there being no curiosity to know, no effort is necessary. To be explicit: You said, in the effort in connection with injunctions such as, 'One should sacrifice,' there is the curiosity to know what the sacrifice is about, what its means are, and how it is to be performed, and it is satisfied by the mention of the goal, the means and the method of the sacrifice ; similarly here too, in the injunction about the knowledge of the Self, those things are necessary. But you are wrong, for all curiosity is ended as soon as one knows the meaning of such texts as, 'One only without a second,' 'Thou art That,' 'Not this, not this,' 'Without interior or exterior' (II. vi. 19 ; III. viii. 8), and 'This self is Brahman' (II. v. 19). And a man does not proceed to know the meaning of those passages, prompted by an injunction. We have already said that if another injunction is needed for this, it would lead to a *regressus in infinitum*. Nor is an injunction noticed in such sentences as, 'Brahman is one only without a second,' for they finish by simply stating the nature of the Self.

Objection : Do they not lose their authority (as Vedas) by being mere statements of the nature of a thing? In other words, just as passages like, 'He (the deity Fire) cried. That is why he was called Rudra'

(Tai. S. I. v. 1. 1), being a mere narration of an event,[1] have no authority, so also the passages delineating the Self have none.

Reply : Not so, for there is a difference (between the two sets of passages). The test of the authority or otherwise of a passage is not whether it states a fact or an action, but its capacity to generate certain and fruitful knowledge. A passage that has this is authoritative, and one that lacks it, is not. But we want to ask you: Is or is not certain and fruitful knowledge generated by passages setting forth the nature of the Self, and if so, how can they lose their authority? Do you not see the result of knowledge in the removal of the evils which are the root of transmigration, such as ignorance, grief, delusion and fear? Or do you not hear those hundreds of Upaniṣadic texts such as, 'Then what delusion and what grief can there be for one who sees unity?' (Īś. 7), 'I am but a knower of (Vedic) Mantras, not of the Self, so I am tormented with grief, and you, sir, must take me beyond the reach of it' (Ch. VII. i. 3). Do passages like, 'He cried,' lead to this kind of certain and fruitful knowledge? If they do not, they may well be without authority. But how can the fact of their having no authority take away the authority of passages leading to certain and fruitful knowledge? And if these are without authority, what trust can one repose in passages dealing with the new and full moon sacrifices, for instance?

Objection : These have authority because they generate knowledge leading to action on the part of a

[1] And not an injunction, which is the sole test of authority for the Vedas according to the Mīmāṁsakas.

man. But passages inculcating the knowledge of the Self do not do that.

Reply : True, but it is nothing against them, for there is reason enough for their authority. And that reason is what we have already stated, and none other. It is not a reason to disprove the authority of passages inculcating the Self that they generate knowledge which has the effect of destroying the seeds of all activity, rather it is their ornament. You said (p. 129), sentences like, '(The aspirant after Brahman) knowing about this alone should attain intuitive knowledge,' convey the necessity of meditation in addition to knowing the meaning of the Vedic dicta. It is true, but they do not constitute an original injunction. Since meditation on the Self is already known as a possible alternative, they can only be restrictive.

Objection: How is that meditation already known as a possible alternative, since, as you said, on the principle of the residuum the train of remembrance of the knowledge of the Self is an inevitable fact?

Reply : It is true, but nevertheless, since the resultant of past actions that led to the formation of the present body must produce definite results, speech, mind and the body are bound to work even after the highest realisation, for actions that have begun to bear fruit are stronger than knowledge ; as for instance an arrow that has been let fly continues its course for some time. Hence the operation of knowledge, being weaker than they, (is liable to be interrupted by them and) becomes only a possible alternative. Therefore

there is need to regulate the train of remembrance of the knowledge of the Self by having recourse to means such as renunciation and dispassion ; but it is not something that is to be originally enjoined, being, as we said, already known as a possible alternative. Hence we conclude that passages such as, '(The aspirant after Brahman) knowing about this alone, should attain intuitive knowledge,' are only meant to lay down the rule that the train of remembrance—already known (as a possible alternative)—of the knowledge of the Self must be kept up, for they can have no other import.

Objection : This should be a meditation on the non-Self, for the particle 'iti' (as) has been used. In passages such as, 'It should be meditated upon as dear' (IV. i. 3), the meaning is not that features such as dearness are to be meditated upon, but that the vital force etc. possessing these features should be meditated upon. Similarly here also, from the use of the particle 'iti' along with the word 'Self' it is understood that something other than the Self (i.e. the Undifferentiated) but having the features of the Self is to be meditated upon. Another reason in support of this view is the difference of the passage in question from another where the Self is presented as the object of meditation. For instance, it will be stated later on, 'One should meditate only upon the world of the Self' (I. iv. 15). In that passage the Self alone is meant to be the object of meditation, for there is the accusative inflexion in the word 'Self.' Here, however, there is no accusative inflexion, but the particle 'iti' is used along with the word 'Self.' Hence it is understood

that the Self is not the object of meditation here, but something else having the features of the Self.

Reply : No, for at the end of this very passage (this text) the Self alone, we find, is presented as the object of meditation, 'Of all these, this Self alone should be realised,' (and elsewhere), 'This Self which is innermost' (I. iv. 8), and 'It knew only Itself' (I. iv 10).

Objection : The Self is not the object of meditation, for the vision of that which entered is negated. In other words, the Śruti precludes the vision of that very Self whose entrance (into the universe) was described, for the words, 'People do not see It' (this text), refer to the Self which is under consideration. Hence the Self is certainly not to be meditated upon.

Reply : Not so, for this is because of the defect of incompleteness. In other words, the preclusion of the vision is only to indicate the defect of incompleteness in the Self, not to forbid It as an object of meditation, for It is qualified by possessing the functions of living etc. If the Self were not meant to be the object of meditation, the mention of Its incompleteness when endowed with single functions such as living, in the passage, 'For It is incomplete (being divided) from this totality by possessing a single characteristic' (this text), would be meaningless. Hence the conclusion is that that Self alone which is not possessed of single features is to be meditated upon, for It is complete. The use of the particle 'iti' along with the word 'Self,' to which you referred, only signifies that the truth of

the Self is really beyond the scope of the term and the concept 'Self.' Otherwise the Śruti would only say. 'One should meditate upon the Self.' But this would imply that the term and the concept 'Self' were permissible with regard to the Self. That, however, is repugnant to the Śruti. Witness such passages, as 'Not this, not this' (II. iii. 6), 'Through what, O Maitreyī, should one know the Knower?' (II. iv. 14; IV. v. 15), 'It is never known, but is the Knower' (III. viii. 11), and 'Whence speech returns baffled together with the mind' (Tai. II. iv. 1 and ix. 1). As for the passage, 'One should meditate only upon the world of the Self,' since it is meant to preclude the possibility of meditation on things other than the Self, it does not convey a different meaning from the one we have been discussing.

Objection: Since they are alike incompletely known, the Self and the non-Self are both to be known. Such being the case, why should care be taken to know the Self alone, as is evident from the passage, 'The Self alone is to be meditated upon,' and not the other?

Reply: *Of all these, this* entity called *Self,* which we are considering, *alone should be realised,* and nothing else. The 'of' has a partitive force, meaning 'among all these.'

Objection: Is the rest not to be known at all?

Reply: Not so. Although it is to be known, it does not require a separate knowledge over and above that of the Self. Why? *For one knows all these*

things other than the Self *through It,* when the Self is known.

Objection : But we cannot know one thing by knowing another.

Reply : We shall answer the point while explaining the passage relating to the drum etc. (II. iv. 7).

Objection : How is the Self the one that should be realised?

Reply : Just as in the world *one may get* a missing animal that is wanted back, by searching it *through its footprints*—'foot' here means the ground with the print of hoof-marks left by a cow etc.—similarly when the Self is attained, everything is automatically attained. This is the idea.

Objection : The topic was knowledge—when the Self is known, everything else is known. So why is a different topic, viz. attainment, introduced here?

Reply : Not so, for the Śruti uses the words 'knowledge' and 'attainment' as synonymous. The non-attainment of the Self is but the ignorance of It. Hence the knowledge of the Self is Its attainment. The attainment of the Self cannot be, as in the case of things other than It, the obtaining of something not obtained before, for here there is no difference between the person attaining and the object attained. Where the Self has to attain something other than Itself, the Self is the attainer and the non-Self is the object attained. This, not being already attained, is separated by acts such as producing, and is to be attained by the initiation of a particular action with the help of particular auxiliaries. And that attainment of something new is transitory, being due to desire and

action that are themselves the product of a false notion, like the birth of a son etc. in a dream. But this Self is the very opposite of that. By the very fact of Its being the Self, It is not separated by acts such as producing. But although It is always attained, It is separated by ignorance only. Just as when a mother-of-pearl appears through mistake as a piece of silver, the non-apprehension of the former, although it is being perceived all the while, is merely due to the obstruction of the false impression, and its (subsequent) apprehension is but knowledge, for this is what removes the obstruction of false impression, similarly here also the non-attainment of the Self is merely due to the obstruction of ignorance. Therefore the attainment of It is simply the removal of that obstruction by knowledge ; in no other sense it is consistent. Hence we shall explain how for the realisation of the Self every other means but knowledge is useless. Therefore the Śruti, wishing to express the indubitable identity of meaning of knowledge and attainment, says after introducing knowledge, 'May *get,*' for the root 'vid' also means 'to get.'

Now the result of meditation on the characteristic is being stated: *He who knows It as such,* knows how this Self, entering into name and form, became famous through that name and form as the 'Self,' and got the association of the vital force etc., *obtains fame and association* with his dear ones. Or, he who knows the Self as described above obtains Kirti or the knowledge of unity coveted by seekers of liberation, and Śloka or liberation which results from that knowledge —gets these primary results of knowledge.

तदेतत्प्रेयः पुत्रात्, प्रेयो वित्तात्, प्रेयोऽन्यस्मात्सर्वस्मात्, अन्तरतरं यदयमात्मा। स योऽन्यमात्मनः प्रियं ब्रुवाणं ब्रूयात्, प्रियं रोत्स्यतीति, ईश्वरो ह, तथैव स्यात्; आत्मानमेव प्रियमुपासीत; स य आत्मानमेव प्रियमुपास्ते न हास्य प्रियं प्रमायुकं भवति ॥ ८ ॥

8. This Self is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than everything else, and is innermost. Should a person (holding the Self as dear) say to one calling anything else dearer than the Self, '(What you hold) dear will die'—he is certainly competent (to say so)—it will indeed come true. One should meditate upon the Self alone as dear. Of him who meditates upon the Self alone as dear, the dear ones are not mortal.

Here is another reason why the Self should be known to the exclusion of everything else. *This Self is dearer than a son:* A son is universally held dear in the world; but the Self is dearer than he, which shows that It is extremely dear. Similarly *dearer than wealth* such as gold or jewels, and *everything else,* whatever is admittedly held dear in the world. Why is the Self dearer than those things, and not the organs etc.? This is being explained: *And is innermost.* The body and the organs are inner and nearer to oneself than a son or wealth, for instance, which are external things. But this Self is nearer than those even. A thing which is extremely dear deserves to be attained by the utmost effort. So is this Self, which

is dearer than everything else held dear in the world. Therefore one should make the utmost effort to attain It, even abandoning that which is imposed as a duty[1] on one, for the attainment of other dear objects. But one may ask, when both Self and non-Self are dear, and the choice of one means the rejection of the other, why should the Self alone be chosen to the exclusion of the other, and not inversely? This is being answered: *Should a person* holding the Self as dear *say to one calling anything else* but the Self, such as a son, *dearer than the Self,* 'What you hold dear, for instance, the son, *will die* (lit. will meet with the extinction of life)'—Why does he say like this? Because *he is certainly competent* to say so. Hence—*it,* what he said, *will indeed come true,* the dear one will die, for he speaks the truth. Therefore he is in a position to say like that. Some say that the word 'Īśvara' (competent) means 'swift.' It might if it was commonly used in that sense. Therefore, giving up all other dear things, *one should meditate upon the Self alone as dear. Of him who meditates upon the Self alone as dear,* who knows that the Self alone is dear and nothing else, and thinks of It with the full conviction that the other things commonly held dear are really anything but dear—of one possessed of this knowledge *the dear ones are not mortal.* This is a mere restatement of a universal fact,[2] for a knower of the Self has nothing else to call dear or the opposite.

[1] By the scriptures ; e.g. marriage, for the sake of having a son.

[2] Viz. that everybody has dear ones and suffers when they die. Although the knower of Brahman has no such limited

Or it may be a eulogy on the choice of the Self as dear (in preference to non-Self); or it may be the declaration of a result for one who is an imperfect knower of the Self, if he meditates upon the Self as dear, for a suffix signifying a habit has been used in the word 'Pramāyuka' (mortal).[1]

तदाहुः, यत् 'ब्रह्मविद्यया सर्वं भविष्यन्तः मनुष्या मन्यन्ते, किमु तद्ब्रह्मावेद्यस्मात्तत्सर्वमभवदिति ॥ ९ ॥

9. They say: Men think, 'Through the knowledge of Brahman we shall become all.' Well, what did that Brahman know by which It became all?

In the words, 'The Self alone is to be meditated upon' (I. iv. 7), the knowledge of Brahman which it is the aim of the whole Upaniṣad to impart, has been briefly indicated. With a view to explaining this aphorism, the Śruti, in order to state the necessity of this knowledge, makes this introduction: *They say.* 'Tat' (that) is preparatory to what is going to be unfolded in the next clause. 'They' refers to those seekers of Brahman who, on getting a teacher who is like a boat on that boundless ocean which has for its water the painful struggle due to rotation in the cycle of birth, decay and death, desire to cross that ocean, and being disgusted with the world of means and ends consisting

vision and therefore does not suffer on that account, yet he is here described in terms that are merely conventional.

[1] Since mortal things cannot be immortal, it only means that they attain longer life by virtue of this meditation.

[2] 'All' here as well as in many subsequent passages means 'infinite existence.'

or righteousness and unrighteousness, their means and their results, long to attain the eternal, supreme good which is entirely different from the above. What do they say? This is being stated: *Men think, 'Through the knowledge of Brahman* or the Supreme Self *we shall become all*, excluding nothing.' The use of the word 'men' indicates their special aptitude for this as they are specially qualified for the achievement of prosperity and liberation. This is the idea. As those seekers think with regard to rites that they would bring sure results, similarly they think that the knowledge of Brahman is sure to lead to identity with all, for the Vedas are equally the authority for both. Now this seems to be something inconsistent, hence we ask, *what did that Brahman* by knowing which men think they will become all, *know by which It became all*? And the Śrutis say that It is all. If It became all without knowing anything, let it be the same with others too, what is the use of the knowledge of Brahman? If, on the other hand, It became all by knowing something, then this identity with all which is the result of the knowledge of Brahman, being the product of knowledge, becomes just like the result of an action, and therefore transitory. There would also be a *regressus in infinitum,* viz. that too had become all by knowing something else, that earlier thing, again, by knowing something else, and so on. We take it for granted that It did not become all without knowing something, for that would be distorting the meaning of the scriptures. But the charge of the result being transitory stands, does it not?—No, none of those charges can be levelled at it, for there is a particular meaning to it.

If indeed that Brahman becanll by knowing something, we ask, what was it? This objection the text gives the following absolutely less reply:

ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत्, तदात्मानमेत्, अहं ब्रह्मास्मीति। तस्मात्तत्सर्वमभवत्; तद्यो योनां प्रत्यबुध्यत स एव तदभवत्, तथर्षीणाम्, तथा माणाम्; तद्धैतत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदे, अहं मवं सूर्यश्चेति। तदिदमप्येतर्हि य एवं वेद, अहं ब्रह्माति, स इदं सर्वं भवति, तस्य ह न देवाश्चनाभूत्या ईशआत्मा ह्येषां स भवति; अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्ते, ऽसावन्योऽहमस्मीति, न स वेद, यथा पशुरेवं स देवा। यथा ह वै बहवः पशवो मनुष्यं भुञ्ज्युः, एवमेक पुरुषो देवान् भुनक्ति; एकस्मिन्नेव पशावादीयमानेऽ भवति, किमु बहुषु? तस्मादेषां तन्न प्रियं यदेतन्मनुविद्युः॥ १०॥

10. This (self) was indeed ahman in the beginning. It knew only It as, 'I am Brahman.' Therefore It becamll. And whoever among the gods knew It abecame That; and the same with sages and n. The sage Vāmadeva, while realising thielf) as That, knew, 'I was Manu, and the s' And to this day whoever in like manner kns It as, 'I am Brahman,' becomes all this verse). Even the gods cannot prevail agai him, for he becomes their self. While who worships·

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another gohinking, 'He is one, and I am another,' d not know. He is like an animal to the godsAs many animals serve a man, so does each n serve the gods. Even if one animal is tn away, it causes anguish, what should one of many animals? Therefore it is not liked them that men should know this.

Prima f view: Brahman here must be the conditioned man,[1] for then only can the identity with all be product of effort. The Supreme Brahman cannot me all as a result of knowledge. But this identity all is spoken of as a result of knowledge: 'There It became all.' Hence the Brahman referred to in passage, 'This was indeed Brahman in the beginn' must be the conditioned Brahman.

Or, sincen alone are qualified (for this identification with, the word 'Brahman' may refer to a future knowe Brahman who will be identified with It. For in passage, 'Men think . . . we shall become all' (. 9), men have been introduced, and it has alreadjen said that they alone are specially qualified for practice of the means of prosperity and liberatioeither the Supreme Brahman nor Hiraṇyagarbhhe conditioned Brahman. Therefore by the word ahman' is meant a man who through the knowledg the conditioned Brahman—identified with the wholiverse—combined with rites, attained identity withe conditioned Brahman (Hiraṇyagarbha), and ing away from all enjoyments (in that

[1] The viewn earlier commentator (Vṛttikāra).

state) and having broken his ties of desire and action by attaining everything, sought unity with the Supreme Brahman through the knowledge of It. It is a common occurrence in the world that words are used having reference to future states, as in the sentence, 'They are cooking rice,'[1] and in the scriptures too, 'The monk,[2] after performing a sacrifice in which wishing fearlessness to all beings is his fee to the priests,' etc. (Va. X.). Similarly here also Brahman means a man desiring to know Brahman and aspiring identity with It. This is the view of some.[3]

Reply : Not so, for that kind of identity with all would be open to the charge of transitoriness. There is no such thing in the world that really assumes a different state through some cause and still is eternal. Similarly, if identity with all be due to the knowledge of Brahman, it cannot at the same time be eternal. And if it be transitory, it would be, as we have already said, like the result of an action. But if by identity with all you mean the cessation, through the knowledge of Brahman, of that idea of not being all which is due to ignorance, then it would be futile to understand by the term 'Brahman' a man who will be Brahman. Even before knowing Brahman, everybody, being Brahman, is really always identical with all, but ignorance superimposes on him the idea that he is not Brahman and not all, as a mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver, or as the sky is imagined to be concave, or

[1] 'Rice' here means the cooked grains.
[2] He can be a monk only *after* the sacrifice.
[3] Bhartṛprapañca, another commentator.

blue, or the like. Similarly, if you think that here also the idea of not being Brahman and not being all that has been superimposed on Brahman by ignorance, is removed by the knowledge of Brahman, then, since the Vedas speak the truth, it is proper to say that what was really the Supreme Brahman is referred to in the sentence, 'This was indeed Brahman in the beginning,' for that is the primary meaning of the word 'Brahman.' But one must not think that the word 'Brahman' here means a man who will be Brahman, which would be contrary to the meaning of that term. For it is wrong to give up the plain meaning of a word used in the Śruti and put a new meaning in its place, unless there is a higher purpose behind it.

Objection: But the fact of not being Brahman and not being all exists apart from the creation of ignorance.

Reply: No, for then it cannot be removed by the knowledge of Brahman. This knowledge has never been observed either directly to remove some characteristic of a thing or to create one. But everywhere it is seen to remove ignorance. Similarly here also let the idea of not being Brahman and not being all that is due to ignorance, be removed by the knowledge of Brahman, but it can neither create nor put a stop to a real entity. Hence it is entirely futile to give up the plain meaning of a word used in the Śruti and put a new meaning in its place.

Objection: But is not ignorance out of place in Brahman?

Reply: Not so, for knowledge regarding Brahman has been enjoined. When there has been no superimposition of silver on a mother-of-pearl, and it is directly visible, no one takes the trouble to say it is a mother-of-pearl, and not silver. Similarly, were there no superimposition of ignorance on Brahman, the knowledge of unity regarding Brahman would not be enjoined in such terms as the following: All this is Existence, All this is Brahman,[1] 'All this is the Self' (Ch. VII. xxv. 2), and This duality has no existence apart from Brahman.[2]

Objection: We do not say that there is no superimposition on Brahman of attributes not belonging to It, as in the case of a mother-of-pearl, but that Brahman is not the cause of the superimposition of these attributes on Itself, nor the author of ignorance.

Reply: Let it be so. Brahman is not the author of ignorance nor subject to error. But it is not admitted that there is any other conscious entity but Brahman which is the author of ignorance or subject to error. Witness such Śruti texts as, 'There is no other knower but Him' (III. vii. 23), 'There is no other knower but This' (III. viii. 11), 'Thou art That' (Ch. VI. viii. 7), 'It knew only Itself as, "I am Brahman"' (this text), and 'He (who worships another god thinking), "He is one, and I am another," does not know' (Ibid.). And the Smṛtis: '(Living) the same in all beings' (G. XIII. 27), 'I am the self, O Arjuna (dwelling in the minds of all beings)' (G. X.

[1] Adapted from Ch. VI. ii. 1 and Mu. II. ii. 11 respectively.

[2] An echo of IV. iv. 19.

20), and '(Wise men are even-minded) to a dog as well as a Caṇḍāla' (G. V. 18). And the Vedic Mantras: 'He who (sees) all beings (in himself)' (Īś. 6), and 'When all beings (have become his self)' (Īś. 7).

Objection: In that case scriptural instruction is useless.

Reply: Quite so, let it be, when the truth has been known.

Objection: But it is also useless to know the truth.

Reply: No, for we see it removes ignorance.

Objection: If there is unity, this removal of ignorance also is impossible.

Reply: Not so, for it contradicts experience. We actually see that the knowledge of unity alone dispels ignorance. If you deny an observed fact, saying it is impossible, you would be contradicting experience, a thing which nobody will allow. Nor is there any question of impossibility with regard to an observed fact, because it has actually been observed.

Objection: But this observation also is impossible.

Reply: There also the same logic will apply.

Objection: 'One indeed becomes good through good work' (III. ii. 13), 'It is followed by knowledge, work' (IV. iv. 2), 'The individual self, the Puruṣa, is a thinker, knower and doer' (Pr. IV. 9)—from such Śruti and Smṛti texts as well as from reason we know that there is a transmigrating self other than and distinct from the Supreme Self. And the latter is known to be distinct from the former from such Śruti texts

as the following: 'This (self) is That which has been described as "Not this, not this," ' (III. iv. 26), 'It transcends hunger etc.,'[1] 'The Self that is sinless, undecaying, deathless' (Ch. VIII. vii. 13), and 'Under the mighty rule of this Immutable' (III. viii. 9). Again, in the systems of logic (Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya) advocated by Kaṇāda and Gautama, the existence of a God distinct from the transmigrating self is established through argument. That the latter is different from God is clearly seen from its activity due to its desire to get rid of the misery of relative existence. Also from such Śruti and Smṛti texts as: 'It is without speech and without zeal' (Ch. III. xiv. 2), and 'I have no duties, O Arjuna' (G. III. 32). And from the distinct mention of God as the object of search and the individual self as the seeker, in such (Śruti) passages as: 'That is to be sought, and That one should desire to realise' (Ch. VIII. vii. 1, 3), 'Knowing It one is not touched (by evil action)' (IV. iv. 23), 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest' (Tai. II. i. 1), 'It should be realised in one form only' (IV. iv. 20), 'He, O Gārgī, who without knowing this Immutable' (III. viii. 10), 'Knowing It alone the sage' (IV. iv. 21), and 'The syllable Om is called the bow, the individual self the arrow, and Brahman the target' (Mu. II. ii. 4). Another reason for the difference is the mention of a journey, particular routes and a destination for a seeker of liberation. If there is no difference, who should make the journey and how, and in the absence of this, two particular routes, viz. the southern and northern, are meaningless, and the destination as

[1] Adapted from III. v. 1.

well. But if the individual self is different from the Supreme Self, all this would be consistent. Also they must be different because the scriptures prescribe the two means, viz. rites and knowledge. If the individual self is different from Brahman, the teaching of rites and knowledge as means to prosperity and liberation respectively may aptly apply to it, but not to God, for the objects of His desire are eternally attained. Therefore it is proper to understand the word 'Brahman' in the sense of a man aspiring to be Brahman.

Reply : No, for then instruction about Brahman would be useless. If a man subject to transmigration and only aspiring to be identified with Brahman became all by knowing himself to be Brahman, although he was not It, then instruction about the Supreme Brahman is certainly useless, for he attained identity with all as a result of knowing only the transmigrating self, and the knowledge of the Supreme Brahman is never utilised[1] for attaining human ends.

Objection : The instruction is only meant for the man subject to transmigration, so that he may practise the meditation based on resemblance[2] with regard to Brahman as, 'I am Brahman.' For if he does not fully know the nature of Brahman, with what can he identify himself in fancy as, 'I am Brahman'? This

[1] By scriptural injunctions, making it a subsidiary part of rites.

[2] This is a kind of meditation known as 'Sampad,' in which an inferior thing is thought of as a superior thing through some common features, often fanciful.

meditation based on resemblance is possible only when the characteristics of Brahman are fully known.

Reply: Not so, for we know that the words 'Brahman' and 'self' are synonymous, being used thousands of times in co-ordination in such texts as the following: 'This self is Brahman' (II. v. 19), 'The Brahman that is immediate and direct' (III. iv. 1-2; III. v. 1), 'The Self (that is sinless)' (Ch. VIII. vii. 1, 3), 'It is truth, It is the Self' (Ch. VI. viii. 7 etc.) and 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest' (Tai. II. i. 1), these last introductory words (to Tai. II.) being shortly after followed by the words, 'From this Self,' etc. (Ibid.). The meditation based on resemblance is performed when the two things concerned are different, not when they are identical. And the sentence, 'This all is the Self' (II. iv. 6). shows the unity of the Self under consideration that is to be realised. Therefore the Self cannot be regarded as Brahman through the meditation based on resemblance.

Nor do we see any other necessity for instruction about Brahman, for the Śruti mentions identification with It in the passages, '(He who) knows (that Supreme) Brahman becomes Brahman' (III. ii. 9), 'You have attained That which is free from fear, O Janaka' (IV. ii. 4), and 'He . . . becomes the fearless Brahman' (IV. iv. 25). If the meditation based on resemblance were meant, this identity would not take place, for one thing cannot become another.

Objection: On the strength of scriptural statements, even the meditation based on resemblance may lead to identity.

Reply : No, for this meditation is only an idea. And knowledge, as we have said, only removes the false notion, it does not create anything. Nor can a scriptural statement impart any power to a thing. For it is an accepted principle that the scriptures are only informative, not creative.[1] Besides, in the passage, 'This Self has entered into these bodies,' etc. (I. iv. 7), it is clear that the Supreme Self alone has entered. Therefore the view that the word 'Brahman' means a man who will be Brahman, is not a sound one. Another reason is that it contradicts the intended meaning. The desired import of this whole Upaniṣad is the knowledge that Brahman is without interior or exterior and homogeneous like a lump of salt, as is known from the assertion made at the end of both Madhu and Muni Kāṇḍas,[2] 'This is the teaching' (II. v. 19), and 'This much indeed is (the means of) immortality, my dear' (IV. v. 15). Similarly, in the Upaniṣads of all recensions the knowledge of the unity of Brahman (self) is the certain import. If, therefore, the passage in question is interpreted to mean that the transmigrating self, which is different from Brahman, knew itself, the desired meaning of the Upaniṣads would be contradicted. And in that case the scripture, having its beginning and end not tallying with each other, would be considered inconsistent. Moreover, the name would be out of place. In other words, if in the passage, 'It knew only Itself,' the word 'It' is supposed to refer to

[1] They only give first-hand information about things unknown. They do not produce anything new. See p. 301.

[2] Consisting of chapters I--II and III--V respectively.

the transmigrating self, the name given to the knowledge would not be 'the knowledge of Brahman,' for then, 'It knew only Itself,' should mean that the transmigrating self was the entity that was known.

Objection : Suppose we say that the word 'Self' refers to an entity other than the knower.[1]

Reply : Not so, for there is the specification, 'I am Brahman.' If the entity known were other than the knower, the specification should be, 'It is Brahman,' or 'That is Brahman,' and not 'I am Brahman.' But since it is, 'I am Brahman,' and there is the assertion, 'It knew only Itself,' we know it for certain that the self is Brahman. And then only the name 'the knowledge of Brahman' would be appropriate, not otherwise. In the other case it would be 'the knowledge of the transmigrating self.' Nor can the same entity really be both Brahman and not Brahman, just as the sun cannot be both bright and dark, for these are contradictory features. And if both were the cause of the name, there should not be the sure appellation 'the knowledge of Brahman.' It should then be 'the knowledge of Brahman and of the transmigrating self.' Nor in proceeding to expound the knowledge of Truth should one present the reality as an absurdity, like a woman, for instance, being one-half old and one-half young. That will only cause doubt in the mind of the listener. Whereas it is sure knowledge that is regarded as leading to liberation, the goal of human life, as is evidenced by the following Śruti and Smṛti

[1] Which, according to the opponent, is the individual self. Hence the entity known would be Brahman, thus justifying the name of the knowledge.

texts: 'He who really has (the conviction that he will attain the conditioned Brahman after death) and has no doubt about it (does attain him)' (Ch. III. xiv. 4), and 'The doubting man perishes' (G. IV. 40). Hence one who wishes to do good to others should not use expressions of a doubtful import.

Objection: To think that Brahman, like us, is a seeker of liberation, is not proper, and that is what we see in the passage, 'It knew only Itself. . . . Therefore It became all.''

Reply: Not so, for by saying this you will be flouting the scriptures. It is not our idea, but that of the scriptures Hence your fling hits them. And you who wish to please Brahman should not give up the real meaning of the scriptures by fancying things contrary to it. Nor should you lose your patience over this much only, for all plurality is but imagined in Brahman, as we know from hundreds of texts like the following: 'It should be realised in one form only' (IV. iv. 20), 'There is no difference whatsoever in Brahman' (IV. iv. 19; Ka. IV. 11), 'When there is duality, as it were' (II. iv. 14; IV. v. 15), and 'One only without a second' (Ch. VI. ii. 1). Since the whole phenomenal world is imagined in Brahman alone and is not real, you say very little when you condemn this particular idea as improper.

Therefore the conclusion is that the word 'Brahman' refers to that Brahman which projected the universe and entered into it.

This, the Brahman (self) that is perceived as being in this body, *was indeed*—this word is emphatic—

Brahman, and all, ***in the beginning,*** even before realisation. But owing to ignorance it superimposes on itself the notion that it is not Brahman, and that it is not all, and consequently thinks, through mistake, that it is an agent, possessed of activity, the experiencer of its fruits, happy or miserable, and transmigrating. But really it is Brahman different from all the foregoing and is all. Being somehow awakened by a merciful teacher who told it that it was not subject to transmigration, *'It knew only Itself,'* its own natural Self, that is, which is free from differentiations superimposed by ignorance. This is the meaning of the particle 'eva' (only).

Objection : Tell me, what is that natural Self which Brahman knew?

Reply : Do you not remember the Self? It has been pointed out as the one that entering into these bodies does the function of the Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna and Samāna.[1]

Objection : You are describing It as one would describe a cow or a horse by simply saying, 'It is a cow,' or 'It is a horse.' You do not show the Self directly.

Reply : Well then, the Self is the seer, hearer, thinker and knower.

Objection : Here also you do not directly point out the nature of that which does the functions of seeing etc. Going is surely not the nature of one who goes, nor cutting that of a cutter.

Reply : In that case the Self is the seer of sight,

[1] See commentary on I. v. 3.

the hearer of hearing, the thinker of thought and the knower of knowledge.

Objection: But what difference does it make in the seer? Whether it be the seer of sight or of a jar, it is but the seer under all circumstances. By saying 'The seer of sight' you are simply stating a difference as regards the object seen. But the seer, whether it be the seer of sight or of a jar, is just the same.

Reply: No, for there *is* a difference, and it is this: If that which is the seer of sight is identical with that sight, it always visualises the latter, and there is never a time when sight is not visualised by the seer. So the vision of the seer must be eternal. If it were transitory, then sight, which is the object visualised, may sometimes not be seen, as a jar, for instance, may not always be perceived by the transitory vision. But the seer of sight never ceases to visualise sight like that.

Objection: Has the seer then two kinds of vision, one eternal and invisible, and the other transitory and visible?

Reply: Yes. The transitory vision is familiar to us, for we see some people are blind, and others are not. If the eternal vision were the only one in existence, all people would be possessed of vision. But the vision of the seer is an eternal one, for the Śruti says, 'The vision of the witness can never be lost' (IV. iii. 23). From inference also we know this. For we find even a blind man has vision consisting of the impressions of a jar etc. in dreams. This shows that the vision of the seer is not lost with the loss of the other

kind of vision. Through that unfailing eternal vision, which is identical with It and is called the self-effulgent light, the Self always sees the other, transitory vision in the dream and waking states, as idea and perception respectively, and becomes the seer of sight. Such being the case, the vision itself is Its nature, like the heat of fire, and there is no other conscious (or unconscious) seer over and above the vision, as the Vaiśeṣikas maintain.

It, Brahman, knew only Itself, the eternal vision, devoid of the transitory vision etc. superimposed on It.

Objection : But knowing the knower is self-contradictory, for the Śruti says, 'One should not try to know the knower of knowledge' (III. iv. 2).

Reply : No, this sort of knowledge involves no contradiction. The Self is indeed known thus, as 'the seer of sight.' Also it does not depend on any other knowledge. He who knows that the vision of the seer is eternal, does not wish to see It in any other way. This wish to see the seer automatically stops because of its very impossibility, for nobody hankers after a thing that does not exist. And that sight which is itself an object of vision does not dare to visualise the seer, in which case one might wish to do it. Nor does anybody want to see himself. Therefore the sentence, 'It knew only Itself,' only means the cessation of the superimposition of ignorance, and not the actual cognising of the Self as an object.

How did It know Itself? As 'I am Brahman, the Self that is the seer of sight.' 'Brahman' is That which is immediate and direct, the Self that is within all, beyond hunger and the like, described as 'Not this,

not this,' neither gross nor subtle, and so on. 'I am, as you[1] said, That and no other, not the transmigrating self.' *Therefore,* from knowing thus, *It,* Brahman, *became all.* Since by the cessation of the superimposed notion of not being Brahman, its effect, the notion of not being all, was also gone, therefore It became all. Hence men are justified in thinking that through the knowledge of Brahman they would become all. The question, 'Well, what did that Brahman know by which It became all?' has been answered: 'This was indeed Brahman in the beginning. It knew only Itself as, "I am Brahman." Therefore It became all.'

And whoever among the gods knew It, the Self, in the manner described above, that awakened self *also became That,* Brahman. *And the same with sages and men.* The words 'gods' etc. are used from the conventional point of view, not from that of the vision of Brahman. We have already said that it is Brahman which has entered everywhere, as set forth in the passage, 'That Supreme Being first entered the bodies' (II. v. 18). Hence the words 'gods' etc. are used from the conventional standpoint determined by the limiting adjuncts such as the body. Really it was Brahman which was in those divine and other bodies even before realisation, being only looked upon as something else. It knew only Itself and thereby became all.

To strengthen the import of the passage that this knowledge of Brahman leads to identity with all, the Śruti quotes some Mantras. How? *The sage* called

[1] The teacher.

Vāmadeva, while realising this, his own self, *as* identical with *That,* Brahman, *knew,* from this realisation of Brahman, i.e. in that state of realisation of the identity of the self and Brahman, visualised these Mantras, *'I was Manu, and the sun,'* etc. (Ṛ. IV. xxvi. 1). The expression, 'While realising this (self) as That'—Brahman—refers to the knowledge of Brahman. And the words, 'I was Manu, and the sun,' refer to its result, identity with all. By the use of the form,[1] 'While realising' It he attained this result, viz. identity with all, the Śruti shows that liberation is attainable through the aid of the knowledge of Brahman, as in the expression, 'While eating he is getting satisfaction.' Someone may think that the gods, who are great, attained this identity with all through the knowledge of Brahman because of their extraordinary power, but those of this age, particularly men, can never attain it owing to their limited power. In order to remove this notion the text says: *And to this day whoever,* curbing his interest in external things, *in like manner knows It,* the Brahman under consideration which has entered into all beings and is indicated by the functions of seeing etc., i.e. his own Self, *as, 'I am Brahman,'* which is untouched by the attributes of the phenomenal universe, is without interior or exterior and absolute, by discarding the differences superimposed by the false notion created by limiting adjuncts, *becomes all this,* owing to his notion of incompleteness—the effect of ignorance—being removed by the knowledge of Brahman. For there is no differ-

[1] The suffix Śatṛ, denoting concurrence.

ence as regards Brahman or the knowledge of It between giants like Vāmadeva and the human weaklings of to-day. But, one may suppose, the result of the knowledge of Brahman may be uncertain in the case of the present generation. This is answered as follows: *Even the gods,* powerful as they may be, *cannot prevail against him,* the man who has known Brahman in the manner described above—have not the capacity to stop his becoming Brahman and all, much less others.

Objection: Is there any ground for supposing that the gods and others can thwart the attainment of the results of the knowledge of Brahman?

Reply: Yes, beacuse men are indebted to them. The Śruti text, (Every Brāhmaṇa—twice-born—by his very birth is indebted) to the sages in respect of continence, to the gods in respect of sacrifices, and to the Manes in respect of progeny' (Tai. S. VI. iii. 10. 5), shows that a man by his very birth is under certain obligations. And we know it from the illustration of animals (in this text). There is also the text, 'Now this self (the ignorant man),' etc. (I. iv. 16), describing him as an object of enjoyment for all, which shows that it is reasonable to suppose that the gods, in order to maintain their livelihood, may hinder men, who are dependent, from attaining immortality, as creditors do with their debtors. The gods also protect their animals like their own bodies, for the Śruti will show that each man being equivalent to many animals, the gods have a great source of livelihood in the rites performed by him. It will presently be stated, 'Therefore it is not liked by them that men should know this' (this text),

and 'Just as one wishes safety to one's body, so do all beings wish safety to him who knows it as such' (I. iv. 16). From the mention of dislike and safety we understand that the gods think that when a man attains the knowledge of Brahman, he will cease to be their object of enjoyment and their animal, for his dependence will end. Therefore the gods may very well hinder a prospective knower of Brahman from attaining the results of the knowledge of Brahman, for they are also powerful.

Objection : In that case the gods may find it like drinking a beverage to obstruct the fruition of results in other spheres too, viz. rites. Well, it would shake one's faith in the performance of the means of achieving prosperity and liberation. Similarly God also, being of inscrutable power; can put obstacles, as also time, action, sacred formulæ, herbs and austerities, which, as we know from the scriptures as well as experience, can help or hinder the fruition of results. This too would shake one's faith in the performance of scriptural rites.

Reply : Not so, for all things spring from definite causes, and we also see variety in the universe. Both these will be inconsistent if things happen spontaneously. Since it is the accepted view of the Vedas, Smṛtis, reasoning and tradition that happiness, misery, and the like are the outcome of one's past work, the gods, or God, or time by no means upset the results of work, for these depend on requisite factors. Work, good or bad, that men do cannot come into being without the help of factors such as the gods, time and God, and even if it did, it would not have the power

to produce results, for it is the very nature of work to spring from many causes such as the different factors. Therefore the gods, God and others being auxiliaries to work, there is nothing to shake our faith in the attainment of its results.

Sometimes also (in the matter of thwarting) they have to depend on the past work of men, for its inherent power cannot be checked. And there is no fixity about the relative predominance of past work, time, destiny and the nature of things etc.; it is inscrutable, and hence throws people into confusion. Some, for instance, say that in bringing about results one's past work is the only factor. Others say it is destiny. A third group mentions time. Still others say it is the nature of things etc. While yet another group maintains it is all these things combined. Regarding this the Vedas and Smṛtis uphold the primacy of past work, as in the passage, 'One indeed becomes good through good work and evil through evil work' (III. ii. 13), and so on. Although one or other of these at times gains ascendancy in its own sphere over the rest, whose potential superiority lies in abeyance for the time being, yet there is no uncertainty about work producing results, for the importance of work is decided by the scriptures as well as reason.[1]

Nor (can the gods check the result of knowledge), for the realisation of Brahman, which is this result, consists in the mere cessation of ignorance. It has been suggested that the gods may thwart the attain-

[1] The variety that we see in the world can be explained only as the outcome of men's diverse past work.

ment of Brahman, which is the result expected from the knowledge of It ; but they do not have that power. Why? Because this result, the attainment of Brahman, immediately follows the knowledge. How? As in the world a form is revealed as soon as the observer's eye is in touch with light, similarly the very moment that one has knowledge of the Supreme Self, ignorance regarding It must disappear. Hence, the effects of ignorance being impossible in the presence of the knowledge of Brahman, like the effects of darkness in the presence of a lamp, whom should the gods thwart and by what means, for is not the knower of Brahman the self of the gods? This is what the text says: *'For he,* the knower of Brahman, *becomes their self,* the reality of these gods, the object of their meditation, the Brahman that is to be known from all scriptures, simultaneously with the knowledge of Brahman, since, as we have said (p. 140), the only obstruction of ignorance vanishes then and there, like a mother-of-pearl mistaken for a piece of silver becoming itself again. Hence the gods cannot possibly try to stand against their own self. They succeed in their effort to put obstacles only in the case of one who seeks a result which is other than the Self and is separated by space, time and causation, but not with regard to this sage, who becomes their self simultaneously with the awakening of knowledge, and is not separated by space, time and causation, for there is no room for opposition here.

Objection : In that case, since there is not a stream of consciousness about knowledge (of Brahman), and since we see that a consciousness of an

opposite nature together with its effects persists, let us say that only the last[1] consciousness of the Self removes ignorance, and not the first one.

Reply : No, for your ground of inference will be falsified on account of the first. If the first consciousness of the Self does not remove ignorance, neither will the last, for they are alike consciousness of the Self.

Objection : Well then, let us say, it is not the isolated consciousness that removes ignorance, but that which is continuous.

Reply : Not so, for there cannot be a continuity, since it would be broken by thoughts of self-preservation etc. So long as these crop up, there cannot be an unbroken stream of consciousness about knowledge, for the two are contradictory.

Objection : Suppose the latter continues till death to the exclusion of the former.

Reply : Not so, for the uncertainty about the requisite number of thoughts to make up that stream would be open to the charge of making the meaning of the scriptures indefinite. In other words, there being nothing to determine that so many thoughts would make up a stream that will remove ignorance, it would be impossible to determine the meaning of the scriptures, which is not desirable.

Objection : The meaning is quite definite, for in so far as it is a stream of consciousness, it will remove ignorance.

Reply : No, for there is no difference between the first and the last stream of consciousness. There

[1] The one arising at the moment of death.

being nothing to determine whether it is the first stream of consciousness about knowledge that removes ignorance, or the last one ending with the moment of death, they too would be open to those two charges already mentioned with regard to the first and last thoughts.

Objection : Well then, let us say that knowledge does not remove ignorance.

Reply : Not so, for the Śruti says, 'Therefore It became all,' as also, 'The knot of the heart is broken,' etc. (Mu. II. ii. 8), 'Then what delusion can there be?' (Īś. 7), and so on.

Objection : These may be mere eulogies.

Reply : No, for then the Upaniṣads in all the recensions would be classed as such, for they have just this one aim.

Objection : Suppose we say that they are but eulogies, for they deal with the self which is already known through perception.[1]

Reply : No, for we have already refuted that contention.[2] Also we have said that knowledge produces palpable results, viz. the cessation of such evils as ignorance, grief, delusion and fear (p. 134). Therefore there can be no question about knowledge removing ignorance, whether it be first or last, continuous or non-continuous, for knowledge culminates in producing the cessation of ignorance and other evils. Any consciousness that produces this result, whether first or last, continuous or non-continuous, is knowledge

[1] As the basis of our ego-consciousness.

[2] The ego-consciousness deals with the individual self, not the Supreme Self, the Witness. See p. 118.

according to us. Hence there is no scope whatsoever for any objection.

You said, the first consciousness does not remove ignorance, because we see that a consciousness of an opposite nature to knowledge together with its effects persists. This is wrong, for the residue of Prārabdha work is the cause of the persistence of the body after knowledge. In other words, that resultant of past work which led to the formation of the present body (Prārabdha), being the outcome of false notions[1] and the evils (of attachment etc.), is able to bear fruit only as such, i.e. as coupled with those notions and evils ; hence until the body falls, it cannot but produce, as part of one's experience of the results of past work, just so much of false notions and the evils of attachment etc., for the past work that made this body has already begun to bear fruit and must run its course like an arrow that has been shot. Therefore knowledge cannot stop that, for they are not contradictory. What does it do then? It stops the effects of ignorance which are contradictory to it and are about to spring up from (the ignorance lying in) the self, which is the substratum of that knowledge, for they have not yet appeared. But the other is past.

Moreover, false notions do not arise in a man of realisation, for there is then no object for them. Whenever a false notion arises, it does so on account of a certain similarity of something to another, without ascertaining the particular nature of that thing, as when a mother-of-pearl is mistaken for a piece of silver.

[1] Notions opposed to reality: considering the non-Self to be the Self and *vice versa*.

And this can no more happen to one who has ascertained the particular nature of that thing, for the source of all false notions (that cursory resemblance) has been destroyed ; as they no more appear when a right perception of the mother-of-pearl, for instance, has taken place. Sometimes, however, memories due to the impressions of false notions antecedent to the dawning of knowledge, simulating those notions, suddenly appear and throw him into the error of regarding them as actual false notions ; as one who is familiar with the points of the compass sometimes all of a sudden gets confused about them. If even a man of realisation comes to have false notions as before, then faith in realisation itself being shaken, no one would care to understand the meaning of the scriptures, and all evidences of knowledge would cease to be such, for then there would be no distinction between things that are valid evidences and those that are not. This also answers the question why the body does not fall immediately after realisation. The destruction of actions done before, after and at the time of realisation as well as those accumulated in past lives—actions that have not yet begun to bear fruit—is proved by the very negation of obstructions to the attainment of results in the present text, as also from such Śruti texts as the following: 'And his actions are destroyed' (Mu. II. ii. 8), 'It takes him only so long (as he does not give up his body)' (Ch. VI. xiv. 2), 'All demerits are burnt up' (Ch. V. xxiv. 3), 'Knowing It one is not touched by evil action' (IV. iv. 23), 'He is never overtaken by these two thoughts (of having done good and evil acts)' (IV. iv. 22), 'Actions done or omitted do not

trouble him' (Ibid.), '(Remorse for doing evil and not doing good) does not trouble him' (Tai. II. ix.), and 'He is not afraid of anything' (Ibid.). Also from such Smṛti texts as the following: 'The fire of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes' (G. IV. 37).

The objection that he is tied up by his obligations (to the gods etc.) is not valid, for they concern an ignorant man. It is he who is under those obligations, for he can be presumed to be an agent and so forth. It will be said later on, 'When there is something else, as it were, then one can see something' (IV. iii. 31). These last words show that the acts of seeing etc. together with their results, which are dependent on many factors created by ignorance, are possible only in the state of ignorance, when the Self, the Reality that has no second, appears as something else, like a second moon when one has got the disease of double vision (Timira). But the text, 'Then what should one see and through what?' (II. iv. 14 ; IV. v. 15), shows that work is impossible in the state of knowledge, when the illusion of manifoldness created by ignorance has been destroyed. Therefore the indebtedness in question belongs only to an ignorant man, for whom it is possible to work, and to none else. We shall show this at length while dealing with passages that are yet to be explained.

As, for instance, here. *While he,* one who is not a knower of Brahman, *who worships another god,* a god different from himself, approaches him in a subordinate position, offering him praises, salutations, sacrifices, presents, devotion, meditation, etc., *thinking, 'He is one, non-self,* different from me, *and I am*

another, qualified for rites, and I must serve him like a debtor'—worships him with such ideas, ***does not know*** the truth. *He,* this ignorant man, has not only the evil of ignorance, but *is* also *like an animal to the gods.* As a cow or other animals are utilised through their services such as carrying loads or yielding milk, so is this man of use to every one of the gods and others on account of his many services such as the performance of sacrifices. That is to say, he is therefore engaged to do all kinds of services for them.

The scriptural rites, with or without the accompaniment of meditation, which this ignorant man, for whom the divisions of caste, order of life and so forth exist, and who is bound to those rites, performs, lead to progress beginning with human birth and ending with identity with Hiraṇyagarbha. While his natural activities, as distinguished from those prescribed by the scriptures, lead to degradation beginning with the human birth itself and ending with identity with stationary objects. That it is so we shall explain in the latter part of this chapter beginning with, 'There are indeed three worlds' (I. V. 16), and continuing right up to the end. While the effect of knowledge (meditation) has been briefly shown to be identity with all. The whole of this Upaniṣad is exclusively devoted to showing the distinction between the spheres of knowledge and ignorance. We shall show that this is the import of the whole book.

Since it is so, therefore the gods can thwart as well as help an ignorant man. This is being shown: *As* in the world ***many animals*** such as cows or horses ***serve a man,*** their owner and controller, *so does each*

ignorant *man,* equivalent to many animals, *serve the gods.* This last word is suggestive of the Manes and others as well. He thinks, 'This Indra and the other gods are different from me and are my masters. I shall worship them like a servant through praises, salutations, sacrifices, etc., and shall attain as results prosperity and liberation granted by them. Now, in the world, *even if one animal* of a man possessing many such *is taken away,* seized by a tiger, for instance, *it causes* great *anguish.* Similarly what is there to wonder at if the gods feel mortified when a man, equivalent to many animals, gets rid of the idea that he is their creature, as when a householder is robbed of many animals? *Therefore it is not liked by them,* these gods—what?—*that men should* somehow *know this* truth of the identity of the self and Brahman. So the revered Vyāsa writes in the Anugītā, 'The world of the gods, O Arjuna, is filled with those who perform rites. And the gods do not like that mortals should surpass them' (Mbh. XIV. xx. 59). Hence as men try to save animals from being seized by tigers etc., so the gods seek to prevent men from attaining the knowledge of Brahman lest they should cease to be their objects of enjoyment. Those, however, whom they wish to set free, they endow with faith and the like; while the opposite class they visit with lack of faith etc. Therefore a seeker of liberation should be devoted to worshipping the gods, have faith and devotion, be obedient (to the gods) and be alert about the attainment of knowledge or about knowledge itself. The mention of the dislike of the gods is an indirect hint at all this.

In the sentence, 'The Self alone is to be meditated upon' (I. iv. 7) the gist[1] of the scriptures has been put in a nutshell. In order to explain it, its relation,[2] and utility have also been stated in the eulogistic passage, 'They say: Men think,' etc. (I. iv. 9). And that ignorance is the cause of one's belonging to the relative plane has been stated in the passage, 'While he who worships another god,' etc. (I. iv. 10). There it has been said that an ignorant man is indebted and dependent like an animal, having to do duties for the gods etc. What is the cause of their having to do those duties? The different castes and orders of life. The following paragraphs are introduced in order to explain what these castes are, because of which this dependent man is bound to the rites connected with them, and transmigrates. It is to explain this in detail that the creation of Indra and other gods was not mentioned immediately after that of Fire. This last, however, was described to complete the picture of creation by Virāj. It should be understood that this creation of Indra and other gods also belongs to that, being a part of it. It is being described here only to indicate the reason why the ignorant man alone is qualified for the performance of rites.

ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीदेकमेव; तदेकं सन्न व्यभवत्। तच्छ्रेयोरूपमत्यसृजत क्षत्रं, यान्येतानि देवत्रा क्षत्राणि— इन्द्रो वरुणः सोमो रुद्रः पर्जन्यो यमो मृत्युरीशान इति। तस्मात्क्षत्रात्परं नास्ति; तस्माद्ब्राह्मणः क्षत्रियमधस्ता-

[1] The knowledge of Brahman.

[2] To the resulting identification with the universe, and so on. The relation here is that of means and end.

दुपास्ते राजसूये, क्षत्र एव तद्यशो दधाति; सैषा क्षत्रस्य योनिर्यद्ब्रह्म। तस्माद्यद्यपि राजा परमतां गच्छति ब्रह्मैवान्तत उपनिश्रयति स्वां योनिम्; य उ एनं हिनस्ति स्वां स योनिमृच्छति, स पापीयान् भवति, यथा श्रेयांसं हिंसित्वा ॥ ११ ॥

11. In the beginning this (the Kṣatriya and other castes) was indeed Brahman,[1] one only. Being one, he did not flourish. He specially projected an excellent form, the Kṣatriya— those who are Kṣatriyas among the gods: Indra, Varuṇa, the moon, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Death, and Īśāna. Therefore there is none higher than the Kṣatriya. Hence the Brāhmaṇa worships the Kṣatriya from a lower position in the Rājasūya sacrifice. He imparts that glory to the Kṣatriya. The Brāhmaṇa is the source of the Kṣatriya. Therefore, although the king attains supremacy (in the sacrifice), at the end of it he resorts to the Brāhmaṇa, his source. He who slights the Brahmaṇa, strikes at his own source. He becomes more wicked, as one is by slighting one's superior.

In the beginning this, the Kṣatriya and other castes, *was indeed Brahman,* identical with that Brahman (Virāj) who after manifesting Fire assumed the form of that. He is called Brahman, because he identified himself with the Brāhmaṇa caste. *One only:* Then there was no differentiation into other

[1] Virāj in the form Fire, who was a Brāhmaṇa.

castes such as the Kṣatriya. *Being one,* i.e. without any protector etc. such as the Kṣatriya, *he did not flourish,* i.e. could not do his work properly. Hence *he,* Virāj, thinking, 'I am a Brāhmaṇa, and these are my duties,' in order to create duties pertaining to a Brāhmaṇa by birth—to glorify himself as a performer of rites—*specially,* pre-eminently, *projected an excellent form.* What is that? *The* caste called *Kṣatriya.* This is being pointed out by a reference to its individuals. *Those who are* well known in the world as *Kṣatriyas among the gods.* The plural is used (in 'Kṣatriyas'), as in grammar a word denoting a caste may be optionally in the plural.[1] Or because there are many individuals in a caste, the difference is figuratively transferred to the group. Who are they? This the text answers by mentioning particularly the anointed ones: *Indra,* the King of gods; *Varuṇa,* of the aquatic animals; *the moon,* of the Brāhmaṇas; *Rudra,* of the beasts; *Parjanya,* of lightning etc.; *Yama,* of the Manes; *Death,* of disease etc.; and *Īśāna,* of luminaries. These are some of the Kṣatriyas, among the gods. It should be understood that after them the human Kṣatriyas, Purūravas and others belonging to the Lunar and Solar dynasties, presided over by the Kṣatriya gods, Indra and the rest, were also created. For the creation of the gods is mentioned for this very purpose. Because Virāj created the Kṣatriyas with some special eminence attached to them, *therefore there is none higher than the Kṣatriya,* who is the controller of the Brāhmaṇa caste even.

[1] See Pāṇini I. ii. 58.

Hence the Brāhmaṇa, although he is the source of him, *worships the Kṣatriya,* who has a higher seat, *from a lower position.* Where? *In the Rājasūya sacrifice. He imparts that glory* or fame which belongs to him, viz. the title of Brahman, *to the Kṣatriya.* That is to say, when the king, anointed for the Rājasūya sacrifice, addresses the priest from his chair as 'Brahman,' the latter replies to him, 'You, O King, are Brahman.' This is referred to in the sentence, 'He imparts that glory to the Kṣatriya.' *The Brāhmaṇa,* who is the topic under consideration, *is* indeed *the source of the* Kṣatriya. *Therefore, although the king attains supremacy,* viz. the distinction of being anointed for the Rājasūya sacrifice, *at the end of it,* when the ceremony is over, *he resorts to the Brāhmaṇa, his source,* i.e. puts the priest forward. But *he who,* proud of his strength, *slights* or looks down upon *the Brāhmaṇa,* his own source, *strikes* at or destroys *his own source. He becomes more wicked* by doing this. The Kṣatriya is already wicked on account of his cruelty, and he is more so by hurting his own source, *as* in life *one is* more wicked *by slighting one's superior.*

स नैव व्यभवत्, स विशमसृजत, यान्येतानि देवजातानि गणश आख्यायन्ते—वसवो रुद्रा आदित्या विश्वेदेवा मरुत इति ॥ १२ ॥

12. Yet he did not flourish. He projected the Vaiśya—those species of gods who are designated in groups: The Vasus, Rudras, Ādityas, Viśvadevas and Maruts.

Yet, even after projecting the Kṣatriyas, *he,* Virāj, *did not flourish* in his work, as before, for want of someone to acquire wealth. *He projected the Vaiśya,* in order to acquire wealth which is the means of performing rites. Who is that Vaiśya? *Those species of gods who are designated in groups.* The Vaiśyas abound in groups, for they succeed in acquiring wealth mostly in combination, not singly.—The suffix in the word 'Jāta' does not change the meaning.—*The Vasus,* a group of eight; similarly the eleven *Rudras,* the twelve *Ādityas,* the thirteen *Viśvadevas,* sons of Viśvā, or the word may mean 'all the gods,' *and* the forty-nine *Maruts,* in seven groups.

स नैव व्यभवत्, स शौद्रं वर्णमसृजत पूषणम्; इयं वै पूषा, इयं हीदं सर्वं पुष्यति यदिदं किंच ॥ १३ ॥

13. He did not still flourish. He projected the Śūdra caste—Pūṣan. This (earth) is Pūṣan. For it nourishes all this that exists.

For want of a servant *he did not still flourish.* He *projected the Śūdra caste.* In the word 'Śaudra' there is a lengthening of the vowel without any change of meaning. What was this Śūdra caste that was projected? *Pūṣan,* he who nourishes. Who is this Pūṣan? He is being particularly pointed out: *This* earth *is Pūṣan.* The Śruti itself gives the derivation: *For it nourishes all this that exists.*

स नैव व्यभवत्, तच्छ्रेयोरूपमत्यसृजत धर्मम्; तदेतत् क्षत्रस्य क्षत्रं यद्धर्मः, तस्माद्धर्मात्परं नास्ति; अथो अबलीयान् बलीयांसमाशंसते धर्मेण, यथा राज्ञैवम्; यो वै स धर्मः सत्यं वै तत्, तस्मात् सत्यं वदन्तमाहुः, धर्मं

वदतीति, धर्मं वा वदन्तं सत्यं वदतीति, एतद्ध्येवैतदुभयं भवति ॥ १४ ॥

14. Yet he did not flourish. He specially projected that excellent form, righteousness (Dharma).[1] This righteousness is the controller of the Kṣatriya. Therefore there is nothing higher than that. (So) even a weak man hopes (to defeat) a stronger man through righteousness, as (one contending) with the king.[2] That righteousness is verily truth. Therefore they say about a person speaking of truth, 'He speaks of righteousness,' or about a person speaking of righteousness, 'He speaks of truth,' for both these are but righteousness.

Yet, even after projecting the four castes, *he did not flourish,* fearing that the Kṣatriya, being fierce, might be unruly. *He specially projected that excellent form.* What is it? *Righteousness. This righteousness,* the projected excellent form, *is the controller of* even *the Kṣatriya,* fiercer than that fierce race even. 'Yat' should be changed into 'Yaḥ.' *Therefore,* since it is the controller of even the Kṣatriya, *there is nothing higher than that,* for it controls all. The text proceeds to explain how it is: *So even a weak man hopes* to defeat *a stronger man* than himself *through* the strength of *righteousness, as* in life a householder contending

[1] Meaning an action approved by the scriptures. In II. v. 11 'Dharma' means the unseen result of such action (Apūrva).

[2] The more obvious meaning, as given in the Vārttika, is: 'As (one does) through the king.'

even *with the king,* who is the most powerful of all. Therefore it goes without saying that righteousness, being stronger than everything else, is the controller of all. *That righteousness,* which is expressed as conduct, being practised by people, *is verily truth.* 'Truth' is the fact of being in accordance with the scriptures. The same thing, when it is practised, is called righteousness, and when it is understood to be in accordance with the scriptures, is truth. Since it is so, *therefore* bystanders knowing the difference between them *say about a person speaking of truth,* i.e. what is in accordance with the scriptures, in dealing with another, *'He speaks of righteousness,'* or well known conventional propriety. Conversely also, *about a person speaking of righteousness* or conventional conduct, they say, *'He speaks of truth,'* or what is in accordance with the scriptures. *For both these* that have been described, that which is known and that which is practised, *are but righteousness.* Therefore that righteousness in its double aspect of knowledge and practice controls all, those that know the scriptures as well as those that do not. Therefore it is the 'controller of the Kṣatriya.' Hence an ignorant man identified with righteousness, in order to practise its particular forms, identifies himself with one or other of the castes, Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya or Śūdra, which is the pre-condition of that practice ; and these are naturally the means that qualify one for the performance of rites.

तदेतद्ब्रह्म क्षत्रं विट् शूद्रः ; तदग्निनैव देवेषु ब्रह्माभवत् ; ब्राह्मणो मनुष्येषु, क्षत्रियेण क्षत्रियो, वैश्येन वैश्यः, शूद्रेण

शूद्रः ; तस्मादग्नावेव देवेषु लोकमिच्छन्ते, ब्राह्मणे मनुष्येषु, एताभ्यां हि रूपाभ्यां ब्रह्माभवत्। अथ यो ह वा अस्माल्लोकात्स्वं लोकमदृष्ट्वा प्रैति, स एनमविदितो न भुनक्ति, यथा वेदो वाननूक्तः, अन्यद्वा कर्माकृतम् ; यदिह वा अप्यनेवंविन्महत्पुण्यं कर्म करोति, तद्धास्यान्ततः क्षीयत एव ; आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत ; स य आत्मानमेव लोकमुपास्ते, न हास्य कर्म क्षीयते। अस्माद्ध्येवात्मनो यद्यत्कामयते तत्तत्सृजते ॥ १५ ॥

15. (So) these (four castes were projected)—the Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra. He became a Brāhmaṇa among the gods as Fire, and among men as the Brāhmaṇa. (He became) a Kṣatriya through the (divine) Kṣatriyas, a Vaiśya through the (divine) Vaiśyas and a Śūdra through the (divine) Śūdra. Therefore people desire to attain the results of their rites among the gods through fire, and among men as the Brāhmaṇa. For Brahmaṇ was in these two forms. If, however, anybody departs from this world without realising his own world (the Self), It, being unknown, does not protect him—as the Vedas not studied, or any other work not undertaken (do not). Even if a man who does not know It as such performs a great many meritorious acts in the world, those acts of his are surely exhausted in the end. One should meditate only upon the world of the Self. He who meditates only upon the world called the

Self never has his work exhausted. From this very Self he projects whatever he wants.

(So) *these* four castes were projected—*the Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra.* They are repeated here together in order to introduce what follows. *He,* Brahman, the Projector (Virāj), *became a Brāhmaṇa among the gods as Fire,* and in no other form, *and* became a Brāhmaṇa *among men as the Brāhmaṇa,* directly. In the other castes he appeared in a changed form[1]: (He bceame) *a Kṣatriya through the* (divine) *Kṣatriyas,* i.e. being presided over by Indra and other gods ; *a Vaiśya through the* (divine) *Vaiśyas*[2] and *a Śūdra through the* (divine) *Śūdra.*[3] Because Brahman, the Projector, was changed in the Kṣatriya and other castes, and was unchanged in Fire and the Brāhmaṇa, *therefore people desire to attain the results of their rites among the gods through fire,* i.e. by performing rites connected with it. It is for this purpose that Brahman abides in the form of fire, which is the receptacle in which sacrificial rites are performed. Therefore it stands to reason that people wish to attain results by performing those rites in the fire. *And among men as the Brāhmaṇa :* If they want human results, there is no need for rites depending on fire etc., but simply by being born as a Brāhmaṇa they attain their life's ends. And it is only when they desire to attain results that depend on the gods, that they have to resort to rites connected with fire. The Smṛti, too, says, 'But a Brāhmaṇa may undoubtedly attain per-

[1] That is, having first become Fire and the Brāhmaṇa.
[2] Presided over by the Vasus etc.
[3] Presided over by Pūṣan.

fection through the repetition of sacred formulæ,[1] whether he does other rites (connected with fire) or not. A Brāhmaṇa is one who is friendly to all' (M. II. 87). Also because the monastic life is open to him only. Therefore people seek to attain the results of their rites, so far as they belong to the human plane, by attaining Brāhmaṇahood. *For Brahman,* the Projector, *was* directly *in these two forms,* the Brāhmaṇa and fire, that are respectively the agent and the receptacle of the rites.

Some[2] explain the passage differently, saying that people wish to realise the world of the Supreme Self by means of fire and the Brāhmaṇa.[3] This is wrong, for the division of castes has been introduced in order to defend the undertaking of rites by people who are under ignorance, and a specification also follows. If the word 'world' here refers to the Supreme Self, the specification that follows, viz. 'Without realising one's own world (the Self),' would be meaningless. If the world in question that is prayed for as being dependent on fire, is any other world but the Self, then only the specification by the word 'own' would be consistent as refuting that extraneous world. The world that is the Self is always denoted by the words 'one's own,' while those that are created by ignorance can never be 'one's own.' That the worlds attained through rites are not

[1] This is suggestive also of the duties belonging to his caste.

[2] Bhartṛprapañca is meant.

[3] By offering oblations and presents respectively.

'one's own' is stated by the words, '(Those acts) are surely exhausted.'

One may object: Brahman projected the four castes for the sake of ritualistic work. And that work, called righteousness, being obligatory on all, controls all and helps them to achieve their life's ends. Therefore, if by that work one attains one's own world called the Supreme Self, although It may be unknown, what is the good of setting It up as the goal? This is being answered: *'If, however,*—the word 'however' refutes the *prima facie* view—*anybody,* owing to identification with the rites depending on fire, or with the duties belonging to the Brāhmaṇa caste, *departs or dies from this* transmigratory, adventitious and extraneous *world* consisting of the taking up of a body and caused by ignorance, desire and work, *without realising his own world* called the Self—because It is always one's own Self—as, 'I am Brahman,' *It*—although It is his own world, yet—*being unknown,* obstructed by ignorance and therefore virtually becoming extraneous to oneself, *does not protect him* by removing his evils such as grief, delusion and fear—as the man in the story[1] (the conventional 'self') fails to protect himself for not knowing that he is the missing tenth man. *As the Vedas not studied* do not protect a man by enlightening him on the rites etc., *or any other,* secular, *work,* e.g. agriculture, *not undertaken,* not manifested in its own form, does not protect anybody by bestowing its results, similarly the Supreme Self, although It is one's own world, on account of not being manifested in Its

[1] See footnote on p. 121.

own form as the eternal Self, does not protect one by destroying one's ignorance etc.

Objection: What is the good of seeking protection through the realisation of one's own world, the Self? Since the rites are sure to produce results, and there are a great many rites conducive to beneficent results, the protection that they will afford will be everlasting.

Reply: Not so, for anything made is perishable. This is being stated: *Even if a man,* a wonderful genius, *who does not know It,* his own world, the Self, *as such,* in the manner described above, continuously *performs a great many meritorious acts* such as the horse sacrifice, producing only beneficent results, *in the world,* with the idea that through those alone he will attain eternity, *those acts of his,* of this ignorant man, being due to desire created by ignorance, *are surely exhausted in the end,* when he has enjoyed their fruits, like the splendour arising from the fantasy of a dream. They are bound to be perishable, for their causes, ignorance and desire, are unstable. Hence there is no hope whatsoever that the protection afforded by the results of meritorious acts will be eternal. Therefore *one should meditate only upon the world of the Self,* one's own world. The word 'Self' is here used in an identical sense with the last words, for 'one's own world' is the topic, and here the words 'one's own' are omitted. *He who meditates only upon the world of the Self*—what happens to him?—*never has his work exhausted,* simply because he has no work. This is a restatement of an eternal fact. That is to say, an ignorant man continuously suffers from the misery of

transmigration by way of exhaustion of the results of his work. Not so this sage. As Emperor Janaka said, 'If Mithilā is ablaze, nothing of mine is burning' (Mbh. XII. clxxvi. 56).

Some say that the ritualistic work itself of a sage who meditates upon the world of his own Self never decays, because of its combination with meditation. And they interpret the word 'world' as inseparably connected with rites in a double aspect: One is the manifested world called Hiraṇyagarbha, which is the repository of ritualistic work, and he who meditates upon this manifested, limited world connected with ritualistic work has his work exhausted, for he identifies himself with the result of limited work. But he who meditates upon that very world connected with work by reducing it to its causal form, the undifferentiated state, does not have his work exhausted, as he identifies himself with the result of unlimited work. This is a nice conceit, but not according to the Śruti, for the words 'one's own world' refer to the Supreme Self which is under consideration. Also, after introducing It in the words 'one's own world' the text again refers to It by dropping the qualifying phrase 'one's own' and using the word 'Self' in the sentence, 'One should meditate only upon the world of the Self.' So there is no scope for conceiving a world connected with ritualistic work. Another reason for this is the qualification further on by words signifying pure knowledge, 'What shall we achieve through children, we who have attained this Self, this world (result)?' (IV. iv. 22). The words 'this Self our world'[1] mark

[1] A paraphrase of a portion of the previous sentence.

It off from the worlds attainable through a son, ritualistic work and lower knowledge (meditation). Also, 'His world is not destroyed by any kind of work' (Kau. III. 1), and 'This is its highest world' (IV. iii. 32). The passage in question ought to have the same import as those just quoted, with the qualifying words. For here also we find the specification 'one's own world.'

Objection : You are wrong, for the sage desires objects through this. That is to say, if 'one's own world' is the Supreme Self, then by meditating upon It one will become That. In that case it is not proper to mention results apart from the attainment of the Self, as in the passage, 'From this (very) Self he projects whatever he wants' (this text).

Reply : Not so, for the passage extols meditation on the world of the Self. The meaning is that the world of the Self alone stands for all that is desirable to him, for he has nothing else but It to ask for, since he has already attained all his objects. Just as another Śruti puts it, 'From the Self is the vital force, from the Self is hope' (Ch. VII. xxvi. 1). Or the passage may indicate that he is identified with all, as before (I. iv. 10). If he becomes one with the Supreme Self, then only it is proper to use the word 'Self' in the phrase 'from this very Self,' meaning, 'from one's own world, the Self,' which is the topic. Otherwise the text would have specified it by saying, 'From the world of work in an undifferentiated state,' to distinguish it from the world of the Supreme Self as well as from work in a manifested state. But since the Supreme Self has already been introduced (as 'one's

own world') and been subsequently specified (by the word 'Self'), you cannot assume an intermediate state not mentioned in the Śruti.

It has been said that an ignorant man identifying himself with his caste, order of life, and so on, and being controlled by righteousness, thinks he has certain duties to the gods and others and is dependent on them like an animal. Now what are those duties that make him so dependent, and who are the gods and others whom he serves through his actions like an animal? To answer this the text deals with both at length:

अथो अयं वा आत्मा सर्वेषां भूतानां लोकः ; स यज्जुहोति, यद्यजते, तेन देवानां लोकः ; अथ यदनुब्रूते तेन ऋषीणाम्, अथ यत्पितृभ्यो निपृणाति, यत्प्रजामिच्छते, तेन पितृणाम् ; अथ यन्मनुष्यान्वासयते, यदेभ्योऽशनं ददाति, तेन मनुष्याणाम् ; अथ यत्पशुभ्यस्तृणोदकं विन्दति, तेन पशूनाम् ; यदस्य गृहेषु श्वापदा वयांस्या पिपीलिकाभ्य उपजीवन्ति, तेन तेषां लोकः ; यथा ह वै स्वाय लोकाया-रिष्टिमिच्छेत्, एवं हैवंविदे सर्वाणि भूतान्यरिष्टिमिच्छन्ति ; तद्वा एतद्विदितं मीमांसितम् ॥ १६ ॥

16. Now this self (the ignorant man) is an object of enjoyment to all beings. That he makes oblations in the fire and performs sacrifices is how he becomes such an object to the gods. That he studies the Vedas is how he becomes an object of enjoyment to the Ṛṣis (sages). That he makes offerings to the Manes and desires

children is how he becomes such an object to the Manes. That he gives shelter to men as well as food is how he becomes an object of enjoyment to men. That he gives fodder and water to the animals is how he becomes such an object to them. And that beasts and birds, and even the ants, feed in his home is how he becomes an object of enjoyment to these. Just as one wishes safety to one's body, so do all beings wish safety to him who knows it as such. This indeed has been known, and discussed.

Now—this word is introductory—*this self*, the householder qualified for rites, who is the subject under consideration, and who being ignorant identifies himself with this microcosm consisting of the body, organs, and so on, *is an object of enjoyment to all beings,* from the gods down to the ants, being helpful to them through the performance of the duties of their caste, order of life, etc. Now, through what particular duties do they help each particular class, for which they are called the objects of enjoyment to them, and what are these particular classes? This is being answered: *That he,* this householder, *makes oblations in the fire and performs sacrifices,* etc. The latter is dedicating some of his things to the gods, and the former is finally offering them in the fire. By this twofold imperative duty he is tied to the gods, being dependent on them like animals. Hence he is their object of enjoyment. *That he studies the Vedas* daily

is how he becomes an object of enjoyment to the Ṛṣis. That he makes offerings to the Manes, of cakes, water, etc., *and desires children,* tries to obtain them—'desire' here includes the having of them i.e. raises children, *is how he becomes such an object to the Manes.* Through this bounden duty he is subservient to the Manes as an object of enjoyment. *That he gives shelter to men* in his house by giving them a place to sit on, water for washing, and so on, *as well as food* to these people who stay, or to others who do not stay, but ask for food, *is how he becomes an object of enjoyment to men. That he gives fodder and water to the animals is how he becomes such an object to them. And that beasts and birds, and even the ants, feed in his home* on the crumbs, the offerings made to them, washings of utensils, etc. *is how he becomes an object of enjoyment to these.*

Because he helps the gods and others by so many services, therefore *just as one wishes safety,* non-destruction, continuity of the idea of possession, *to one's body,* maintains it in all respects by nourishing and protecting it lest one should lose one's hold on it, *so do all beings,* the gods and the rest described above, *wish safety,* non-destruction, *to him who knows it as such,* who thinks that he is an object of enjoyment to all beings, and that he must discharge his obligations like a debtor as above. That is, they protect him in all respects to safeguard their rights on him, as a householder does his animals. It has been said, 'Therefore it is not liked by them,' etc. (I. iv. 10). *This,* that the above-mentioned duties must be dis-

charged like debts, ***indeed has been known*** from the section dealing with the five[1] great sacrifices (Ś. I. vii. 2. 6), ***and discussed*** in the section on the sacrificial offerings (Ś. I. vii. 2. 1).

If by knowing Brahman he gets rid of that bondage of duty which makes him an animal, as it were, under what compulsion does he take up the bondage of ritualistic work as if he were helpless, and not the pursuit of knowledge which is the means of freedom from that?

Objection : Has it not been said that the gods guard him?

Reply : Yes, but they too guard only those who, being qualified for rites, are under their authority. Otherwise this would be attaining the results of actions not done and forfeiting those of actions actually done. But they do not guard any and every man not particularly qualified for rites. Therefore there must be something, goaded by which a man becomes averse to one's own world, the Self, as if he were helpless.

Objection : Is it not ignorance, for only an ignorant man becomes averse to his own self and engages in activity?

Reply : That is not the motive power either, for it merely conceals the true nature of a thing. But it indirectly becomes the root of initiating action, just as blindness is the cause of one's falling into a a pit etc.

[1] Viz. those meant for the gods, the Ṛṣis, the Manes, men and animals. They have been described in the text.

Objection: Well then, say what is the cause of a man's activity.

Reply: That is being stated here—it is desire. As the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (II. 5) says that fools, being under ignorance which is natural to man, are outgoing in their tendencies and pursue objects of desire. And the Smṛti also says, 'It is desire, it is anger,'[1] etc. (G. III. 37). And the Manu Saṁhitā (II. 4) also describes all activity as being due to desire. This import is being elaborated here up to the end of the chapter:

आत्मैवेदमग्र आसीदेक एव; सोऽकामयत—जाया मे स्यात्, अथ प्रजायेय; अथ वित्तं मे स्यात्, अथ कर्म कुर्वीयेति; एतावान् वै कामः, नेच्छंश्चनातो भूयो विन्देत्; तस्मादप्येतर्ह्येकाकी कामयते—जाया मे स्यात्, अथ प्रजायेय; अथ वित्तं मे स्यात्, अथ कर्म कुर्वीयेति; स यावदप्येतेषामेकैकं न प्राप्नोति, अकृत्स्न एव तावन्मन्यते; तस्यो कृत्स्नता—मन एवास्यात्मा, वाग्जाया, प्राणः प्रजा, चक्षुर्मानुषं वित्तम्, चक्षुषा हि तद्विन्दते; श्रोत्रं दैवम्, श्रोत्रेण हि तच्छृणोति; अत्मैवास्य कर्म, आत्मना हि कर्म करोति; स एष पाङ्क्तो यज्ञः, पाङ्क्तः पशुः, पाङ्क्तः पुरुषः, पाङ्क्तमिदं सर्वं यदिदं किञ्च; तदिदं सर्वमाप्नोति य एवं वेद ॥ १७ ॥ इति चतुर्थं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

17. This (aggregate of desirable objects) was but the self in the beginning—the only entity.

[1] Which is desire thwarted.

He desired, 'Let me have a wife, so that I may be born (as the child). And let me have wealth, so that I may perform rites.' This much indeed is (the range of) desire. Even if one wishes, one cannot get more than this. Therefore to this day a man being single desires, 'Let me have a wife, so that I may be born. And let me have wealth, so that I may perform rites.' Until he obtains each one of these, he considers himself incomplete. His completeness also (comes thus): The mind is his self, speech his wife, the vital force his child, the eye his human wealth, for he obtains it through the eye, the ear his divine wealth, for he hears of it through the ear, and the body is its (instrument of) rite, for he performs rites through the body. (So) this sacrifice has five factors—the animals have five factors, the men have five factors, and all this that exists has five factors. He who knows it as such attains all this.

This was but the self in the beginning, before marriage. 'Self' here means a natural, ignorant man of the upper three castes identified with the body and organs (i.e. a student). There was nothing different from that self that could be desired, such as a wife, and the self was *the only entity* in existence, possessed of ignorance which is the root of the desire for a wife and so forth. Being tinged by the impressions of ignorance that are natural to one and consist in a

superimposition on the Self of ideas of action, its factors such as the agent, and its results, *he desired.* How? *Let me,* the agent, *have a wife* who will qualify me for the rites. Without her I am not qualified for them. Hence let me have a wife, to confer on me this right. *So that I* myself *may be born,* as the child. *And let me have wealth* such as cattle, which are the means of performing the rites, *so that I may perform rites*[1] that will give me prosperity and liberation, in order that I may perform rites that will wipe out my indebtedness and help me to attain the worlds of the gods and others, as well as rites that have material ends, such as those leading to the birth of a son, wealth and heaven. *This much indeed,* i.e. limited to these things only, *is desire.* Desirable objects are only these—the things comprised by the desire for means, viz. wife, son, wealth and rites. The three worlds, viz. those of men, the Manes and the gods, are but the results of the above. For the desire for means, viz. wife, son, wealth and rites, is for securing these. Therefore the desire for the worlds is the same as the previous one. That one and the same desire assumes a twofold aspect according to ends and means. Hence it will be asserted later on, 'For both these are but desires' (III. v. 1 ; IV. iv. 22).

Since all undertakings are for the sake of results, the desire for the worlds, being implied by the former desire, is taken as mentioned ; hence the assertion, 'This much indeed is desire.' When eating has been mentioned, the resulting satisfaction has not to be separately mentioned, for eating is meant for that.

[1] The regular and occasional rites.

These two hankerings after the ends and means are the desire, prompted by which an ignorant man helplessly enmeshes himself like a silkworm, and through absorption in the path of rituals becomes outgoing in his tendencies and does not know his own world, the Self. As the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa says, 'Being infatuated with rites performed with the help of fire, and choked by smoke, they do not know their own world, the Self' (III. x. 11. 1). One may ask, how are desires asserted to be so many, for they are infinite? This is being explained: Because *even if one wishes, one cannot get more than this,* which consists of the results and means. There is nothing in life besides these results and means, either visible or invisible, that can be acquired. Desire is concerning things to be acquired, and since these extend no farther than the above, it is but proper to say, 'This much indeed is desire.' The idea is this: Desire consists of the two hankerings after the ends and means, visible or invisible, which are the special sphere of an ignorant man. Hence the wise man should renounce them.

In ancient times an ignorant man possessed of desire wished like this, and others before him had also done the same. Such is the way of the world. This creation of Virāj has been like this. It has been said that he was afraid on account of his ignorance ; then, prompted by desire, he was unhappy in being alone, and to remove that boredom he wished for a wife ; and he was united with her, which led to this creation. Because it was like this, *therefore to this day,* in his creation, *a man being single,* before marriage, *desires, 'Let me have a wife, so that I may be born. And let*

me have wealth, so that I may perform rites.' This has already been explained. Desiring like this and trying to secure a wife and so forth, *until he obtains each one of these,* the wife and the rest, *he considers himself incomplete.* As a corollary to this, we understand that he is complete when he secures all of these things. But when he fails to attain this completeness, the Śruti suggests a method to bring this about: *His completeness,* the completeness of this man who considers himself incomplete, is this—comes about in this way. How? This body with organs etc. is being divided. Since the rest of them follow *the mind,* it, being their chief, is like the self, hence it *is his self.* As the head of a family is the self, as it were, of the wife and the rest,[1] for these four follow him, so here also the mind is conceived of as the self of this man for his completeness. Similarly *speech* is *his wife,* for speech follows the mind as a wife does her husband. 'Speech' here means words conveying an injunction or prohibition, which the mind receives through the ear, understands and uses. Hence speech is like a wife to the mind. These, speech and mind, standing for wife and husband, produce the vital force for performing rites. Hence *the vital force* is like a *child.*

These rites, which represent the activity of the vital force etc., are performed with the help of wealth that is visible to the eye. Hence *the eye* is *human wealth.* Wealth is of two kinds, human and other than human ; hence the qualifying word 'human' to keep out the other kind. Human wealth such as cattle,

[1] Son, human wealth and divine wealth.

which is used in ceremonies, is seen by the eye. Hence the eye stands for it. Because of this relationship with it, the eye is called human wealth. *For he obtains it,* the human wealth, *through the eye,* i.e. sees cows etc. What is the other kind of wealth? *The ear* is *divine wealth,* for since meditation is concerning the gods, it is called divine wealth, and here the ear corresponds to that. How? *For he hears of it,* the divine wealth, or meditation, *through the ear.* Hence, meditation being dependent on the ear, the latter is called divine wealth. Now in this matter of resemblances what is the rite that is performed by these beginning with the self and ending with wealth? This is being answered: *The body is his rite.* 'Ātman' (self) here means the body. How does the body stand for the rite? Because it is the cause of the rite. How? *For he performs rites through the body.* For the man who considers himself incomplete, completeness can be attained in this way through imagination, just as externally it can be brought about by having a wife and so on. Therefore *this sacrifice has five factors,* and is accomplished only through meditation even by one who does not perform rites. But how can it be called a sacrifice by being merely conceived as having five factors? Because the external sacrifice too is performed through animals and men, and both these have five factors, being connected with the five things described above, such as the mind. This is expressed by the text: *The animals* such as cows, *have five factors,* and *the men have five factors.* Although men also are animals, yet being qualified for rites, they are distinguished from

the others, hence they are separately mentioned. In short, *all this,* the means and the results of rites, *that exists has five factors. He who knows it as such,* imagines himself to be the sacrifice consisting of five factors, *attains all this* universe as his own self.

SECTION V

यत्सप्तान्नानि मेधया तपसाजनयत्पिता ।
एकमस्य साधारणम्, द्वे देवानभाजयत् ॥
त्रीण्यात्मनेऽकुरुत, पशुभ्य एकं प्रायच्छत् ।
तस्मिन्सर्वं प्रतिष्ठितं यच्च प्राणिति यच्च न ॥
कस्मात्तानि न क्षीयन्तेऽद्यमानानि सर्वदा ।
यो वैतामक्षितिं वेद सोऽन्नमत्ति प्रतीकेन ॥
स देवानपिगच्छति, स ऊर्जमुपजीवति ॥
इति श्लोकाः ॥ १ ॥

1. That the father produced seven kinds of food through meditation and rites (I shall disclose). One is common to all eaters. Two he apportioned to the gods. Three he designed for himself. And one he gave to the animals. On it rests everything—what lives and what does not. Why are they not exhausted, although they are always being eaten? He who knows this cause of their permanence eats food with Pratīka (pre-eminence). He attains (identity with) the gods and lives on nectar. These are the verses.

Ignorance has been discussed. It has been said in that connection that an ignorant man worships another god, thinking he is different from himself, and that prompted by desire, he, identifying himself with

a particular caste and order of life and being regulated by a sense of duty, performs rites such as making offerings in the fire, which help the gods and others and make him an object of enjoyment to them. And as all beings by their rites individually projected him as their object of enjoyment, so did he by his performance of rites with five factors, such as making offerings in the fire, project all beings as well as the whole universe as his objects of enjoyment. Thus everyone according to his meditation and rites is both the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment of the whole universe. That is to say, everyone is alternately the cause as well as the effect of everyone else.[1] This we shall describe in the section on knowledge, the meditation on things mutually helpful (II. v.), showing, as a step to the realisation of the unity of the self, how everything is the effect of everything else and helpful to it. The universe which the ignorant man in question projected as his object of enjoyment through his meditation and rites with material ends having five factors, such as making offerings in the fire, being divided in its entirety into seven parts as causes and effects, is called the seven kinds of food, being an object of enjoyment. Hence he is the father of these different kinds of food. *These are the verses*, Mantras describing in brief these varieties of food together with their uses, and are called Ślokas for that reason.

[1] Not Hiraṇyagarbha alone, but every being in a particular cycle who performs meditation and rites according to the scriptures, is here spoken of as the father of all in the next cycle.

'यत्सप्तान्नानि मेधया तपसाजनयत्पिता' इति मेधया हि तपसाजनयत्पिता। 'एकमस्य साधारणम्' इतीदमेवास्य तत्साधारणमन्नं यदिदमद्यते। स य एतदुपास्ते न स पाप्मनो व्यावर्तने, मिश्रं ह्येतत्। 'द्वे देवानभाजयत्' इति हुतं च प्रहुतं च, तस्माद्देवेभ्यो जुह्वति च प्र च जुह्वति ; अथो आहुर्दर्शपूर्णमासाविति। तस्मान्नेष्टियाजुकः स्यात्। 'पशुभ्य एकं प्रायच्छत्' इति तत्पयः। पयो ह्येवाग्रे मनुष्याश्च पशवश्चोपजीवन्ति ; तस्मात् कुमारं जातं घृतं वै वाग्रे प्रतिलेहयन्ति, स्तनं वानुधापयन्ति ; अथ वत्सं जातमाहुरतृणाद इति। 'तस्मिन् सर्वं प्रतिष्ठितं यच्च प्राणिति यच्च न' इति पयसि हीदं सर्वं प्रतिष्ठितं यच्च प्राणिति यच्च न। तद्यदिदमाहुः, संवत्सरं पयसा जुह्वदप पुनर्मृत्युं जयतीति, न तथा विद्यात् ; यदहरेव जुहोति तदहः पुनर्मृत्युमपजयत्येवं विद्वान्, सर्वं हि देवेभ्योऽन्नाद्यं प्रयच्छति। 'कस्मात्तानि न क्षीयन्तेऽद्यमानानि सर्वदा' इति पुरुषो वा अक्षितिः, स हीदमन्नं पुनः पुनर्जनयते। 'यो वैतामक्षितिं वेद' इति पुरुषो वा अक्षितिः, स हीदमन्नं धिया धिया जनयते कर्मभिः ; यद्धैतन्न कुर्यात्क्षीयेत ह ; 'सोऽन्नमत्ति प्रतीकेन' इति मुखं प्रतीकम्, मुखेनेत्येतत्। 'स देवानपिगच्छति, स ऊर्जमुपजीवति' इति प्रशंसा ॥ २ ॥

2. 'That the father produced seven kinds of food through meditation and rites' means that the father indeed produced them through meditation and rites. 'One is common to all eaters' means, this food that is eaten is the common food of all eaters. He who adores (monopolises)

this food is never free from evil, for this is general food. 'Two he apportioned to the gods' means making oblations in the fire, and offering presents otherwise to the gods. Therefore people perform both these. Some, however, say, those two are the new and full moon sacrifices. Therefore one should not be engrossed with sacrifices for material ends. 'One he gave to the animals'—it is milk. For men and animals first live on milk alone. Therefore they first make a new-born babe lick clarified butter or suckle it. And they speak of a new-born calf as not yet eating grass. 'On it rests everything—what lives and what does not' means that on milk indeed rests all this that lives and that does not. It is said that by making offerings of milk in the fire for a year one conquers further death. One should not think like that. He who knows as above conquers further death the very day he makes that offering, for he offers all eatable food to the gods. 'Why are they not exhausted, although they are always being eaten?'—means that the being (eater) is indeed the cause of their permanence, for he produces this food again and again. 'He who knows this cause of their permanence' means that the being (eater) is indeed the cause of their permanence, for he produces this food through his meditation for the time being and rites. If he does not do this, it will be exhausted. 'He eats food with Pratīka':

'Pratīka' means pre-eminence; hence the meaning is, pre-eminently. 'He attains the gods and lives on nectar' is a eulogy.

That the father produced seven kinds of food through meditation and rites: 'Yat' (that) is an adverb modifying the verb 'produced.' The words 'Medhā' and 'Tapas' here mean meditation and rites respectively, for these are the topic, and the ordinary meanings of the words 'Medhā' and 'Tapas' (intelligence and austerity) are out of place. For rites with five factors, viz. the wife and so forth, were described, and just after that, meditation, referred to by the words, 'He who knows it as such,' etc. (I. iv. 17). Therefore the familiar meanings of the two words 'Medhā' and 'Tapas' must not be supposed here. Hence the meaning of the sentence is: 'The seven kinds of food which the father produced through his meditation and rites, I shall disclose.' The last words should be supplied to complete the sentence. In the Vedas the meaning of the Mantras, being hidden, is generally difficult to understand, hence the Brāhmaṇa[1] (this text) proceeds to explain them. Now what is the meaning of 'That the father produced seven kinds of food through meditation and rites'? This is being answered. The text explains the sentence only by the use of the particle 'hi' (indeed) signifying a well-known fact. That is to say, the meaning of this Mantra is

[1] A portion of the Vedas explaining the Mantras. The Vedas consist of Mantras and Brāhmaṇas.

well known. The words of the Mantra, 'That the father produced,' being of the form of a restatement, it also refers to something well known. Hence the Brāhmaṇa boldly says: *The father indeed produced them through meditation and rites.*

Objection: How is this meaning well known?

Reply: In the first place it is evident that the ignorant man is the father of the means, beginning with the wife and ending with the rites, whereby the worlds are achieved as the result, and it has also been stated in the passage, 'Let me have a wife,' etc. (I. iv. 17). There it has been said that meditation, which is divine wealth, rites and a son are the means whereby the father projects the worlds which are the results. And what will be stated later on (I. v. 16) is also well known. Hence it is right to say, 'The father indeed produced them through meditation and rites.' Moreover, it is well known in life that desire is concerning results. And the wife and so forth have been stated to be objects of desire in the passage, 'This much indeed is desire' (I. iv. 17). There can be no desire in the subject-matter of the knowledge of Brahman (liberation), for it is the oneness of everything. Hence it is implied that one's natural[1] thoughts and actions, which are not according to the scriptures, of course lead to a projection of the relative universe (not liberation). This is also proved by the fact that the evil results ending in identity with stationary

[1] That is, prompted by desire, which is the product of ignorance.

objects, are due to such thoughts and actions. But the text seeks to bring out that relation of end and means among objects which is according to the scriptures,[1] for it is sought to inculcate an aversion to them with a view to enjoining the knowledge of Brahman. For since this entire gross and subtle universe is impure, transitory, consisting of ends and means, painful and within the category of ignorance, one gets disgusted with it, and for such a one the knowledge of Brahman has to be introduced.

Now the different uses of the varieties of food are being stated: *One is common to all eaters,* is the wording of the Mantra. Its explanation is given by the words: *This food is the common food of all eaters.* What is it? This *that is eaten* by all beings daily. The father, after producing the different kinds of food, designed this to be the common food of all eaters. *He who adores* or is devoted to *this* common *food,* which being eaten sustains the life of all living beings—adoration, as we see in life, means devotion, as when we say, 'One adores a teacher,' 'One adores a king,' etc.; hence the meaning is: who is chiefly concerned with enjoying food to prolong his existence, instead of performing rites to store (good) unseen results—such a man *is never free from evil.* Compare the Vedic Mantra, '(If an ignorant man) obtains food that is useless (to the gods, it is veritably his death)' (Ṛ. X. cxvii. 6). And the Smṛtis, 'One must not cook only for oneself' (Mbh. XII. ccxlix. 5), 'He who eats without offering to the gods is a thief' (G. III. 12),

[1] The other kind being left out of account as being palpably injurious.

'The killer of a noble Brāhmaṇa[1] wipes (his sin) in the man who eats his food,' and so on (M. VIII. 317). Why is he not free from evil? *For this* food which is eaten by all beings *is general food,* the common property of all. And just because it is the food of all, any morsel that is put into the mouth is seen to be painful to others, for everyone eagerly expects that it will be his. Therefore it is impossible even to eat without causing pain to others. The Smṛti too says, 'Since the sins of men (abide in food, it is a greater sin not to share it with others).'

Some say that it refers to the food called Vaiśvadeva, which is daily offered (in the fire) by householders for the beasts etc. This is wrong, for this particular food is not observed to be common to all eaters like that which is eaten by all creatures. Nor does the specification, 'This that is eaten,' agree with it. Besides, as this food known as Vaiśvadeva is included in that eaten by all creatures, the latter kind of food, which is also eaten by outcasts, dogs, etc., should be understood, for we see that there is this kind of food over and above that known as Vaiśvadeva. With regard to it the specification, 'This that is eaten,' is appropriate. If the words 'common to all eaters' do not mean this food, it will give rise to a suspicion that it was not produced and apportioned by the father. But there is unanimity on the point that all kinds of food were produced and apportioned by him. Besides it is not right that one performing

[1] The commoner meaning of the word 'Bhrūṇa' is a fœtus.

the scriptural rite called Vaiśvadeva should not be free from evils. And it has not been forbidden. Nor is it a naturally hateful type of work like fishing, for instance, for decent people practise it, and the Śruti says that sin accrues from its non-performance. But in the other case there is the possibility of sin, for the Vedic Mantra says, 'I eat that person as food who eats food (without giving part of it to others)' (Tai. III. x. 6).

Two he apportioned to the gods, is the wording of the Mantra. Which are the two kinds of food that he produced and apportioned to the gods? *Making oblations in the fire, and offering presents otherwise to the gods* after finishing the former. Because the father distributed these two kinds of food to the gods, *therefore* to this day householders at the proper time *perform both these,* make oblations in the fire, thinking that they are offering that food to the gods, and after that offer them presents. *Some, however, say* that the two kinds of food the father gave to the gods are not the above two offerings, but *the new and full moon sacrifices.* The first view holds that the above two offerings are meant, for the Śruti mentions both (food and offering) as two, and those offerings are very well known. (This is rebutted as follows:) Although the number is all right with regard to those two offerings, still the fact that the new and full moon sacrifices —which too are mentioned by the Śruti—are the food of the gods, is better known, being revealed by the Mantras. Besides, when the choice lies between a principal and a subordinate object (denoted by the same word), the preference goes to the former. Now

the new and full moon sacrifices are more important than the above two offerings. Hence it is proper to conclude that they alone are meant by the words, 'Two he apportioned to the gods.' Because these two kinds of food, the new and full moon sacrifices, were set apart by the father for the gods, *therefore,* to keep them intact for the gods, *one should not be engrossed with sacrifices for material ends.* The word 'Iṣṭi' here means 'Kāmyeṣṭi,' sacrifices with material ends. This is well known from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (I. iii. 5. 10). From the use of a suffix denoting habit we understand that one must not be primarily engrossed with the performance of these sacrifices with material ends.[1]

One he gave to the animals. What is that one food which the father gave to the animals? *It is milk.* How are we to know that the animals are the owners of it? This is being explained: *For men and animals first live on milk alone.* It must be their food, for how else would they systematically live on that first? How do they live on it first? Because men and animals to this day live on that food, just as the father apportioned it in the beginning. *Therefore* men of the upper three castes *make a new-born babe lick clarified butter,* in contact with gold, in the post-natal ceremony, *or,* i.e. afterwards, *suckle it.* The other castes (who do not have this ceremony) do whichever is practicable. In the case of animals other than men, they only suckle the young one. *And they speak of*

[1] So there is no antagonism with such Vedic texts as, 'One who desires heaven must sacrifice' (Tā. XVI. iii. 3).

of a new-born calf, when somebody asks them how old it is, *as not yet eating grass,* i.e. very young—still living on milk. Whether they first take clarified butter in the post-natal and other ceremonies, or whether others drink milk, in either case they drink but milk, for clarified butter, being a modification of milk, is also milk.

Why is the food of animals, which is the seventh in order, explained as the fourth? Because it is a means of rites. Rites such as the Agnihotra are performed with the help of milk. And these rites, which depend on wealth, are the means of the three kinds of food to be presently mentioned, which are the results—as the two kinds of food, the new and full moon sacrifices mentioned above. Hence, falling under the category of rites, it is explained together with them. Moreover, since both (they and it) are equally means, mere order should give precedence to the natural sequence due to sense. Besides, this way of explaining facilitates understanding. The different kinds of food can thus be easily explained without a break, and their meaning[1] too will be easily grasped. What is the meaning of, *On it rests everything—what lives and what does not? That on milk indeed,* the food of animals, *rests all this,* the whole universe in its threefold division according to the body, the elements and the gods—*that lives,* the animate kingdom, *and that does not* live, stationary objects such as hills. The word 'indeed,' signifying something well-known, furnishes the explanation. How is the substance called

[1] That four of them are means and three are results.

milk the support of everything? Because it is the cause. And it is a cause in that it is an integral part of rites such as the Agnihotra. That the whole universe is the result of the oblations offered in the Agnihotra and other rites, is proved by hundreds of Śruti and Smṛti texts. Hence it is quite proper to explain the Mantra by the use of the word 'indeed.'

It is said in some other Brāhmaṇas *that by making offerings of milk in the fire for a year one conquers further death.* The reference is to the following: In a year three hundred and sixty oblations are offered (counting morning and evening oblations as one). That accounts for double the number (splitting each into two). The bricks called Yājuṣmatī, used in making the altar for the Agnihotra, being also of that number, the oblations are looked upon as these bricks, and so also are the days of the year. Through this meditation based on resemblance people attain identity with Fire, the Prajāpati called the Year. By offering oblations for a year in this way one conquers further death, i.e. is born after death among the gods, no more to die. Thus do the Brāhmaṇa texts run. *One should not think like that. He who knows as* stated *above,* that everything rests on milk, being the result of the oblations of milk, *conquers further death the very day he makes that offering*—he has not to wait for a year, but attains identity with the universe in one day. This is expressed by the text, 'Conquers further death,' i.e. the sage dying once or getting rid of the body, is identified with the universe, and does not take on another limited body to make further

death possible. What is the reason of his conquering further death by attaining identity with the universe? This is being answered: *For he offers all eatable food to* all *the gods* by means of the morning and evening oblations. Therefore it is proper that he, by making himself one with the oblations and attaining identity with all the gods as their food—being the sum total of them—does not die any more. This too has been stated in another Brāhmaṇa: 'Brahman, the self-born (a man seeking identity with Hiraṇyagarbha) performed rites. He reflected, "Rites do not produce eternal results. Well, let me offer myself in all beings (as in a fire) and all beings in me." Offering himself in all beings and all beings in himself, he attained the highest place among all beings, independence and absolute rulership' (Ś. XIII. vii. 1. 1).

Why are they not exhausted, although they are awlays, continuously, *being eaten?* Since the time when the father producing the seven kinds of food distributed them to different groups of eaters, they have been eating those foods, for they live on them. And they ought to be exhausted, since everything that is made must wear out. But they are not dwindling, for we see the universe remains intact. So there must be a cause for their permanence. Hence the question, 'Why are they not exhausted?' It is answered as follows: *The being is indeed the cause of their permanence.* Just as in the beginning the father was the producer of the different kinds of food through his meditation and rites with five factors such as the wife, and their eater too, so those to whom he gave the foods,

although they are their eaters, are their fathers as well, for they produce them through their meditation and rites. This is expressed as follows: The being who eats the foods is indeed the cause of their permanence. How? This is being explained: *For he produces this food* of seven kinds that is eaten, consisting of the body and organs, actions and results, *again and again through his meditation for the time being and rites,* i.e. the efforts of his speech, mind and body. *If he does not do this,* not produce for a moment the seven kinds of food mentioned above through his meditation and rites, *it would be exhausted,* or finished, being continuously eaten. Therefore just as the being is continuously eating the foods, he is also creating them according to his meditation and rites. Hence the being is the cause of their permanence by continuously creating them. That is to say, for this reason the foods are not exhausted although they are being eaten. Therefore the whole universe consisting of a series of meditations and rites, means and ends, actions and results—although, being held together by a stream of work and impressions of innumerable beings in combination, it is transient, impure, flimsy, resembling a flowing river or a burning lamp, flimsy like a banana stalk, and comparable to foam, illusion, a mirage, a dream, and so on—appears nevertheless to those who have identified themselves with it to be undecaying, eternal and full of substance. Hence for stimulating our renunciation the text says, 'He produces this food through his meditation for the time being and rites. If he does not do this, it will be exhausted,' for from

the second chapter the knowledge of Brahman has to be inculcated for those who are disgusted with this universe.

Although three kinds of food are yet to be described, still taking them as already explained along with the previous ones, the result of knowing these as they are, is being summed up: *He who knows this cause of their permanence* as described above, *means that the being* (eater) *is indeed the cause of their permanence, for he produces this food through his meditation for the time being and rites. If he does not do this, it will be exhausted. He eats food with Pratīka* is being explained: *'Pratīka' means pre-eminence; hence the meaning is, pre-eminently.* He who knows that the being who is the father of the different kinds of food is the cause of their permanence, pre-eminently eats food and never becomes a subsidiary part of it. Unlike an ignorant man, this sage, being the self of the foods, becomes only their eater, but never a food. *He attains the gods,* is identified with the gods, *and lives on nectar:* This statement *is a eulogy;* there is no new meaning in it.

'त्रीण्यात्मनेऽकुरुत' इति मनो वाचं प्राणम्, तान्यात्मनेऽकुरुत ; 'अन्यत्रमना अभूवम्, नादर्शम्,' 'अन्यत्रमना अभूवम्, नाश्रौषम्' इति, मनसा ह्येव पश्यति, मनसा शृणोति । कामः संकल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाऽश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीर्भीरित्येतत्सर्वं मन एव ; तस्मादपि पृष्ठत उपस्पृष्टो मनसा विजानाति ; यः कश्च शब्दो वागेव सा । एषा ह्यन्तमायत्ता, एषा हि न ; प्राणोऽपानो व्यान उदानः

समानोऽन इत्येतत्सर्वं प्राण एव ; एतन्मयो वा अयमात्मा, वाङ्मयो मनोमयः प्राणमयः ॥ ३ ॥

3. 'Three he designed for himself' means: The mind, the organ of speech and the vital force; these he designed for himself. (They say), 'I was absent-minded, I did not see it,' 'I was absent-minded, I did not hear it.' It is through the mind that one sees and hears. Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, want of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shame, intelligence and fear—all these are but the mind. Even if one is touched from behind, one knows it through the mind; therefore (the mind exists). And any kind of sound is but the organ of speech, for it serves to determine a thing. but it cannot itself be revealed. Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna, Samāna and Ana—all these are but the vital force. This body is identified with these—with the organ of speech, the mind and the vital force.

The three kinds of food—results of rites with five factors—which have been spoken of, being effects and extensive in scope, were kept separate from the previous ones. The succeeding portion up to the end of this section is devoted to the explanation of them. What is the meaning of, *Three he designed for himself?* It *means: The mind, the organ of speech and vital force* are the three kinds of food; *these* the father, after producing them at the beginning of the cycle,

designed for himself. Of these, there is a doubt regarding the existence and nature of the mind. Hence the text says: There *is* a mind apart from the external organs such as the ear. For it is a well-known fact that even when there is a connection between the external organ, the object and the self, a man does not perceive that object, which may be just in front, and when asked, 'Have you seen this form?' he says, 'My mind was elsewhere—*I was absent-minded, I did not see it.*' Similarly when asked, 'Have you heard what I have said?' he says, '*I was absent-minded, I did not hear it.*' Therefore it is understood that that something else, viz. the internal organ called mind, which joins itself to the objects of all the organs, exists, in the absence of which the eye and other organs fail to perceive their respective objects such as form and sound, although they have the capacity to do so, and in the presence of which they succeed in it. Hence *it is through the mind that* everybody *sees and hears,* for vision and the like are impossible when the mind is engaged.

After the existence of the mind has been proved, the text proceeds to describe its nature: *Desire,* sex-attraction and the like, *resolve,* deciding about a thing which is before us, that it is white or blue and so on, *doubt,* notion of uncertainty, *faith,* belief in the efficacy of rites directed to invisible ends (the hereafter) as well as in the existence of the gods and the like, *want of faith,* the opposite notion, *steadiness,* supporting the body etc. when they droop, *unsteadiness,* the opposite of that, *shame, intelligence and fear*

—*all these,* all such, *are but the mind.* They are forms of the mind or the internal organ. Another reason for the existence of the mind is being stated: Because *even if one is touched* by anybody *from behind* invisibly, *one knows it* distinctly, that this is a touch of the hand, or that this is a touch of the knee, *therefore* the internal organ called mind exists. If there is no mind to distinguish them, how can the skin alone do this? That which helps us to distinguish between perceptions is the mind.

The mind then exists, and its nature too has been known. Three kinds of food, which are the results of rites, viz. the mind, the organ of speech and the vital force, were sought to be explained here in their divisions according to the body, the elements and the gods. Of these, only the mind, out of the group consisting of the organ of speech, the mind and the vital force as relating to the body, has been explained. Now the organ of speech is to be described. Hence the text says: *And any kind of sound* in the world, whether it is of the articulate kind uttered by creatures with the help of the palate etc., or it is of the other kind produced by musical instruments or clouds etc., *is but the organ of speech.* So the nature of the organ of speech has been stated. Now its function is being described: *For it,* the organ of speech, *serves to determine* or reveal *a thing, but it cannot itself be revealed,* like things; it only reveals them, for it is self-luminous like a lamp etc. The light of a lamp and so forth is not of course revealed by another light. Similarly the organ of speech only reveals things, but cannot itself be revealed by others (of the same category). Thus

the Śruti avoids a *regressus in infinitum* by saying, 'It cannot itself be revealed.' That is to say, the very function of the organ of speech is to reveal.

Now the vital force is being described: *Prana,* the function of which is connected with the heart and is capable of moving to the mouth and nostrils, so called because it moves forward. *Apāna,* which functions below the heart and extends up to the navel ; it is called Apāna, because it helps excretion. *Vyāna,* that which regulates the Prāṇa and Apāna and is the nexus between them, as also the cause of actions requiring strength. *Udāna,* that which causes nutrition, rising up, and so on ; it extends from the sole of the feet to the head and functions upwards. *Samāna,* so called because of assimilating what we eat and drink ; it has its seat in the belly and helps the digestion of food. *Ana* is the generalisation of these particular functions and is concerned with the general activities of the body. Thus *all these* functions of the Prāṇa and the rest, as described above, *are but the vital force* (Prāṇa).

The Praṇa, which means the Ana (general nerve function) in the body with particular functions, has been described. And its activity also has been explained by a reference to its different functions. So the three kinds of food called the mind, the organ of speech and the vital force as relating to the body, have been explained. *Identified with these,* i.e. their modifications, or composed of the mind, speech and vital force of Hiraṇyagarbha—what is it? *this body* including the organs, the microcosm, called 'self' because

it is accepted as their self by ignorant people. That which has been described in a general way as 'identified with these,' is being elucidated by the specification *with the organ of speech, the mind and the vital force.*

The manifestations of those foods belonging to Hiraṇyagarbha as they relate to the elements are being described:

त्रयो लोका एत एव ; वागेवायं लोकः, मनोऽन्तरिक्ष-लोकः, प्राणोऽसौ लोकः ॥ ४ ॥

4. These are the three worlds. The organ of speech is this world (the earth), the mind is the sky, and the vital force is that world (heaven).

These, the organ of speech, the mind and the vital force, *are the three worlds* called the earth, sky and heaven. This is being specified: *The organ of speech is this world, the mind is the sky, and the vital force is that world.*

त्रयो वेदा एत एव ; वागेवर्ग्वेदः, मनो यजुर्वेदः, प्राणः सामवेदः ॥ ५ ॥

5. These are the three Vedas. The organ of speech is the Ṛg-Veda, the mind is the Yajur-Veda and the vital force the Sāma-Veda.

देवाः पितरो मनुष्या एत एव ; वागेव देवाः, मनः पितरः, प्राणो मनुष्याः ॥ ६ ॥

6. These are the gods, the Manes and men. The organ of speech is the gods, the mind the Manes, and the vital force men.

पिता माता प्रजैत एव ; मन एव पिता, वाङ्माता, प्राणः प्रजा ॥ ७ ॥

7. These are the father, mother and child. The mind is the father, the organ of speech the mother, and the vital force the child.

Similarly *these are the three Vedas*, etc. These sentences are all easy.

विज्ञातं विजिज्ञास्यमविज्ञातमेत एव ; यत्किंच विज्ञातं वाचस्तद्रूपम्, वाग्घि विज्ञाता ; वागेनं तद्भूत्वावति ॥ ८ ॥

8. These are what is known, what it is desirable to know, and what is unknown. Whatever is known is a form of the organ of speech, for it is the knower. The organ of speech protects him (who knows this) by becoming that (which is known).

These are what is known, what it is desirable to know, and what is unknown. This is being specified: *Whatever is* clearly *known is a form of the organ of speech.* The Śruti itself gives the reason: *For it is the knower,* being self-luminous. How can that be other than a knower which brings to light other objects as well? It will be stated later on, 'Through the organ of speech, O Emperor, a friend is known' (IV. i. 2). He who knows the particulars of the organ of speech

gets the following result: *The organ of speech protects him* who knows its manifestations as given above, *by becoming that* which is known. That is, it becomes his food, or object of enjoyment, in that form.

यत्किंच विजिज्ञास्यं मनसस्तद्रूपम्, मनो हि विजिज्ञास्यम्; मन एनं तद्भूत्वावति ॥ ९ ॥

9. Whatever it is desirable to know is a form of the mind, for the mind is what it is desirable to know. The mind protects him (who knows this) by becoming that (which it is desirable to know).

Similarly, *whatever it is desirable* clearly *to know is a form of the mind, for the mind,* since it takes the form of a doubt (considers the pros and cons of a thing), *is what it is desirable to know.* As before, he who knows the manifestations of the mind gets the following result: *The mind protects him by becoming that* which it is desirable to know, i.e. it becomes his food in that form.

यत्किंचाविज्ञातं प्राणस्य तद्रूपम्, प्राणो ह्यविज्ञातः; प्राण एनं तद्भूत्वावति ॥ १० ॥

10. Whatever is unknown is a form of the vital force, for the vital force is what is unknown. The vital force protects him (who knows this) by becoming that (which is unknown).

Likewise *whatever is* completely *unknown,* and not even suspected, *is a form of the vital force, for*

the vital force is what is unknown, as the Śruti speaks of it as undefined (Ch. II. xxii. 1). Since the organ of speech, the mind and the vital force have been divided into the forms of what is known, what it is desirable to know, and what is unknown,[1] the statements, 'These are the three worlds,' and so on, are to be accepted solely on the authority of the Śruti. Since we see these three forms, viz. what is known, etc., are applicable to everything, it is from the statement of the Śruti that we are to understand that the meditation is to be confined to the particular objects as indicated. *The vital force protects him by becoming that,* i.e. becomes his food in the form of what is unknown. We often see that teachers and parents, for instance, help their pupils and (very young) children, barely suspected by or unknown to them. Similarly the mind and vital force can be the food of the sage, barely suspected by and unknown to him (respectively).

The manifestations of the organ of speech, the mind and the vital force relating to the elements have been described. The following (three) paragraphs deal with their manifestations relating to the gods:

तस्यै वाचः पृथिवी शरीरम्, ज्योतीरूपमयमग्निः ;
तद्यावत्येव वाक्, तावती पृथिवी, तावानयमग्निः ॥ ११ ॥

11. The earth is the body of that organ of speech, and this fire is its luminous organ. And

[1] This is a wider classification including all the previous ones mentioned in paragraphs 4 to 7, and involving a cross-division. Nevertheless we are to take them as they are, since the Śruti recommends them for meditation.

as far as the organ of speech extends, so far extends the earth and so far does this fire.

The earth is the body, or the external container, *of that organ of speech* which has been spoken of as the food of Hiraṇyagarbha, *and this* terrestrial *fire is its luminous organ,* the content of the earth. The vocal organ of Hiraṇyagarbha has two forms: One is the effect (body), the container and non-luminous: the other is the instrument (organ), the content and luminous. Both these, the earth and fire, are but the vocal organ of Hiraṇyagarbha. *And as far as the organ of speech* in its twofold aspect relating to the body and the elements *extends, so far* throughout *extends the earth,* the effect, as its container, *and so far does this fire,* which is the content and the instrument, pervading the earth in its luminous form. The rest is similar.

अथैतस्य मनसो द्यौः शरीरम्, ज्योतीरूपमसावादित्यः ; तद्यावदेव मनः, तावती द्यौः, तावानसावादित्यः ; तौ मिथुनं समैताम्, ततः प्राणोऽजायत ; स इन्द्रः, स एषोऽसपत्नः, द्वितीयो वै सपत्नः ; नास्य सपत्नो भवति य एवं वेद ॥ १२ ॥

12. Heaven is the body of this mind, and that sun is its luminous organ. And as far as the mind extends, so far extends heaven, and so far does that sun. The two were united, and from that the vital force emanated. It is the Supreme Lord.[1] It is without a rival. A second being is indeed a rival. He who knows it as such has no rival.

[1] This is said for the purpose of meditation.

Heaven is the body, the effect, the container, *of this mind* that has already been spoken of as the food of Hiraṇyagarbha, *and that sun is its luminous organ,* the content. *And as far as the mind* in its aspect relating to the body or the elements *extends, so far extends heaven,* which is the container of the mind, the luminous organ, *and so far does that sun,* which is the luminous organ and the content. *The two,* fire and the sun, which are the forms of the organ of speech and the mind relating to the gods, the mother and father, *were united,* between the two halves of the cosmic shell (heaven and earth), the one resolving to do the function of generation belonging to the father, the mind, or the sun, and the other that of manifestation belonging to the mother, the organ of speech, or fire. *And from that* union *the vital force,* or Vayu[1] *emanated,* to function as vibration. *It,* that which emanated, *is the Supreme Lord,* and not only that but *it is* also *without a rival.* What is a rival? *A second being,* appearing as an adversary, *is* called *a rival.* Hence the organ of speech and the mind, although they are different entities (from the vital force), never become its rivals, both being subordinate to the vital force (on the cosmic plane) as in the body. Incidentally, the result of meditation on this absence of rivalry is as follows: *He,* the sage, *who knows it,* the vital force, *as such,* as being without a rival, *has no rival.*

अथैतस्य प्राणस्यापः शरीरम्, ज्योतीरूपमसौ चन्द्रः ; तद्यावानेव प्राणः, तावत्य आपः, तावानसौ चन्द्रः, त एते

[1] The cosmic aspect of the vital force, symbolised by air.

सर्व एव समाः, सर्वेऽनन्ताः ; स यो हैतानन्तवत उपास्तेऽन्तवन्तं स लोकं जयति ; अथ यो हैताननन्तानुपास्तेऽनन्तं स लोकं जयति ॥ १३ ॥

13. Water is the body of this vital force, and that moon is its luminous organ. And as far as the vital force extends, so far extends water, and so far does that moon. These are all equal, and all infinite. He who meditates upon these as finite wins a finite world, but he who meditates upon these as infinite wins an infinite world.

Water is the body, the effect, the container of the organs, *of this vital force* that is the food of Hiraṇyagarbha, not of the vital force that has just been described as the child, *and that moon is its luminous organ,* as before. *And as far as the vital force* in its aspects relating to the body etc. *extends, so far extends water, and so far does that moon,* the content of the water, the organ, which in its aspects relating to the body and the elements pervades the water. So these are the three kinds of food, called the organ of speech, the mind, and the vital force, which were produced by the father through rites with five factors. And the whole universe in its aspects relating to the body and the elements is pervaded by these. There is nothing besides these, either of the nature of an effect or an instrument (body or organ), and Hiraṇyagarbha is the sum of these. *These,* the organ of speech, the mind, and the vital force, *are all equal* in extensity—pervade whatever concerns the animate world in its aspects

relating to the body and the elements, *and* for this very reason they are *infinite,* for they last as long as the relative universe. Surely we do not know of any relative universe apart from the bodies and organs. And it has been stated (pars. 11-13) that speech, mind and the vital force consist of the body and organs. *He who,* whoever, *meditates upon these*—which are a part and parcel of Hiraṇyagarbha—in their aspect relating to the body or the elements, *as finite, wins a finite world*—a result which is commensurate with that meditation. That is, he is born as finite, not as one with these. *But he who meditates upon these as infinite,* as consisting of the universe, a part and parcel of all beings, and unlimited, *wins an infinite world.*

It has been said that the father, after producing seven kinds of food through rites with five factors, designed three of them for himself. These, the results of those rites, have been explained. Now how are these the results of those rites? This is being answered: Because those three kinds of food also, we find, have five factors, for wealth and rites can also be included in them. Of them, the earth and fire, as has been explained, are the mother, heaven and the sun are the father, and the vital force (Vāyu), which is between these two, is the child. In order to show how wealth and rites can be included in them the next two paragraphs are being introduced.

स एष संवत्सरः प्रजापतिः षोडशकलः, तस्य रात्रय

एव पञ्चदश कलाः, ध्रुवैवास्य षोडशी कला; स रात्रिभिरेवा च पूर्यतेऽप च क्षीयते; सोऽमावास्यां रात्रिमेतया षोडश्या कलया सर्वमिदं प्राणभृदनुप्रविश्य ततः प्रातर्जायते; तस्मादेतां रात्रिं प्राणभृतः प्राणं न विच्छिन्द्यात्, अपि कृकलासस्य, एतस्या एव देवताया अपचित्यै ॥ १४ ॥

14. This Prajāpati (Hiraṇyagarbha) has sixteen digits and is represented by the year. The nights (and days) are his fifteen digits, and the constant one is his sixteenth digit. He (as the moon) is filled as well as wasted by the nights (and days). Through this sixteenth digit he permeates all these living beings on the new-moon night and rises the next morning. Therefore on this night one should not take the life of living beings, not even of a chameleon, in adoration of this deity alone.

This Prajāpati consisting of the three kinds of food, who is under consideration, is being particularly described as the year. He *has sixteen digits* or members *and is represented by the year,* consists of the year, or is Time. *The nights* and the days, i.e. the lunar days, *are* the *fifteen digits* of this Prajāpati consisting of time, *and the constant one,* which is ever the same, *is his sixteenth digit. He is filled as well as wasted by the nights,* the lunar days, called the digits. In the bright fortnight the Prajāpati who is the moon is filled by the lunar days beginning with the first, through the gradual increase of digits, i.e. waxes, till

he attains the fulness of his orb on the full-moon night, and is also wasted by them in the dark fortnight through the gradual decrease of digits, till only the constant digit is left on the new-moon night. *Through this* abiding *sixteenth digit* called the constant one, *he*, the Prajāpati who is Time, *permeates all these living beings* by means of the water they drink and the herbs they eat—pervades them in these two forms—*on the new-moon night and*, staying there overnight, *rises the next morning*, joined to the second digit.

Thus that Prajāpati consists of five factors: Heaven and the sun as well as mind are the father; the earth and fire as well as the organ of speech are his wife, the mother; the vital force is their child; the lunar days, or digits, are wealth, for they increase and decrease like it; and the fact that these digits, which are divisions of time, cause changes in the universe is the rite. Thus this Prajāpati, as a whole, emerges as the result of rites with five factors, which is quite in accordance with his desire, 'Let me have a wife, so that I may be born. And let me have wealth, so that I may perform rites' (I. iv. 17). It is an accepted principle in life that the effect is commensurate with the cause. Because this moon on this night abides in her constant digit permeating all living beings, *therefore on this* new-moon *night one should not take the life of living beings*, not kill them, *not even of a chameleon*, which is naturally vicious and is killed by people, because the very sight of it is inauspicious. One may ask: Is not the killing of animals forbidden by the dictum, 'One must not kill any animal except

where it is prescribed by the scriptures' (Cf. Ch. VIII. xv. 1)? To this we reply: Yes, it is; the present text, however, does not make an exception to that rule about the killing of animals at other times that the new-moon night, or even of the chameleon, but is only (a special prohibition) *in adoration of this deity,* the moon.

यो वै स संवत्सरः प्रजापतिः षोडशकलः, अयमेव स योऽयमेवंवित्पुरुषः; तस्य वित्तमेव पञ्चदश कलाः, आत्मैवास्य षोडशी कला, स वित्तेनैवा च पूर्यतेऽप च क्षीयते; तदेतन्नभ्यं यदयमात्मा, प्रधिर्वित्तम्; तस्माद्यद्यपि सर्वज्यानिं जीयते, आत्मना चेज्जीवति, प्रधिनागादित्येवाहुः ॥ १५ ॥

15. That Prajāpati who has sixteen digits and is represented by the year is indeed this man who knows as above. Wealth constitutes his fifteen digits, and the body his sixteenth digit. He is filled as well as wasted by wealth. This body stands for a nave, and wealth is the felloe. Therefore if a man loses everything, but he himself lives, people say that he has only lost his outfit.

He who has been remotely described as *that Prajāpati who has sixteen digits and is represented by the year,* should not be considered to be altogether remote, because he is directly observed as this one. Who is it? *This man who knows* the Prajāpati consisting of the three kinds of food to be identical with himself, *as* described *above.* What is the similarity

between them? This is being explained: *Wealth* such as cattle *constitutes* the *fifteen digits* of this man who knows as above, for it increases and decreases, and it aids the performance of rites. To contribute to his completeness, *the body* is the *sixteenth digit* of this sage, corresponding to the constant digit (of the moon). Like the moon *he is filled as well as wasted by wealth.* This is a familiar thing in everyday life. *This stands for a nave,* is fit to be such. What is it? This *body. And wealth is the felloe*, stands for the external outfit, like the spokes and felloes of a wheel. *Therefore* even *if a man loses everything,* suffers that affliction, *but he himself,* corresponding to the nave of a wheel, *lives, people say that he has only lost his outfit*, been deprived of his outer trappings, like a wheel losing its spokes and felloes. That is to say, if he is alive, he again grows by means of wealth, corresponding to the spokes and felloes.

Thus it has been explained how a man by the performance of rites with five factors combined with meditation, the divine wealth, becomes the Prajāpati consisting of the three kinds of food. And it has also been said that wealth such as the wife stands for the outfit. In the previous portion it has only been known in a general way that sons, rites and meditation lead to the attainment of the worlds, but not that there is a very definite relation between them and those results. This relation between the means such as the son and the particular results has to be stated. Hence the following paragraph :

अथ त्रयो वाव लोकाः—मनुष्यलोकः पितृलोको देवलोक इति ; सोऽयं मनुष्यलोकः पुत्रेणैव जय्यः, नान्येन कर्मणा ; कर्मणा पितृलोकः, विद्यया देवलोकः ; देवलोको वै लोकानां श्रेष्ठः, तस्माद्विद्यां प्रशंसन्ति ॥ १६ ॥

16. There are indeed three worlds, the world of men, the world of the Manes and the world of the gods. This world of men is to be won through the son alone, and by no other rite; the world of the Manes through rites; and the world of the gods through meditation. The world of the gods is the best of the worlds. Therefore they praise meditation.

The word 'Atha' is introductory. *There are indeed three worlds* attainable by means mentioned in the scriptures, neither more nor less.—'Indeed' is intensive.—Which are they? *The world of men, the world of the Manes and the world of the gods.* Of these, *this world of men is to be won* or attained *through the son alone* as means, *and by no other rite,* nor meditation. The last two words are understood. How this world is to be won through the son we shall explain later on. *The world of the Manes through rites* alone such as the Agnihotra, neither through the son nor through meditation. *And the world of the gods through meditation,* neither through the son nor through rites. *The world of the gods is the best of the* three *worlds. Therefore they praise meditation,* as being the means of attaining it.

अथातः संप्रत्तिः—यदा प्रैष्यन्मन्यतेऽथ पुत्रमाह, त्वं

ब्रह्म, त्वं यज्ञः, त्वं लोक इति ; स पुत्रः प्रत्याह, अहं ब्रह्म, अहं यज्ञः, अहं लोक इति ; यद्वै किंचानूक्तं तस्य सर्वस्य ब्रह्मेत्येकता। ये वै के च यज्ञास्तेषां सर्वेषां यज्ञ इत्येकता ; ये वै के च लोकास्तेषां सर्वेषां लोक इत्येकता ; एतावद्वा इदं सर्वम् ; एतन्मा सर्वं सन्नयमितोऽभुनजदिति, तस्मात् पुत्रमनुशिष्टं लोक्यमाहुः, तस्मादेनमनुशासति ; स यदैवंविदस्माल्लोकात्प्रैति, अथैभिरेव प्राणैः सह पुत्रमाविशति। स यद्यनेन किंचिदक्ष्णयाऽकृतं भवति, तस्मादेनं सर्वस्मात्पुत्रो मुञ्चति, तस्मात्पुत्रो नाम ; स पुत्रेणैवास्मिँल्लोके प्रतितिष्ठति, अथैनमेते दैवाः प्राणा अमृता आविशन्ति ॥ १७ ॥

17. Now therefore the entrusting: When a man thinks he will die, he says to his son, 'You are Brahman, you are the sacrifice, and you are the world.' The son replies, 'I am Brahman, I am the sacrifice, and I am the world.' (The father thinks:) 'Whatever is studied is all unified in the word "Brahman." Whatever sacrifices there are, are all unified in the word "sacrifice." And whatever worlds there are, are all unified in the word "world." All this (the duties of a householder) is indeed this much. He, being all this, will protect me from (the ties of) this world.' Therefore they speak of an educated son as being conducive to the world. Hence (a father) teaches his son. When a father who knows as above departs from this world, he

penetrates his son together with the organ of speech, the mind and the vital force. Should anything be left undone by him through any slip the son exonerates him from all that. Therefore he is called a son. The father lives in this world through the son. Divine and immortal speech, mind and vital force permeate him.

Thus the three means called the son, rite and meditation have been connected with their respective results, the three worlds. A wife, being an aid to the obtaining of a son and the performance of rites, is not a separate means, and has therefore not been separately mentioned. Wealth too, being an aid to the performance of rites, is not a separate means. It is a well-known fact that meditation and rites lead to the winning of the worlds by merely coming into existence. But one does not know how a son, not being of the nature of an activity, can help to win them. This has to be explained. *Now therefore* follows *the entrusting*. This is the name of the rite which is going to be described. It is called 'entrusting,' because a father in this manner entrusts his own duties to his son. When should this be done? This is being stated : ***When a man***, a father, on account of some omen or otherwise, ***thinks he will die, he says to his son***, calling him, ***'You are Brahman, you are the sacrifice, and you are the world.' The son***, thus addressed, ***replies, 'I am Brahman, I am the sacrifice, and I am the world.'*** Having already been instructed, he knows what to do ; so he says these three sentences.

Thinking the meaning of these sentences to be hidden, the Śruti proceeds to explain them. *Whatever is studied* has been or remains to be studied, *is all unified in the word 'Brahman.'* That is, let the study of the Vedas which so long was my duty, be henceforth done by you, for you are Brahman. Similarly *whatever sacrifices there are,* that were to be performed by me, whether I have performed them or not, *are all unified in the word 'sacrifice.'* That is, let whatever sacrifices I used to perform, be henceforth performed by you, for you are the sacrifice. *And whatever worlds there are,* that were to be won by me, whether I have won them or not, *are all unified in the word 'world.'* Henceforth you should win them, for you are the world. From now on I entrust to you the resolve which was mine of dutifully undertaking study, sacrifices and the conquest of the worlds, and I am freed from the resolve concerning these ties of duty. All this the son accepted as it was, having been instructed to that effect.

Guessing this intention of the father, the Śruti says: *All this,* the whole duty of a householder, *is indeed this much,* viz. that he must study the Vedas, perform sacrifices and win the worlds. *He, being all this,* taking all this load of mine off me and putting it on himself, *will protect me from this world.* The past tense has been used in the sense of the future, there being no restriction about tense in the Vedas. Because a son who is thus trained will free his father from this world, i.e. from the ties of duty on earth, *therefore* Brāhmaṇas *speak of an educated son as being conducive to the world* for his father. *Hence* a father

teaches his son, hoping he will be conducive to his attainment of the world. *When a father who knows as above,* who has entrusted his resolve about his duties to his son, *departs from this world, he penetrates* or pervades *his son together with the organ of speech, the mind and the vital force,* which are under consideration. Owing to the cessation of the cause (false notion etc.) which limited them to the body, the father's organ of speech, mind and vital force pervade everything in their cosmic form as the earth, fire and so on, like the light of a lamp within a jar when the latter is broken. The father too pervades everything along with them, for he is identified with the organ of speech, the mind and the vital force. He thinks, 'I am the infinite organ of speech, mind and vital force, whose manifestations have various aspects such as that relating to the body.' Therefore it has been rightly said, 'He penetrates his son together with the organ of speech, the mind and the vital force,' for he follows these. He becomes the self of all including the son. The idea is this: A father who has a son instructed in this way remains in this very world as that son; that is, he should not be considered to be dead. Witness another Śruti, 'This other self of his is his substitute for the performance of meritorious rites' (Ai. IV. 4, adapted).

Now the derivation of the word 'Putra' (son) is being given: *Should anything,* any duty, *be left undone by him,* the father, *through any slip* or slight omission in the middle, *the son exonerates him from all that* unfulfilled duty of his standing as an obstacle to his attainment of the world, by fulfilling it him-

self. *Therefore,* because he saves his father by fulfilling his duties, ***he is called a son.*** This is the derivative meaning of the word 'Putra'—one who 'saves' the father by 'completing' his omissions. ***The father*** although dead, is immortal and ***lives in this world through*** such a ***son.*** Thus he wins this world of men through his son. The world of the Manes and that of the gods are not won in that way, but simply by the fact of existence of meditation and rites. These help to attain the worlds not by undertaking some other activity like the son, but by simply coming into existence. ***Divine and immortal speech, mind and vital force,*** those pertaining to Hiraṇyagarbha, ***permeate him,*** this father who has entrusted his duties to his son.

पृथिव्यै चैनमग्नेश्च दैवी वागाविशति ; सा वै दैवी वाग्यया यद्यदेव वदति तत्तद्भवति ॥ १८ ॥

18. The divine organ of speech from the earth and fire permeates him. That is the divine organ of speech through which whatever he says is fulfilled.

How does this take place? This will be explained in this and the next two paragraphs. The Śruti itself has shown that the son, rites and meditation lead respectively to the world of men, of the Manes and of the gods. Here some prattlers (the Mīmāṁsakas) ignorant of the particular import of the Śruti say that the means such as the son lead to liberation. The Śruti has thus gagged them: Beginning with the statement that rites with five factors are undertaken

with material ends, in the passage, 'Let me have a wife,' etc. (I. iv. 17), it has, among other things, concluded by connecting the son and the rest with their respective results. Therefore it is proved that the Śruti text referring to the (three) debts applies to an ignorant man and not one who has realised the Supreme Self. It will also be stated later on, 'What shall we achieve through children, we who have attained this Self, this world?' (IV. iv. 22).

Others[1] say that the winning of the worlds of the Manes and the gods means turning away from them. And if one has a son and at the same time performs rites and meditation together, one turns away from these three worlds, and through the knowledge of the Supreme Self attains liberation. Hence, they say, the means such as the son lead indirectly to liberation itself. To silence them also, this portion of the Śruti sets itself to show the results attained by a man who has a son to whom he has entrusted his own duties, who performs rites and who knows the meditation on the three kinds of food as identical with himself. And one cannot say that this very result is liberation, for it is connected with the three kinds of food, and all the foods are the effects of meditation and rites, since the father is stated to produce them again and again, and there is the statement about decay, 'If he does not do this, it would be exhausted' (I. v. 2). Thus only would the mention of the effect and instrument in the words, 'body' and 'luminous organ' (I. v. 11-13), be appropriate. Besides, the topic is concluded by a

[1] Bhartṛprapañca is meant.

representation of the foods as consisting of name, form and action : 'This (universe) indeed consists of three things, ' etc. (I. vi. 1). And it cannot be deduced from this one sentence in question (I. v. 16) that these three means being combined lead to liberation in the case of some, and identity with the three kinds of food in the case of others, for the sentence only admits of a single interpretation, viz. that means such as the son lead to identity with the three kinds of food.

The divine organ of speech, that which relates to the gods, *from the earth and fire permeates him,* this man who has entrusted his duties to his son. The divine organ of speech, consisting of the earth and fire, is the material of the vocal organs of all. But (in an ignorant man) it is limited by attachment and other evils pertaining to the body. In the case of the sage, these evils being eliminated, it becomes all-pervading, like water, or like the light of a lamp, when its obstruction has been removed. This is expressed by the text, 'The divine organ of speech from the earth and fire permeates him.' And *that is the divine organ of speech,* devoid of the evils of falsehood etc. and pure, *through which whatever he says* about himself or others *is fulfilled.* That is, his speech becomes infallible and irresistible.

दिवश्चैनमादित्याच्च दैवं मन आविशति ; तद्वै दैवं मनो येनानन्द्येव भवति, अथो न शोचति ॥ १९ ॥

19. The divine mind from heaven and the sun permeates him. That is the divine mind

through which he only becomes happy and never mourns.

Similarly *the divine mind from heaven and the sun permeates him.* And *that is the divine mind,* being naturally pure, *through which he only becomes happy and never mourns,* not being connected with the causes of grief.

अद्भ्यश्चैनं चन्द्रमसश्च दैवः प्राण आविशति ; स वै दैवः प्राणो यः संचरंश्चासंचरंश्च न व्यथते, अथो न रिष्यति ; स एवंवित्सर्वेषां भूतानामात्मा भवति ; यथैषा देवतैवं सः ; यथैतां देवतां सर्वाणि भूतान्यवन्ति, एवं हैवंविदं सर्वाणि भूतान्यवन्ति । यदु किंचेमाः प्रजाः शोचन्ति, अमैवासां तद्भवति, पुण्यमेवामुं गच्छति, न ह वै देवान् पापं गच्छति ॥ २० ॥

20. The divine vital force from water and the moon permeates him. That is the divine vital force which, when it moves or does not move, feels no pain nor is injured. He who knows as above becomes the self of all beings. As is this deity (Hiraṇyagarbha), so is he. As all beings take care of this deity, so do they take care of him. Howsoever these beings may grieve, that grief of theirs is connected with them. But only merit goes to him. No demerit ever goes to the gods.

Likewise *the divine vital force from water and the moon permeates him.* It is being specified : *That is the divine vital force which, when it moves* among the

different beings taken individually, *or does not move,* when they are taken collectively—or *moves* in moving animals and *does not move* in stationary objects—*feels no pain,* is not affected by fear that causes sorrow, *nor is injured* or killed. *He who knows* the meditation on the three kinds of food as identical with himself, *as* described *above, becomes the self of all beings,* becomes their vital force, their mind and their speech, and thus, being the self of all beings, becomes omniscient and the doer of everything as well. This is the import. *As is this deity,* Hiraṇyagarbha, who attained this state first, *so is he*—his omniscience or omnipotence is never thwarted. 'He' refers to the sage who is compared with the other. Moreover, *as all beings take care of* or worship *this deity,* Hiraṇyagarbha, through sacrifices etc., *so do they take care of him,* one who knows as above, constantly offer him worship consisting of sacrifices etc.

Now a doubt arises : It has been said that he becomes the self of all beings. Hence, being identified with their bodies and organs, he may be affected by their joys and sorrows. To which the answer is : Not so, for his understanding is not limited. It is those that identify themselves with limited objects who are seen to be affected by sorrow when, for instance, they are abused by anybody, thinking he has abused them. But this sage who is the self of all has no particular notion of identity with either the object that is abused or the agency that abuses, and cannot therefore be miserable on that account. And there is no ground for sorrow as in the case of that due to someone's

death. As when somebody dies, a man feels miserable, thinking that he was his son or brother—the grief being due to this relationship, and where this cause is absent, one, although witnessing that death, is not afflicted, similarly this divine being, who is not identified with limited things, having no defects such as the false notions about 'mine' or 'yours,' and so on, which lead to misery, is not affected by it.

This is being expressed: *Howsoever these beings may grieve, that grief of theirs,* the pain due to that grief and the like, *is connected with them,* for it is due to their identification with limited things. But in the case of one who is the self of all, what can be connected, or disconnected, and with what? *But only merit,* i.e. good results, *goes to him,* the sage who is enjoying the status of Hiraṇyagarbha. He has done exceedingly meritorious work ; hence only the results of that go to him. *No demerit ever goes to the gods,* for there is no scope for the results of evil actions among them. That is, misery, which is the result of evil actions, does not go to them.

Meditation on all three—the organ of speech, the mind and the vital force—without any distinction has been described in the passage, 'These are all equal, and all infinite' (I. v. 13). No speciality attaching to any one of these has been mentioned. Should one understand this as it is, or upon examination may some distinction be found in any one of these either for the purposes of a vow or meditation? This is being answered:

अथातो व्रतमीमांसा ; प्रजापतिर्ह कर्माणि ससृजे, तानि सृष्टान्यन्योन्येनास्पर्धन्त—वदिष्याम्येवाहमिति वाग्दध्रे, द्रक्ष्याम्यहमिति चक्षुः, श्रोष्याम्यहमिति श्रोत्रम्, एवमन्यानि कर्माणि यथाकर्म; तानि मृत्युः श्रमो भूत्वोपयेमे, तान्याप्नोत्, तान्याप्त्वा मृत्युरवारुन्ध ; तस्माच्छ्राम्यत्येव वाक्, श्राम्यति चक्षुः, श्राम्यति श्रोत्रम्; अथेममेव नाप्नोद्योऽयं मध्यमः प्राणः ; तानि ज्ञातुं दध्रिरे । अयं वै नः श्रेष्ठो यः संचरंश्चासंचरंश्च न व्यथते, अथो न रिष्यति, हन्तास्यैव सर्वे रूपमसामेति ; त एतस्यैव सर्वे रूपमभवन्, तस्मादेत एतेनाख्यायन्ते प्राणा इति ; तेन ह वाव तत्कुलमाचक्षते यस्मिन्कुले भवति य एवं वेद ; य उ हैवंविदा स्पर्धतेऽनुशुष्यति, अनुशुष्य हैवान्ततो म्रियत इत्यध्यात्मम् ॥ २१ ॥

21. Now a consideration of the vow: Prajāpati projected the organs. These, on being projected, quarrelled with one another. The organ of speech took a vow, 'I will go on speaking.' The eye: 'I will see.' The ear: 'I will hear.' And so did the other organs according to their functions. Death captured them in the form of fatigue—it overtook them, and having overtaken them it controlled them. Therefore the organ of speech invariably gets tired, and so do the eye and the ear. But death did not overtake this vital force in the body. The organs resolved to know it. 'This is the greatest among us that, when it moves or does not move, feels no pain nor is injured. Well, let us all be

of its form.' They all assumed its form. Therefore they are called by this name of 'Prāṇa.' That family in which a man is born who knows as above, is indeed named after him. And he who competes with one who knows as above shrivels, and after shrivelling dies at the end. This is with reference to the body.

Now begins *a consideration of the vow* or act of meditation—among these organs whose function is to be observed as a vow? *Prajāpati* (Virāj), after projecting the beings, *projected the organs* such as that of speech, called here 'work,' because they are instruments of work. The particle 'ha' denotes tradition. *These, on being projected, quarrelled with one another.* How? *The organ of speech took a vow, 'I will go on speaking,* will never stop doing my function of speaking. If there is anybody who, like me, can keep at his function, let him show his strength.' Similarly *the eye*: *'I will see.' The ear*: *'I will hear.' And so did the other organs according to their* respective *functions. Death,* the destroyer, *captured them,* the organs, *in the form of fatigue.* How? *It overtook them,* appeared among those organs, as they were engaged in their functions, in the form of fatigue, *and having overtaken them it,* death, *controlled them,* i.e. stopped them from functioning. *Therefore,* to this day, *the organ of speech,* being engaged in its function of speaking, *invariably gets tired,* ceases to function, being affected by death in the form of fatigue. *And so do the eye and the ear. But death* in the form of

fatigue *did not overtake this vital force in the body,* which functions in the mouth. Therefore even now it functions tirelessly. *The* other *organs resolved to know it. 'This is the greatest,* foremost, *among us,* because, *when it moves or does not move,* it *feels no pain nor is injured. Well, let us* now *all be of its form,* identify ourselves with the vital force.' Having decided thus, *they all assumed its form,* realised the vital force as their own self—observed the function of the vital force as a vow, thinking their own functions as insufficient to ward off death. Because the other organs have the form of the vital force in so far as they are mobile, and have their own form in so far as they perceive objects, *therefore they,* the organ of speech and the rest, *are called by this name of 'Prāṇa.'* Nothing can be mobile except the vital force. And we observe that the functions of the organs are always preceded by movement.

That family in which a man is born who knows as above, that all the organs are but the vital force and are named after it, *is indeed named after him by* people. It is known by the name of the sage, that it is the family of such and such, as 'the line of Tapatī.'[1] This is the result accruing to one who knows as above, that the organ of speech and the rest are but forms of the vital force and are named after it. *And he who competes* as a rival *with one who knows as above,* with the sage who identifies himself with the vital force, *shrivels* in this very body, *and after shrivelling dies at the end,* he does not die suddenly without suffering.

[1] The daughter of the sun.

This is with reference to the body: Here is concluded the subject of meditation on the vital force as identical with oneself in so far as it relates to the body. That relating to the gods will be next taken up.

अथाधिदैवतम्—ज्वलिष्याम्येवाहमित्यग्निर्दध्रे, तप्स्याम्यहमित्यादित्यः, भास्याम्यहमिति चन्द्रमाः, एवमन्या देवता यथादैवतम् ; स यथैषां प्राणानां मध्यमः प्राणः, एवमेतासां देवतानां वायुः ; निम्लोचन्ति ह्यन्या देवताः, न वायुः ; सैषानस्तमिता देवता यद्वायुः ॥ २२ ॥

22. Now with reference to the gods: Fire took a vow, 'I will go on burning.' The sun: 'I will give heat.' The moon: 'I will shine.' And so did the other gods according to their functions. As is the vital force in the body among these organs, so is Vāyu (air) among these gods. Other gods sink, but not air. Air is the deity that never sets.

Now the meditation *with reference to the gods* is being described. It is being decided which deity is the best for the purpose of observing his functions as a vow. Everything here is as in the preceding paragraph with reference to the body. *Fire took a vow, 'I will go on burning.' The sun: 'I will give heat.' The moon: 'I will shine.' And so did the other gods according to their functions. As,* with reference to the body, *is the vital force in the body among these organs,* not overtaken by death; nor stopped from functioning —remaining intact in its vow of functioning as the

vital force, *so is Vāyu* (air) *among these gods* such as fire. *Other gods* such as fire *sink,* or set, cease to function, like the organ of speech etc. in the body, *but not air,* like the vital force in the body. Therefore *air is the deity that never sets.* Thus it is decided after consideration that the vow of one who identifies oneself with the vital force with reference to the body, and with air with reference to the gods, is unbroken.

अथैष श्लोको भवति—'यतश्चोदेति सूर्यः, अस्तं यत्र च गच्छति' इति प्राणाद्वा एष उदेति, प्राणेऽस्तमेति ; 'तं देवाश्चक्रिरे धर्मम्, स एवाद्य, स उ श्वः' इति। यद्वा एतेऽमुर्ह्यध्रियन्त तदेवाप्यद्य कुर्वन्ति। तस्मादेकमेव व्रतं चरेत्, प्राण्याच्चैवापान्याच्च, नेन्मा पाप्मा मृत्युराप्नुवदिति ; यद्यु चरेत्समापिपयिषेत्, तेनो एतस्यै देवतायै सायुज्यं सलोकतां जयति ॥ २३ ॥ इति पञ्चमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

23. Now there is this verse: 'The gods observed the vow of that from which the sun rises and in which he sets. It is (followed) to-day, and it will be (followed) to-morrow.' The sun indeed rises from the vital force and also sets in it. What these (gods) observed then, they observe to this day. Therefore a man should observe a single vow—do the functions of the Prāṇa and Apāna (respiration and excretion), lest the evil of death (fatigue) should overtake him. And if he observes it, he should seek to finish it. Through it he attains identity with this deity, or lives in the same world with it.

Now there is this verse or Mantra that brings out this very meaning: '*The gods,* fire and the rest, and the organ of speech etc. (in the body), in ancient times, after consideration *observed the vow of that,* viz. air and the vital force, *from which the sun rises*—externally he rises from air, and as the eye in the body, from the vital force—*and in which,* air and the vital force, *he sets* in the evening, and when a man goes to sleep. *It is* followed by the gods *to-day,* now, *and it will be* followed by them *to-morrow,* in future. The words ' followed by the gods ' are understood. Now the Brāhmaṇa briefly explains this Mantra : *The sun indeed rises from the vital force and also sets in it,* What is the meaning of the words, ' The gods observed the vow of that. . . . It is (followed) to-day, and it will be (followed) to-morrow'? this is being stated: *What* vow *these* gods, fire and the rest and the organ of speech etc., *observed then,* i.e., the vow of air and of the vital force, *they observe to this day,* and will observe unbroken. But the vow of the organ of speech etc. and of fire and the rest is broken, for we see that at the time of setting, and when one falls asleep, they sink in air and the vital force respectively.

Similarly it has been said elsewhere, 'When a man sleeps, his organ of speech is merged in the vital force, and so are the mind, the eye and the ear. And when he awakes, these again arise from the vital force. This is with reference to the body. Now with reference to the gods: When fire goes out, it sets in air. Hence they speak of it as having set. It indeed sets in air. And when the sun sets, he enters air, and so does the moon ; the quarters too rest

on air. And they again arise from the air' (Ś. X. iii. 3 6-8).

Because this one vow of air and the vital force, consisting of vibration or movement, persists in the gods such as fire and in the organ of speech etc.—since all the gods follow it alone, *therefore a man*, another person also, *should observe a single vow*. What is that? *Do the functions of the Prāṇa and Apāna*. The functions of these two, viz., respiration and excretion, never stop. Therefore, giving up the functions of all other organs, he should observe this one vow, *lest the evil of death* in the form of fatigue *should overtake him*. 'Lest' denotes apprehension. 'If I swerve from this vow, I am sure to be overtaken by death'—with this dread at heart he should observe the vow of the vital force. This is the idea. *And if he observes it*, does take up the vow of the vital force, *he should seek to finish it*. If he desists from this vow, the vital force and the gods would be flouted. Therefore he must finish it. *Through it*, the observance of this vow of identification with the vital force, thinking, 'The vocal and other organs in all beings as well as fire and the other gods are but a part and parcel of me, and I, the vital force, the self, initiate all movement,' *he attains identity with this deity*, the vital force,[1] *or lives in the same world with it*. This latter result takes place when the meditation is not up to the mark.

[1] Of which Hiraṇyagarbha is the cosmic aspect.

SECTION VI

त्रयं वा इदम्—नाम रूपं कर्म; तेषां नाम्नां वागित्येतदेषामुक्थम्, अतो हि सर्वाणि नामान्युत्तिष्ठन्ति। एतदेषां साम, एतद्धि सर्वैर्नामभिः समम्; एतदेषां ब्रह्म, एतद्धि सर्वाणि नामानि बिभर्ति ॥ १ ॥

1. This (universe) indeed consists of three things: name, form and action. Of those names, speech (sound in general) is the Uktha (source), for all names spring from it. It is their Sāman (common feature), for it is common to all names. It is their Brahman (self), for it sustains all names.

The differentiated universe consisting of means and ends, which was introduced as the subject-matter of ignorance, with its results culminating in identification with the vital force, as well as its state prior to manifestation denoted by the word 'undifferentiated,' like a tree and its seed—all *this indeed consists of three things.* What are they? *Name, form and action,* all non-Self, and not the Self that is the Brahman, immediate and direct. Therefore one should turn away from it. This is the import of this section. One whose mind is not averse to this non-Self, has no inclination to meditate upon the Self, one's own world, as 'I am Brahman,' for the two tendencies—one going outwards and the other devoting itself to the inner Self—are contradictory. Compare the following

from the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (IV. 1): 'The self-born Lord injured the organs by making them outgoing in their tendencies. Therefore they perceive only external things, but not the inner Self. Once in a while some steady man, desiring immortality, turns his gaze inwards and sees the inner Self.'

How can one establish the fact that this differentiated and undifferentiated universe made up of actions, their factors and their results, consists only of name, form and action, and is not the Self? This is being answered: *Of those names* as set forth (in the preceding portion), *speech,* i.e. sound in general—for it has been stated, 'And any kind of sound is but the organ of speech' (I. v. 3)—*is the Uktha,* the cause or material of these particular names, as the salt rock is of particles of salt. This is expressed by the text: *For all names,* the differentiations such as Yajñadatta and Devadatta, *spring from it,* this generality of names, like particles of salt from the salt rock. And an effect is not separate from its cause. Also particulars are included in the general. How does the relation of general and particulars apply here? *It,* sound in general, *is their Sāman,* so called because of sameness, i.e., common feature. *For it is common to all names,* which are its own particular forms. Another reason is that the particular names, being derived from it, are not different from it. And we see that something which is derived from another is not different from it, as a jar, for instance, is not different from clay. How are particular names derived from speech? This is being explained: Because *it,* what is designated by the word 'speech,' *is their Brahman,* self, for names

are derived from speech, since they have no reality apart from sound. This is being demonstrated: ***For it,*** sound in general, ***sustains*** or supports ***all names*** or particular sounds by giving them reality. Thus on account of their relation as cause and effect, and as general and particulars, and the one giving the other reality, particular names are proved to be just sound. Similarly in the next two paragraphs all this is to be applied as here set forth.

अथ रूपाणां चक्षुरित्येतदेषामुक्थम्; अतो हि सर्वाणि रूपाण्युत्तिष्ठन्ति ; एतदेषां साम, एतद्धि सर्वै रूपैः समम् ; एतदेषां ब्रह्म, एतद्धि सर्वाणि रूपाणि बिभर्ति ॥ २ ॥

2\. Now of forms the eye (anything visible) is the Uktha (source), for all forms spring from it. It is their Sāman (common feature), for it is common to all forms. It is their Brahman (self), for it sustains all forms.

Now of forms, white, black, etc., *the eye,* i.e. anything that is perceptible to the eye, form in general, or whatever is visible, which is here denoted by the word 'eye,' (*is the Uktha*). *For all forms spring from it. It is their Sāman, for it is common to all forms, It is their Brahman, for it sustains all forms.*

अथ कर्मणामात्मेत्येतदेषामुक्थम्, अतो हि सर्वाणि कर्माण्युत्तिष्ठन्ति ; एतदेषां साम, एतद्धि सर्वैः कर्मभिः समम् ; एतदेषां ब्रह्म, एतद्धि सर्वाणि कर्माणि बिभर्ति ; तदेतत्त्रयं सदेकमयमात्मा, आत्मो एकः सन्नेतत्त्रयम् ;

तदेतदमृतं सत्येन छन्नम्; प्राणो वा अमृतम्, नामरूपे सत्यम्, ताभ्यामयं प्राणश्छन्नः ॥ ३ ॥ इति षष्ठं ब्राह्मणम् ॥ इति प्रथमोऽध्यायः ॥

3. And of actions the body (activity) is the Uktha (source), for all actions spring from it. It is their Sāman (common feature), for it is common to all actions. It is their Brahman (self), for it sustains all actions. These three together are one—this body, and the body, although one, is these three. This immortal entity is covered by truth (the five elements): The vital force is the immortal entity, and name and form are truth; (so) this vital force is covered by them.

Now all particular actions consisting of thought and perception as well as movement are being summed up in activity in general. How? *Of* all particular *actions the body,* i.e. activity in general, *is the Uktha.* The activity of the body is here called the 'body,' for it has been stated that one works through the body. And all activity is manifested in the body. Hence action or activity in general, having its seat in the body, is designated by the word 'body.' The rest is to be explained as before. *These three,* viz. name, form and action described above, combining *together,* being the support of one another and the cause of one another's manifestation, and merging in one another, like three sticks supporting one another, *are one.* In what form are they unified? This is being stated:

This body, this aggregate of body and organs. This has been explained under the three kinds of food, 'This body is identified with these,' etc. (I. v. 3). The whole differentiated and undifferentiated universe is this much—consists of name, form and action. *And the body, although one,* viz. this aggregate of body and organs, yet existing in different forms in its aspects relating to the body, the elements and the gods, *is these three,* name, form and action. *This immortal entity,* presently to be mentioned, *is covered by truth.* This sentence is being explained: *The vital force,* which is of the nature of an organ, which supports the body from within, and is (a limiting adjunct of) the Self, *is the immortal entity. And name and form,* represented by the body, which is an effect, *are truth.* (So) *this vital force,* which is active and supports name and form, *is covered* or hidden (*by them*), which are external, made up of the body, subject to origin and destruction, and mortal. Thus the nature of the relative universe, which is the subject-matter of ignorance, has been pointed out. After this the Self, which is the subject-matter of knowledge, has to be studied. Hence the second chapter is being commenced.

CHAPTER II

SECTION I

'The Self alone is to be meditated upon' (I. iv. 7) ; to search after It is to search after everything ; and that Self, being dearer than everything else, is to be searched after. The passage, 'It knew only Itself as, "I am Brahman" ' (I. iv. 10), shows that the Self alone is the subject-matter of knowledge. And what is concerned with seeing differences is the subject-matter of ignorance, as indicated in the passage, '(He who worships another god thinking), "He is one, and I am another," does not know' (Ibid.). 'It should be realised in one form only' (IV. iv. 20), 'He goes from death to death who sees difference, as it were, in It' (IV, iv. 19 ; Ka. IV. 10)—in such passages as these all the Upaniṣads differentiate the subject-matter of knowledge from that of ignorance.

Of these the whole subject-matter of ignorance has been explained up to the end of the first chapter, by assigning the differences regarding ends and means to their respective places. And that entire subject-matter of ignorance which has been so explained is of two kinds: Internally it is the vital force, the sustainer and illuminer, and immortal—comparable to the posts etc. of a house. Externally it is denoted by the word 'truth,' which is an effect, non-luminous, subject to birth and death, and mortal—corresponding to the

straw, Kuśa grass and earth in a house. 'By that is the vital force (denoted by the word 'immortality') covered'—thus it has been concluded. And that same vital force has various ramifications according to the different external media through which it manifests itself. It is said that the vital force is one god. Its one common external body, with the sun etc. as its different parts, is variously designated by such terms denoting the body as Virāj, Vaiśvānara, the self of a human form, Prajāpati, Ka and Hiraṇyagarbha. To think that Brahman, one and manifold, is this much only, that there is nothing more than this, and that he is completely limited by each body, conscious, the agent and experiencer, has obvious reference to the subject-matter of ignorance. A Brāhmaṇa named Gārgya who has accepted this (conditioned) Brahman as his self, is put forward as the speaker ; while Ajātaśatru, who believes in the opposite kind of Brahman as his self, is the listener.

This method is adopted because if a subject is presented in the form of a story comprising a *prima facie* view and a conclusion, it is easily understood by the listener. If, on the contrary, it is presented only through sentences that convey the bare meaning, as in the case of logic, it is very difficult to understand, because the truth is highly abstruse. As has been elaborately shown in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, in such passages as, 'That which is rare for many even to hear of,' etc. (II. 7), that Brahman is intelligible only to a highly purified divine intellect and unintelligible to an ordinary intellect. So also in the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad, 'He only knows who has got a teacher'

(VI. xiv. 2), and 'Knowledge received from the teacher alone (is best)' (Ch. IV. ix. 3). And in the Gitā, 'Sages who have realised the truth will instruct you in knowledge' (IV. 34). Here too the great abstruseness of Brahman will be set forth in elaborate detail in the conversation between Sākalya and Yājña-valkya. Hence the attempt to present the truth in the form of a story comprising a *prima facie* view and a conclusion is quite reasonable.

Moreover, the story is meant to teach rules of conduct. If the teacher and the student be such and such, then the import underlying the story is understood. The story also forbids the use of mere argumentation, as given out in the following Śruti and Śmṛti passages, 'This understanding is not to be attained through argument' (Ka. II. 9), and 'To one who has been burnt by logic-chopping (this instruction is) not (to be given)' (Mbh. XII. cclii. 18). That faith is a great factor in the realisation of Brahman is another implication of the story, because in the story Gārgya and Ajātaśatru are seen to have great faith. 'One who has faith attains knowledge,' also says the Smṛti (G. IV. 39).

ॐ । दृप्तबालाकिर्हानूचानो गार्ग्य आस, स होवाचाजातशत्रुं काश्यम्, ब्रह्म ते ब्रवाणीति ; स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, सहस्रमेतस्यां वाचि दद्मः, जनको जनक इति वै जना धावन्तीति ॥ १ ॥

1. Om. There was a man of the Garga

family called Proud Bālāki, who was a speaker.[1] He said to Ajātaśatru, the King of Benares, 'I will tell you about Brahman.' Ajātaśatru said, 'For this proposal I give you a thousand (cows). People indeed rush saying, "Janaka, Janaka." (I too have some of his qualities.)'

There was at some past date *a man* holding the *prima facie* view and knowing only the conditioned Brahman which is the subject-matter of ignorance, *of the Garga family,* descended from Garga, *called Proud Bālāki.* 'Proud,' because of his very ignorance about the real Brahman. 'Bālāki'—the son of Balākā. The particle 'ha' refers to tradition as set forth in the story. *Who was a speaker,* one skilled in expounding, eloquent. *He said to Ajātaśatru, the King of Benares,* after approaching him, *'I will tell you about Brahman.'* Thus accosted, *Ajātaśatru said, 'For this proposal* that you have made to me *I give you a thousand* cows.' The idea is, that little statement is the reason for the gift of a thousand cows. Why is the instruction about Brahman itself not made the reason for this gift, instead of the mere proposal about it? Because the Śruti itself sets forth the King's intention. The two sentences, 'Janaka is benevolent,' and 'Janaka loves to hear,' have been condensed into the two words '*Janaka, Janaka.*' *Indeed* signifies a well-known fact. The King means: Janaka is benevolent, and he likes to hear about Brahman ; so *people* who want tc hear or speak about Brahman or want some present *rush*

[1] The same topic is dealt with in the fourth and last chapter of the Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad also.

to him. Therefore (by your proposal) you have given me too a chance to demonstrate all those qualities.

स होवाच गार्ग्यः, य एवासावादित्ये पुरुष एतमेवाहं ब्रह्मोपास इति ; स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, मा मैतस्मिन्संवदिष्ठाः, अतिष्ठाः सर्वेषां भूतानां मूर्धा राजेति वा अहमेतमुपास इति ; स य एतमेवमुपास्तेऽतिष्ठाः सर्वेषां भूतानां मूर्धा राजा भवति ॥ २ ॥

2. Gārgya said, 'That being who is in the sun, I meditate upon as Brahman.' Ajātaśatru said, 'Please don't talk about him. I meditate upon him as all-surpassing, as the head of all beings and as resplendent.' He who meditates upon him as such becomes all-surpassing, the head of all beings and resplendent.

When the King was thus eager to listen and turned towards him, *Gārgya said,* 'The being who identifies himself both with *the sun* and the eye, and who having entered the body through the eye resides in the heart as the ego, the experiencer and agent—*that being I meditate* or look *upon as Brahman* in this aggregate of body and organs. Therefore I ask you to meditate upon that being as Brahman.' Thus addressed, *Ajātaśatru* replied stopping him by a gesture of the hand, *'Please don't talk about him,* this Brahman, as something to be known.' The repetition of the negative particle is for stopping further speech. 'When both of us know the same Brahman, you insult me by trying to make me out as ignorant. Hence please don't discuss this Brahman. If you know of

any other Brahman, you should tell me of that, and not of what I already know. If, however, you think that I know only Brahman, but not his particular attributes nor the results of meditating upon them, please don't think so, for I know all that you speak of. How? *All-surpassing,* who exists surpassing all beings ; also *the head of all beings ;* and *resplendent,* being endowed with resplendence. I meditate upon the Brahman with these attributes as the agent and experiencer in this aggregate of body and organs.' And one who meditates upon such conditioned Brahman obtains results accordingly. *He who meditates upon him as such becomes all-surpassing, the head of all beings and resplendent,* for the results must correspond with the particular attributes meditated upon. As the Śruti says, 'One becomes exactly as one meditates upon Him' (Ś. X. v. 2. 20).

स होवाच गार्ग्यः, य एवासौ चन्द्रे पुरुष एतमेवाहं ब्रह्मोपास इति ; स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, मा मैतस्मिन्संवदिष्ठाः, बृहन्पाण्डरवासाः सोमो राजेति वा अहमेतमुपास इति ; स य एतमेवमुपास्तेऽहरहर्ह सुतः प्रसुतो भवति, नास्यान्नं क्षीयते ॥ ३ ॥

3. Gārgya said, 'That being who is in the moon, I meditate upon as Brahman.' Ajātaśatru said, 'Please don't talk about him. I meditate upon him as the great, white-robed, radiant Soma.'[1] He who meditates upon him

[1] The word means the moon as well as a famous creeper of ancient India which together with its juice was indispensable to sacrifices.

as such has abundant Soma pressed in his principal and auxiliary sacrifices every day, and his food never gets short.

When Ajātaśatru in the course of the dialogue refuted the presentation of the sun as Brahman, Gārgya put forward another, viz. the presentation of the moon as Brahman. *That being who is in the moon* and also in the mind as the experiencer and agent—all this is as in the previous paragraph. His attributes are: *Great* in size; *white-robed,* because the vital force (which identifies itself with the moon) has an aqueous body; and *radiant Soma.* Considering the moon and the drink-yielding creeper Soma that is pressed in sacrifices to be one, *I meditate upon* that as Brahman. *He who meditates upon* Brahman *as such,* with the above-mentioned attributes, *has abundant Soma pressed in his principal* sacrifices *and* all the more in his *auxiliray sacrifices every day.* That is, he has the means of performing both kinds of sacrifices. *And his food never gets short,* because he meditates upon Brahman as consisting of food.

स होवाच गार्ग्यः, य एवासौ विद्युति पुरुष एतमेवाहं ब्रह्मोपास इति; स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, मा मैतस्मिन्संवदिष्ठाः, तेजस्वीति वा अहमेतमुपास इति; स य एतमेवमुपास्ते तेजस्वी ह भवति, तेजस्विनी हास्य प्रजा भवति ॥ ४ ॥

4. Gārgya said, 'That being who is in lightning, I meditate upon as Brahman.' Ajāta-

śatru said, 'Please don't talk about him. I meditate upon him as powerful.' He who meditates upon him as such becomes powerful, and his progeny too becomes powerful.

Likewise there is one god *in lightning,* the skin and the heart. *Powerful* is the attribute. The result of this meditation is that *he becomes powerful, and his progeny too becomes powerful.* Because lightning may be of diverse forms, the result of the meditation reaches his progeny as well as himself.

स होवाच गार्ग्यः, य एवायमाकाशे पुरुष एतमेवाहं ब्रह्मोपास इति ; स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, मा मैतस्मिन्संवदिष्ठाः, पूर्णमप्रवर्तीति वा अहमेतमुपास इति ; स य एतमेवमुपास्ते पूर्यते प्रजया पशुभिः, नास्यास्माल्लोकात्प्रजोद्वर्तते ॥ ५ ॥

5. Gārgya said, 'This being who is in the ether, I meditate upon as Brahman.' Ajātaśatru said, 'Please don't talk about him. I meditate upon him as full and unmoving.' He who meditates upon him as such is filled with progeny and cattle, and his progeny is never extinct from this world.

Likewise there is one god *in the ether,* in the ether enclosed by the heart and in the heart. *Full* and *unmoving* are the two attributes. The result of meditation on Brahman with the attribute of fullness is that *he is filled with progeny and cattle,* while that of meditation on the attribute of immobility is that *his*

progeny is never extinct from this world—the continuity of his line.

स होवाच गार्ग्यः, य एवायं वायौ पुरुष एतमेवाहं ब्रह्मोपास इति ; स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, मा मैतस्मिन्संवदिष्ठाः, इन्द्रो वैकुण्ठोऽपराजिता सेनेति वा अहमेतमुपास इति ; स य एतमेवमुपास्ते जिष्णुर्हापराजिष्णुर्भवत्यन्यतस्त्यजायी ॥ ६ ॥

6. Gārgya said, 'This being who is in air, I meditate upon as Brahman.' Ajātaśatru said, 'Please don't talk about him. I meditate upon him as the Lord, as irresistible, and as the unvanquished army.' He who meditates upon him as such ever becomes victorious and invincible, and conquers his enemies.

Likewise there is one god *in air,* the vital force and the heart. *The Lord, irresistible* and *the unvanquished army,* one that has never been defeated by enemies, are the attributes. 'Army,' because the Maruts (the air-gods) are known to be a group. And the result of the meditation is that *he ever becomes victorious and invincible* by enemies, *and conquers his enemies.*

स होवाच गार्ग्यः, य एवायमग्नौ पुरुष एतमेवाहं ब्रह्मोपास इति ; स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, मा मैतस्मिन्संवदिष्ठाः, विषासहिरिति वा अहमेतमुपास इति ; स य एतमेवमुपास्ते विषासहिर्ह भवति, विषासहिर्हास्य प्रजा भवति ॥ ७ ॥

7. Gārgya said, 'This being who is in fire, I meditate upon as Brahman.' Ajātaśatru said, 'Please don't talk about him. I meditate upon him as forbearing.' He who meditates upon him as such becomes forbearing, and his progeny too becomes forbearing.

There is one god *in fire*, speech and the heart. *Forbearing*, tolerant of others, is the attribute. As fire has many forms, the result includes the progeny, as before.

स होवाच गार्ग्यः, य एवायमप्सु पुरुष एतमेवाहं ब्रह्मोपास इति; स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, मा मैतस्मिन्संवदिष्ठाः, प्रतिरूप इति वा अहमेतमुपास इति; स य एतमेवमुपास्ते प्रतिरूपं हैवैनमुपगच्छति, नाप्रतिरूपम्, अथो प्रतिरूपोऽस्माज्जायते ॥ ८ ॥

8. Gārgya said, 'This being who is in water, I meditate upon as Brahman.' Ajātaśatru said, 'Please don't talk about him. I meditate upon him as agreeable.' He who meditates upon him as such has only agreeable things coming to him, and not contrary ones; also from him are born children who are agreeable.

There is one god *in water*, the seed and the heart. *Agreeable*, i.e. not contrary to the Śrutis and Smṛtis, is his attribute. The result is that *only agreeable things*, those in accordance with the injunctions of the Śrutis and Smṛtis, come *to him*, not adverse ones.

Another result is that *from him are born children who are* such (i.e. obeying the scriptures).

स होवाच गार्ग्यः, य एवायमादर्शे पुरुष एतमेवाहं ब्रह्मोपास इति ; स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, मा मैतस्मिन्संवदिष्ठाः, रोचिष्णुरिति वा अहमेतमुपास इति ; स य एतमेवमुपास्ते रोचिष्णुर्ह भवति रोचिष्णुर्हास्य प्रजा भवति, अथो यैः सन्निगच्छति सर्वांस्तानतिरोचते ॥ ९ ॥

9. Gārgya said, 'This being who is in a looking-glass, I meditate upon as Brahman.' Ajātaśatru said, 'Please don't talk about him. I meditate upon him as shining.' He who meditates upon him as such becomes shining, and his progeny too becomes shining. He also outshines all those with whom he comes in contact.

There is one god *in a looking-glass* and in other reflecting objects such as a sword, and in the intellect, which is pure of material. *Shining,* naturally bright, is the attribute. The result of the meditation is likewise. The progeny is included in the result, because there are many shining objects.

स होवाच गार्ग्यः, य एवायं यन्तं पश्चाच्छब्दोऽनूदेत्येतमेवाहं ब्रह्मोपास इति ; स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, मा मैतस्मिन्संवदिष्ठाः, असुरिति वा अहमेतमुपास इति ; स य एतमेवमुपास्ते सर्वं हैवास्मिँल्लोक आयुरेति, नैनं पुरा कालात्प्राणो जहाति ॥ १० ॥

10. Gārgya said, 'This sound that issues behind a man as he walks, I meditate upon as Brahman.' Ajātaśatru said, 'Please don't talk about him. I meditate upon him as life.' He who meditates upon him as such attains his full term of life in this world, and life does not depart from him before the completion of that term.

Considering the *sound that issues behind a man as he walks* and the vital force which is the cause of life in this body to be one, he says, *'This sound,'* etc. *Life* is the attribute. The result of the meditation is that *he attains his full term of life in this world*, as acquired through his past work, *and* even though troubled by disease, *life does not depart from him before the completion of that term*, measured by that past work.

स होवाच गार्ग्यः, य एवायं दिक्षु पुरुष एतमेवाहं ब्रह्मोपास इति ; स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, मा मैतस्मिन्संव-दिष्ठाः, द्वितीयोऽनपग इति वा अहमेतमुपास इति ; स य एतमेवमुपास्ते द्वितीयवान् ह भवति, नास्माद्गण-श्छिद्यते ॥ ११ ॥

11. Gārgya said, 'This being who is in the quarters, I meditate upon as Brahman.' Ajātaśatru said, 'Please don't talk about him, I meditate upon him as second and as non-separating. He who meditates upon him as such gets companions, and his followers never depart from him.

There is one god *in the quarters*, the ears and the heart, viz. the Aśvins, the twin-gods who are never separated from each other. His attributes are: being attended with a companion and not being separated from one another, the quarters and the Aśvins having these characteristics. And the man who meditates upon this gets that as a result, viz. being attended by companions and not being deserted by his followers.

स होवाच गार्ग्यः; य एवायं छायामयः पुरुष एतमेवाहं ब्रह्मोपास इति ; स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, मा मैतस्मिन्संवदिष्ठाः, मृत्युरिति वा अहमेतमुपास इति ; स य एतमेवमुपास्ते सर्वं हैवास्मिँल्लोक आयुरेति, नैनं पुरा कालान्मृत्युरागच्छति ॥ १२ ॥

12. Gārgya said, 'This being who identifies himself with the shadow, I meditate upon as Brahman.' Ajātaśatru said, 'Please don't talk about him. I meditate upon him as death.' He who meditates upon him as such attains his full term of life in this world, and death does not overtake him before the completion of that term.

There is one god in *the shadow* or external darkness, internally in ignorance, which is a veil, and in the heart. His attribute is *death*. The result of the meditation is as before, the only difference being that in the absence of premature death he is free from suffering due to disease etc.

स होवाच गार्ग्यः, य एवायमात्मनि पुरुष एतमेवाहं ब्रह्मोपास इति ; स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, मा मैतस्मिन्संव-

विष्ठाः, आत्मन्वीति वा अहमेतमुपास इति ; स य एतमेव-मुपास्त आत्मन्वी ह भवति, आत्मन्विनी हास्य प्रजा भवति ; स ह तूष्णीमास गार्ग्यः ॥ १३ ॥

13. Gārgya said, 'This being who is in the self, I meditate upon as Brahman.' Ajātaśatru said, 'Please don't talk about him, I meditate upon him as self-possessed.' He who meditates upon him as such becomes self-possessed, and his progeny too becomes self-possessed. Gārgya remained silent.

There is one god *in the self* or Hiraṇyagarbha, in the intellect and the heart. His attribute is *self-possessed.* The result of the meditation is that *he becomes self-possessed, and his progeny too becomes self-possessed.* It should be noted that since the intellect is different according to each individual, the result is extended to the progeny also.

When his conceptions of Brahman were thus rejected one by one owing to the King's having already known them, *Gārgya,* with his knowledge of Brahman exhausted, had nothing more to say in reply and *remained silent,* with his head bent down.

स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, एतावन्नू३ इति ; एतावद्धीति ; नैतावता विदितं भवतीति ; स होवाच गार्ग्यः, उप त्वा यानीति ॥ १४ ॥

14. Ajātaśatru said, 'Is this all?' 'This is all.' 'By knowing this much one cannot know

(Brahman).' Gārgya said, 'I approach you as a student.'

Seeing Gārgya in that state *Ajātaśatru said, 'Is this all* the knowledge of Brahman that you have? Or is there anything else?' The other said, *'This is all.'* Ajātaśatru said, *'By knowing this much one cannot* claim to *know* Brahman. Why then did you proudly say you would teach me about Brahman?'

Objection : Does it mean that this much knowledge amounts to nothing?

Reply : No, for the Śruti describes meditations with particular results. Those passages cannot certainly be construed as mere eulogy. For wherever a meditation has been set forth, we find phrases conveying original injunctions as for instance, 'All-surpassing, (the head) of all beings' (II. i. 2). And corresponding results are everywhere distinctly mentioned. This would be inconsistent were the passages merely eulogistic.

Objection : Why then was it said, 'By knowing this much one cannot know (Brahman)?'

Reply : There is nothing wrong in it. It has a relation to the capacity of the aspirant. Gārgya, who knew only the conditioned Brahman, proceeded to teach Ajātaśatru, who was the listener, about Brahman. Therefore the latter, who knew the unconditioned Brahman, was right in saying to Gārgya, 'You do not know the true or unconditioned Brahman that you proceeded to teach me about.' If he wanted to refute Gārgya's knowledge of the conditioned Brahman too, he would not say, 'By knowing *this much*' ; he

would simply say, 'You know nothing.' Therefore we admit that in the sphere of ignorance there are all these phases of Brahman. Another reason for saying, 'By knowing this much one cannot know (Brahman),' is that this knowledge of the conditioned Brahman leads to that of the Supreme Brahman. That these phases of Brahman consist of name, form and action and have to be known in the sphere of ignorance, has been shown in the first chapter. Therefore the statement, 'By knowing this much one cannot know (Brahman),' implies that there is some other phase of Brahman which should be known. *Gārgya,* being versed in the code of conduct, knew that that knowledge must not be imparted to one who was not a regular student. So he himself *said, 'I approach you as* would any other *student* approach his teacher.'

स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, प्रतिलोमं चैतद्यद्ब्राह्मणः क्षत्रियमुपेयात्, ब्रह्म मे वक्ष्यतीति, व्येव त्वा ज्ञपयिष्यामीति; तं पाणावादायोत्तस्थौ, तौ ह पुरुषं सुप्तमाजग्मतुः, तमेतैर्नामभिरामन्त्रयांचक्रे, बृहन् पाण्डरवासः सोम राजन्निति; स नोत्तस्थौ, तं पाणिनाऽऽपेषं बोधयांचकार, स होत्तस्थौ ॥ १५ ॥

15. Ajātaśatru said, 'It is contrary to usage that a Brāhmaṇa should approach a Kṣatriya thinking, "He will teach me about Brahman." However I will instruct you.' Taking Gārgya by the hand he rose. They came to a sleeping man. (Ajātaśatru) addressed him by these

names, 'Great, White-robed, Radiant, Soma.' The man did not get up. (The King) pushed him with the hand till he awoke. Then he got up.

Ajātaśatru said: It is contrary to usage—what is so?—*that a Brāhmaṇa,* who comes of a superior caste qualified to be a teacher, *should approach a Kṣatriya,* who is by custom not a teacher, in the rôle of a student, with a view to receiving instruction from him about Brahman. This is forbidden in the scriptures laying down rules of conduct. Therefore remain as a teacher; *I will* anyway *instruct you* about the true Brahman which should be known, knowing which one can claim to have a knowledge of Brahman.

Seeing Gārgya abashed, in order to set him at ease, *he* took him *by the hand* and *rose. They,* Gārgya and Ajātaśatru, *came to a man* who was asleep in a certain part of the palace. Coming to him he *addressed* the sleeping man *by these names, 'Great, White-robed, Radiant, Soma.'* Even though thus addressed, *the* sleeping *man did not get up.* Finding he did not awake, (the King) *pushed him* again and again *with the hand till he awoke. Then he got up.* From this it was evident that the being whom Gārgya wanted to convey was not Brahman, the agent and experiencer in this body.

Objection: How do you know that the act of going to the sleeping man, calling him and his not getting up indicate that the Brahman advocated by Gārgya is not (the true) Brahman?

Reply: In the waking state, as the being whom Gārgya put forward as Brahman, the agent and ex-

periencer, is in touch with the organs, so is the being put forward by Ajātaśatru— who is the master of the other being—in touch with them, as a king is with his servants. But the grounds of ascertaining the difference between the two beings put forward by Gārgya and Ajātaṣatru, that stand in the relation of servant and master respectively, cannot be discriminated, because they are then mixed up. That is to say, the experiencer is the seer or subject, and not an object, and that which is not the experiencer is an object, and not the subject ; but these two, being mixed up in the waking state, cannot be shown separately. Hence their going to a sleeping man.

Objection : Even in the sleeping man there is nothing to determine that when addressed by special names, only the experiencer will perceive, and not the non-experiencer.

Reply : Not so, for the characteristics of the being whom Gārgya means are well-defined. That vital force which is covered by 'truth' (name and form constituting the gross body), which is the self (the subtle body) and immortal, which does not set when the organs have set (are inactive), whose body is water, which is white-robed, great, on account of being without a rival, and is the radiant Soma consisting of sixteen digits—that vital force remains just as it is known to be, doing its function, with its (active) nature intact. Nor does Gārgya mean that any other agency contrary to the vital force is active at that time. Hence it should know when called by its own names ; but it did not. Therefore by the principle

of the residuum the Brahman meant by Gārgya is proved not to be the experiencer.

If the Brahman meant by Gārgya were the experiencer by its very nature, it would perceive objects whenever it came in contact with them. For instance, fire, whose nature it is to burn and illumine, must always burn any combustible it gets, such as straw or tender grass, and also illumine things. If it does not, we cannot assert that fire burns or illumines. Likewise, if the vital force advocated by Gārgya were by nature such that it would perceive sound and other objects that came within its range, it would perceive the words 'Great, White-robed.' etc.. which are appropriate objects for it ; just as fire invariably burns and illumines straw, tender grass, etc., that come in contact with it. Therefore, since it did not perceive sound etc. coming within its range, we conclude that it is not by nature an experiencer ; for a thing can never change its nature. Therefore it is conclusively proved that the vital force is not the experiencer.

Objection : May not the non-perception be due to its failure to associate the particular names by which it was addressed with itself? It may be like this: As when one out of a number of persons sitting together is addressed, he may hear, but may not particularly understand that it is he who is being called, because of his failure to associate his particular name with himself, similarly the vital force does not perceive the words addressed to it. because it fails to understand that the names such as 'Great' are its own

and to associate them with itself, and not because it is other than the knower.

Reply : Not so, for when the vital force is admitted to be a deity, the non-association in question is impossible. In other words, one who admits that the deity identifying himself with the moon etc. is the vital force in the body, and is the experiencer (self), must also admit, for the sake of intercourse with him, that he associates himself with his particular names. Otherwise no intercourse with him will be possible in the acts of invocation etc.

Objection : The objection is not proper, since according to the view that makes the experiencer (self) other than the vital force, there is a similar non-perception. In other words, one who posits a different experiencer from the vital force must admit that it too, when called by such names as 'Great,' should hear them, because those names then apply to it. But we never see it do this when called by those names. Therefore the fact that the vital force fails to hear the call is no proof that it is not the experiencer.

Reply : Not so, for that which possesses something as a part of it cannot identify itself with only that much. According to the view that holds the experiencer to be other than the vital force, the latter is one of its instruments, and it is the possessor of them. It does not identify itself with only the deity of the vital force, as one does not with one's hand. Therefore it is quite reasonable that the experiencer, identifying itself with the whole, does not hear when addressed by the names of the vital force. Not so,

however, with the latter when it is addressed by its special names. Besides, the self does not identify itself with just a deity.

Objection: Such a view is untenable, because we sometimes see that the self does not hear even when called by its own name. For instance, when a man is fast asleep, he does not sometimes hear even when called by his conventional name, say Devadatta. Similarly the vital force, although it is the experiencer, does not hear.

Reply: Not so, for there is this difference between the self and the vital force that the former sleeps, but the latter does not. When the self is asleep, its organs do not function, being absorbed in the vital force. So it does not hear even when its own name is called. But if the vital force were the experiencer, its organs should never cease to function, nor should it fail to hear the call, since it is ever awake.

Objection: It was not proper to call it by its unfamiliar names. There are many familiar names denoting the vital force, such as Prāṇa. Leaving them aside, to call it by unfamiliar names such as 'Great' was not proper, for it is against convention. Therefore we maintain that although it failed to hear, the vital force *is* the experiencer.

Reply: No, for the purpose of using those unfamiliar names was to refute the contention that the deity of the moon is the experiencer. To be explicit: That the vital force which is in this body and ever awake is not the experiencer, has already been proved simply by its failure to hear the call. But names

denoting the deity of the moon were addressed to it to disprove Gārgya's contention that the vital force, which is the same as the deity of the moon, is the experiencer in this body. This purpose could not be served if the vital force were addressed by its popular names. By the refutation of the vital force the contention that any other organ is the experiencer is also refuted, because no organ can function at that time, all being absorbed in the vital force. (And no other deity can be the experiencer), for there is no such deity.

Objection : There is, for a number of gods with particular attributes have been mentioned in the portion beginning with 'All-surpassing' and ending with 'Self-possessed.'

Reply : Not so, for all the Śrutis admit them to be unified in the vital force, as in the illustration of the spokes and nave. Moreover, in the passages, 'Covered by truth' (I. vi. 3), and 'The vital force is the immortal entity' (Ibid.), no other experiencer besides the vital force is admitted.[1] Also, in the passages, 'This indeed is all the gods' (I. iv. 6), and 'Which is that one god? The vital force' (III. ix. 9), all the gods have been shown to be unified in the vital force.

Similarly none of the organs can be put forward as the experiencer ; for in that case it would be impossible to connect memory, perception, wish, etc. in the same subject, as in the case of different bodies. What one person has seen another cannot recollect, or

[1] In the position taken by Gārgya.

perceive, or wish, or recognise. Therefore none of the organs can by any means be the experiencer. Nor can mere (momentary) consciousness[1] be such.

Objection : Why not take the body itself to be the experiencer, why imagine something over and above it?

Reply : That cannot be, for we notice a difference made by the pushing. If this aggregate of body and organs were the experiencer, then, since this aggregate ever remains the same, pushing or not pushing would not make any difference as regards awaking. If, however, something other than the body were the experiencer, then, since it has different kinds of relation to the body, and may presumably get pleasure, pain or stupor as the varied result of its past actions, according as they were good, indifferent, or bad, there would naturally be a difference in the perception due to pushing or not pushing. But were the body itself the experiencer, there should not be any difference, since differences concerning relation and the result of past actions would be out of place in that case. Nor should there be any difference due to the strength or feebleness of the sound, touch, etc. But there *is* this difference, since Ajātaśatru roused the sleeping man, whom a mere touch could not awaken, by repeatedly pushing him with the hand. Therefore it is proved that that which awoke through pushing—blazing forth, as it were, flashing, as it were, and come from somewhere,

[1] Without an abiding substratum: the view of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism.

as it were, rendering the body different from what it was, endowing it with consciousness, activity, a different look, etc.—*is* an entity other than the body and different from the types of Brahman advocated by Gārgya.

Moreover the vital force, being a compound, must be for the benefit of some other entity. We have already said that it, like the post etc. of a house, is the internal supporter of the body and is combined with the body etc. It is also as a felloe is to the spokes. And in it, which is comparable to a nave, everything is fixed. Therefore we understand that like a house etc. it has been compounded for the benefit of some entity categorically different from its parts as also the aggregate. We see that the parts of a house such as posts, walls, straw and wood, as also the house itself, subserve the purpose of a person who sees, hears, thinks and knows them, and whose existence and manifestation are independent of the birth, growth, decay, death, name, form, effect and other attributes of those things. From this we infer that the parts of the vital force etc. as also the aggregates must subserve the purpose of some entity that sees, hears, thinks and knows them, and whose existence and manifestation are independent of the birth, growth, etc. of those things.

Objection: But since the deity (called the vital force) is conscious, it is equal in status (to the self); so how can it be subordinate (to the other)? That the vital force is conscious has already been admitted when we see it addressed by particular names. And since

it is conscious, it cannot subserve the purpose of another, for it is equal in status.

Reply : Not so, for the instruction that is sought to be conveyed is about the unconditioned, absolute Brahman. That the self identifies itself with action, its factors and its results, is due to the limitations of name and form and is superimposed by ignorance. It is this that causes people to come under relative existence, consisting in their identification with action and the rest. This has to be removed by a knowledge of the real nature of the unconditioned Self. Hence to teach about that this Upaniṣad (from this chapter) has been begun. For instance, it opens with, 'I will tell you about Brahman' (II. i. 1), and 'By knowing this much one cannot know (Brahman)' (II. i. 14) and concludes with, 'This much indeed is (the means of) immortality, my dear' (IV. v. 15). And nothing else is either meant to be taught or expressed in between. Therefore there is no scope for the objection that one cannot be subordinate to the other, being equal in status.

The relation of principal and subordinate is only for the dealings of the differentiated or conditioned Brahman, and not the opposite One ; whereas the whole Upaniṣad seeks to teach about the unconditioned Brahman, for it concludes with, 'This (self) is That which has been described as "Not this, not this," ' etc. (III. ix. 26 ; IV. ii. 4 ; IV. iv. 22 ; IV. v. 15). Therefore it is proved that there is a conscious Brahman other than and different from these types of unconscious Brahman.

स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, यत्रैष एतत्सुप्तोऽभूद्य एष विज्ञानमयः पुरुषः, क्वैष तदाभूत्, कुत एतदागादिति ; तदु ह न मेने गार्ग्यः ॥ १६ ॥

16. Ajātaśatru said, 'When this being full of consciousness (identified with the mind) was thus asleep, where was it, and whence did it thus come?' Gārgya did not know that.

Having thus proved the existence of the self other than the body, *Ajātaśatru said* to Gārgya, *"When this being full of consciousness was thus asleep,* before being roused by pushing,' etc. 'Conciousness' here means the instrument of knowledge, i.e. the mind, or more specifically, the intellect. What then does the phrase 'full of consciousness' mean? It means: which is perceived in the intellect, which is perceived through it, and which perceives through it.

Objection : When the suffix 'mayaṭ' has so many meanings, how do you know that it means 'full of'?

Reply : Because in such passages as, 'This self is indeed Brahman, as well as identified with the intellect, the Manas' (IV. iv. 5), we see the suffix used in the sense of fulness. Besides, the self is never known to be a modification of the consciousness that is the Supreme Self. Again, in the passage, 'This being full of consciousness,' etc., the self is mentioned as something already familiar. And lastly, the meanings, 'made of' and 'resembling,' are here impossible. Hence on the principle of the residuum the meaning is fulness only. Therefore the phrase means, 'Identi-

fied with the mind, which considers the pros and cons of a subject and does other functions.' 'Being' (Puruṣa), because it dwells in the intellect as in a city. The question, 'Where was it then?' is intended to teach the nature of the self. By a reference to the absence of effects before awaking, it is intended to show that the self is of a nature opposed to action, its factors and its results. Before awaking (in profound sleep) it perceives nothing whatsoever like pleasure and so forth, which are the effects of past work. Therefore, not being caused by past work, we understand that that is the very nature of the self. In order to teach that the self was then in its nature, and that only when it deviates from it, it becomes—contrary to its nature—subject to transmigration, Ajātaśatru asks Gārgya, who was abashed, with a view to enlightening him on the point. These two questions, *'Where was it then?'* and *'Whence did it thus come?'* should have been asked by Gārgya. But simply because he does not ask them, Ajātaśatru does not remain indifferent. He proceeds to explain them, thinking that Gārgya must be instructed, for he himself has promised, 'I will instruct you.' Although thus enlightened, Gārgya did not understand where the self was before awaking and whence it came the way it did, either to tell or ask about them. He *did not know that.*

स होवाचाजातशत्रुः, यत्रैष एतत्सुप्तोऽभूद्य एष विज्ञानमयः पुरुषः, तदेषां प्राणानां विज्ञानेन विज्ञानमादाय य एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिञ्छेते ; तानि यदा गृह्णात्यथ

हैतत्पुरुषः स्वपिति नाम ; तद्गृहीत एव प्राणो भवति, गृहीता वाक्, गृहीतं चक्षुः, गृहीतं श्रोत्रम्, गृहीतं मनः ॥ १७ ॥

17. Ajātaśatru said, 'When this being full of consciousness is thus asleep, it absorbs at the time the functions of the organs through its own consciousness, and lies in the Ākāśa (Supreme Self) that is in the heart. When this being absorbs them, it is called Svapiti. Then the nose is absorbed, the organ of speech is absorbed, the eye is absorbed, the ear is absorbed, and the mind is absorbed.'

Ajātaśatru, to convey his intended meaning, *said :* I shall answer the question I asked, viz. 'When this being full of consciousness was thus asleep, where was it, and whence did it come?' Listen. *When this being full of consciousness is thus asleep, it absorbs at the time the functions of the organs,* their capacity to perceive their respective objects, *through its own consciousness,* the particular manifestation in its limiting adjunct, the mind, caused by its material, ignorance, *and lies in the Ākāśa that is in the heart.* 'Ākāśa' here means the Supreme Self, which is identical with its own self. It lies in that Supreme Self, which is its own nature and transcendent ; not in the ordinary ether, for there is another Śruti in its support: 'With Existence, my dear, it is then united' (Ch. VI. viii. 1). The idea is that it gives up its differentiated forms, which are created by its connection with the limiting adjunct,

the subtle body, and remains in its undifferentiated, natural, absolute self.

Objection : How do you know that when it gives up the superintendence over the body and organs, it lives in its own self?

Reply : Through its name being well-known.

Objection : What is that?

Reply : *When this being absorbs them,* the functions of the organs, *it is called Svapiti.* Then this is its[1] name that becomes widely known. And this name has reference to a certain attribute of its. It is called Svapiti, because it is merged in its own self.

Objection : True, the fact of this name being well-known tells us of the transcendent character of the self, but there are no arguments in favour of it.

Reply : There are. During sleep *the nose* (Prāṇa) *is absorbed.* 'Prāṇa' here means the organ of smell, for the context deals with the organs such as that of speech. It is only when it is connected with these organs that the self is seen to have relative attributes, because of those limiting adjuncts. And these organs are then absorbed by it. How? *The organ of speech is absorbed, the eye is absorbed, the ear is absorbed, and the mind is absorbed.* Therefore it is clear that the organs being absorbed, the self rests in its own self, for then it is no more changed into action, its factors and its results.

स यत्रैतत्स्वप्न्यया चरति ते हास्य लोकाः ; तदुतेव महाराजो भवति, उतेव महाब्राह्मणः, उतेवोच्चावचं निग-

[1] The word 'Puruṣa' in the text is explained as standing for the genitive case.

च्छति ; स यथा महाराजो जानपदान् गृहीत्वा स्वे जनपदे यथाकामं परिवर्तेत, एवमेवैष एतत्प्राणान् गृहीत्वा स्वे शरीरे यथाकामं परिवर्तते ॥ १८ ॥

18. When it thus remains in the dream state, these are its achievements: It then becomes an emperor, as it were, or a noble Brāhmaṇa, as it were, or attains states high or low, as it were. As an emperor, taking his citizens, moves about as he pleases in his own territory, so does it, thus taking the organs, move about as it pleases in its own body.

Objection: Although it is dissociated from the body and organs in the dream state, which is a kind of experience, we observe it to be possessed of relative attributes: it is happy, miserable, bereaved of friends, as in the waking state, and grieves or is deluded. Therefore it must be possessed of attributes such as grief and delusion, and these as also pleasure, pain, etc. are not superimposed on it by the error brought on by its contact with the body and organs.

Reply: No, because those experiences are false. ***When it,*** the self in question, ***remains in the dream state,*** which is a kind of experience, ***these are its achievements,*** results of past work. What are they? ***It then becomes an emperor, as it were.*** This apparent suzerainty—not actual suzerainty, as in the waking state—is its achievement. Likewise a ***noble Brāhmaṇa, as it were.*** It also ***attains states high or low,*** such as that of a god or an animal, ***as it were.*** Its suzerainty and other achievements are absolutely false, for there

is the clause 'as it were,' and they are contradicted by waking experience. Therefore it is not actually connected with the grief, delusion, etc., caused by the loss of friends and so forth, in dreams.

Objection : As its achievements of the waking state are not contradicted in that state, so its achievements such as suzerainty, which occur in the dream state, are not contradicted in that state, and are a part of the self, not superimposed by ignorance.

Reply : By demonstrating[1] that the self is a conscious entity distinct from the vital force etc., have we not indicated that its identification with the body and organs or with godhead in the waking state is superimposed by ignorance and is not real? How then can it start up as an illustration of the dream-world, like a dead man desiring to come back to life?

Objection : True. Viewing the self, which is other than the body etc., as the body and organs or as a god, is superimposed by ignorance, like seeing a mother-of-pearl as a piece of silver. This is established by the very arguments that prove the existence of the self other than the body etc., but those arguments were not used specifically to prove the unattached nature of the self. Therefore the illustration of viewing the self as the body and organs or as a god in the waking state is again brought forward. Every argument ceases to be a mere repetition if there is some little distinction in it.

Reply : Not so. The achievements such as

[1] See commentary, p. 274.

suzerainty, which are perceived in a dream, are not a part of the self, for then we see a world which is distinct from it and is but a reflection of the world perceived in the waking state. In reality, an emperor, lying in his bed while his subjects are asleep in different places, sees dreams, with his senses withdrawn, and in that state finds himself, as in the waking state, to be an emperor, again surrounded by his subjects, taking part in a pageant and having enjoyments, as it were. Except the emperor sleeping in his bed, there is no second one who, surrounded by his subjects, is known to move about among the objects of enjoyment in the day-time—whom the former would visualise in sleep. Besides, one whose senses are withdrawn can never see objects having colour etc. Nor can there be in that body another like it, and one sees dreams remaining only in the body.

Objection: But one lying in bed sees oneself moving in the street.

Reply: One does not see dreams outside. So the text goes on: *As an emperor, taking his citizens,* his retinue and others who minister to his comforts *moves about as he pleases in his own territory,* acquired through conquest etc., *so does it,* this individual self, *thus taking the organs,* withdrawing them from the places they occupy in the waking state—'Etat' (this) is here an adverb (meaning, thus)—*move about as it pleases in its own body,* not outside. That is, it experiences impressions corresponding to things previously perceived, revived by its desires and the resultant of past actions. Therefore in dreams worlds that

never exist are falsely superimposed as being a part of the self. One must know the worlds experienced in the waking state also to be such. Hence it goes without saying that the self is pure, and is never connected with action, its factors and its results. Since in both waking and dream states we observe that the gross and subtle worlds consisting of action, its factors and its results are but objects for the seer, therefore that seer, the self, is different from its objects, the worlds perceived in those states, and is pure.

Since in a dream, which is a kind of experience, the impressions (of past experiences) are objects, we know that they are not attributes of the self, and that for this reason it is pure. Now in the passage, 'Then it moves about as it pleases,' movement at pleasure has been spoken of. It may be urged that the relation of the seer to the objects is natural, and that therefore it becomes impure. Hence to establish its purity the Śruti says:

अथ यदा सुषुप्तो भवति, यदा न कस्यचन वेद, हिता नाम नाड्यो द्वासप्ततिः सहस्राणि हृदयात्पुरीततमभिप्रतिष्ठन्ते, ताभिः प्रत्यवसृप्य पुरीतति शेते; स यथा कुमारो वा महाराजो वा महाब्राह्मणो वातिघ्नीमानन्दस्य गत्वा शयीत, एवमेवैष एतच्छेते ॥ १९ ॥

19. Again when it becomes fast asleep—when it does not know anything—it comes back along the seventy-two thousand nerves called Hitā, which extend from the heart to the pericardium (the whole body), and remains in the

body. As a baby, or an emperor, or a noble Brāhmaṇa lives, having attained the acme of bliss, so does it remain.

Again, when it becomes fast asleep, etc. Even when it dreams, it is nothing but pure. *Again when* giving up dreams, which are a kind of experience, *it becomes fast* or perfectly *asleep*—attains its natural state of perfect purity,[1] becomes pure as it is by nature, giving up, like water, the impurity due to contact with other things, (then its purity is all the more clearly established). When does it become perfectly asleep? *When it does not know anything.* Or, does not know anything else relating to sound etc. The last few words have to be understood. The first is the right interpretation, for the purport is that there is no particular consciousness in the state of profound sleep.

Thus it has been said that when there is no particular consciousness, it is the state of profuond sleep. By what process does this take place? This is being described: *Seventy-two thousand nerves called Hitā,* which are the metabolic effects of the food and drink in the body, *extend from the heart,* that lotus-shaped lump of flesh, *to the pericardium,* which here means the body ; that is, they branch off, covering the whole body like the veins of an Aśvattha leaf. The heart is the seat of the intellect, the internal organ, and the other or external organs are subject to that intellect abiding in the heart. Therefore in accordance with the individual's past actions the intellect in the waking

[1] Samprasāda: a synonym of profound sleep.

state extends, along those nerves interwoven like a fish-net, the functions of the organs such as the ear to their seats, the outer ear etc., and then directs them. The individual self pervades the intellect with a reflection of its own manifested consciousness. And when the intellect contracts, it too contracts. That is the sleep of this individual self. And when it perceives the expansion of the intellect, it is waking experience. It follows the nature of its limiting adjunct, the intellect, just as a reflection of the moon etc. follows the nature of water and so forth. Therefore when the intellect that has the waking experience comes back along those nerves, the individual self too *comes back and remains in the body,* uniformly pervading it, as fire does a heated lump of iron. Although it remains unchanged in its own natural self, it is here spoken of as remaining in the body, because it follows the activities of the intellect, which again is dependent on one's past actions. For the self has no contact with the body in profound sleep. It will be said later on, 'He is then beyond all woes of the heart' (IV. iii. 22). That this state is free from all miseries pertaining to relative existence is thus illustrated: *As a baby, or an emperor* whose subjects are entirely obedient, and who can do whatever he says, *or a noble Brāhmaṇa* who is exceedingly mature in erudition and modesty, *lives, having attained the acme of bliss,* literally, a degree of it that entirely blots out misery. It is a well-known fact that these, the baby and the rest, while they remain in their normal state, are exceedingly happy. It is only when they depart

from it that they feel miserable, not naturally. Therefore their normal state is cited as an illustration, because it is well-known. The reference is not to their sleep, for sleep is the thing to be illustrated here. Besides there is no difference between their sleep and anybody else's. If there were any difference, the one might serve as an illustration of the other. Therefore their sleep is not the illustration. *So,* like this example, *does it,* the individual self, *remain.* 'Eat' is an adverb here. So does it remain in its own natural self beyond all relative attributes during profound sleep.

The question, 'Where was it then?' (II. i. 16) has been answered. And by this answer the natural purity and transcendence of the individual self has been mentioned. Now the answer to the question, 'Whence did it come?' (Ibid.) is being taken up.

Objection : If a man living at a particular village or town wants to go somewhere else, he starts from that very place, and from nowhere else. Such being the case, the question should only be, 'Where was it then?' We very well know that a man comes from where he was, and from nowhere else. So the question, 'Whence did it come?' is simply redundant.

Reply : Do you mean to flout the Vedas?

Objection : No, I only wish to hear some other meaning to the second question ; so I raise the objection of redundancy.

Reply : Well then, we do not take the word 'whence' in the sense of an ablative, since in that case

the question would be a repetition, but not if we take it in a different sense.

Objection : Then let us take the question as an inquiry about the cause. 'Whence did it come?' means, 'What caused it to come here?'

Reply : It cannot be an inquiry about the cause either, for we have a different kind of answer. For instance, the answer sets forth the origin of the whole universe from the Self, like sparks from fire, and so on. In the emanation of sparks the fire is not the efficient cause, but that from which they separate. Similarly in the sentence, 'From this Self,' etc. (this text), the Supreme Self is spoken of as that source from which the individual self emanates. Therefore the answer being different, you cannot take the word 'whence' as an inquiry about the cause.

Objection : Even if it were used in an ablative sense, the objection of redundancy would remain just the same.

Reply : Not so. The two questions are meant to convey that the self is not connected with action, its factors and its results. In the preceding chapter the subject-matter of knowledge and ignorance has been introduced. 'The Self alone is to be meditated upon' (I. iv. 7), 'It knew only Itself' (I. iv. 10), 'One should meditate only upon the world of the Self' (I. iv. 15)—these represent the subject-matter of knowledge. And that of ignorance includes rites with five factors and its three results, the three kinds of food, consisting of name, form and action. Of these, all that had to be said about the subject-matter of ignorance has been said. But the Self devoid of attri-

butes that is the subject-matter of knowledge has only been introduced, but not conclusively dealt with. To do this the present chapter has opened with, 'I will tell you about Brahman' (II. i. 1), and also 'I will instruct you' (II. i. 15). Therefore that Brahman which is the subject-matter of knowledge, has to be explained in Its true nature. And Its true nature is devoid of differences relating to action, its factors and its results, exceedingly pure and one—this is the intended meaning. Therefore the Śruti raises two questions that are appropriate to it, viz. 'Where was it then, and whence did it come?' (II. i. 16).

Now that in which a thing exists is its container, and what is there is the content, and the container and content are observed to be different. Similarly that from which a thing comes is its starting place, and that which comes is the agent, which is observed to be different from the other. Therefore one would be apt to think, in accordance with convention, that the self was somewhere, being different from that place, and came from somewhere, being different from it, and the means by which it came is also different from it. That idea has to be removed by the answer. (So it is stated that) this self was not in any place different from itself, nor did it come from any place different from itself, nor is there in the self any means different from itself. What then is the import? That the self was in its own Self. This is borne out by the Śruti passages, 'It merges in its own Self' (Ch. VI. viii. 1), 'With Existence, my dear, it is then united' (Ibid.), 'Fully embraced by the Supreme Self' (IV. iii. 21), 'Rests on the Supreme Self,' etc. (Pr. IV. 7).

For the same reason it does not come from any place different from itself. This is shown by the text itself, 'From this Self,' etc. For there is no other entity besides the Self.

Objection : There are other entities besides the Self, such as the organs.

Reply : No, because the organs etc. spring from the Self alone. How this takes place is described as follows:

स यथोर्णनाभिस्तन्तुनोच्चरेत्, यथाग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गा व्युच्चरन्ति, एवमेवास्मादात्मनः सर्वे प्राणाः, सर्वे लोकाः, सर्वे देवाः, सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति ; तस्योपनिषत्—सत्यस्य सत्यमिति ; प्राणा वै सत्यम्, तेषामेष सत्यम् ॥ २० ॥ इति प्रथमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

20. As a spider moves along the thread (it produces), and as from a fire tiny sparks fly in all directions, so from this Self emanate all organs, all worlds, all gods and all beings. Its secret name (Upaniṣad) is 'the Truth of truth.' The vital force is truth, and It is the truth of that.

This is illustrated thus: *As* in the world *a spider,* which is well known to be one entity, *moves along the thread* which is not different from itself—and there is no other auxiliary to its movement but itself—*and as from* one homogeneous *fire tiny sparks,* little specks of fire, *fly* in different ways, or in numbers ; as these two illustrations show activity even in the absence of

any difference regarding auxiliaries, as also natural unity before the activity starts, just *so from this Self,* i.e. from the real nature of the individual self before it wakes up, *emanate all organs* such as that of speech, *all worlds* such as the earth, which are the results of one's past actions, *all gods* such as fire, who preside over the organs and the worlds, *and all* living *beings,* from Hiraṇyagarbha down to a clump of grass. If the reading is, 'All these souls,'[1] then the meaning will be, 'Souls with particular characteristics manifested owing to connection with limiting adjuncts.' It is the Self from which this moving and unmoving world continually proceeds like sparks of fire, in which it is merged like a bubble of water, and with which it remains filled during existence. The *secret name* (Upaniṣad) of this Self or Brahman, etc. 'Upaniṣad' means 'that which brings (one) near' (Brahman), that is, a word denoting It (a name). That this capacity to 'bring near' is a speciality of this particular name is known on the authority of the scriptures alone. What is this secret name? *The Truth of truth.* Since this secret name always has a transcendental import, it is difficult to understand. Therefore the Śruti gives its meaning: *The vital force is truth, and It is the Truth of that.* The next two sections will be devoted to explaining this sentence.

Question: Granted that the next two sections will be devoted to explaining the secret name. The text says, 'Its secret name.' But we do not know

[1] As the Mādhyandina recension has it.

whether it is the secret name of the individual self, which is the subject under discussion, which awoke through pushing, is subject to transmigration, and perceives sound etc., or whether it refers to some transcendent principle.

Reply : What difference does it make?

Question : Just this: If it refers to the relative (transmigrating) self, then that is to be known, and by knowing it (identity with) all will be attained; further it alone will be denoted by the word 'Brahman,' and the knowledge of it will be the knowledge of Brahman. But if the transcendent Self is meant, then the knowledge of It will be the knowldege of Brahman, and from that identity with all will be attained. That all this will happen we know on the authority of the scriptures. But according to this view (if the individual self and Brahman are different) the Vedic texts that teach their identity, such as, 'The Self alone is to be meditated upon' (I. iv. 7) and 'It knew only Itself as, "I am Brahman"' (I. iv. 10), will be contradicted. And (if they are identical) there being no relative self different from the Supreme Self, spiritual instruction will be useless. Since this (unity of the self) is a question that has not been answered and is a source of confusion even to scholars, therefore in order to facilitate the understanding of passages that deal with the knowledge of Brahman for those who seek It, we shall discuss the point as best as we can.

Prima facie view: The transcendent Supreme Self is not meant, for the text states the origin of the

universe from a self which awoke on being pushed with the hand, which perceives sound etc., and which is possessed of a distinct state (profound sleep). To be explicit: There is no Supreme Self devoid of the desire for food etc., which is the ruler of the universe. Why? Because the Śruti, after introducing the topic, 'I will tell you about Brahman' (II. i. 15), then mentioning the rousing of the sleeping man by pushing with the hand—thereby showing him to be the perceiver of sound etc.—and describing his transition through the dream state to that of profound sleep, shows the origin of the universe from that very self possessed of the state of profound sleep, by the two illustrations of sparks of fire and the spider, in the passage, 'So from this Self.' etc. And no other cause of the origin of the universe is mentioned in between, for this section deals exclusively with the individual self. Another Śruti, the Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad, which deals with the same topic, after introducing the beings who are in the sun etc., says, 'He said: He, O Bālāki, who is the maker of these beings, and whose handiwork this universe is, is indeed to be known' (IV. 19). This shows that the individual self roused from sleep, and none other, is to be known. Similarly by saying, 'But it is for one's own sake that all is loved' (II. iv. 5; IV. v. 6), the Śruti shows that that self which is familiar to us as being dear is alone to be realised through hearing, reflection and meditation. So also the statements made while introducing the topic of knowledge, such as, 'The Self alone is to be meditated upon' (I. iv. 7), 'This (Self) is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth,' etc. (I. iv. 8), 'It knew

only Itself as, "I am Brahman," ' etc. (I. iv. 10), would be consistent if there were no Supreme Self. It will also be said further on, 'If a man knows himself to be the Self' (IV. iv. 12). Moreover, in all Vedānta it is the inner self which is put forward as the entity to be known, as 'I (am Brahman),' and never any external object like sound etc., saying, 'That is Brahman.' Similarly in the Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad, in the passage, 'Do not seek to know about speech, know the speaker,' etc. (III. 8 etc.), it is the agent (the individual self) using speech etc. as intruments, which is put forward as the entity to be known.

Objection : Suppose we say that the individual self in a different state is the Supreme Self? It may be like this: The same individual self which perceives sound etc. in the waking state is changed into the transcendent Supreme Self, the ruler of the universe, on getting into the state of profound sleep.

Tentative answer : No, this is contrary to experience. We never find anything having this characteristic outside of Buddhist philosophy. It never happens in life that a cow standing or going is a cow, but that on lying down she becomes a horse or any other species. It is contrary to logic also. A thing that is known through some means of knowledge to have a certain characteristic, retains that characteristic even in a different place, time or condition. If it ceases to have that characteristic, all application of the means of knowledge would stop. Similarly the Sāṁkhyas, Mīmāṁsakas and others who are skilled in logic adduce

hundreds of reasons to prove the absence of a transcendent Self.

Objection : Your view is wrong, for the relative self too lacks the knowledge of how to effect the origin, continuity and dissolution of the universe. To be explicit: The position you have advocated so elaborately, viz. that the same relative self which perceives sound etc. becomes the ruler of the universe when it attains a different condition, is untenable. For everybody knows that the relative self lacks the knowledge, power and means to effect the origin, continuity and dissolution of the universe. How can a relative self like us construct this universe in which the earth etc. are located, and which it is impossible even to think of with the mind?

Tentative answer : Not so, for the scriptures are in our favour. They show the origin etc. of the universe from the relative self, for example, 'So from this Self,' etc. (this text). Therefore our view is all right.

Objection[1]*:* There is a transcendent Supreme Self, and It is the cause of the universe, for such is the verdict of the Śruti, Smṛti and reason. Witness hundreds of Śruti passages such as, 'That which knows things in a general and particular way' (Mu. I. i. 9 and II. ii. 7), 'That which transcends hunger and thirst' (III. v. 1), 'Unattached, It is not attached to anything' (III. ix. 26), 'Under the mighty rule of this Immutable,' etc. (III. viii. 9), 'That which living in all beings . . . . is the internal ruler and immortal'

[1] By the believers in Iśvara only as the efficient, not material cause of the universe.

(III. vii. 15), '(That Being) who definitely projects those beings . . . . and is at the same time transcendent' (III. ix. 26), 'That great, birthless Self' (IV. iv. 22 etc.), 'It is the bank that serves as the boundary to keep the different worlds apart' (Ibid.), 'The controller of all, the lord of all' (Ibid.), 'The Self that is sinless, undecaying, immortal' (Ch. VIII. vii. 1, 3), 'It projected fire' (Ch. VI. ii. 3), 'In the beginning this universe was only the Self' (Ai. I. 1), 'It is not affected by human misery, being beyond it' (Ka. v. 11). Also the Smṛti passage, 'I am the origin of all, and from Me everything springs' (G. X. 8).

Tentative answer : Have we not said that the text, 'So from this self,' shows the origin of the universe from the relative self?

Objection : Not so, for since in the passage, 'The Ākāśa that is in the heart' (II. i. 17), the Supreme Self has been introduced, the text, 'So from this Self,' should refer to the Supreme Self. In reply to the question, 'Where was it then?' (II. i. 16), the Supreme Self, denoted by the word 'Ākāśa,' has been mentioned in the text, 'It lies in the Ākāśa that is in the heart.' That the word 'Ākāśa' refers to the Supreme Self is clear from texts such as: 'With Existence, my dear, it is then united' (Ch. VI. viii. 1), 'Every day they attain this world that is Brahman, but they do not realise this' (Ch. VIII. iii. 2), 'Fully embraced by the Supreme Self' (IV. iii. 21), and 'Rests on the Supreme Self' (Pr. IV. 7). That the Supreme Self is the topic further appears from the use of the word 'Self' with reference to the Supreme Self,

which has been introduced in the passage, 'In it there is a little space' (Ch. VIII. i. 1). Therefore the passage, 'So from this Self,' should indicate that the universe springs from the Supreme Self alone. And we have already said that the relative self has not the power and knowledge to project, maintain and dissolve the universe.

In the passages, 'The Self alone is to be meditated upon' (I. iv. 7), and 'It knew only Itself as, "I am Brahman" ' (I. iv. 10), the topic of the knowledge of Brahman was introduced, and this deals with Brahman as its subject. This section too opens with sentences such as, 'I will tell you about Brahman' (II. i. 1), and 'I will teach you about Brahman' (II. i. 15). Now the transcendent Brahman, which is beyond hunger etc. and is eternal, pure, enlightened and free by nature, is the cause of the universe, while the relative self is the opposite of that; therefore it would not (in its present state) perceive itself to be identical with Brahman. On the other hand, would not the inferior relative self be open to censure if it identified the Supreme Self, the self-effulgent ruler of the universe, with itself? Therefore it is unreasonable to say, "I am Brahman."

Hence one should wish to worship Brahman with flowers, water, folding of the palms, praises, prostration, sacrifices, presents, repetition of Its name, meditation, Yoga, etc. Knowing It through worship one becomes Brahman, the ruler of all. But one should not think of the transcendent Brahman as the relative self; it would be like thinking of fire as cold, and the sky as possessed of form. The scriptural passages too

that teach the identity of the self with Brahman should be taken as merely eulogistic. This interpretation will also harmonise with all logic and common sense.

Advaitin's reply: That cannot be, for from Mantra and Brāhmaṇa texts we know that the Supreme Self alone entered. Beginning with, 'He made bodies,' etc. (II. v. 18), the text says, 'The Supreme Being entered the bodies' (Ibid.), 'He transformed Himself in accordance with each form; that form of His was for the sake of making Him known' (II. v. 19; R. VI. xlvii. 18); 'The Wise One, who after projecting all forms, names them, and goes on uttering those names' (Tai. Ā. III. xii. 7)—thus thousands of Mantras in all recensions show that it is the transcendent Īśvara who entered the body. Similarly Brāhmaṇa texts such as, 'After projecting it, the Self entered into it' (Tai. II. vi. 1), 'Piercing this dividing line (of the head) It entered through that gate' (Ai. III. 12), 'That deity (Existence), penetrating these three gods (fire, water and earth) as this individual self,' etc. (Ch. VI. iii. 3, 4), 'This Self, being hidden in all beings, is not manifest,' etc. (Ka. III. 12). Since the word 'Self' has been used in all scriptures to denote Brahman, and since it refers to the inner Self, and further the Śruti passage, 'He is the inner Self of all beings' (Mu. II. i. 4), shows the absence of a relative self other than the Supreme Self, as also the Śruti texts, 'One only without a second' (Ch. VI. ii. 1), 'This universe is but Brahman' (Mu. II. ii. 11), 'All this is but the Self' (Ch. VIII. xxv. 2), it is but proper to conclude the identity of the individual self with Brahman.

Objection : If such is the import of the scriptures, then the Supreme Self becomes relative, and if it is so, the scriptures (teaching Its transcendence) become useless ; while if It is (identical with the individual self and yet) transcendent, then there is this obvious objection that spiritual instruction becomes redundant. To be explicit: If the Supreme Self, which is the inmost Self of all beings, feels the miseries arising from contact with all bodies, It obviously becomes relative. In that case those Śruti and Smṛti texts that establish the transcendence of the Supreme Self, as also all reason would be set at naught. If, on the other hand, it can somehow be maintained that It is not connected with the miseries arising from contact with the bodies of different beings, it is impossible to refute the charge of the futility of all spiritual instruction, for there is nothing for the Supreme Self either to achieve or to avoid.

To this dilemma some suggest the following solution: The Supreme Self did not penetrate the bodies directly in Its own form, but It became the individual self after undergoing a modification. And that individual self is both different from and identical with the Supreme Self. In so far as it is different, it is affected by relativity, and in so far as it is identical, it is capable of being ascertained as, 'I am Brahman.' Thus there will be no contradiction anywhere.

Now, if the individual self be a modification of the Supreme Self, there may be the following alternatives: The Supreme Self may be an aggregate of many things

and consist of parts, like the substance earth, and the individual self may be the modification of some portion of It, like a jar etc. Or the Supreme Self may retain Its form, and a portion of It be modified, like hair or a barren tract, for instance. Or the entire Supreme Self may be modified, like milk etc. Now in the first view, according to which a particular thing out of an aggregate of a great many things of the same category becomes the individual self, since this particular thing is only of the same category, the identity is but figurative, not real. In that case it would be a contradiction of the verdict of the Śruti. If, however, (as in the second view) the Supreme Self is a whole eternally consisting of parts inseparably connected together, and, while It remains unchanged in form, a portion of It becomes the relative individual self, then, since the whole inheres in all the parts, it is affected by the merit or defect of each part ; hence the Supreme Self will be subject to the evil of transmigration attaching to the individual self. Therefore this view also is inadmissible ; while the view that holds that the whole of the Supreme Self is transformed disregards all the Śrutis and Smṛtis and is therefore unacceptable. All these views contradict reason as well as Śruti and Smṛti texts such as, '(Brahman is) without parts, devoid of activity and serene' (Śv. VI. 19), 'The Supreme Being is resplendent, formless, including both within and without, and birthless' (Mu. II. i. 2), 'All-pervading like the sky and eternal,' 'That great, birthless Self is undecaying, immortal, undying' (IV. iv. 25), 'It is never born nor dies' (Ka. II. 18 ; G. II. 20), 'It is undifferentiated,' etc. (G. II. 25). If the individual

self be a portion of the immutable Supreme Self, then it will find it impossible to go (after death) to places in accordance with its past work, or else the Supreme Self will, as already said (p. 299), be subject to transmigration.

Objection : Suppose we say that the individual self is a portion of the Supreme Self detached from It like a spark of fire, and that transmigrates.

Reply : Yet the Supreme Self will get a wound by this breaking off of Its part, and as that part transmigrates, it will make a hole in the assemblage of parts in another portion of the Supreme Self—which will contradict the scriptural statements about Its being without any wound. If the individual self, which is a part of the Supreme Self, transmigrates, then, since there is no space without It, some other parts of It being pushed and displaced, the Supreme Self will feel pain as if It had colic in the heart.

Objection : There is nothing wrong in it, for there are Śruti texts giving illustrations of sparks of fire etc.

Reply : Not so, for the Śruti is merely informative. The scriptures seek not to alter things, but to supply information about things unknown, as they are.

Objection : What difference does it make?

Reply : Listen. Things in the world are known to possess certain fixed characteristics such as grossness or fineness. By citing them as examples the scriptures seek to tell us about some other thing which does not contradict them. They would not cite an example from life if they wanted to convey an idea of something contradictory to it. Even if they did, it would be to

no purpose, for the example would be different from the thing to be explained. You cannot prove that fire is cold, or that the sun does not give heat, even by citing a hundred examples, for the facts would already be known to be otherwise through another means of knowledge. And one means of knowledge does not contradict another, for it only tells us about those things that cannot be known by any other means. Nor can the scriptures speak about an unknown thing without having recourse to conventional words and their meanings. Therefore one who follows convention can never prove that the Supreme Self really has parts or stands to other things in the relation of whole to part.

Objection: But do not the Śruti and Smṛti say, 'Tiny sparks' (this text), and 'A part of Myself' (G. XV. 7)?

Reply: Not so, for the passages are meant to convey the idea of oneness. We notice in life that sparks of fire may be considered identical with fire. Similarly a part may be considered identical with the whole. Such being the case, words signifying a modification or part of the Supreme Self, as applied to the individual self, are meant to convey its identity with It. That this is so appears also from the introduction and conclusion. In all the Upaniṣads first identity is broached, then by means of illustrations and reasons the universe is shown to be a modification or part or the like of the Supreme Self, and the conclusion again brings out the identity. Here, for instance, the text begins with, 'This all is the Self' (II. iv. 6), then through arguments and examples about the origin,

continuity and dissolution of the universe, it adduces reasons for considering its identity with Brahman, such as the relation of cause and effect, and it will conclude with, 'Without interior or exterior' (II. v. 19; III. viii. 8), and 'This self is Brahman' (II. v. 19). Therefore from that introduction and conclusion it is clear that the passages setting forth the origin, continuity and dissolution of the universe are for strengthening the idea of the identity of the individual self with the Supreme Self. Otherwise there would be a break in the topic. All believers in the Upaniṣads are unanimous on the point that all of these enjoin on us to think of the identity of the individual self with the Supreme Self. If it is possible to construe the passages setting forth the origin etc. of the universe so as to keep up the continuity of that injunction, to interpret them so as to introduce a new topic would be unwarrantable. A different result too would have to be provided for. Therefore we conclude that the Śruti passages setting forth the origin etc. of the universe must be for establishing the identity of the individual self and Supreme Self.

Regarding this teachers of Vedānta[1] narrate the following parable: A certain prince was discarded by his parents as soon as he was born, and brought up in a fowler's home. Not knowing his princely descent, he thought himself to be a fowler and pursued the fowler's duties, not those of a king, as he would if he knew himself to be such. When, however, a very compassionate man, who knew the prince's fitness for

[1] The reference is to Draviḍācārya.

attaining a kingdom, told him who he was—that he was not a fowler, but the son of such and such a king, and had by some chance come to live in a fowler's home—he, thus informed, gave up the notion and the duties of a fowler and, knowing that he was a king, took to the ways of his ancestors. Similarly this individual self, which is of the same category as the Supreme Self, being separated from It like a spark of fire and so on, has penetrated this wilderness of the body, organs, etc., and, although really transcendent, takes on the attributes of the latter, which are relative, and thinks that it is this aggregate of the body and organs, that it is lean or stout, happy or miserable—for it does not know that it is the Supreme Self. But when the teacher enlightens it that it is not the body etc., but the transcendent Supreme Brahman, then it gives up the pursuit of the three kinds of desire[1] and is convinced that it is Brahman. When it is told that it has been separated from the Supreme Brahman like a spark, it is firmly convinced that it is Brahman, as the prince was of his royal birth.

We know that a spark is one with fire before it is separated. Therefore the examples of gold, iron and sparks of fire are only meant to strengthen one's idea of the oneness of the individual self and Brahman, and not to establish the multiplicity caused by the origin etc. of the universe. For the Self has been ascertained to be homogeneous and unbroken consciousness, like a lump of salt, and there is the statement, 'It should be realised in one form only'

[1] Those for a son, for wealth and for heaven. See IV. iv. 22.

(IV. iv. 20). If the Śruti wanted to teach that Brahman has diverse attributes such as the origin of the universe, like a painted canvas, a tree, or an ocean, for instance, it would not conclude with statements describing It to be homogeneous like a lump of salt, without interior or exterior, nor would it say, 'It should be realised in one form only.' There is also the censure, 'He (goes from death to death) who sees difference, as it were, in It,' etc. (IV. iv. 19; Ka. IV. 10). Therefore the mention in all Vedānta texts of the origin, continuity and dissolution of the universe is only to strengthen our idea of Brahman being a homogeneous unity, and not to make us believe in the origin etc. as an actuality.

Nor is it reasonable to suppose that a part of the indivisible, transcendent, Supreme Self becomes the relative. individual self, for the Supreme Self is intrinsically without parts. If a part of the indivisible Supreme Self is supposed to be the relative, individual self, it is tantamount to taking the former to be the latter. If, on the other hand, the individual self be a part of the Supreme Self owing to some adventitious limiting adjunct of It, like the ether enclosed in a jar, a bowl, etc., then thinking people would not consider that it is really a part of the Supreme Self, deserving to be treated as something distinct.

Objection: We sometimes see that thinking as well as ignorant people entertain fanciful notions about things.

Reply: Not so, for ignorant people have false notions, whereas thinking people have notions that

relate only to an apparent basis for conventional intercourse. For instance, even thinking people sometimes say that the sky is dark or red, where the darkness or redness of the sky has just the above apparent reality. But because of that the sky can never actually become dark or red. Therefore in ascertaining the true nature of Brahman, men of wisdom should not think of It in terms of whole and part—unit and fraction—or cause and effect. For the essential meaning of all the Upaniṣads is to remove all finite conceptions about Brahman. Therefore we must give up all such conceptions and know Brahman to be undifferentiated like the sky. This is borne out by hundreds of Śruti texts such as, ''All-pervading like the sky and eternal,' and 'It is not affected by human misery, being beyond it' (Ka. V. 11). We must not imagine the self to be different from Brahman, like a portion of fire, which is ever hot, being cold, or like a portion of the effulgent sun being dark, for, as already said, the essential meaning of all the Upaniṣads is to remove all finite conceptions about Brahman. Therefore all relative conditions in the transcendent Self are only possible through the limiting adjuncts of name and form. Compare the Śruti Mantras, 'He transformed Himself in accordance with each form' (II. v. 19), and 'The Wise One, who after projecting all forms names them, and goes on uttering those names,' etc. (Tai. Ā. III. xii. 7). The relative conditions of the self is not inherent in it. It is not true, but erroneous, like the notion that a crystal is red or of any other colour owing to its association with limiting adjuncts such as a red cotton pad. Śruti

and Smṛti texts such as, 'It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were' (IV. iii. 7), 'It neither increases nor decreases through work' (IV. iv. 23), 'It is not affected by evil work' (Ibid.), 'Living the same in all beings' (G. XIII. 27), '(Wise men are even-minded) to a dog as well as a Caṇḍāla, etc.' (G. V. 18), as also reasoning establish only the transcendence of the Supreme Self. Hence, if we admit It to be indivisible, it will be particularly impossible for us to maintain that the individual self is either a part, a modification, or inherent power of the Supreme Self, or something different from It. And we have already said that the Śruti and Smṛti passages referring to the relation of whole and part etc. are for the purpose of establishing their oneness, not difference, for only thus will there be continuity as regards the import of those passages.

If all the Upaniṣads teach that there is only the Supreme Self, why, it may be asked, is something contradictory to it, viz. the individual self, put forward? Some say that it is for removing the objections against the authority of the ritualistic portion of the Vedas: For the passages dealing with rites depend on a multiplicity of actions, their factors and their results, including the sacrificers, who enjoy those results, and the priests, who officiate in them. Now, if there were no separate individual self, the transcendent Supreme Self would be one. How under such circumstances would those passages induce people to do actions producing good results, or dissuade them from those that have bad results? Who again would be the bound soul for whose liberation the Upaniṣads would be taken

up? Further, according to the view which holds that there is only the Supreme Self, how can instruction about It be imparted? And how can that instruction bear fruit? For instruction is given in order to remove the bondage of a bound soul; hence in the absence of the latter the Upaniṣads will have nobody to address themselves to. Such being the case, the same objections and replies that apply to the advocates of the ritualistic portion of the Vedas, apply also to the advocates of the Upaniṣads. For, as owing to the absence of difference the ritualistic portion, being without support, falls through as an authority, so do the Upaniṣads. Then why not accept the authority of only the ritualistic portion, which can be interpreted literally? But the Upaniṣads may be rejected, since in accepting them as authority one has to alter their obvious import.[1] The ritualistic portion, being authority once, cannot again cease to be authority. It cannot be that a lamp will sometimes reveal objects and sometimes not. There is also contradiction with other means of knowledge such as perception. The Upaniṣads that establish the existence of Brahman alone not only contradict their obvious import and the authority of the ritualistic portion of the Vedas, but they also run counter to such means of knowledge as perception, which definitely establish differences in the world. Therefore the Upaniṣads cannot be taken as authority. Or they must have some other meaning. But they can never mean that only Brahman exists.

[1] Since many passages clearly have a dualistic import.

Advaitin's reply : That cannot be, for we have already answered those points. A means of knowledge is or is not a means according as it leads or does not lead to valid knowledge. Otherwise even a post, for instance, would be considered a means of knowledge in perceiving sound etc.

Objection : What follows from this?

Reply : If the Upaniṣads lead to a valid knowledge of the unity of Brahman, how can they cease to be a means of knowledge?

Objection : Of course they do not lead to valid knowledge, as when somebody says that fire produces cold.

Reply : Well then, we ask you, do not your words refuting the authority of the Upaniṣads accomplish their object, like fire revealing things, or do they not? If you say they do, then your words of refutation are means of valid knowledge, and fire does reveal things. If your words of refutation are valid, then the Upaniṣads too are valid. So please tell us the way out.

Objection : That my words mean the refutation of the authority of the Upaniṣads, and that fire reveals things are palpable facts, and hence constitute valid knowledge.

Reply : What then is your grudge against the Upaniṣads, which are seen directly to convey a valid knowledge of the unity of Brahman, for the refutation is illogical? And we have already said that a palpable result, viz. cessation of grief and delusion, is indirectly brought about by the knowledge of this unity. There-

fore, the objections having been answered, there is no doubt of the Upaniṣads being authority.

You have said that the Upaniṣads are no authority, since they contradict their obvious import. This is wrong, because there is no such contradiction in their meaning. In the first place, the Upaniṣads never give us the idea that Brahman both is and is not one only without a second, as from the sentence that fire is both hot and cold we get two contradictory meanings. We have said this taking it for granted that a passage can have different meanings. But it is not an accepted canon of the system that tests passages (Mīmāṁsā) that the same passage may have different meanings. If it has, one will be the proper meaning, and the other will be contradictory to it. But it is not an accepted rule with those who test passages that the same sentence has different meanings—one appropriate, and the other contradictory to it. Passages have unity only when they have the same meaning. In the second place, there are no passages in the Upaniṣads that contradict the unity of Brahman. As to the conventional[1] expression, 'Fire is cold as well as hot,' it is not a unitary passage, because part of it merely relates what is known through another means of knowledge (perception). The portion, 'Fire is cold,' is one sentence, but the clause, 'Fire is hot,' merely reminds us of what is known through another means of knowledge ; it does not give us that meaning at first hand. Therefore it is not to be united with the clause, 'Fire is cold,' because

[1] Having relation to human experience, as opposed to Vedic.

its function is exhausted by its merely reminding us of what is experienced through another source of knowledge. As to the presumption that this sentence conveys contradictory meanings, it is but an error due to the words 'hot' and 'cold' being used as co-ordinate with the word 'fire.' But neither in Vedic nor in conventional usage does the same passage have more than one meaning.

You have said that passages of the Upaniṣads clash with the authority of the ritualistic portion of the Vedas. This is not correct, because they have a different meaning. The Upaniṣads establish the unity of Brahman ; they do not negate instructions regarding the means to the attainment of some desired object, or prevent persons from undertaking it, for, as already said, a passage cannot have more than one meaning. Nor do ritualistic passages fail to lead to valid knowledge regarding their own meaning. If a passage produces valid knowledge regarding its own special meaning, how can it clash with other passages?

Objection : If Brahman be the only reality, ritualistic passages are left without any object to apply to, and hence they cannot certainly lead to valid knowledge.

Reply : Not so, for that valid knowledge is palpable. We see it arising out of sentences such as, 'One who desires heaven must perform the new and full moon sacrifices,' and 'One must not kill a Brāhmaṇa.' The assumption that this cannot take place if the Upaniṣads teach the unity of Brahman, is only an

inference. And an inference cannot stand against perception. Therefore your statement that valid knowledge itself cannot arise, is absolutely wrong.

Moreover, actions, their factors and their results are things we naturally believe in: they are the creation of ignorance. When through their help a man who desires to gain something good or to avoid something evil, proceeds to adopt a means of which he has only a vague, not definite idea, the Śruti simply tells him about that; it says nothing either for or against the truth of the diversity of actions, their factors and their results, which people have already taken for granted. For the Śruti only prescribes means for the attainment of desired ends and the avoidance of untoward results. To be explicit: As the Śruti that deals with rites having material ends takes the desires as they are—although they are the result of erroneous notions—and prescribes means for attaining them, and it does not cease to do this on the ground that desires are an evil, being the result of erroneous notions, similarly the Śruti dealing with the regular rites such as the Agnihotra takes the diversity of actions and their factors as they are—although they proceed from error—and enjoins rites such as the Agnihotra, seeing some utility in them, whether it be the attainment of some particular desired end or the avoidance of some particular untoward result. It does not refrain from enjoining them simply because the utility relates to something that is unreal, being within the domain of ignorance; as is the case with rites having material ends. Nor would ignorant people cease to engage themselves in those rites, for we

see them doing it, as in the case of people who are swayed by desires.

Objection : But it is only those that have knowledge who are competent to perform rites.

Reply : No, for we have already said that the knowledge of the unity of Brahman militates against one's competency to perform rites. This should also be taken as an answer to the charge that if Brahman be the only reality, there will be no scope left for instruction, and hence it can neither be received nor produce any result. The diversity of people's desires, attachments and so forth is another reason. People have innumerable desires and various defects such as attachment. Therefore they are lured by the attachment etc. to external objects, and the scriptures are powerless to hold them back ; nor can they persuade those that are naturally averse to external objects to go after them. But the scriptures do this much that they point out what leads to good and what to evil, thereby indicating the particular relations that subsist between the ends and means ; just as a lamp, for instance, helps to reveal forms in the dark. But the scriptures neither hinder nor direct a person by force, as if he were a slave. We see how people disobey even the scriptures because of an excess of attachment etc. Therefore according to the varying tendencies of people, the scriptures variously teach the particular relations subsisting between the ends and means. In this matter people themselves adopt particular means according to their tastes, and the scriptures simply remain neutral, like the sun, for instance, or a lamp. Similarly somebody

may think the highest goal to be not worth striving after. One chooses one's goal according to one's knowledge, and wants to adopt corresponding means. This is borne out also by the eulogistic passages of the Śruti such as, 'Three classes of Prajāpati's sons lived a life of continence with their father, Prajāpati,' etc. (V. ii. 1). Therefore the Vedānta texts that teach the unity of Brahman are not antagonistic to the ritualistic scriptures. Nor are the latter thereby deprived of their scope. Neither do the ritualistic scriptures, which uphold differences such as the factors of an action, take away the authority of the Upaniṣads as regards the unity of Brahman. For the means of knowledge are powerful in their respective spheres, like the ear etc.

Nevertheless certain self-styled wise men (the logicians), following their own whims, think that the different means of knowledge are mutually contradictory, and also level against us the objection that if Brahman be the only reality, such Upaniṣadic texts contradict perception. For instance, objects such as sound, which are perceived by the ear and so forth, are observed to be different from one another. So those who hold that Brahman is the only reality contradict perception. Similarly the relative selves that perceive sound etc. through the ear and so forth, and acquire merit or demerit through their work, are inferred to be different in different bodies. So those who hold that Brahman is the only reality also contradict inference. They also cite contradiction with the Śruti. For instance, in passages such as, 'One who desires villages must sacrifice' (Tā. XVII. x. 4),

'One who desires animals must sacrifice' (Ibid. XVI. xii. 8) and 'One who desires heaven must sacrifice' (Ibid. XVI. iii. 3), the objects desired such as villages, animals and heaven are known to be different from the men who apply the means of obtaining them.

Our reply is that they are the scum of the Brāhmaṇa and other castes, who, with their minds poisoned by vicious reasoning, hold views about the meaning of the Vedas that are divorced from tradition, and are therefore to be pitied. How? To those who say that sound etc., perceived through the ear and so forth, contradict the unity of Brahman, we put this question: Does the variety of sound and the rest contradict the oneness of the ether? If it does not, then there is no contradiction in our position with perception. They said: The selves that perceive sound etc. through the ear and so forth, and acquire merit or demerit through their work, are inferred to be different in different bodies; so the unity of Brahman also contradicts inference. But we ask them, 'By whom are they so inferred?' If they say, 'By us all who are experts in inference,' we would ask them, 'But who really are you that call yourselves so?' What would be their reply then? Perhaps they would say, 'When dexterity in inference has been severally denied of the body, the organs, the mind and the self, we experts in inference should be the self joined to its accessories, the body, organs and mind, for actions depend on many factors.' Our reply is: 'If such be your dexterous inference, then you become multiple. For you yourselves have admitted that actions depend on many factors. Now

inference also is an action, which, as you have also admitted, is done by the self joined to its accessories, the body, organs and mind. Thus, while saying that you are experts in inference, you virtually admit that each of you is multiple—the self joined to the accessories, the body, organs and mind.' O the dexterity in inference shown by these bulls of logicians who lack only a tail and horns! How can a fool who does not know his own self know its unity or difference? What will he infer about it? And on what grounds? For the self has no characteristic that might be used to infer natural differences between one self and another. Those characteristics having name and form which the opponents will put forward to infer differences in the self belong only to name and form, and are but limiting adjuncts of the self, just as a jar, a bowl, an air-hole, or the pores in earth are of the ether. When the logician finds distinguishing characteristics in the ether, then only will he find such characteristics in the self. For not even hundreds of logicians, who admit differences in the self owing to limiting adjuncts, can show any characteristic of it that would lead one to infer differences between one self and another. And as for natural differences, they are out of the question, for the self is not an object of inference. Because whatever the opponent regards as an attribute of the self is admitted as consisting of name and form, and the self is admitted to be different from these. Witness the Śruti passage, 'Ākāśa (the self-effulgent One) is verily the cause of name and form. That within which they are is Brahman' (Ch. VIII. xiv. 1), and also 'Let me

manifest name and form' (Ch. VI. iii. 2). Name and form have origin and dissolution, but Brahman is different from them. Therefore how can the unity of Brahman contradict inference, of which It is never an object? This also refutes the charge that it contradicts the Śruti.

It has been objected that if Brahman be the only reality, there will be nobody to receive instruction and profit by it; so instruction about unity will be useless. This is wrong. For (if you contend on the ground that) actions are the result of many factors, (we have already refuted this point, hence) at whom is the objection levelled? (Surely not at us.) (If, however, your ground is that) when the transcendent Brahman is realised as the only existence, there is neither instruction nor the instructor nor the result of receiving the instruction, and therefore the Upaniṣads are useless—it is a position we readily admit. But if you urge that (even before Brahman is realised) instruction is useless, since it depends on many factors, we reply, no, for it will contradict the assumption[1] of all believers in the self (including yourself). Therefore this unity of Brahman is a secure fortress impregnable to logicians, those first-rate heretics and liars, and inaccessible to persons of shallow understanding, and to those who are devoid of the grace of the scriptures and the teacher. This is known from such Śruti and Smṛti texts as the following, 'Who but me can know that Deity who has both joy and the absence of it?' (Ka. II. 21), 'Even the gods in ancient times were puzzled over

[1] That instruction is necessary before realisation.

this' (Ka. I. 21), and 'This understanding is not to be attained through argument' (Ka. II. 9), as also from those that describe the truth as attainable through special favour and grace, and also from the Mantras that depict Brahman as possessed of contradictory attributes, such as, 'It moves, and does not move, It is far, and near,' etc. (Īś. 5). The Gītā too says, 'All beings are in Me,' etc. (IX. 4). Therefore there is no other entity called the relative self but the Supreme Brahman. Hence it is well said in hundreds of Śruti passages, 'This was indeed Brahman in the beginning. It knew only Itself as, "I am Brahamn." ' (I. iv. 10), 'There is no other witness but This, no other hearer but This,' etc. (III. viii. 11). Therefore the highest secret name of 'the Truth of truth' belongs only to the Supreme Brahman.

SECTION II

The preceding section has broached the topic, 'I will tell you about Brahman' (II. i. 15). In this connection it has been stated that that from which the universe originates, of which it consists (during continuity), and into which it dissolves is the one Brahman. Now what are the constituents of that universe which originates and dissolves? The five elements. And the elements consist of name and form. It has already been said that name and form are called truth. And Brahman is the Truth of this truth consisting of the elements. How it is that the elements are called truth, will be explained in the (third) section, treating of the gross and subtle universes. Because the body and organs, as also the vital force, consist of these gross and subtle elements, therefore they are truth. In order to define the nature of those elements that form the body and organs, this and the following section are introduced. That will be an explanation of the secret name ('the Truth of truth'), for Brahman, the Truth of truth, will be ascertained only by ascertaining that the body and organs are truth. It has been said, 'The vital force is truth, and Brahman is the Truth of that' (II. i. 20). Now, to explain what this vital force is, and how many and what its secret names are, the nature of the vital force, which is an instrument of the self, is being described in the course of describing the secret name of Brahman, just as a

traveller notices wells, parks, etc., lying along the road.

यो ह वै शिशुं साधानं सप्रत्याधानं सस्थूणं सदामं वेद सप्त ह द्विषतो भ्रातृव्यानवरुणद्धि । अयं वाव शिशुर्योऽयं मध्यमः प्राणः, तस्येदमेवाधानम्, इदं प्रत्याधानम्, प्राणः स्थूणा, अन्नं दाम ॥ १ ॥

1. He who knows the calf with its abode, its special resort, its post and its tether kills his seven envious kinsmen: The vital force in the body is indeed the calf; this body is its abode, the head its special resort, strength its post, and food its tether.

He who knows the calf with its abode, its special resort, its post and its tether gets this result. What is that? He *kills his seven envious kinsmen.* Kinsmen are of two kinds, those who envy and those who do not; here the former are meant. The seven organs[1]—instruments for perceiving objects—that are in the head, that is to say, the attachment to sense-objects which they cause, are called kinsmen, since they are born with a person. Because they turn his vision from the Self to the sense-objects, therefore they are envious kinsmen—since they thus hinder him from perceiving the inner Self. It is also said in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, 'The self-born Lord injured the organs by making them outgoing in their tendencies. Therefore they perceive only external things, but not the inner Self,' etc. (Ka. IV. 1). He who knows the calf and the

[1] The eyes, ears, nostrils and mouth.

rest—understands their real nature—removes from view, or kills, these envious kinsmen. When the aspirant, hearing of this result, is inclined to know more about them, the Śruti says: *This is indeed the calf*. Which? This *vital force* which is *in the body* as the subtle body, which in its fivefold form pervades the body, and was addressed as 'Great, White-robed, Radiant, Soma' (II. i. 15), and on which the organs such as that of speech and the mind rest, as we know from the illustration of the post to which the horse's feet are tethered (VI. i. 13). It is like a young calf, not being in direct touch with the sense-objects like the other organs.

Mention has been made of 'the calf with its abode.' Now what is the abode of that calf, that instrument of the self, the vital force, which is here likened to a calf? *This body,* which is an effect, *is its abode*. An abode is that in which something is put. This body is the abode of that calf, the vital force, because it is by staying in the body that the organs come to function as channels of perception, not while they rest only on the vital force. This has been demonstrated by Ajātaśatru as follows: When the organs are withdrawn, the individual self is not noticed; it is only when they occupy their respective seats in the body that the individual self is noticed as perceiving things. This was proved by the (sleeping) man's being roused by pushing with the hand. *The head is its special resort.* It is so called because the vital force is connected with particular parts of it. *Strength,* the power that comes out of food and drink, is *its post*. 'Prāṇa' and 'Bala' (strength) are synonyms, for the

vital force abides in the body, being supported by strength. This is borne out by the Śruti text, 'When this self becomes weak and senseless, as it were' (IV. iv. 1). Just as a calf is supported by a post,[1] so is the vital force by strength. Some understand that the respiratory force that works in the body is the post. *And food* is *its tether*. The food we eat is changed into three forms. That which is the grossest is excreted from the body and is absorbed into the earth. The intermediate form of chyle, passing through the stages of blood etc., nourishes its effect, the gross body, which is composed of seven ingredients.[2] The body is nourished by the accession of its cause, viz. food, because it is the product of food; and when this is reversed, it decays and falls. The finest form, called 'nectar' and 'highly powerful,' goes past the navel to the heart, and penetrating the seventy-two thousand nerves that radiate from there, generates strength, here designated as 'post,' and thereby helps the subtle body, which is the aggregate of the inner organs and is here called the calf, to stay in the gross body. Therefore food is the connecting link between the vital force and the body, like a calf's tether with a loop at each end.

Now certain secret names regarding the calf living in its special resort, with reference to the eye, are being mentioned:

तमेताः सप्ताक्षितय उपतिष्ठन्ते ; तद्या इमा अक्षन् लोहिन्यो राजयस्ताभिरेनं रुद्रोऽन्वायत्तः, अथ या अक्षन्ना-

[1] When, for instance, somebody is tugging it.

[2] Skin, blood, flesh, fat, marrow, bone and seed.

पस्ताभिः पर्जन्यः, या कनीनका तयादित्यः, यत्कृष्णं तेनाग्निः, यच्छुक्लं तेनेन्द्रः, अधरयैनं वर्तन्या पृथिव्यन्वायत्ता, द्यौरुत्तरया ; नास्यान्नं क्षीयते य एवं वेद ॥ २ ॥

2. These seven gods that prevent decay worship it: Through these pink lines in the eye Rudra attends on it; through the water that is in the eye, Parjanya; through the pupil, the sun; through the dark portion, fire; through the white portion, Indra; through the lower eye-lid the earth attends on it; and through the upper eye-lid, heaven. He who knows it as such never has any decrease of food.

These seven gods that prevent decay (lit. undecaying), to be presently named, *worship it,* this vital force, the instrument, which is tied to the body by food, and resides in the eye. The root 'sthā' with the prefix 'upa' becomes Ātmanepadin when it signifies praying with Mantras. Here too the seven names of the gods stand for Mantras instrumental to prayer ; so the use of the Ātmanepada with 'sthā' is not out of place. Now the gods that prevent decay are being enumerated. *Through these* familiar *pink lines in the eye* as aids, *Rudra attends on it,* the vital force that is in the body. *Through* the aid of *the water that is in the eye,* which comes out when there is contact with smoke etc., the god *Parjanya* attends on, i.e. prays to the vital force ; and he is the food of the vital force and the cause of its permanence. We have it in another Śruti, 'When Parjanya causes rain, the vital force is

glad.' *Through the pupil,* which has the power of sight, *the sun* prays to the vital force. *Through the dark portion* of the eye *fire* prays to it. *Through the white portion* of the eye *Indra* prays. *Through the lower eye-lid the earth attends on it,* because both occupy a lower position. *And through the upper eye-lid, heaven,* because both occupy an upper position. *He who knows it as such,* knows that these seven gods that are the food of the vital force constantly pray to it, gets this as a result—he *never has any decrease of food.*

तदेष श्लोको भवति ।

अर्वाग्बिलश्चमस ऊर्ध्वबुध्नः,

तस्मिन्यशो निहितं विश्वरूपम् ।

तस्यासत ऋषयः सप्त तीरे,

वागष्टमी ब्रह्मणा संविदाना ॥ इति ।

'अर्वाग्बिलश्चमस ऊर्ध्वबुध्नः' इतीदं तच्छिरः, एष ह्यर्वाग्बिलश्चमस ऊर्ध्वबुध्नः; 'तस्मिन्यशो निहितं विश्वरूपम्' इति प्राणा वै यशो विश्वरूपम्, प्राणानेतदाह; 'तस्यासत ऋषयः सप्त तीरे' इति प्राणा वा ऋषयः, प्राणानेतदाह; 'वागष्टमी ब्रह्मणा संविदाना' इति वाग्घ्यष्टमी ब्रह्मणा संवित्ते ॥३॥

3. Regarding this there is the following verse: 'There is a bowl that has its opening below and bulges at the top; various kinds of knowledge have been put in it; seven sages sit by its side, and the organ of speech, which has

communication with the Vedas, is the eighth.' The ' bowl that has its opening below and bulges at the top ' is this head of ours, for it is the bowl that has its opening below and bulges at the top. ' Various kinds of knowledge have been put in it,' refers to the organs; these indeed represent various kinds of knowledge. ' Seven sages sit by its side,' refers to the organs; they indeed are the sages. ' The organ of speech, which has communication with the Vedas, is the eighth,' because the organ of speech is the eighth and communicates with the Vedas.

Regarding this subject *there is the following verse* or Mantra: *'There is a bowl that has its opening below,'* etc. Now the Śruti explains the Mantra. What is that bowl? *This head of ours,* for it is shaped like a bowl. How? *For it has its opening below,* the mouth standing for this opening, *and bulges at the top,* the head because of its round shape answering to the description. *' Various kinds of knowledge have been put in it'*: Just as the Soma juice is put in the bowl, so have various kinds of knowledge been put in the head. *The organs* such as the ear, and the vital force, which is distributed among them in seven forms, *represent various kinds of knowledge,* because they are the cause of the perception of sound etc. This is what the Mantra says. *'Seven sages sit by its side'*: This portion of the Mantra *refers to the organs,* which are of a vibratory nature. *They* alone *are the sages. 'The organ of speech, which has communication with the*

Vedas, is the eighth.'[1] The reason for this is given: *Because the organ of speech is the eighth and communicates with* (or utters) *the Vedas.*

इमावेव गोतमभरद्वाजौ, अयमेव गोतमः, अयं भरद्वाजः ; इमावेव विश्वामित्रजमदग्नी, अयमेव विश्वामित्रः, अयं जमदग्निः ; इमावेव वसिष्ठकश्यपौ, अयमेव वसिष्ठः, अयं कश्यपः ; वागेवात्रिः, वाचा ह्यन्नमद्यते, अत्तिर्ह वै नामैतद्यदत्रिरिति ; सर्वस्यात्ता भवति, सर्वमस्यान्नं भवति य एवं वेद ॥ ४ ॥ इति द्वितीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

4. These two (ears) are Gotama and Bharadvāja: this one is Gotama, and this one Bharadvāja: These two (eyes) are Viśvāmitra and Jamadagni: this one is Viśvāmitra, and this one Jamadagni. These two (nostrils) are Vasiṣṭha, and Kaśyapa: this one is Vasiṣṭha, and this one Kaśyapa: The tongue is Atri, for through the tongue food is eaten. 'Atri' is but this name 'Atti.' He who knows it as such becomes the eater of all, and everything becomes his food.

Now who are the sages that sit by the side of that bowl? *These two* ears *are Gotama and Bharadvāja: this one is Gotama, and this one Bharadvāja,* meaning the right and the left ear respectively, or inversely. Similarly, to instruct about the eyes the Śruti says,

[1] The tongue counts as two: as the organ of taste it will be enumerated in the next paragraph as the seventh sage ; as the organ of speech it is here spoken of as the eighth.

These two are Viśvāmitra and Jamadagni : this one, the right, *is Viśvāmitra, and this one,* the left, *Jamadagni,* or inversely. To instruct about the nostrils the Śruti says, *These two are Vasiṣṭha and Kaśyapa : this one,* the right nostril, *is Vasiṣṭha, and this one,* the left, *Kaśyapa,* or inversely, as before. *The tongue is Atri,* because of its association with eating ; this is the seventh sage. *For through the tongue food is eaten.* Therefore that which is indirectly called *'Atri' is but this* familiar *name 'Atti'* (eats)—on account of being the eater. Through meditation on the derivation of the word 'Atri,' he *becomes the eater of all* kinds of food belonging to the vital force. In the next world he becomes only the eater, and is never treated as food. This is expressed by the words, *'And everything becomes his food.' He who knows it,* the true nature of the vital force, *as such,* as described above, becomes the vital force in this body, and is only the eater associated with the abode and the special resort, and not food. That is to say, he is entirely removed from the category of food.

SECTION III

At the end of the first section it has been said that the vital force is truth. Its secret names also have been explained in connection with those of Brahman, implying thereby that this is the same vital force. Of what does it consist, and how is it called truth?—these questions have to be answered. Hence this section is commenced in order to define the nature of the five elements, called truth, which consist of the body and organs. It is by the elimination of these limiting adjuncts that the Śruti wishes to define the nature of Brahman negatively, saying, 'Not this, not this.' Now Brahman has two forms: The Brahman that is (respectively) connected with the body and organs, which are the product of the five elements, is designated as gross and subtle, is mortal and immortal,[1] and includes the impressions created by those elements, is the omniscient, omnipotent, conditioned Brahman, consisting of actions, their factors and their results, and admitting of all kinds of association. That same Brahman, again, is devoid of all limiting adjuncts, the object of intuition, birthless, undecaying, immortal, fearless, and beyond the reach of even speech and mind, being above duality, and is described as 'Not this, not this.' Now these are the two forms by the elimination of which Brahman is so described; hence the text begins:

[1] That is, relatively.

द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणो रूपे—मूर्तं चैवामूर्तं च, मर्त्यं चामृतं च, स्थितं च यच्च, सच्च त्यच्च ॥ १ ॥

1. Brahman has but two forms—gross and subtle, mortal and immortal, limited and unlimited, defined and undefined.

Brahman or the Supreme Self *has but two forms,* through the superimposition of which by ignorance the formless Supreme Brahman is defined or made conceivable. The word 'Vāva' (indeed) is emphatic. Which are those two forms? The *gross and subtle.* The other phases of the gross and subtle are included in them ; so they are counted as two only. What are those phases of the gross and subtle? These are being mentioned: *Mortal,* subject to destruction, *and immortal,* its opposite. *Limited,* which goes a little distance and stops, *and unlimited,* which goes on, is pervasive, the opposite of 'limited.' *Defined,* having particular characteristics that distinguish it from others, *and undefined,* the opposite of that, which can only be distantly referred to, as something we know not what.

तदेतन्मूर्तं यदन्यद्वायोश्चान्तरिक्षाच्च ; एतन्मर्त्यम्, एतत्स्थितम्, एतत्सत् ; तस्यैतस्य मूर्तस्य, एतस्य मर्त्यस्य, एतस्य स्थितस्य, एतस्य सत एष रसो य एष तपति, सतो ह्येष रसः ॥ २ ॥

2. The gross (form) is that which is other than air and the ether. It is mortal, it is limited, and it is defined. The essence of that which is

gross, mortal, limited and defined is the sun that shines, for it is the essence of the defined.

The gross and the subtle have each four phases. Now what are the phases of the gross, and what are those of the subtle? This is being separately shown. *The gross* (form) *is:* 'Gross' means having well-defined parts, with parts interpenetrating one another, i.e. compact or solid. What is it? *That which is other*—than what?—*than* the two elements, *air and the ether;* hence it refers to the three remaining elements, viz. earth etc. *It,* this triad of elements called gross, *is* also *mortal,* or perishable. Why? Because it is limited; it is only a limited thing which, when joined to some other thing, is checked by it, as a jar by a post or wall, for instance. Similarly the gross form *is limited,* being related to some other object, and mortal, because of its clash with the latter. *And it is defined,* having noticeable peculiarities of its own; and for that very reason it is limited, and being limited it is mortal, and hence it is also gross. Or because it is gross it is mortal, and being mortal it is limited, and being limited it is defined. Since these four features do not contradict one another, any one of them may stand to the others in the relation of principal and qualifying word, or of cause and effect. In any case, the three elements, each possessed of the four features, constitute the gross form of Brahman. Any one of these four epithets being taken, the others are automatically taken. This is stated as follows: *The essence of that which is gross, mortal, limited and defined,* i.e. of the three elements each having the four

attributes, *is the sun that shines,* for the sun is the quintessence of the three elements. It is the perfection of them, because through it they get their features of varying colours. The shining solar orb is the representation of the cosmic body, *for it is the essence of the defined,* i.e. of the three elements ; hence that is meant. Because the shining sun has a gross form and is the best product of the elements. About the cosmic organ within the solar orb, we shall now speak.

अथामूर्तम्—वायुश्चान्तरिक्षं च ; एतदमृतम्, एतद्यत्, एतत्त्यत् ; तस्यैतस्यामूर्तस्य, एतस्यामृतस्य, एतस्य यतः, एतस्य त्यस्यैष रसो य एष एतस्मिन्मण्डले पुरुषः, तस्य ह्येष रसः—इत्यधिदैवतम् ॥ ३ ॥

3. Now the subtle—it is air and the ether. It is immortal, it is unlimited, and it is undefined. The essence of that which is subtle, immortal, unlimited and undefined is the being that is in the sun, for that is the essence of the undefined. This is with reference to the gods.

Now the subtle form is being described. *It is air and the ether,* the two remaining elements. Being subtle *it is immortal,* and unlimited, hence not clashing with anything, and therefore immortal, not subject to destruction. *It is unlimited,* the opposite of limited, i.e. pervasive. Because it cannot be distinguished from others, therefore *it is undefined.* The word 'Tyat' indicates something that can be only indirectly described. The relation among the four epithets is as before. *The essence of that which is subtle, immortal,*

unlimited and undefined, i.e. of the two subtle elements each having the four attributes, ***is the being that is in the sun,*** Hiraṇyagarbha as the cosmic organ,[1] which is called the vital force. That is the quintessence of the two subtle elements, as in the previous instance (the solar orb was of the gross elements). This 'being' is the perfection of the two subtle elements, because they[2] emanate from the Undifferentiated in order to form the subtle body of Hiraṇyagarbha. And because they seek to produce this, therefore it is the best product of them. ***For that is the essence of the undefined,*** because the 'being' that is in the sun is not perceived like the solar orb, and is the essence of the two elements. Hence there is a similarity between the being who is in the sun and the two elements. Therefore the reason furnished in the clause, 'For that is the essence of the undefined,' as if it were a familiar experience, is quite in order.

Some[3] say that the word 'essence' means cause, referring to the self of Hiraṇyagarbha, which is a conscious entity. The past actions of Hiraṇyagarbha direct air and the ether, and with these as their support[4] they direct the other elements. Therefore, being the

[1] Corresponding to the organs in the body. The subtle body of Hiraṇyagarbha is meant, and not his conscious self, as will presently be seen.

[2] Air and the ether are the principal, not the only ingredients of the cosmic subtle body. The other three elements also are there, but they play a subordinate part

[3] The reference is to Bhartṛprapañca.

[4] That is, taking their form.

director, through its own actions, of air and the ether, it is called their essence, or cause. This view is wrong, because it makes the essence of the subtle form dissimilar to that of the gross form. To be explicit: The essence of the three gross elements is, as we have seen, the solar orb, which is gross and of the same class as the three elements ; it is not a conscious entity. Therefore it stands to reason that the essence of the two subtle elements also should be of the same class as they. For the trend of both passages is the same. For instance, the gross and subtle forms have been distinguished as having four attributes each ; so it is but proper that the essences of the gross and subtle forms, like these forms themselves of which they are the essences, should also be distinguished on the same principle.[1] One cannot cook one half of a hen and keep the other half for laying eggs.

Objection : Suppose we say that the essence of the gross form too refers to the corscious self that identifies itself with the solar orb[2]?

Reply : You say too little. The Śrutis everywhere teach that all gross and subtle forms are Brahman.

Objection : Is not the word 'being,' as applied to unconscious things, inappropriate?

Reply : No. We find the word 'being' applied in the Śrutis to the subtle body having wings, tail, etc.

[1] That is, there must be a common feature between them, to maintain the parallelism. Since one is insentient, the other must be so too. Otherwise there will be absurdity.

[2] The cause and effect being one.

In the following passage, '"We can never beget progeny (initiate activity) so long as we are thus divided. Let us make these seven beings[1] into one (the subtle body)." They made these seven beings into one,' etc. (Ś. VI. i. 1. 3), we find the use of the word 'being,' as also in another Śruti (Tai. II. i.) referring to the gross body, which is the product of the food we eat, and other finer bodies. The words, *This is with reference to the gods,* close the topic so as to introduce the next topic, which is relating to the body.

अथाध्यात्मम्—इदमेव मूर्तं यदन्यत्प्राणाच्च, यश्चाय-मन्तरात्मन्नाकाशः ; एतन्मर्त्यम्, एतत्स्थितम्, एतत्सत्; तस्यैतस्य मूर्तस्य, एतस्य मर्त्यस्य, एतस्य स्थितस्य, एतस्य सत एष रसो यच्चक्षुः, सतो ह्येष रसः ॥ ४ ॥

4. Now with reference to the body: The gross form is but this—what is other than (the corporeal) air and the ether that is in the body. It is mortal, it is limited, and it is defined. The essence of that which is gross, mortal, limited and defined is the eye, for it is the essence of the defined.

Now the division of the gross and subtle *with reference to the body* is being set forth. What is that *gross form?* It *is but this.* What is it? *What is other than* (the corporeal) *air and the ether that is in the body,* i.e. the three constituent elements of the body other than these two. *It is mortal,* etc.—to be

[1] The five sense-organs, the organ of speech, and mind.

explained as in the preceding paragraphs. *The essence of that which is defined is the eye.* The eye is the essence of the (three gross) materials that build up the body, for it is that which lends importance to the (three gross elements in the whole) body, just as the solar orb does with reference to the gods. Also because of their priority in point of time. (We have it in the Brāhmaṇa) that in the embryo it is the eyes that are first formed (Ś. IV. ii. i. 28). The Śruti too hints at this: 'His essence, or lustre, came forth. This was Fire'[1] (I. ii. 2). And the eyes possess lustre. The three elements in the body have the eyes as their essence. *For it is the essence of the defined:* The meaning of the reason is that the eye is gross and is also the essence (of the three gross elements in the body).

अथामूर्तम्—प्राणश्च यश्चायमन्तरात्मन्नाकाशः ; एतद-मृतम्, एतद्यत्, एतत्त्यत् ; तस्यैतस्यामूर्तस्य एतस्या-मृतस्य, एतस्य यतः, एतस्य त्यस्यैष रसो योऽयं दक्षिणे-ऽक्षन्पुरुषः, त्यस्य ह्येष रसः ॥ ५ ॥

5. Now the subtle—it is (the corporeal) air and the ether that is in the body. It is immortal, it is unlimited, and it is undefined. The essence of that which is subtle, immortal, unlimited and undefined is this being that is in the right eye, for this is the essence of the undefined.

Now the subtle form is being described. The two remaining elements, (the corporeal) *air and the ether*

[1] Since 'essence' is here used synonymously with 'lustre.'

that is in the body—are the subtle form. The rest is to be explained as before. *The essence of that which is **undefined** is this being that is in the right eye* (i.e. the subtle body). The specification about the right eye is based on the evidence of the scriptures. For they declare that the subtle body is specially manifest in the right eye ; we see it mentioned in all the Śrutis. *For this is the essence of the undefined :* as before, the meaning of the reason is that the subtle body is fine, because it cannot be definitely perceived, and is also the essence (of the two subtle elements in the body).

तस्य हैतस्य पुरुषस्य रूपम् । यथा माहारजनं वासः, यथा पाण्ड्वाविकम्, यथेन्द्रगोपः, यथाग्न्यर्चिः, यथा पुण्डरीकम्, तथा सकृद्विद्युत्तम्; सकृद्विद्युत्तेव ह वा अस्य श्रीर्भवति य एवं वेद; अथात आदेशः—नेति नेति, न ह्येतस्मादिति नेत्यन्यत्परमस्ति; अथ नामधेयम्—सत्यस्य सत्यमिति; प्राणा वै सत्यम्, तेषामेष सत्यम् ॥ ६ ॥ इति तृतीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

6. The form of that 'being' is as follows: Like a cloth dyed with turmeric, or like grey sheep's wool, or like the (scarlet) insect called Indragopa, or like a tongue of fire, or like a white lotus, or like a flash of lightning. He who knows it as such attains splendour like a flash of lightning. Now therefore the description (of Brahman): 'Not this, not this.' Because there is no other and more appropriate description than

this 'Not this.' Now Its name: 'The Truth of truth.' The vital force is truth, and It is the Truth of that.

The division of the gross and subtle, called truth, which are the limiting adjuncts of Brahman, into what relates to the gods and what relates to the body, in their twofold division of the body and organs, has been explained. Now we (the scriptures) shall describe *the form of that 'being'* identified with the organs, i.e. the subtle body. It consists of impressions, and is produced by the union of the intellect and the impressions of gross and subtle objects; it is variegated[1] like pictures on a canvas or wall, is comparable to an illusion, or magic, or a mirage, and is puzzling to all. For instance, the Buddhistic Idealists (Yogācāras) are mistaken into thinking that the self is this much only. The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, on the other hand, maintain that like the colour of a cloth, these impressions are the attributes of the self, which is a substance. While the Sāṁkhyas hold that the mind, which is dependent on the Prakṛti[2] and is possessed of three tendencies, is a separate entity, subserves the purpose of the self, and operates for its highest good (liberation through experience).

Some self-styled followers[3] of the Upaniṣads too spin out the following theory: The gross and subtle elements make one (the lowest) entity, the Supreme

[1] All this shows that it is the mind that is being described, and not the self.

[2] The primordial material out of which the universe has been formed.

[3] A hit at Bhartṛprapañca

Self is the highest entity, and different from and intermediate between these two is the third entity, which is the sum total of one's meditations, actions and previous experience, together with the individual self which is the agent and experiencer, the one that Ajātaśatru awoke. The actions etc. are the cause, and the gross and subtle elements mentioned above as also the body and organs, which are the means of meditations and actions, are the effect. They also establish a connection with the logicians by stating that the actions etc. abide in the subtle body. Then they are frightened lest this should smack of Sāṁkhya, and conform also to the Vaiśeṣika view by saying that just as odour, which abides in flowers, can be conserved in oil through boiling, even when the flowers are gone, so even when the subtle body is gone, all actions etc. are conserved in a portion of the Supreme Self. That portion, although transcendent, becomes conditioned through attributes—the actions etc.—coming from elsewhere.[1] This individual self then becomes the agent and experiencer, and is subject to bondage and liberation. Those actions etc. are but adventitious things, coming from the elements ; the individual self, being a portion of the Supreme Self, is in itself transcendent. Ignorance, which springs from the Self, although natural to It, is not an attribute of the Self, just as a desert does not affect the whole earth. Through this statement they conform also to the Sāṁkhya view.

They look upon all this as excellent because of its harmonising with the logicians' view, but they do not

[1] The elements forming the body and organs.

see that it contradicts the verdict of the Upaniṣads as well as all reasoning. How? For instance, we have already said that if the Supreme Self be composed of parts (and the individual self be identical with It), that view would be open to various objections, such as the Supreme Self being subject to transmigration and having wounds, besides the impossibility of Its going after death to places in accordance with Its past work. While if the individual self be eternally different from the Supreme Self, it can never be identical with It. If it is urged that the subtle body itself is figuratively referred to as part of the Supreme Self, like the ether enclosed in a jar, a bowl, the pores of the earth, etc., then it is impossible to maintain that even when the subtle body[1] has ceased to be (as in the state of profound sleep), impressions persist in a part of the Supreme Self, or that ignorance springs from It, as a desert from the earth, and so on. Nor can we even mentally imagine that impressions move from one thing to another without the help of some object in which they can inhere. Nor would such Śruti passages as, 'Desire, deliberation, doubt (etc. are but the mind)' (I. v. 3), 'It is on the heart (mind) that colours rest' (III. ix. 20), 'It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were', (IV. iii. 7), 'All desires that are in his heart' (IV. iv. 7 ; Ka. VI. 14), and 'He is then beyond all the woes of his heart' (IV. iii. 22)—fit in with such a view. And it is not proper to explain these passages otherwise than literally, for they are meant to show that the individual self is no other than the Supreme Brahman. And all the Upaniṣads end by giving out

[1] Which is the repository of impressions.

this sole meaning. Therefore persons skilled only in fancifully interpreting the Śrutis all distort their meaning. Yet, if those interpretations are in consonance with the teaching of the Vedas, they are welcome ; we have no grudge against them.

Moreover, the expression, 'Brahman has but two forms,' does not agree with the view that posits three entities. If, however, the gross and subtle forms together with the impressions respectively springing from them constitute two forms, gross and subtle, while Brahman is a third entity possessed of those two forms, and there is no fourth entity in between, then only is the assertion, 'Brahman has but two forms,' congruous. Otherwise we have to imagine that the individual self is a part of Brahman, and has the two forms ; or that the Supreme Self, through the medium of the individual self, has them. In that case the use of the dual number, indicating only 'two forms,' would be inconsistent. The plural, denoting 'many forms,' including the impressions, would be more appropriate—the gross and subtle forms being two, and the impressions being a third entity. If it is maintained that the gross and subtle forms alone are the forms of the Supreme Self, but the impressions belong to the individual self, then the form of expression used, viz. that 'the Supreme Self, which undergoes modification through the medium of the individual self, (has the forms),' would be meaningless, since impressions too would equally affect the Supreme Self through the medium of the individual self. But we cannot at all imagine, except in a figurative sense, that a thing undergoes modification through the medium of something else. Nor is the individual

self something different from the Supreme Self. To admit this is to contradict one's own premise. Therefore this sort of interpretation has its origin only in the imagination of those who are ignorant of the meaning of the Vedas, and is not warranted by the text. An interpretation of the Vedas that is not so warranted cannot be regarded either as a true interpretation or as helping towards it, for the Vedas do not derive their authority from any other source. Therefore the view that three entities are in question is untenable.

The subtle body has been introduced in connection with matters relating to the body in the clause, 'The being that is in the right eye' (II. iii. 5), and in connection with those relating to the gods in the clause, 'The being that is in the sun' (II. iii. 3). The word 'that' (in the expression, 'The form of that being') refers to something that is being discussed, in other words, that which is the essence of the subtle undefined, but not the individual self.

Objection : Why should not these forms belong to the individual self, since it too has a place in the discussion, and the word 'that' refers to something that is under discussion?

Reply : No, for the Śruti wants to teach the transcendent nature of the individual self. If the forms, 'Like a cloth dyed with turmeric,' etc. (II. iii. 6), really belong to the individual self, then it would not be described as indefinable in the terms, 'Not this, not this.'

Objection : Suppose we say this is a description of something else, and not of the individual self.

Reply : Not so, for at the end of the fourth chapter (IV. v. 15), referring to the individual self[1] in the words, 'Through what, O Maitreyī, should one know the Knower?' (IV. v. 15), it is concluded: 'This self is That which has been described as "Not this, not this." ' Besides, thus only can the statement, 'I will instruct you (about Brahman),' be relevant. That is to say, if the Śruti wants to teach the transcendent nature of the individual self—which is free from all differentiations of limiting adjuncts, then only can this assertion be fulfilled. Because, instructed in this way, the student knows himself to be Brahman, thoroughly understands the import of the scriptures, and is afraid of nothing. If, on the other hand, the individual self is one, and what is described as 'Not this, not this' is something else, then the student would understand just the reverse of truth, viz. that Brahman is something, and that he is something else. He would not 'Know only himself as, "I am Brahman" ' (I. iv. 10). Therefore the forms given in the passage, 'Now the form of that being,' etc. are only those of the subtle body.

Besides, in order to tell the nature of the Supreme Self, which is the Truth of truth, the latter must be told in its entirety. And impressions being the particular forms of that truth, these forms of the impressions are being mentioned. These are the forms of this being, i.e. of the subtle body that is being discussed. What are they? As in life we have *a cloth dyed with turmeric,* so in the presence of objects of enjoyment the mind gets a similar colouring of impressions, whence a man under such circumstances is said to be attached,

[1] In its unconditioned aspect as the Witness.

as a cloth, for instance, is dyed. Also as *sheep's wool* is *grey*, so are some other forms of impressions. Again, as in the world *the insect called Indragopa* is deep red, so also are some impressions of the mind. The colouring varies sometimes according to the objects presented to the mind, and sometimes according to the tendencies of the mind itself. As again *a tongue of fire* is bright, so are some people's impressions at times. *Like a white lotus* too are the impressions of some. As in nature *a* single *flash of lightning* illumines everything so according to the intensity of the manifestation of knowledge, do the impressions of some people. It is impossible to ascertain the beginning, middle or end, or number, place, time and circumstances of these impressions, for they are innumerable, and infinite are their causes. So it will be said in the fourth chapter, '(This self is) identified with this (what is perceived) and with that (what is inferred),' etc. (IV. iv. 5). Therefore the examples given in the passage, 'Like a cloth dyed with turmeric,' etc. are not meant to indicate the exact number of the varieties of impressions, but merely to suggest their types, meaning that impressions are like these. The form of impression that has been cited at the end, viz. 'Like a flash of lightning,' belongs to Hiraṇyagarbha, which suddenly manifests itself like lightning, as he emanates from the Undifferentiated.[1] *He* who knows that particular form of impression belonging to Hiraṇyagarbha, *attains splendour like a flash of lightning*. The particles 'ha' and 'vai' are for emphasis. Just like this, i.e. like that of Hiraṇyagarbha, becomes the splendour or fame

[1] The unmanifested state of the universe.

of one *who knows it,* the form of impression last mentioned, *as such,* as described above.

Having thus completely described the nature of 'truth,' the Śruti, in order to ascertain the nature of what has been called 'the Truth of truth,' viz. Brahman, begins this: *Now therefore*—since after ascertaining the nature of 'truth,' what remains is the Truth of truth, therefore the nature of that will be next ascertained. *Description* is a definite statement about Brahman. What is this statement? *Not this, not this.*

How through these two terms 'Not this, not this' is it sought to describe the Truth of truth? By the elimination of all differences due to limiting adjuncts, the words refer to something that has no distinguishing mark such as name, or form, or action, or heterogeneity, or species, or qualities. Words denote things through one or other of these. But Brahman has none of these distinguishing marks. Hence It cannot be described as, 'It is such and such,' as we can describe a cow by saying, 'There moves a white cow with horns.' Brahman is described by means of name, form and action superimposed on It, in such terms as, 'Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman' (III. ix. 28), and 'Pure Intelligence' (II. iv. 12), 'Brahman,' and 'Atman.' When, however, we wish to describe Its true nature, free from all differences due to limiting adjuncts, then it is an utter impossibility. Then there is only one way left, viz. to describe It as 'Not this, not this,' by eliminating all possible specifications of It that one may know of.

These two negative particles are for conveying all-inclusiveness through repetition so as to eliminate every specification whatsoever that may occur to us. Such being the case, the doubt that Brahman has not been described is removed. If, on the other hand, the two negative particles merely eliminated just the two aspects of Brahman that are being discussed (viz. the gross and subtle), then other aspects of It besides these two would not be described, and there would still be a doubt as to what exactly Brahman is like. So that description of Brahman would be useless, for it would not satisfy one's desire to know It. And the purpose of the sentence, 'I will instruct you about Brahman' (II. i. 15), would remain unfulfilled. But when through the elimination of all limiting adjuncts the desire to know about space, time and everything else (that is not Brahman) is removed, one realises one's identity with Brahman, the Truth of truth, which is homogeneous like a lump of salt, is Pure Intelligence, and is without interior or exterior ; his desire to know is completely satisfied, and his intellect is centred in the Self alone. Therefore the two negative particles in 'Not this, not this' are used in an all-inclusive sense.

Objection: Well, after buckling to with such ado is it fair to describe Brahman thus?

Reply : Yes. *Because there is no other and more appropriate description than this 'Not this,* not this,' therefore this is the only description of Brahman. The particle 'iti' covers all possible predications that are to be eliminated by the two negative particles, as when we say, 'Every village is beautiful.' It was said, 'Its secret name is: The Truth of truth' (II. i. 20) ; it is

thus that the Supreme Brahman is the Truth of truth. Therefore the *name* of Brahman that has been mentioned is appropriate. What is it? *The Truth of truth. The vital force is truth, and It is the Truth of that.*

SECTION IV

'The Self alone is to be meditated upon' (I. iv. 7) ; 'Of all these, this Self alone should be realised' (Ibid.), for 'It is dearer than a son' etc. (I. iv. 8).[1] In the course of explanation of the above passages already introduced, the aim of knowledge and its relation to that aim have been stated in the sentence. 'It knew only Itself as, "I am Brahman." Therefore It became all' (I. iv. 10). Thus it has been mentioned that the inner Self is the domain of knowledge. While that of ignorance is relative existence, which consists of the ends and means of rites with five factors, which again depend on the division of men into four castes.; it is by nature alternatively manifest and unmanifest like the tree and the seed, and is made up of name, form and action. This relative existence has been dealt with in the passage beginning with, 'He (who worships another god thinking), "He is one, and I am another," does not know' (I. iv. 10), and concluded in the passage, 'This indeed consists of three things: name, form and action' (I. vi. 1). One aspect of it is in accordance with the scriptures and makes for progress leading up to the world of Hiraṇya-garbha ; while the other aspect is not in accordance with the scriptures and causes degradation down to the level of stationary objects. All this has already been shown in the section beginning with, 'Two classes of

[1] The last two quotations are adapted

Prajāpati's sons,' etc. (I. iii. 1). In order to show how a man disgusted with this domain of ignorance can qualify himself for the knowledge of Brahman, which deals with the inner Self, the entire domain of ignorance has been concluded in the first chapter. But in the second chapter, after introducing the inner Self, which is the domain of the knowledge of Brahman, in the words, 'I will tell you about Brahman' (II. i. 1), and 'I will instruct you about Brahman' (II. i. 15), the Śruti has taught about that Brahman, the one without a second devoid of all differences, by eliminating, in the wrods, 'Not this, not this,' all material qualities summed up in the word 'truth,' which by its very nature comprises action, its factors and its results. As part of this knowledge of Brahman, the Śruti wishes to enjoin renunciation.

Rites with five factors such as wife, son and wealth constitute the domain of ignorance, because they do not lead to the attainment of the Self. If a thing calculated to produce a particular result is applied to bring about a different result, it frustrates its purpose. Running or walking is not the means to appease one's hunger or thirst. The son and the rest have been prescribed in the Śruti as means to the attainment of the world of men, of the Manes and of the gods, not as means to the attainment of the Self. They have been mentioned as producing those specific results. And they have not been enjoined on the knower of Brahman, being classed by the Śruti as rites with material ends, in the passage, 'This much indeed is desire' (I. iv. 17). And the knower of Brahman

has already attained all desires ; he cannot for that very reason have any more desires. The Śruti too says. 'We who have attained this Self, this world' (IV. iv. 22).

But there are some who hold that even a knower of Brahman has desires. They have certainly never heard the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, nor of the distinction made by the Śruti that the desire for a son and so forth belongs to an ignorant man, and that with regard to the domain of knowledge, the statement, 'What shall we achieve through children, we who have attained this Self, this world?' and so on, is applicable. They do not also know the contradiction, based on incongruity, between the attainment of knowledge, which obliterates all action with its factors and results, and ignorance together with its effects. Nor have they heard Vyāsa's statement (on the subject). The contradiction rests on the opposite trends of the nature of rites and that of knowledge, which partake respectively of ignorance and illumination. On being asked, 'There are two Vedic injunctions: Perform rites, and give up rites. What is the goal of knowledge, and what of rites? I wish to be enlightened on this. So please instruct me. These two (it seems) are mutually contradictory and run counter to each other' (Mbh. XII. ccxlvii. 1-2), Vyāsa replied, thereby showing the contradiction, 'Men are bound by rites and freed by knowledge. Hence sages who have known the truth never perform rites,' and so on (Ibid., verse 7). Therefore the knowledge of Brahman leads to the highest goal for man not with, but without the help of any auxiliary means, for otherwise there would be

contradiction all round. It is to show this that renunciation of the world, which consists in giving up all means, is sought to be enjoined as a subsidiary step. For at the end of the fourth chapter it has been asserted, 'This much indeed is (the means of) immortality, my dear'; and we have also a sign for inference (about this) in the fact that Yājñavalkya, who was a ritualist, renounced the world.

Moreover, the knowledge of Brahman as a means to immortality has been imparted to Maitreyī, who was without the means to perform rites. Also wealth has been deprecated. If rites were means to immortality, the derogatory remarks about wealth would be out of place, since on it rites with five factors depend. If, however, rites are desired to be shunned, then it is proper to decry the means to them. Besides (in the state of knowledge) there is an absence of the consciousness about caste, order of life, etc., which are the qualifications for the performance of rites, as we see in the passages, 'The Brāhmaṇa ousts one' (II. iv. 6 ; IV. v. 7), 'The Kṣatriya ousts one,' etc. (Ibid.). When one ceases to consider oneself a Brāhmaṇa, a Kṣatriya, or the like, there is certainly no room for such injunctions as that this is the duty of Brāhmaṇas, or that this is the duty of Kṣatriyas, for there are no such persons. For a man who does not identify himself as a Brāhmaṇa, a Kṣatriya, or the like, rites and their accessories, which are the effects of that consciousness, are automatically dropped because of the giving up of that consciousness. Therefore this story is introduced with a view to enjoining renunciation of the world as part of the knowledge of the Self.

मैत्रेयीति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः, उद्यास्यन्वा अरेऽहम-स्मात्स्थानादस्मि, हन्त तेऽनया कात्यायन्यान्तं करवा-णीति ॥ १ ॥

1. 'Maitreyī, my dear, said Yājñavalkya, 'I am going to renounce this life. Allow me to finish between you and Kātyāyanī.'[1]

The sage *Yājñavalkya* addressing his wife, Maitreyī, *said, 'Maitreyī, I am going to renounce this* householder's *life*—I intend to take up the life of renunciation, which is the next higher life. Hence I ask your permission.—The particle 'are' is a vocative. —Further I wish *to finish between you and* my second wife, *Kātyāyanī*, i.e. put an end to the relationship that existed between you through me, your common husband; by dividing my property between you I will separate you through wealth, and go.'

सा होवाच मैत्रेयी, यन्नु म इयं भगोः सर्वा पृथिवी वित्तेन पूर्णा स्यात्कथं तेनामृता स्यामिति ; नेति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः, यथैवोपकरणवतां जीवितं तथैव ते जीवितं स्यात्, अमृतत्वस्य तु नाशास्ति वित्तेनेति ॥ २ ॥

2. Thereupon Maitreyī said, 'Sir, if indeed this whole earth full of wealth be mine, shall I be immortal through that?' 'No,' replied Yājñavalkya, 'your life will be just like that of

[1] The same episode also forms the fifth section of the fourth chapter of this book.

people who have plenty of things, but there is no hope of immortality through wealth.'

Thus addressed, *Maitreyī said, 'Sir, if indeed this whole earth* girdled by the ocean and *full of wealth be mine, shall I be immortal through that,* i.e. through rites such as the Agnihotra, which can be performed with the entire wealth of the earth? The particle 'nu' indicates deliberation. The word 'Katham' (how) indicates disbelief, meaning 'never'; or it may have an interrogative force, in which case it should be construed with the slightly remote words, 'Shall I be immortal?' *'No,' replied Yājñavalkya.* If the word 'how' indicates disbelief, Yājñavalkya's word 'No' is an approval. If it has an interrogative force, his reply means, 'You can never be immortal ; as is the life of people of means filled with materials of enjoyment, so will your life be ; *but there is no hope,* even in thought, *of immortality through wealth,* i.e. rites performed with wealth.'

सा होवाच मैत्रेयी, येनाहं नामृता स्यां किमहं तेन कुर्याम्? यदेव भगवान्वेद तदेव मे ब्रूहीति ॥ ३ ॥

3. Then Maitreyī said, 'What shall I do with that which will not make me immortal? Tell me, sir, of that alone which you know (to be the only means of immortality).'

Thus addressed, *Maitreyī said* in reply, 'If this is so, *what shall I do with that* wealth *which will not make me immortal? Tell me, sir, of that alone*

which you know to be the only means of immortality.'

स होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः, प्रिया बतारे नः सती प्रियं भाषसे, एहि, आस्स्व, व्याख्यास्यामि ते, व्याचक्षाणस्य तु मे निदिध्यासस्वेति ॥ ४ ॥

4. Yājñavalkya said, 'My dear, you have been my beloved (even before), and you say what is after my heart. Come, take your seat, I will explain it to you. As I explain it, meditate (on its meaning).

When rites performed with wealth were rejected as a means to immortality, *Yājñavalkya,* seeing that Maitreyī concurred with his views, was pleased and *said,* 'O Maitreyī, *you have been my beloved* even before, *and* now *you say what is* just *after my heart.* Therefore *come* and *take your seat, I will explain to you* what you desire—that knowledge of the Self which confers immortality. But *as I explain it, meditate,* or desire to reflect steadfastly, on the meaning of my words.' The particle 'bata' is suggestive of tenderness.

स होवाच, न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति। न वा अरे जायायै कामाय जाया प्रिया भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय जाया प्रिया भवति। न वा अरे पुत्राणां कामाय पुत्राः प्रिया भवन्ति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय पुत्राः प्रिया भवन्ति। न वा अरे वित्तस्य कामाय वित्तं प्रियं भवति, आत्मनस्तु

कामाय वित्तं प्रियं भवति। न वा अरे ब्रह्मणः कामाय ब्रह्म प्रियं भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय ब्रह्म प्रियं भवति। न वा अरे क्षत्रस्य कामाय क्षत्रं प्रियं भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय क्षत्रं प्रियं भवति। न वा अरे लोकानां कामाय लोकाः प्रिया भवन्ति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय लोकाः प्रिया भवन्ति। न वा अरे देवानां कामाय देवाः प्रिया भवन्ति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय देवाः प्रिया भवन्ति। न वा अरे भूतानां कामाय भूतानि प्रियाणि भवन्ति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय भूतानि प्रियाणि भवन्ति। न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति। आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यो मैत्रेयि, आत्मनो वा अरे दर्शनेन श्रवणेन मत्या विज्ञानेनेदं सर्वं विदितम्॥ ५॥

5. He said: It is not for the sake of the husband, my dear, that he is loved, but for one's own sake that he is loved. It is not for the sake of the wife, my dear, that she is loved, but for one's own sake that she is loved. It is not for the sake of the sons, my dear, that they are loved, but for one's own sake that they are loved. It is not for the sake of wealth, my dear, that it is loved, but for one's own sake that it is loved. It is not for the sake of the Brāhmaṇa, my dear, that he is loved, but for one's own sake that he is loved. It is not for the sake of the Kṣatriya, my dear, that he is loved, but for one's own sake that he is loved. It is not for the sake of the worlds, my dear, that they are loved, but

for one's own sake that they are loved. It is not for the sake of the gods, my dear, that they are loved, but for one's own sake that they are loved. It is not for the sake of the beings, my dear, that they are loved, but for one's own sake that they are loved. It is not for the sake of all, my dear, that all is loved, but for one's own sake that it is loved. The Self, my dear Maitreyī, should be realised—should be heard of, reflected on and meditated upon. By the realisation of the Self, my dear, through hearing, reflection and meditation, all this is known.

With a view to teaching renunciation as a means to immortality, Yājñavalkya creates a distaste for the wife, husband, sons, etc., so that they may be given up. *He said, 'It is not for the sake* or necessity *of the husband that he is loved* by the wife, *but* it is *for one's own sake that he is loved* by her.' The particle 'vai' (indeed) recalls something that is well-known, signifying that this is a matter of common knowledge. Similarly *it is not for the sake of the wife,* etc. The rest is to be explained as before. Likewise *it is not for the sake of the sons, wealth, the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣatriya, the worlds, the gods, the beings,* and *all.* The priority of enumeration is in the order of their closeness to us as sources of joy ; for it is all the more desirable to create a distaste for them. The use of the word 'all' is for including everything that has and has not been mentioned. Hence it is a well-known fact that the Self alone is dear, and nothing else. It has already been said, 'This (Self) is dearer

than a son,' etc. (I. iv. 8). The present text serves as a detailed commentary on that. Therefore our love for other objects is secondary, since they contribute to the pleasure of the Self ; and our love for the Self alone is primary. Therefore *'the Self, my dear Maitreyī, should be realised,* is worthy of realisation, or should be made the object of realisation. It *should* first *be heard of* from a teacher and from the scriptures, then *reflected on* through reasoning, *and* then steadfastly *meditated upon.'* Thus only is It realised—when these means, viz. hearing, reflection and meditation, have been gone through. When these three are combined, then only true realisation of the unity of Brahman is accomplished, not otherwise—by hearing alone. The different castes such as the Brāhmaṇa or the Kṣatriya, the various orders of life, and so on, upon which rites depend, and which consist of actions, their factors and their results, are objects of notions superimposed on the Self by ignorance—based on false notions like that of a snake in a rope. In order to destroy these he says, *'By the realisation of the Self, my dear, through hearing, reflection and meditation, all this is known.'*[1]

ब्रह्म तं परादाद्योऽन्यत्रात्मनो ब्रह्म वेद, क्षत्रं तं परादाद्योऽन्यत्रात्मनः क्षत्रं वेद, लोकास्तं परादुर्योऽन्यत्रात्मनो लोकान्वेद, देवास्तं परादुर्योऽन्यत्रात्मनो देवान्वेद, भूतानि तं परादुर्योऽन्यत्रात्मनो भूतानि वेद, सर्वं तं परादाद्योऽन्य-

[1] Śaṅkara's language here follows IV. v. 6.

आत्मनः सर्वं वेद ; इदं ब्रह्म, इदं क्षत्रम्, इमे लोकाः, इमे देवाः, इमानि भूतानि, इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा ॥ ६ ॥

6. The Brāhmaṇa ousts one who knows him as different from the Self. The Kṣatriya ousts one who knows him as different from the Self. The worlds oust one who knows them as different from the Self. The gods oust one who knows them as different from the Self. The beings oust one who knows them as different from the Self. All ousts one who knows it as different from the Self. This Brāhmaṇa, this Kṣatriya, these worlds, these gods, these beings, and this all are the Self.

Objection : How can the knowledge of one thing lead to that of another?

Reply : The objection is not valid, for there is nothing besides the Self. If there were, it would not be known, but there is no such thing ; the Self is everything. Therefore It being known, everything would be known. How is it that the Self is everything? The Śruti answers it: *The Brāhmaṇa ousts* or rejects the man *who knows him* to be *different from the Self,* i.e. who knows that the Brāhmaṇa is not the Self. The Brāhmaṇa does so out of a feeling that this man considers him to be different from the Self. For the Supreme Self is the Self of all. Similarly *the Kṣatriya, the worlds, the gods, the beings,* and *all* oust him. *This Brāhmaṇa* and all the rest that have been

enumerated *are the Self* that has been introduced as the object to be realised through hearing etc. Because everything springs from the Self, is dissolved in It, and remains imbued with It during continuance, for it cannot be perceived apart from the Self. Therefore everything is the Self.

स यथा दुन्दुभेर्हन्यमानस्य न बाह्याञ्छब्दाञ्छक्नुयाद्ग्रहणाय, दुन्दुभेस्तु ग्रहणेन—दुन्दुभ्याघातस्य वा—शब्दो गृहीतः ॥ ७ ॥

7. As when a drum is beaten one cannot distinguish its various particular notes, but they are included in the general note of the drum or in the general sound produced by different kinds of strokes.

But how can we know that all this is the Self now? Because of the inherence of Pure Intelligence in everything, we conclude that everything is That. An illustration is being given: We see in life that if a thing cannot be perceived apart from something else, the latter is the essence of that thing. *As,* for instance, *when a drum* or the like *is beaten* with a stick etc., *one cannot distinguish its various particular notes* from the general note of the drum, *but they are included in,* taken as modifications of, *the general note:* We say these are all notes of the drum, having no existence apart from the general note of the drum. *Or* the particular notes produced by different kinds of strokes are included *in the general sound produced by* those *strokes:* They cannot be perceived as distinct notes,

having no separate existence. Similarly nothing particular is perceived in the waking and dream states apart from Pure Intelligence. Therefore those things should be considered non-existent apart from Pure Intelligence.

स यथा शङ्खस्य ध्मायमानस्य न बाह्याञ्छब्दाञ्छक्नुयाद्ग्रहणाय, शङ्खस्य तु ग्रहणेन—शङ्खध्मस्य वा—शब्दो गृहीतः ॥ ८ ॥

8. As when a conch is blown one cannot distinguish its various particular notes, but they are included in the general note of the conch or in the general sound produced by different kinds of playing.

Similarly, *as when a conch is blown,* connected or filled with sound. *one cannot distinguish its various particular notes,* etc.—to be explained as before.

स यथा वीणायै वाद्यमानायै न बाह्याञ्छब्दाञ्छक्नुयाद्ग्रहणाय, वीणायै तु ग्रहणेन—वीणावादस्य वा—शब्दो गृहीतः ॥ ९ ॥

9. As when a Vīṇā[1] is played on one cannot distinguish its various particular notes, but they are included in the general note of the Vīṇā or in the general sound produced by different kinds of playing.

Similarly, *as when a Vīṇā is played on,* etc. The dative case in 'Vīṇāyai' stands for the genitive. The citation of many examples here is for indicating

[1] A kind of guitar.

varieties of genus ; for there are many distinct kinds of genus, sentient and insentient. It is to show how through a series of intermediate steps they are included in a supreme genus, Pure Intelligence, that so many examples are given. Just as a drum, a conch and a Vīṇā have distinct general and particular notes of their own, which are included in sound in general, so during the continuance of the universe we may know all things to be unified in Brahman, because the varieties of genus and particulars are not different from It.

स यथार्द्रैधाग्नेरभ्याहितात्पृथग्धूमा विनिश्चरन्ति, एवं वा अरेऽस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद्यदृग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्वाङ्गिरस इतिहासः पुराणं विद्या उपनिषदः श्लोकाः सूत्राण्यनुव्याख्यानानि व्याख्यानानि ; अस्यैवैतानि निःश्वसितानि ॥ १० ॥

10. As from a fire kindled with wet faggot diverse kinds of smoke issue, even so, my dear, the Ṛg-Veda, Yajur-Veda, Sāma-Veda, Atharvāṅgirasa, history, mythology, arts, Upaniṣads, verses, aphorisms, elucidations and explanations are (like) the breath of this infinite Reality. They are like the breath of this (Supreme Self).

Likewise it may be understood that the universe, at the time of its origin as also prior to it, is nothing but Brahman. As before the separation of the sparks, smoke, embers and flames, all these are nothing but fire, and therefore there is but one substance, fire, so it

is reasonable to infer that this universe differentiated into names and forms is, before its origin, nothing but Pure Intelligence. This is expressed as follows: *As from a fire kindled with wet faggot diverse kinds of smoke issue.* The word 'smoke' is suggestive of sparks etc. as well—meaning smoke, sparks, etc., issue. Like this example, O Maitreyī, all this is like *the breath of this infinite Reality,* the Supreme Self that is being discussed. 'Breath' here means, like the breath. As a man breathes without the slightest effort, so do all these come out of It. What are those things that are spoken of as issuing from It as Its breath? *The Ṛg-Veda, Yajur-Veda, Sāma-Veda, Atharvāṅgirasa,* i.e. the four kinds of Mantras. *History,* such as the dialogue between Urvaśī and Purūravas—'The nymph Urvaśī,' and so on (Ś. XI. iv. 4. 1); it is this Brāhmaṇa that is meant. *Mythology,* such as, 'This universe was in the beginning unmanifest,' etc. (Tai. II. 7). *Arts,* which treat of music, dancing, etc.—'This is also Veda,' etc. (Ś. XIII. iv. 3. 10-14). *Upaniṣads,* such as, 'It should be meditated upon as dear,' etc. (IV. 1. 3). *Verses,* the Mantras occurring in the Brāhmaṇas, such as, 'Regarding this there are the following verses' (IV. iii. 11; IV. iv. 8). *Aphorisms,* those passages of the Vedas which present the truth in a nutshell, for example, 'The Self alone is to be meditated upon' (I. iv. 7). *Elucidations*—of the Mantras. *Explanations,* eulogistic passages. Or 'elucidations' may be of the 'aphorisms' above. As the passage, 'The Self alone is to be meditated upon,' or the passage, 'He (who worships another god thinking), "He is one, and I am another," does not know. He

is like an animal (to the gods)' (I. iv. 10), has this concluding portion of the present chapter as its elucidation. And 'explanations' may be of the Mantras. Thus these are the eight divisions of the Brāhmaṇas.

So only the Mantras and Brāhmaṇas are meant.[1] It is the eternally composed and already existent Vedas that are manifested like a man's breath—without any thought or effort on his part. Hence they are an authority as regards their meaning, independently of any other means of knowledge. Therefore those who aspire after well-being must accept the verdict of the Vedas on knowledge or on rites, as it is. The differentiation of forms invariably depends on the manifestation of their names.[2] Name and form are the limiting adjuncts of the Supreme Self, of which, when they are differentiated, it is impossible to tell whether they are identical with or different from It, as is the case with the foam of water. It is name and form in all their stages[3] that constitute relative existence. Hence name has been compared to breath. By this statement it is implied that form too is like breath. Or we may explain it differently: In the passage, 'The Brāhmaṇa ousts one . . . . all this is the Self' (II. iv. 6 ; IV. v. 7), the entire world of duality has been spoken of as the domain of ignorance. This may lead to a doubt about the authority of the Vedas. In order to remove this doubt it is said that since the Vedas issue

[1] And not the popular meanings of those eight terms.
[2] The one implies the other
[3] Varying degrees of grossness or subtleness.

without any effort like a man's breath, they are an authority ; they are not like other books.

स यथा सर्वासामपां समुद्र एकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां स्पर्शानां त्वगेकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां गन्धानां नासिके एकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां रसानां जिह्वैकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां रूपाणां चक्षुरेकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां शब्दानां श्रोत्रमेकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां संकल्पानां मन एकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां विद्यानां हृदयमेकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां कर्मणां हस्तावेकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषामानन्दानामुपस्थ एकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां विसर्गाणां पायुरेकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषामध्वनां पादावेकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां वेदानां वागेकायनम्, ॥ ११ ॥

11. As the ocean is the one goal[1] of all sorts of water, as the skin is the one goal of all kinds of touch, as the nostrils are the one goal of all odours, as the tongue is the one goal of all savours, as the eye is the one goal of all colours, as the ear is the one goal of all sounds, as the Manas is the one goal of all deliberations, as the intellect is the one goal of all kinds of knowledge, as the hands are the one goal of all sorts of work, as the organ of generation is the one goal of all kinds of enjoyment, as the anus is the one goal of all excretions, as the feet are the one goal of all kinds of walking, as the organ of speech is the one goal of all Vedas.

[1] The place where they merge or are unified.

Moreover, it is not only at the time of its origin and continuance that the universe, on account of its non-existence apart from Pure Intelligence, is Brahman, but it is so at the time of dissolution also. Just as bubbles, foam, etc. are non-existent apart from water, so name, form and action, which are the effects of Pure Intelligence and dissolve in It are non-existent apart from It. Therefore Brahman is to be known as Pure Intelligence, one and homogeneous. So the text runs as follows—the examples are illustrative of dissolution—*As the ocean is the one goal,* meeting place, the place of dissolution or unification, *of all sorts of water* such as that of rivers, tanks and lakes. Likewise *as the skin is the one goal of all kinds of touch* such as soft or hard, rough or smooth, which are identical in nature with air.[1] By the word 'skin,' touch in general, which is perceived by the skin, is meant ; in it different kinds of touch are merged, like different kinds of water in the ocean, and become nonentities without it, for they were merely its modifications. Similarly that touch in general, denoted by the word 'skin,' is merged in the deliberation of the Manas, that is to say, in a general consideration by it, just as different kinds of touch are included in touch in general perceived by the skin ; without this consideration by the Manas it becomes a nonentity. The consideration by the Manas also is merged in a general cognition by the intellect, and becomes non-existent without it. Becoming mere consciousness, it is merged in Pure Intelligence, the Supreme Brahman, like different kinds of water in the

[1] As representing the vital force

ocean. When through these successive steps sound and the rest, together with their receiving organs, are merged in Pure Intelligence, there are no more limiting adjuncts, and only Brahman, which is Pure Intelligence, comparable to a lump of salt, homogeneous, infinite, boundless and without a break, remains. Therefore the Self alone must be regarded as one without a second.

Similarly *the nostrils,* i.e. odour in general, (*are the one goal*) *of all odours,* which are modes of earth. Likewise *the tongue,* or taste in general perceived by the tongue, *of all savours,* which are modes of water. So also *the eye,* or colour in general perceived by the eye, *of all colours,* which are modes of light. So also (*the ear,* or) sound in general perceived by the ear, *of all sounds,* as before. Similarly the generalities of sound and the rest are merged in deliberation, i.e. a general consideration of them by the Manas. This consideration by the Manas again is merged in mere consciousness, i.e. a general cognition by the intellect. Becoming mere consciousness, it is merged in the Supreme Brahman, which is Pure Intelligence. Similarly the objects of the motor organs such as different kinds of speaking, taking, walking, excretion and enjoyment are merged in their general functions, like different kinds of water in the ocean, and can no more be distinguished. These general functions are again nothing but the vital force, which is identical with intelligence. The Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad reads, 'That which is the vital force is intelligence, and that which is intelligence is the vital force' (III. 3).

Objection : In everyone of those instances the mergence of the objects only has been spoken of, but not that of the organs. What is the motive of this?

Reply : True, but the Śruti considers the organs to be of the same category as the objects, not of a different category. The organs are but modes of the objects in order to perceive them, as a light, which is but a mode of colour, is an instrument for revealing all colours. Similarly the organs are but modes of all particular objects in order to perceive them, as is the case with a lamp. Hence no special care is to be taken to indicate the dissolution of the organs ; for these being the same as objects in general, their dissolution is implied by that of the objects.

It has been stated as a proposition that 'This all is the Self' (II. iv. 6). The reason given for this is that the universe is of the same nature as the Self, springs from the Self, and is merged in It. Since there is nothing but Intelligence at the time of the origin, continuance and dissolution of the universe, therefore what has been stated as 'Intelligence is Brahman' (Ai. V. 3) and 'All this is but the Self' (Ch. VII. xxv. 2), is established through reasoning. The Paurāṇikas hold that this dissolution is natural.[1] While that which is consciously effected by the knowers of Brahman through their knowledge of Brahman is called extreme dissolution, which happens through the

[1] The effects dissolving into their causes.

cessation of ignorance. What follows deals specially with that.

स यथा सैन्धवखिल्य उदके प्रास्त उदकमेवानुविलीयेत, न हास्योद्ग्रहणायेव स्यात्, यतो यतस्त्वाददीत लवणमेव, एवं वा अर इदं महद्भूतमनन्तमपारं विज्ञानघन एव। एतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानु विनश्यति, न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्तीत्यरे ब्रवीमीति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः ॥ १२ ॥

12. As a lump of salt dropped into water dissolves with (its component) water, and no one is able to pick it up, but whencesoever one takes it, it tastes salt, even so, my dear, this great, endless, infinite Reality is but Pure Intelligence. (The self) comes out (as a separate entity) from these elements, and (this separateness) is destroyed with them. After attaining (this oneness) it has no more consciousness.[1] This is what I say, my dear. So said Yājñavalkya.

An illustration on the point is being given: *As a lump of salt,* etc. The derivative meaning of the word 'Sindhu' is water, because it 'flows' That which is a modification or product of water is 'Saindhava,' or salt. 'Khilya' is the same as 'Khila' (a lump). A lump of salt *dropped into water,* its cause, *dissolves with* the dissolution of (its component) *water.* The solidification of a lump through its connection with

[1] That is, particular consciousness.

particles of earth and heat goes when the lump comes in contact with water, its cause. This is the dissolution of (the component) water, and along with it the lump of salt is said to be dissolved. *No one,* not even an expert, *is able to pick it up* as before. The particle 'iva' is expletive ; the meaning is, none can at all pick it up. Why? *Whencesoever,* from whichsoever part, *one takes* the water and tastes *it, it* is *salt.* But there is no longer any lump.

Like this illustration, O Maitreyī, is *this great Reality* called the Supreme Self, from which you have been cut off by ignorance as a separate entity, through your connection with the limiting adjuncts of the body and organs, and have become mortal, subject to birth and death, hunger and thirst, and other such relative attributes, and identified with name, form and action, and think you are born of such and such a family. That separate existence of yours, which has sprung from the delusion engendered by contact with the limiting adjuncts of the body and organs, enters its cause, the great Reality, the Supreme Self, which stands for the ocean, is undecaying, immortal, beyond fear, pure, homogeneous like a lump of salt, Pure Intelligence, infinite, boundless, without a break, and devoid of differences caused by the delusion brought on by ignorance. When that separate existence has entered and been merged in its cause, in other words, when the differences created by ignorance are gone, the universe becomes one without a second, 'the great Reality.' Great, because It is greater than everything else and is the cause of the ether etc.; Reality (Bhūta)

—always a fact, for It never deviates from Its nature. The verbal suffix 'kta' here denotes past, present and future. Or the word 'Bhūta' may denote truth ; the expression then would mean: It is great and true. There may be things in the relative world as big as the Himalayas, for instance, created by a dream or illusion, but they are not true ; hence the text adds the qualifying word 'true.' It is *endless*. Sometimes this may be in a relative sense ; hence the text qualifies it by the term *infinite*. *Pure Intelligence :* Lit. a solid mass of intelligence. The word 'Ghana' (a solid mass) excludes everything belonging to a different species, as 'a solid mass of gold or iron.' The particle 'eva' (only) is intensive. The idea is that there is no foreign element in It.

Question : If It is one without a second, really pure and untouched by the miseries of the relative world, whence is this separate existence of the individual self, in which it is born or dies, is happy or miserable, possessed of the ideas of 'I and mine,' and so on, and which is troubled by many a relative attribute?

Reply : I will explain it. There are the elements transformed into the body, organs and sense-objects, consisting of name and form. They are like the foam and bubbles on the limpid water of the Supreme Self. The mergence of these elements down to sense-objects in Brahman, which is Pure Intelligence, through a discriminating knowledge of the Truth has been spoken of—like the emptying of rivers into the ocean. *From these elements* called 'truth,' i.e. with their aid, the self *comes out* like a lump of salt. As from water

reflections of the sun, moon and so on arise, or from the proximity of such limiting adjuncts as red cotton-pads a transparent crystal turns red and so forth, so from the limiting adjuncts of the elements, transformed into the body and organs, the self comes out clearly as an individualised entity. These elements, transformed into the body, organs and sense-objects, from which the self comes out as an individual, and which are the cause of its individualisation, are merged, like rivers in the ocean, by the realisation of Brahman through the instruction of the scriptures and the teacher, and are destroyed. And when they are destroyed like the foam and bubbles of water, this individualised existence too *is destroyed with them.* As the reflections of the sun, moon, etc. and the colour of the crystal vanish when their causes, the water, the red cotton-pad, and so on, are removed, and only the (sun), moon, etc., remain as they are, so the endless, infinite and limpid Pure Intelligence alone remains.

After attaining (this oneness) the self, freed from the body and organs, *has no more* particular *consciousness. This is what I say, my dear* Maitreyī. No more is there such particular consciousness as, 'I so and so am the son of so and so ; this is my land and wealth ; I am happy or miserable.' For it is due to ignorance, and since ignorance is absolutely destroyed by the realisation of Brahman, how can the knower of Brahman, who is established in his nature as Pure Intelligence, possibly have any such particular consciousness? Even when a man is in the body,[1]

[1] E.g. in the state of deep sleep

particular consciousness is impossible; so how can it ever exist in a man who has been absolutely freed from the body and organs? *So said Yājñavalkya*—propounded this philosophy of the highest truth to his wife, Maitreyī.

सा होवाच मैत्रेयी, अत्रैव मा भगवानमूमुहत्, न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्तीति ; स होवाच न वा अरेऽहं मोहं ब्रवीमि, अलं वा अर इदं विज्ञानाय ॥ १३ ॥

13. Maitreyī said, 'Just here you have thrown me into confusion, sir—by saying that after attaining (oneness) the self has no more consciousness.' Yājñavalkya said, 'Certainly I am not saying anything confusing, my dear; this is quite sufficient for knowledge, O Maitreyī.'

Thus enlightened, *Maitreyī said,* 'By attributing contradictory qualities *just here,* to this identical entity, Brahman, *you have thrown me into confusion,* revered *sir.*' So she says, 'Just here,' etc. How he attributed contradictory qualities is being explained: 'Having first stated that the self is but Pure Intelligence, you now say that *after attaining* (oneness) it *has no more consciousness.* How can it be only Pure Intelligence, and yet after attaining oneness have no more consciousness? The same fire cannot both be hot and cold. So I am confused on this point.' *Yājñavalkya said,* 'O Maitreyī, *certainly I am not saying anything confusing,* i.e. not using confusing language.'

Maitreyī : Why did you mention contradictory qualities—Pure Intelligence and, again, absence of consciousness?

Yājñavalkya : I did not attribute them to the same entity. It is you who through a mistake have taken one and the same entity to be possessed of contradictory attributes. I did not say this. What I said was this: When the individual existence of the self that is superimposed by ignorance and is connected with the body and organs is destroyed by knowledge, the particular consciousness connected with the body etc., consisting of a false notion, is destroyed on the destruction of the limiting adjuncts of the body and organs, for they are deprived of their cause, just as the reflections of the moon etc., and their effects, the light and so forth, vanish when the water and the like, which form their support, are gone. But just as the sun, moon, etc., which are the realities behind the reflections, remain as they are, so that Pure Intelligence which is the transcendent Brahman remains unchanged. That has been referred to as 'Pure Intelligence.' It is the Self of the whole universe, and does not really pass out with the destruction of the elements. But the individual existence, which is due to ignorance, is destroyed. 'Modifications are but names, a mere effort of speech,' says another Śruti (Ch. VI. i. 4-6 and iv. 1-4). But this is real. 'This self, my dear, is indestructible' (IV. v. 14). Therefore *this* 'great, endless, infinite Reality'—already explained (par. 12) —*is quite sufficient for knowledge, O Maitreyī.* Later it will be said, 'For the knower's function of knowing can never be lost ; because it is immortal' (IV. iii. 30).

यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं जिघ्रति, तदितर इतरं पश्यति, तदितर इतरं शृणोति, तदितर इतरमभिवदति, तदितर इतरं मनुते, तदितर इतरं विजानाति ; यत्र वा अस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं जिघ्रेत्, तत्केन कं पश्येत्, तत्केन कं शृणुयात्, तत्केन कमभिवदेत्, तत्केन कं मन्वीत, तत्केन कं विजानीयात्? येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात्? विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयादिति ॥ १४ ॥ इति चतुर्थं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

14. Because when there is duality, as it were, then one smells something, one sees something, one hears something, one speaks something, one thinks something, one knows something. (But) when to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should one smell and through what, what should one see and through what, what should one hear and through what, what should one speak and through what, what should one think and through what, what should one know and through what? Through what should one know That owing to which all this is known—through what, O Maitreyī, should one know the Knower?

Why then is it said that after attaining oneness the self has no more consciousness? Listen. *Because when,* i.e. in the presence of the particular or individual aspect of the Self due to the limiting adjuncts of the

body and organs conjured up by ignorance, *there is duality, as it were,* in Brahman, which really is one without a second, i.e. there appears to be something different from the Self.

Objection: Since duality is put forward as an object for comparison, is it not taken to be real?

Reply: No, for another Śruti says, 'Modifications are but names, a mere effort of speech' (Ch. VI. i. 4-6 and iv. 1-4), also 'One only without a second' (Ch. VI. ii. 1), and 'All this is but the Self' (Ch. VII. xxv. 2).

Then, just because there is duality as it were, therefore *one,* he who smells, viz. the unreal individual aspect of the Supreme Self, comparable to the reflection of the moon etc. in water, *smells something* that can be smelt, through something else, viz. the nose. 'One' and 'something' refer to two typical factors of an action, the agent and object, and 'smells' signifies the action and its result. As for instance in the word 'cuts.' This one word signifies the repeated strokes dealt and the separation of the object cut into two; for an action ends in a result, and the result cannot be perceived apart from the action. Similarly he who smells a thing that can be smelt does it through the nose. The rest is to be explained as above. *One knows something.* This is the state of ignorance. But when ignorance has been destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman, there is nothing but the Self. *When to the knower of Brahman everything* such as name and form has been merged in the Self and *has* thus *become the Self, then what* object to be smelt *should one smell,*

who should smell, *and through what* instrument? Similarly *what should one see* and *hear?* Everywhere an action depends on certain factors; hence when these are absent, the action cannot take place ; and in the absence of an action there can be no result. Therefore so long as there is ignorance, the operation of actions, their factors and their results can take place, but not in the case of a knower of Brahman. For to him everything is the Self, and there are no factors or results of actions apart from It. Nor can the universe, being an unreality, be the Self of anybody. Therefore it is ignorance that conjures up the idea of the non-Self ; strictly speaking, there is nothing but the Self. Therefore when one truly realises the unity of the Self, there cannot be any consciousness of actions, their factors and their results. Hence, because of contradiction, there is an utter absence of actions and their means for the knower of Brahman. The words 'what' and 'through what' are meant as a fling, and suggest the sheer impossibility of the other factors of an action also ; for there cannot possibly be any factors such as the instrument. The idea is that no one by any means can smell anything in any manner.

Even in the state of ignorance, when one sees something, *through what* instrument *should one know That owing to which all this is known?* For that instrument of knowledge itself falls under the category of objects. The knower may desire to know not about itself, but about objects. As fire does not burn itself, so the self does not know itself, and the knower can have no knowledge of a thing that is not its object. Therefore through what instrument should one know

the knower owing to which this universe is known, and who else should know it? And when to the knower of Brahman who has discriminated the Real from the unreal there remains only the subject, absolute and one without a second, *through what* instrument, *O Maitreyī, should one know* that *Knower?*

SECTION V

The section on Maitreyī was commenced in order to indicate that means of immortality which is wholly independent of rites. It is the knowledge of the Self, with the renunciation of everything as part of it. When It is known, the whole universe is known ; and It is dearer than everything ; therefore It should be realised. And the way to this realisation is set forth in the statement that It should be heard of, reflected on and meditated upon. It should be heard of from the spiritual teacher and the scriptures, and reflected on through reasoning. The reasoning has been stated in the passage furnishing arguments in support of the proposition, 'All this is but the Self' (Ch. VII. xxv. 2), viz. that the universe has sprung only from the Self, has the Self alone for its genus and dissolves only into the Self. Now the validity of this reason may be questioned. It is to refute this doubt that this section is commenced.

Because there is mutual helpfulness among the parts of the universe including the earth, and because it is common experience that those things which are mutually helpful spring from the same cause, are of the same genus and dissolve into the same thing, therefore this universe consisting of the earth etc., on account of mutual helpfulness among its parts, must be like that. This is the meaning which is expressed in this section. Or, after the proposition, 'All this is

but the Self,' has been supported by the reason that the universe has its origin, continuance and dissolution in the Self, the meaning is concluded with the present section, which preponderates in scriptural evidence. As the Naiyāyikas say, 'The restatement of a proposition after stating the reason is conclusion' (Gau. N. I. i. 39). Others[1] explain that the scriptural passages preceding the illustration of the drum are for the purpose of hearing, those prior to the present section are for reflection—since they give the arguments, and the present section enjoins meditation. In any case, since reflection through reasoning must be strictly in accordance with the verdict of scriptural evidence, and meditation too must be in accordance with reflection through reasoning, that is to say, with the findings of scriptural evidence and reasoning, a separate enjoining of meditation is unnecessary. Therefore, in our opinion, the allocating of separate sections to the hearing, reflection and meditation is meaningless. At any rate the meaning of this and the foregoing chapter is summed up in this section.

इयं पृथिवी सर्वेषां भूतानां मधु, अस्यै पृथिव्यै सर्वाणि भूतानि मधु ; यश्चायमस्यां पृथिव्यां तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, यश्चायमध्यात्मं शारीरस्तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, अयमेव स योऽयमात्मा ; इदममृतम्, इदं ब्रह्म, इदं सर्वम् ॥ १ ॥

1. This earth is (like) honey[2] to all beings,

[1] The reference is to Bhartṛprapañca.

[2] That is, effect, or helpful.

and all beings are (like) honey to this earth. (The same with) the shining immortal being who is in this earth, and the shining, immortal, corporeal being in the body. (These four) are but this Self. This (Self-knowledge) is (the means of) immortality; this (underlying unity) is Brahman; this (knowledge of Brahman) is (the means of becoming) all.

This well-known *earth is* the *honey* or effect—being like honey—of *all beings* from Hiraṇyagarbha down to a clump of grass. Just as a beehive is made by a great many bees, so is this earth made by all beings. Likewise *all beings are* the *honey* or effect of *this earth*. Also, *the shining*, i.e. possessed of the light of intelligence, and *immortal being who is in this earth, and the shining, immortal*—as above—*corporeal being in the body*, i.e. the self as identified with the subtle body, are like honey—being helpful—to all beings, and all beings are like honey to them. This we gather from the particle 'ca' (and) in the text. Thus these four are the composite effect of all beings, and all beings are the effect of these four. Hence the universe has originated from the same cause. That one cause from which it has sprung is alone real—it is Brahman. Everything else is an effect, a modification, a mere name, an effort of speech merely. This is the gist of this whole section dealing with the series of things mutually helpful. (The above fourfold division) is *but this Self* that has been premised in the passage, 'This all is the Self' (II. iv. 6). *This* Self-knowledge *is* the means of *immortality* that has been explained to

Maitreyī. *This* (underlying unity) *is* the *Brahman* which has been introduced at the beginning of this chapter in the passages, 'I will speak to you about Brahman' (II. i. 1) and 'I will teach you (about Brahman)' (II. i. 15), and the knowledge of which is called the knowledge of Brahman. *This* knowledge of Brahman *is* that by means of which one becomes *all*.

इमा आपः सर्वेषां भूतानां मधु, आसामपां सर्वाणि भूतानि मधु ; यश्चायमास्वप्सु तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, यश्चायमध्यात्मं रैतसस्तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, अयमेव स योऽयमात्मा ; इदममृतम्, इदं ब्रह्म, इदं सर्वम् ॥ २ ॥

2. This water is like honey to all beings, and all beings are like honey to this water. (The same with) the shining, immortal being who is in this water, and the shining, immortal being identified with the seed in the body. (These four) are but this Self. This (Self-knowledge) is (the means of) immortality, this (underlying unity) is Brahman, this (knowledge of Brahman) is (the means of becoming) all.

Likewise *water*. *In the body* it exists specially in *the seed*.

अयमग्निः सर्वेषां भूतानां मधु, अस्याग्नेः सर्वाणि भूतानि मधु, यश्चायमस्मिन्नग्नौ तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः,

यश्चायमध्यात्मं वाङ्मयस्तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, अयमेव स योऽयमात्मा ; इदममृतम्, इदं ब्रह्म, इदं सर्वम् ॥ ३ ॥

3. This fire is like honey to all beings, and all beings are like honey to this fire. (The same with) the shining, immortal being who is in this fire, and the shining, immortal being identified with the organ of speech in the body. (These four) are but this Self. This (Self-knowledge) is (the means of) immortality, this (underlying unity) is Brahman, this (knowledge of Brahman) is (the means of becoming) all.

Similarly *fire*. It exists specially in *the organ of speech.*

अयं वायुः सर्वेषां भूतानां मधु, अस्य वायोः सर्वाणि भूतानि मधु ; यश्चायमस्मिन्वायौ तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, यश्चायमध्यात्मं प्राणस्तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, अयमेव स योऽयमात्मा ; इदममृतम्, इदं ब्रह्म, इदं सर्वम् ॥ ४ ॥

4. This air is like honey to all beings, and all beings are like honey to this air. (The same with) the shining, immortal being who is in this air, and the shining, immortal being who is the vital force in the body. (These four) are but this Self. This (Self-knowledge) is (the means of) immortality; this (underlying unity) is Brahman; this (knowledge of Brahman) is (the means of becoming) all.

Likewise *air*. It *is the vital force in the body*. The elements are called honey, because they help by furnishing materials for the body. While the beings, shining and so forth, residing in them are called honey, because they help by serving as the organs. As has been said, 'The earth is the body of that organ of speech, and this fire is its luminous organ' (I. v. 11).

अयमादित्यः सर्वेषां भूतानां मधु, अस्यादित्यस्य सर्वाणि भूतानि मधु; यश्चायमस्मिन्नादित्ये तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, यश्चायमध्यात्मं चाक्षुषस्तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, अयमेव स योऽयमात्मा; इदममृतम्, इदं ब्रह्म, इदं सर्वम् ॥ ५ ॥

5. This sun is like honey to all beings, and all beings are like honey to this sun. (The same with) the shining, immortal being who is in this sun, and the shining, immortal being identified with the eye in the body. (These four) are but this Self. This (Self-knowledge) is (the means of) immortality; this (underlying unity) is Brahman; this (knowledge of Brahman) is (the means of becoming) all.

So also the *sun is like honey. In the body, the being identified with the eye.*

इमा दिशः सर्वेषां भूतानां मधु, आसां दिशां सर्वाणि भूतानि मधु; यश्चायमासु दिक्षु तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, यश्चायमध्यात्मं श्रौत्रः प्रातिश्रुत्कस्तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः,

अयमेव स योऽयमात्मा ; इदममृतम् , इदं ब्रह्म, इदं सर्वम् ॥ ६ ॥

6. These quarters are like honey to all beings, and all beings are like honey to these quarters. (The same with) the shining, immortal being who is these quarters, and the shining, immortal being identified with the ear and with the time of hearing, in the body. (These four) are but this Self. This (Self-knowledge) is (the means of) immortality; this (underlying unity) is Brahman; this (knowledge of Brahman) is (the means of becoming) all.

Likewise the *quarters are like honey*. Although *the ear* is the counterpart of the quarters *in the body,* yet *the being identified with the time of hearing* is mentioned, because he is specially manifest at the time of hearing sounds.

अयं चन्द्रः सर्वेषां भूतानां मधु, अस्य चन्द्रस्य सर्वाणि भूतानि मधु ; यश्चायमस्मिंश्चन्द्रे तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, यश्चायमध्यात्मं मानसस्तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, अयमेव स योऽयमात्मा ; इदममृतम् , इदं ब्रह्म, इदं सर्वम् ॥ ७ ॥

7. This moon is like honey to all beings, and all beings are like honey to this moon. (The same with) the shining, immortal being who is in this moon, and the shining, immortal being identified with the mind in the body. (These four) are but this Self. This (Self-knowledge) is

(the means of) immortality; this (underlying unity) is Brahman; this (knowledge of Brahman) is (the means of becoming) all.

Similarly the *moon. In the body, the being identified with the mind.*

इयं विद्युत्सर्वेषां भूतानां मधु, अस्यै विद्युतः सर्वाणि भूतानि मधु ; यश्चायमस्यां विद्युति तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, यश्चायमध्यात्मं तैजसस्तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, अयमेव स योऽयमात्मा ; इदममृतम् , इदं ब्रह्म, इदं सर्वम् ॥ ८ ॥

8. This lightning is like honey to all beings, and all beings are like honey to this lightning. (The same with) the shining, immortal being who is in this lightning, and the shining, immortal being identified with light in the body. (These four) are but this Self. This (Self-knowledge) is (the means of) immortality; this (underlying unity) is Brahman; this (knowledge of Brahman) is (the means of becoming) all.

So also *lightning. In the body, the being identified with* the *light* that is in the organ of touch.

अयं स्तनयित्नुः सर्वेषां भूतानां मधु, अस्य स्तनयित्नोः सर्वाणि भूतानि मधु ; यश्चायमस्मिन्स्तनयित्नौ तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, यश्चायमध्यात्मं शाब्दः सौवरस्तेजोमयो-

ऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, अयमेव स योऽयमात्मा ; इदममृतम्, इदं ब्रह्म, इदं सर्वम् ॥ ९ ॥

9. This cloud is like honey to all beings, and all beings are like honey to this cloud. (The same with) the shining, immortal being who is in this cloud, and the shining, immortal being identified with sound and voice in the body. (These four) are but this Self. This (Self-knowledge) is (the means of) immortality; this (underlying unity) is Brahman; this (knowledge of Brahman) is (the means of becoming) all.

Likewise the *cloud.* Although *the being identified with sound* is the one represented *in the body,* yet as he is specially manifest in *voice,* he is here mentioned as such.

अयमाकाशः सर्वेषां भूतानां मधु, अस्याकाशस्य सर्वाणि भूतानि मधु ; यश्चायमस्मिन्नाकाशे तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, यश्चायमध्यात्मं हृद्याकाशस्तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, अयमेव स योऽयमात्मा ; इदममृतम्, इदं ब्रह्म, इदं सर्वम् ॥ १० ॥

10. This ether is like honey to all beings, and all beings are like honey to this ether. (The same with) the shining, immortal being who is in this ether, and the shining, immortal being who is (identified with) the ether in the heart, in the body. (These four) are but this Self. This (Self-knowledge) is (the means of) immortality; this (underlying unity) is Brahman; this (knowl-

edge of Brahman) is (the means of becoming) all.

Similarly the *ether. In the body, the ether in the heart.*

It has been stated that the elements beginning with earth and ending with the ether as also the gods, identified respectively with the body and the organs, are like honey to each individual because of their helpfulness. What connects them with these individuals so that they are helpful like honey, is now being described:

अयं धर्मः सर्वेषां भूतानां मधु, अस्य धर्मस्य सर्वाणि भूतानि मधु ; यश्चायमस्मिन्धर्मे तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, यश्चायमध्यात्मं धार्मस्तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, अयमेव स योऽयमात्मा ; इदममृतम्, इदं ब्रह्म, इदं सर्वम् ॥ ११ ॥

11. This righteousness (Dharma) is like honey to all beings, and all beings are like honey to this righteousness. (The same with) the shining, immortal being who is in this righteousness, and the shining, immortal being identified with righteousness in the body. (These four) are but this Self. This (Self-knowledge) is (the means of) immortality; this (underlying unity) is Brahman; this (knowledge of Brahman) is (the means of becoming) all.

This righteousness, etc. Although righteousness is not directly perceived, it is here described by the word 'this' as though it were, because the effects initiated by it (earth etc.) are directly perceived. Righteousness

has been explained (I. iv. 14) as consisting of the Śrutis and Smṛtis, as the power which controls even the Kṣatriyas etc., which causes the variety of the universe through the transformation of the elements, and which is practised by people. This last is another reason why it has been mentioned here as something directly perceived—as 'this righteousness.' There truth and righteousness, consisting respectively of the scriptures and approved conduct, have been spoken of as one. Here, however, in spite of their identity they are mentioned as separate, because they produce their effects in two distinct forms—visible and invisible. Righteousness that is invisible, called Apūrva,[1] produces its effects invisibly in a general and a particular form. In its general form it directs the elements such as earth, and in its particular form it directs the aggregate of body and organs, in matters relating to the body. Of these, *the shining being who is in this righteousness* that directs the elements such as earth, *and, in the body,* (*the being identified with righteousness*) that fashions the aggregate of body and organs (are also like honey to all beings and *vice versa*).

इदं सत्यं सर्वेषां भूतानां मधु, अस्य सत्यस्य सर्वाणि भूतानि मधु, यश्चायमस्मिन्सत्ये तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, यश्चायमध्यात्मं सात्यस्तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, अयमेव स योऽयमात्मा ; इदममृतम्, इदं ब्रह्म, इदं सर्वम् ॥ १२ ॥

[1] Lit. new. According to the Mīmāṁsakas every action, after it is over, remains in a subtle form, which has the peculiar, indestructible power of materialising at a subsequent period as the tangible result of that action.

12. This truth is like honey to all beings, and all beings are like honey to this truth. (The same with) the shining, immortal being who is in this truth, and the shining, immortal being identified with truth in the body. (These four) are but this Self. This (Self-knowledge) is (the means of) immortality; this (underlying unity) is Brahman; this (knowledge of Brahman) is (the means of becoming) all.

Likewise that righteousness, in its visible form as good conduct that is practised, comes to be known as *truth*. It also is twofold—general and particular. The general form is inherent in the elements, and the particular form in the body and organs. Of these, (*the being who is*) *in this truth* that is inherent in the elements and consists of present action, *and, in the body,* (*the being identified with* the *truth*) that is inherent in the body and organs (are like honey to all beings and *vice versa*). 'The wind blows through truth,' says another Śruti (Mn. XXII. 1).

इदं मानुषं सर्वेषां भूतानां मधु, अस्य मानुषस्य सर्वाणि भूतानि मधु ; यश्चायमस्मिन्मानुषे तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, यश्चायमध्यात्मं मानुषस्तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, अयमेव स योऽयमात्मा ; इदममृतम्, इदं ब्रह्म, इदं सर्वम् ॥ १३ ॥

13. This human[1] species is like honey to all beings, and all beings are like honey to this human species. (The same with) the shining,

[1] This includes the other species.

immortal being who is in this human species, and the shining, immortal being identified with the human species in the body. (These four) are but this Self. (This Self-knowledge) is (the means of) immortality; this (underlying unity) is Brahman; this (knowledge of Brahman) is (the means of becoming) all.

This particular aggregate of body and organs is directed by righteousness and truth. The *human* and other *species* are the particular types to which it belongs. We observe in life that all beings are helpful to one another only by belonging to the human or other species. Therefore these species, human and the rest, are *like honey to all beings*. These too may be indicated in two ways—externally as well as internally.[1]

अयमात्मा सर्वेषां भूतानां मधु, अस्यात्मनः सर्वाणि भूतानि मधु ; यश्चायमस्मिन्नात्मनि तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, यश्चायमात्मा तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः, अयमेव स योऽयमात्मा ; इदममृतम् , इदं ब्रह्म, इदं सर्वम् ॥ १४ ॥

14. This (cosmic) body is like honey to all beings, and all beings are like honey to this (cosmic) body. (The same with) the shining, immortal being who is in this (cosmic) body, and the shining, immortal being who is this (individual) self. (These four) are but this Self. This

[1] From the standpoint of the person describing them.

(Self-knowledge) is (the means of) immortality; this (underlying unity) is Brahman; this (knowledge of Brahman) is (the means of becoming) all.

The aggregate of bodies and organs which is connected with the human and other species, designated here as *this body* (i.e. the cosmic body), *is like honey to all beings*.

Objection : Has this not been indicated by the term 'corporeal being' in the passage dealing with, earth (II. v. 1)?

Reply : No, for there only a part, viz. that which is a modification of earth, was meant. But here the cosmic body, the aggregate of bodies and organs devoid of all distinctions such as those pertaining to the body and the elements, and consisting of all elements and gods, is meant by the expression 'this body.' *The shining, immortal being who is in this* (cosmic) *body* refers to the cosmic mind which is the essence of the subtle (II. iii. 3). Only a part of it was mentioned as being associated with earth etc. But no manifestation with reference to the body is mentioned here, because the cosmic mind has no such limitation. The term *this self* refers to the only remaining entity, the individual self, whose purpose this aggregate of gross and subtle bodies subserves.

स वा अयमात्मा सर्वेषां भूतानामधिपतिः, सर्वेषां भूतानां राजा ; तद्यथा रथनाभौ च रथनेमौ चाराः सर्वे समर्पिताः, एवमेवास्मिन्नात्मनि सर्वाणि भूतानि, सर्वे

देवाः, सर्वे लोकाः, सर्वे प्राणाः, सर्व एत आत्मानः समर्पिताः ॥ १५ ॥

15. This Self, already mentioned, is the ruler of all beings, and the king of all beings. Just as all the spokes are fixed in the nave and the felloe of a chariot-wheel, so are all beings, all gods, all worlds, all organs and all these (individual) selves fixed in this Self.

This Self, already mentioned, refers to the Self[1] in which the remaining individual self of the last paragraph was stated to be merged (II. iv. 12). When the latter, which is possessed of the limiting adjunct of the body and organs created by ignorance, has been merged through the knowledge of Brahman in the true Self (or Brahman), it—such a self—becomes devoid of interior or exterior, entire, Pure Intelligence, the Self of all beings, and an object of universal homage—the absolute *ruler of all beings,* not like a prince or a minister, but *the king of all beings.* The expression 'ruler of all' qualifies the idea of kingship. One may be a king by just living like a king, but he may not be the ruler of all. Hence the text adds the qualifying epithet 'ruler of all.' Thus the sage, the knower of Brahman, who is the Self of all beings, becomes free. The question, 'Men think, "Through the knowledge of Brahman we shall become all." Well, what did that Brahman know by which It became all?' (I. iv. 9)—is thus answered. That is, by hearing of one's own

[1] That is, the individual self as merged in the Supreme Self.

self as the Self of all from the teacher and the Śrutis, by reflecting on It through reasoning, and by realising It at first hand, as explained in this and the previous section (one becomes all). Even before realisation one has always been Brahman, but through ignorance one considered oneself different from It ; one has always been all, but through ignorance one considered oneself otherwise. Therefore, banishing this ignorance through the knowledge of Brahman, the knower of Brahman, having all the while been Brahman, became Brahman, and having throughout been all, became all.

The import of the scripture that was briefly indicated[1] has been completely dealt with. Now illustrations are being given to show that in this knower of Brahman who is the self of all and has realised himself as such, the whole universe is fixed: *Just as all the spokes are fixed in the nave and the felloe of a chariot-wheel, so are all beings* from Hiraṇyagarbha down to a clump of grass, *all gods* such as Fire, *all worlds* such as this earth, *all organs* such as that of speech, *and all these selves,* which penetrate every body like a reflection of the moon in water and are conjured up by ignorance—in short, the whole universe, *fixed in this Self,* i.e. in the knower of Brahman who has realised his identity with the Supreme Self. It has been stated (I. iv. 10) that Vāmadeva, who was a knower of Brahman, realised that he had been Manu and the sun ; this identification with all is thus explained: This man of realisation, this knower of Brahman, identifies himself with all as his limiting adjunct, is

[1] In I. iv. 10 and II. i. 1

the self of all, and becomes all. Again he is without any limiting adjuncts, without name, devoid of interior or exterior, entire, Pure Intelligence, birthless, undecaying, immortal, fearless, immovable, to be described as 'Not this, not this,' neither gross nor subtle, and so on.

The logicians and certain self-styled scholars versed in the Śrutis (Mīmāṁsakas), not knowing this import of them, think that they are contradictory, and fall into an abyss of confusion by attempting fanciful interpretations. This import of which we speak is borne out by the following Mantras of the scriptures: 'One and unmoved, but swifter than the mind' (Īś. 4), and 'It moves, and does not move' (Īś. 5). Similarly in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, 'Than which there is nothing higher or lower' (Śv. III. 9 ; Mn. X. 4) and 'He goes on singing this hymn: I am the food, I am the food, I am the food,' etc. (Tai. III. x. 5). So in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 'Laughing (or eating), playing and enjoying' (VIII. xii. 3), 'If he desires to attain the world of the Manes, (by his mere wish they appear)' (Ch. VIII. ii. 1), 'Possessed of all odours and all tastes' (Ch. III. xiv. 2), and so on. In the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad too, (That which) knows things in a general and particular way' (I. i. 9 and II. ii. 7), and 'It is farther than the farthest, and again It is here, right near' (Mu. III. i. 7). In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad too, 'Minuter than an atom and bigger than the biggest' (II. 20), and 'Who (but me can know) that Deity who has both joy and the absence of it?' (Ka. II. 21). Also 'Staying, It surpasses those that run' (Īś. 4).

Similarly in the Gītā: 'I am the Vedic sacrifice and that enjoined in the Smṛtis' (IX. 16), 'I am the father of this universe' (IX. 17), '(The self) does not take on anybody's demerits' (V. 15), '(Living) the same in all beings' (XIII. 27), 'Undivided among divided (things)' (XVIII. 20), and 'The devourer as well as producer' (XIII. 16). Considering these and similar scriptural texts as apparently contradictory in their import, they, with a view to arriving at their true meaning on the strength of their own intellect, put forward fanciful interpretations, as for instance, that the self exists or does not exist, that it is or is not the agent, is free or bound, momentary, mere consciousness, or nothing—and never go beyond the domain of ignorance, because everywhere they see only contradictions. Therefore those alone who tread the path shown by the Śrutis and spiritual teachers, transcend ignorance. They alone will succeed in crossing this unfathomable ocean of delusion, and not those others who follow the lead of their own clever intellect.

The knowledge of Brahman leading to immortality has been completely dealt with. It was this that Maitreyī asked of her husband in the words, 'Tell me, sir, only of that which you know to be leading to immortality' (II. iv. 3; IV. v. 4). In order to extol this knowledge of Brahman the following story is introduced. The two Mantras are meant to give the purport of the story in brief. Since both Mantra and Brāhmaṇa extol it, the capacity of the knowledge of Brahman to confer immortality and the attainment of

identity with all becomes obvious as if it were set up on the highway. As the rising sun dispels the gloom of night, so (does the knowledge of Brahman remove ignorance). The knowledge of Brahman is also eulogised in this way, that being in the custody of King Indra it is difficult of attainment even by the gods, since this knowledge carefully preserved by Indra was attained after great pains even by the Aśvins, who are doctors to the gods. They had to behead the instructing Brāhmaṇa and fix a horse's head on him. When this was severed by Indra, they restored the Brāhmaṇa's head to its place, and heard the entire knowledge of Brahman from his own lips. Therefore there neither has been nor will be—and of course there is not—any better means of realising our life's ends than this. So this is the highest tribute that can be paid to it.

The knowledge of Brahman is further extolled thus: It is well known in the world that rites are the means to attain all our life's ends ; and their performance depends on wealth, which cannot possibly confer immortality. This can be attained only through Self-knowledge independently of rites. Although it could easily be treated of in the ritualistic portion, under the Pravargya rites, yet, because of its contradiction to rites, this Self-knowledge. coupled only with renunciation of the world, is discussed as the means of immortality, after that portion is passed. This shows that there is no better means of attaining our life's ends than this. In another way also is the knowledge of Brahman eulogised. Everybody delights in company.

The Śruti says, 'He (Virāj) was not happy (alone). Therefore people (to this day) do not like to be alone' (I. iv. 3). Yājñavalkya, though just like any other man, gave up through his Self-knowledge his attachment to worldly objects such as wife, children and wealth, became satisfied with knowledge, and took delight only in the Self. The knowledge of Brahman is further eulogised thus: Since Yājñavalkya, on the eve of his departure from the worldly life, instructed his beloved wife about it just to please her. We infer this from the following, 'You say what is after my heart. Come, take your seat,' etc. (II. iv. 4).

इदं वै तन्मधु दध्यङ्ङाथर्वणोऽश्विभ्यामुवाच । तदेतदृषिः पश्यन्नवोचत् ।

तद्वां नरा सनये दंस उग्र-
माविष्कृणोमि तन्यतुर्न वृष्टिम् ।
दध्यङ् ह यन्मध्वाथर्वणो वा-
मश्वस्य शीर्ष्णा प्र यदीमुवाच ॥ इति ॥ १६ ॥

16. This is that meditation on things mutually helpful which Dadhyac, versed in the Atharva-Veda, taught the Aśvins. Perceiving this the Ṛṣi (Mantra) said, 'O Aśvins in human form, that terrible deed called Daṁsa which you did out of greed, I will disclose as a cloud does rain—(how you learnt) the meditation on things mutually helpful which Dadhyac, versed in the Atharva-Veda, taught you through a horse's head.'

We have said that the story given here is for the sake of eulogy. What is that story? It is as follows: *This* refers to what has just been dealt with, for it is present to the mind. The particle 'vai' is a reminder. It reminds us of the story narrated elsewhere (Ś. XIV. I. i., iv.) in a different context, which is suggested by the word *that*. That meditation on things mutually helpful which was only hinted at, but not clearly expressed, in the section dealing with the rite called Pravargya, is described in this section in the words, 'This earth,' etc. (II. v. I). How was it hinted at there?—'Dadhyac, versed in the Atharva-Veda, taught these Aśvins the section dealing with the meditation on things mutually helpful; it was a favourite subject with them; therefore he came to them (wishing to teach them) thus' (Ś. XIV. I. iv. I3): 'He said, "Indra has told me that he will behead me the moment I teach it to anybody; therefore I am afraid of him. If he does not behead me, then I will accept you as my disciples." They said, "We will protect you from him." "How will you protect me?" "When you will accept us as your disciples, we shall cut off your head, remove it elsewhere and preserve it. Then bringing a horse's head we shall fix it on you; you will teach us through that. As you do so, Indra will cut off that head of yours, then we shall bring your own head and replace it on you." "All right," said the Brāhmaṇa, and accepted the Aśvins as his disciples. When he did so, they cut off his head and kept it by elsewhere; then bringing a horse's head

they fixed it on him ; through that he taught them. As he was teaching them, Indra cut off that head. Then the Aśvins brought his own head and replaced it on him' (Ś. XIV. I. i. 22-24). On that occasion, however, only that portion of the meditation on things mutually helpful was taught which forms part of the rite called Pravargya, but not the secret portion known as Self-knowledge. The story that was recited there is here mentioned for the sake of eulogy. *This is that meditation on things mutually helpful which Dadhyac, versed in the Atharva-Veda, taught the Aśvins* through this device.

Perceiving this deed *the Ṛṣi* or Mantra *said : O Aśvins in human form, that terrible deed,* etc. 'That' qualifies the remote *Daṁsa,* which is the name of the deed. What kind of deed was it? 'Terrible.' Why was it done? *Out of greed.* People do terrible deeds in the world tempted by greed ; these Aśvins too appear to have done exactly like that. What you have done in secret, *I will disclose.* Like what? *As a cloud does rain.* In the Vedas the particle 'na' used after a word denotes comparison, not negation, as in the expression, 'Aśvam na,' (like a horse). 'I will disclose your terrible deed as a cloud indicates rain through rumbling noise etc.'—this is the construction.

Objection : How can these two Mantras be in praise of the Aśvins? They rather condemn them.

Reply : There is nothing wrong in it ; these are eulogistic, not condemnatory. Because in spite of doing such a despicable deed they passed off absolutely scatheless ; nor did they suffer anything in the unseen

realm. Therefore these two Mantras are eulogistic. People sometimes rightly construe blame as praise, and likewise it is common knowledge that praise may be blame in disguise.

The secret *meditation on things mutually helpful,* known as Self-knowledge, *which Dadhyac, versed in the Atharva-Veda, taught you through a horse's head.* 'Ha' and 'im' are expletives.

इदं वै तन्मधु दध्यङ्ङाथर्वणोऽश्विभ्यामुवाच । तदेतदृषिः पश्यन्नवोचत् ।
आथर्वणायाश्विना दधीचे-
ऽश्व्यं शिरः प्रत्यैरयतम् ।
स वां मधु प्रवोचदृतायन्
त्वाष्ट्रं यद्दस्रावपि कक्ष्यं वाम् ॥ इति ॥ १७ ॥

17. This is that meditation on things mutually helpful which Dadhyac, versed in the Atharva-Veda, taught the Aśvins. Perceiving this the Ṛṣi said, 'O Aśvins, you set a horse's head on (the shoulders of) Dadhyac, versed in the Atharva-Veda. O terrible ones, to keep his word he taught you the (ritualistic) meditation on things mutually helpful connected with the sun, as also the secret (spiritual) meditation on them.'

This is that meditation, etc., is to be explained as in the preceding paragraph ; it refers to the other Mantra that relates the same story. *Dadhyac, versed in the Atharva-Veda,* etc. There may be others versed in the Atharva-Veda ; so the term is qualified by mention of the name, Dadhyac. *'O Aśvins,'* etc.—

this is spoken by the Ṛṣi[1] who visualised the Mantra. 'When the Brāhmaṇa's head was severed, *you* cut off *a horse's head*—O the cruelty of it!—and *set* it on the Brāhmaṇa's shoulders. And *he taught you the meditation on things mutually helpful* that he had promised to teach you.' Why did he run the risk of his life to do this? *To keep his word*—desiring to fulfil his promise. This is a hint that keeping one's solemn promise is more important than even life. What was the meditation on things mutually helpful that he taught? That which was *connected with the sun:* The head of Yajña,[2] being severed, became the sun. To restore the head the rite called Pravargya was started. The meditation concerning the severing of the head of Yajña, its restoration, and so on, which forms a part of the rite, is the meditation on things mutually helpful connected with the sun. *Terrible ones*—who destroy their rival forces, or kill their enemies. 'He taught you not only the ritualistic meditation on things mutually helpful connected with the sun, but *also the secret meditation on them* relating to the Supreme

[1] Here Śaṅkara explains the word in its literal and more plausible meaning. In paragraph 16 it was explained as the Mantra itself. The name of the sage is Kakṣīvat. For the verses given in paragraphs 16, 17 and 19 see R.—I. cxvi. 12, I. cxvii. 22 and VI. xlvii. 18 respectively.

[2] Lit. sacrifice. Here it means Viṣṇu, who is identified with it, For the story how Viṣṇu, proud of his well-earned excellence over the other gods, stood resting his chin on the extremity of a bow, and how the others out of jealousy got some white-ants to gnaw off the bow-string, which resulted in the severing of Viṣṇu's head, see Ś. XIV. 1. i. 6-10. Compare also Tai. Ā. V. i. 3-6.

Self' which is dealt with in the present section, in fact, throughout this and the preceding chapter. The verb 'taught' is to be repeated here from above.

इदं वै तन्मधु दध्यङ्ङाथर्वणोऽश्विभ्यामुवाच । तदेतदृषिः पश्यन्नवोचत् ।

पुरश्चक्रे द्विपदः, पुरश्चक्रे चतुष्पदः ।
पुरः स पक्षी भूत्वा पुरः पुरुष आविशत् ॥ इति ।

स वा अयं पुरुषः सर्वासु पूर्षु पुरिशयः ; नैनेन किंचनानावृतम्, नैनेन किंचनासंवृतम् ॥ १८ ॥

18. This is that meditation on things mutually helpful which Dadhyac, versed in the Atharva-Veda, taught the Aśvins. Perceiving this the Ṛṣi said, ' He made bodies with two feet and bodies with four feet. That Supreme Being first entered the bodies as a bird (the subtle body). ' He on account of his dwelling in all bodies is called the Puruṣa. There is nothing that is not covered by him, nothing that is not pervaded by Him.

This is that meditation, etc., is to be explained as before. The two foregoing Mantras sum up the story which is connected with the rite called Pravargya. They express in the form of a story the purport of the two chapters that have a bearing on that rite. Now the text proceeds to describe through the two following Mantras the purport of the two chapters that deal with the meditation on Brahman. It has been said that the Brāhmaṇa versed in the Atharva-Veda also taught the Aśvins a secret meditation on things mutually helpful.

What that meditation was is now being explained. *He made bodies,* etc.—the Supreme Lord who made this universe come out of the unmanifested state, in the course of His manifesting the undifferentiated name and form, after first projecting the worlds such as this earth, made bodies *with two feet,* viz. human and bird bodies, *and bodies with four feet,* viz. animal bodies. *That Supreme Being,* the Lord, *first entered the bodies as a bird,* i.e. as the subtle body. The text itself explains it: *He on account of His dwelling in all bodies is called the Puruṣa. There is nothing that is not covered by Him ;* likewise there is *nothing that is not pervaded by Him.* That is, everything is enveloped by Him as its inside and outside. Thus it is He who as name and form—as the body and organs—is inside and outside everything. In other words, the Mantra, 'He made bodies,' etc. briefly enunciates the unity of the Self.

इदं वै तन्मधु दध्यङ्ङाथर्वणोऽश्विभ्यामुवाच । तदेतदृषिः पश्यन्नवोचत् ।

रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव,
तदस्य रूपं प्रतिचक्षणाय ।
इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते,
युक्ता ह्यस्य हरयः शता दश ॥ इति ।

अयं वै हरयः, अयं वै दश च सहस्राणि, बहूनि चानन्तानि च ; तदेतद्ब्रह्मापूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्यम्, अयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः, इत्यनुशासनम् ॥ १९ ॥ इति पञ्चमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

19. This is that meditation on things

mutually helpful which Dadhyac, versed in the Atharva-Veda, taught the Aśvins. Perceiving this the Ṛṣi said, '(He) transformed Himself in accordance with each form; that form of His was for the sake of making Him known. The Lord on account of Māyā (notions superimposed by ignorance) is perceived as manifold, for to Him are yoked ten organs, nay hundreds of them. He is the organs; He is ten, and thousands—many, and infinite. That Brahman is without prior or posterior, without interior or exterior. This self, the perceiver of everything, is Brahman. This is the teaching.

This is that meditation, etc., is to be explained as before. (He) *transformed Himself in accordance with each form*, or (to put it differently) assumed the likeness of each form. A son has the same form as, or resembles, his parents. A quadruped is not born of bipeds, nor *vice versa*. The same Lord, in the process of manifesting name and form, 'transformed Himself in accordance with each form.' Why did He come in so many forms? *That form of His was for the sake of making Him known.* Were name and form not manifested, the transcendent nature of this Self as Pure Intelligence would not be known. When, however, name and form are manifested as the body and organs, it is possible to know Its nature. *The Lord on account of Māyā* or diverse knowledge, or (to give an alternative meaning) the false identifications created by name, form and the elements, not in truth—*is perceived as manifold,* because of these notions superimposed by

ignorance, although He is ever the same Pure Intelligence. Why? *For to Him are yoked,* like horses to a chariot, *ten organs*—called 'Hari' because they draw —*nay hundreds of them*, for the purpose of revealing their objects ; 'hundreds,' because there are a great many beings. Since there are a large number of sense-objects (the Supreme Self appears as manifold). It is to reveal them, and not the Self, that the organs are yoked. As the Kaṭha Upaniṣad says, 'The self-born Lord injured the organs by making them outgoing in their tendencies' (IV. 1). Therefore the Self is known not in Its true nature as homogeneous Pure Intelligence, but merely as the sense-objects.

Question : Then this Lord is one entity, and the organs another?

Reply : No ; *He is the organs ; he is ten, and thousands—many, and infinite*—because there are an infinite number of beings. In short, *that Brahman* which is the self *is without prior,* i.e. cause, *or posterior,* i.e. effect, *without interior or exterior,* i.e. it has no other species within It or without It. What is this homogeneous Brahman? *This self.* What is it? The inner self that sees, hears, thinks, understands, knows ; *the perceiver of everything,* because as the self of all it perceives everything. *This is the teaching* of all Vedānta texts—the gist of them. It leads to immortality and fearlessness. The import of the scriptures has been fully dealt with.

SECTION VI

अथ वंशः । पौतिमाष्यो गौपवनात्, गौपवनः पौतिमाष्यात्, पौतिमाष्यो गौपवनात्, गौपवनः कौशिकात्, कौशिकः कौण्डिन्यात्, कौण्डिन्यः शाण्डिल्यात्, शाण्डिल्यः कौशिकाच्च गौतमाच्च, गौतमः ॥ १ ॥

1. Now the line of teachers: Pautimāṣya (received it) from Gaupavana. Gaupavana from another Pautimāṣya. This Pautimāṣya from another Gaupavana. This Gaupavana from Kauśika. Kauśika from Kauṇḍinya. Kauṇḍinya from Śāṇḍilya. Śāṇḍilya from Kauśika and Gautama. Gautama—

आग्निवेश्यात्, आग्निवेश्यः शाण्डिल्याच्चानभिम्लाताच्च, आनभिम्लात आनभिम्लातात्, आनभिम्लात आनभिम्लातात्, आनभिम्लातो गौतमात्, गौतमः सैतवप्राचीनयोग्याभ्याम्, सैतवप्राचीनयोग्यौ पाराशर्यात्, पाराशर्यो भारद्वाजात्, भारद्वाजो भारद्वाजाच्च गौतमाच्च, गौतमो भारद्वाजात्, भारद्वाजः पाराशर्यात्, पाराशर्यो बैजवापायनात्, बैजवापायनः कौशिकायनेः, कौशिकायनिः ॥ २ ॥

2. From Āgniveśya. Āgniveśya from Śāṇḍilya and Ānabhimlāta. Ānabhimlāta from another of that name. He from a third Ānabhimlāta. This Ānabhimlāta from Gautama.

Gautama from Saitava and Prācīnayogya. They from Pārāśarya. Pārāśarya from Bhāradvāja. He from Bhāradvāja and Gautama. Gautama from another Bhāradvāja. He from another Pārāśarya. Pārāśarya from Baijavāpāyana. He from Kauśikāyani. Kauśikāyani—

घृतकौशिकात्, घृतकौशिकः पाराशर्यायणात्, पाराशर्यायणः पाराशर्यात्, पाराशर्यो जातूकर्ण्यात्, जातूकर्ण्य आसुरायणाच्च यास्काच्च, आसुरायणस्त्रैवणेः, त्रैवणिरौपजन्धनेः, औपजन्धनिरासुरेः, आसुरिर्भारद्वाजात्, भारद्वाज आत्रेयात्, आत्रेयो माण्टेः, माण्टिर्गौतमात्, गौतमो गौतमात्, गौतमो वात्स्यात्, वात्स्यः शाण्डिल्यात्, शाण्डिल्यः कैशोर्यात्काप्यात्, कैशोर्यः काप्यः कुमारहारितात्, कुमारहारितो गालवात्, गालवो विदर्भीकौण्डिन्यात्, विदर्भीकौण्डिन्यो वत्सनपातो बाभ्रवात्, वत्सनपाद्बाभ्रवः पथः सौभरात्, पन्थाः सौभरोऽयास्यादाङ्गिरसात्, अयास्य आङ्गिरस आभूतेस्त्वाष्ट्रात्, आभूतिस्त्वाष्ट्रो विश्वरूपात्त्वाष्ट्रात्, विश्वरूपस्त्वाष्ट्रोऽश्विभ्याम्, अश्विनौ दधीच आथर्वणात्, दध्यङ्ङाथर्वणोऽथर्वणो दैवात्, अथर्वा दैवो मृत्योः प्राध्वंसनात्, मृत्युः प्राध्वंसनः प्रध्वंसनात्, प्रध्वंसन एकर्षेः, एकर्षिर्विप्रचित्तेः, विप्रचित्तिर्व्यष्टेः, व्यष्टिः सनारोः, सनारुः सनातनात्, सनातनः सनगात्, सनगः परमेष्ठिनः, परमेष्ठी ब्रह्मणः; ब्रह्म स्वयंभु, ब्रह्मणे नमः ॥ ३ ॥ इति षष्ठं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

3. From Ghṛtakauśika. Ghṛtakauśika from Pārāśaryāyaṇa. He from Pārāśarya. Pārā-

śarya from Jātūkarṇya. Jātūkarṇya from Āsurāyaṇa and Yāska. Āsurāyaṇa from Traivaṇi. Traivaṇi from Aupajandhani. He from Āsuri. Āsuri from Bhāradvāja. Bhāradvāja from Ātreya. Ātreya from Māṇṭi. Māṇṭi from Gautama. Gautama from another Gautama. He from Vātsya. Vātsya from Śāṇḍilya. Śāṇḍilya from Kaiśorya Kāpya. He from Kumārahārita. Kumārahārita from Gālava. Gālava from Vidarbhīkauṇḍinya. He from Vatsanapāt Bābhrava. He from Pathin Saubhara. He from Ayāsya Āṅgirasa. He from Ābhūti Tvāṣtra. He from Viśvarūpa Tvāṣṭra. He from the Aśvins. They from Dadhyac Ātharvaṇa. He from Atharvan Daiva. He from Mṛtyu Prādhvaṁsana. He from Prādhvaṁsana. Prādhvaṁsana from Ekarṣi. Ekarṣi from Viprachitti. Viprachitti from Vyaṣṭi. Vyaṣṭi from Sanāru. Sanāru from Sanātana. Sanātana from Sanaga. Sanaga from Parameṣṭhin (Virāj). He from Brahman (Hiraṇyagarbha). Brahman is self-born. Salutation to Brahman.

Now the line of teachers for the first two chapters called Madhukāṇḍa, which aim at expounding the knowledge of Brahman, is being given as a eulogy on the latter. This is also a Mantra to be expounded and regularly repeated. The word 'Vaṁśa' (line of teachers) is so called because of its resemblance to a bamboo. Just as a bamboo is divided into sections,

so is this line of teachers divided into sections beginning from the top down to the root. The order of succession of teachers of the first four chapters (of the last book[1] of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa) is here spoken of as 'Vaṁśa.' In this list the names in the nominative case stand for the disciples, and those in the ablative case stand for the teachers. *Parameṣṭhin* is Virāj. *From Brahman* or Hiraṇyagarbha[2]; beyond him the line of teachers does not extend. As for *Brahman*,[3] It *is selfborn*, eternal. *Salutation to* that eternal *Brahman*.

[1] Of which the opening chapter of this work forms the third chapter (Kāṅva recension).

[2] In whose mind the Vedas were revealed through the grace of the Lord, the 'Brahman' next mentioned.

[3] The Supreme Brahman, of which the Vedas are but another form ; hence there can be no question of their originating from some other source.

CHAPTER III

SECTION I

With 'Janaka, Emperor of Videha,' etc., the portion relating to Yājñavalkya begins. Though it treats of the same subject as the preceding one, viz. the Madhukāṇḍa, yet it is not a mere repetition, being mainly argumentative, whereas the preceding portion was mainly of the nature of scriptural evidence. When both scriptural evidence and argument start to demonstrate the unity of the Self, they can show it as clearly as a bael fruit on the palm of one's hand, for it has been said, '(The Self) should be heard of, reflected on,' etc. (II. iv. 5 ; IV. v. 6). Therefore it is to test the meaning of the Śrutis in the light of arguments that this portion relating to Yājñavalkya, which is mainly argumentative, is commenced.

The story may be taken either as a eulogy on knowledge or as prescribing the way to acquire it ; for it is a well-known fact, which scholars also notice in the scriptures, that the making of presents is one such way. Through presents people are won over ; and here we see that plenty of gold and a thousand cows are presented. Therefore, though this section has another main purpose, the story is introduced to show that the making of presents is a way to the acquisition of knowledge. Another customary way of acquiring it, as observed in the system of logic, is the association

with adepts in that line, and discussion with them; that too is amply shown in this chapter. And it is a common experience that association with scholars adds to our knowledge. Therefore we must conclude that the story is meant to point out the way to acquire knowledge.

ॐ। जनको ह वैदेहो बहुदक्षिणेन यज्ञेनेजे; तत्र ह कुरुपञ्चालानां ब्राह्मणा अभिसमेता बभूवुः; तस्य ह जनकस्य वैदेहस्य विजिज्ञासा बभूव, कः स्विदेषां ब्राह्मणानामनूचानतम इति; स ह गवां सहस्रमवरुरोध; दश दश पादा एकैकस्याः श्रृङ्गयोराबद्धा बभूवुः ॥ १ ॥

1. Om. Janaka, Emperor of Videha, performed a sacrifice in which gifts were freely distributed. Vedic scholars from Kuru and Pañcāla were assembled there. Emperor Janaka of Videha had a desire to know, 'Which is the most erudite of these Vedic scholars?' He had a thousand cows confined in a pen, and on the horns of each cow were fixed ten Pādas[1] (of gold).

There was a ruler *of Videha* named *Janaka,* who was an Emperor. He *performed a sacrifice in which gifts were freely distributed.* Or the sacrifice itself may have had that name, referred to elsewhere in the Vedas. Or the horse sacrifice may here be so called because of the abundance of gifts in it. *Vedic scholars from Kuru and Pañcāla*—which are famous for their large number

[1] A Pāda is about one-third of an ounce.

of scholars—*were assembled* in that sacrifice, either on invitation or as spectators. Seeing that large assembly of scholars, *Emperor Janaka of Videha,* the sacrificer, *had a desire to know* which was the greatest Vedic scholar among them. He thought like this: *'Which is the most erudite of these Vedic scholars?* They are all versed in the Vedas, but which is the greatest of them?' Being desirous of knowing this, *he,* as a means to finding it out, *had a thousand* young *cows confined in a pen.* The cows are being described. *On the horns of each cow were fixed ten Pādas*—a Pāda being a quarter of a Pala—of gold, five on each horn.

तान्होवाच, ब्राह्मणा भगवन्तः, यो वो ब्रह्मिष्ठः स एता गा उद्जतामिति । ते ह ब्राह्मणा न दधृषुः; अथ ह याज्ञवल्क्यः स्वमेव ब्रह्मचारिणमुवाच, एताः सोम्योद्ज सामश्रवा३ इति; ता होदाचकार; ते ह ब्राह्मणाश्चुक्रुधुः, कथं नो ब्रह्मिष्ठो ब्रुवीतेति; अथ ह जनकस्य वैदेहस्य होताश्वलो बभूव; स हैनं पप्रच्छ, त्वं नु खलु नो याज्ञवल्क्य ब्रह्मिष्ठोऽसी३ इति; स होवाच, नमो वयं ब्रह्मिष्ठाय कुर्मः, गोकामा एव वयं स्म इति; तं ह तत एव प्रष्टुं दध्रे होताश्वलः ॥ २ ॥

2. He said to them, 'Revered Brāhmaṇas, let him who is the best Vedic scholar among you drive these cows (home).' None of the Brāhmaṇas dared. Then Yājñavalkya said to a pupil of his, 'Dear Sāmaśravas, please drive these cows (home).' He drove them. The Brāhmaṇas were enraged. 'How does he dare

to call himself the best Vedic scholar among us?' There was a Hotṛ[1] of Emperor Janaka of Videha named Aśvala. He now asked Yājñavalkya, 'Yājñavalkya, are you indeed the best Vedic scholar among us?' Yājñavalkya replied, 'I bow to the best Vedic scholar, I just want the cows.' Thereupon the Hotṛ Aśvala determined to interrogate him.

Having the cows thus confined, *he said* addressing those Brāhmaṇas, '*Revered Brāhmaṇas,* you are all Vedic scholars; *let him who is* specially so *among you drive these cows* home.' *None of the Brāhmaṇas* thus addressed *dared* to announce his surpassing Vedic scholarship. When they were thus silenced *Yājña-valkya said to a pupil of his, 'Dear Sāmaśravas, please drive these cows* home.' 'Sāmaśravas' means one who learns how to chant the Sāman. Hence by implication Yājñavalkya is made out to be versed in all the four Vedas.[2] *He drove* the cows towards his teacher's home. Yājñavalyka, by accepting the prize meant for the best Vedic scholar, indirectly declared himself as such; so *the Brāhmaṇas were enraged.* The reason for their anger is being stated: *How does he dare to call*

[1] A priest who has the duty of invoking the gods in a sacrifice, reciting from the Ṛg-Veda.

[2] He is principally a teacher of the Yajur-Veda; the pupil in question learns from him how to chant the Sāman, which is the Ṛc set to music; so he must also know these two Vedas; and the Atharva-Veda is subsidiary to the other three.

himself the best Vedic scholar among us who are each a great scholar? Among the Brāhmaṇas thus enraged, *there was a Hotṛ of Janaka,* the sacrificer, *named Aśvala.* He prided himself upon being the greatest Vedic scholar, and was insolent owing to royal patronage. So he challenged Yājñavalkya as follows: *'Yājñavalkya, are you indeed the best Vedic scholar among us?'* The prolonged accent signifies censure. *Yājñavalkya replied: 'I bow to the best Vedic scholar,* now *I just want the cows.' Thereupon,* i.e. when he accepted the prize meant for the best Vedic scholar and thereby declared himself to be one, the *Hotṛ Aśvala determined to interrogate him.*

याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, यदिदं सर्वं मृत्युनाप्तम्, सर्वं मृत्युनाभिपन्नम्, केन यजमानो मृत्योराप्तिमतिमुच्यत इति; होत्रर्त्विजाग्निना वाचा; वाग्वै यज्ञस्य होता, तद्येयं वाक् सोऽयमग्निः, स होता, स मुक्तिः, सातिमुक्तिः ॥ ३ ॥

3. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'since all this is overtaken by death, and swayed by it, by what means does the sacrificer go beyond the clutches of death?' 'Through the organ of speech—through fire, which is the (real) priest called Hotṛ. The sacrificer's organ of speech is the Hotṛ. This organ of speech is fire; this fire is the Hotṛ; this (fire) is liberation; this (liberation) is emancipation.'

'Yājñavalkya,' said he. In the section on the Udgītha (I. iii.) comprised in the Madhukāṇḍa it has

been briefly explained how a sacrificer can escape death through the rite with five factors coupled with the meditation about it. The present section being an examination of that, a rather detailed treatment is being given here in order to introduce some particulars about that meditation. *'Since all this,* the accessories of this rite such as the priests and the fire, *is overtaken by death,* i.e. by ritualistic work attended with our natural attachment—not only overtaken, but also *swayed by* death, *by what means,* or meditation, *does the sacrificer go beyond the clutches of death,* become independent of it?'

Objection : Has it not already been said in the section on the Udgītha that he transcends death by identifying himself with the vital force in the mouth?

Reply : Yes, but the particulars that have been omitted there will be given here. So there is nothing wrong in it.

Yājñavalkya said, *'Through the organ of speech —through fire, which is the* (real) *priest called Hotṛ.'* The explanation follows. Who is that Hotṛ through whom the sacrificer transcends death? *'The sacrificer's organ of speech is the Hotṛ.'* 'Sacrifice' here means the sacrificer. Witness the Śruti, 'The sacrifice is the sacrificer' (Ś. XIV. II. ii. 24). The sacrificer's organ of speech is the Hotṛ with reference to sacrifices. How? *This organ of speech* of the sacrificer *is* the well-known *fire,* with reference to the gods. This has already been explained under the topic of the three kinds of food (I. v. 3, 11). And that *fire is the Hotṛ,* for the Śruti says, 'Fire is the Hotṛ' (Ś. VI. IV. ii. 6). These two

auxiliaries of a sacrifice, viz. the priest called Hotṛ with reference to sacrifices, and the organ of speech with reference to the body, being limited, are 'overtaken by death,' i.e. are continually changed by ritualistic work directed by our natural attachment due to ignorance, and are therefore 'swayed by death.' If the sacrificer looks upon them as fire, their divine form, it conduces to his[1] liberation from death. So the text says: *This is liberation,* i.e. the Hotṛ who is fire is liberation. In other words, looking upon the Hotṛ as fire is that. As soon as the sacrificer looks upon the two auxiliaries as fire, he is freed from death consisting in his limited natural attachment relating to the body and the elements. Therefore that Hotṛ, when looked upon as fire, is 'liberation,' i.e. the means of liberation, for the sacrificer. *This is emancipation:* That which is liberation is emancipation, i.e. a means to it. To look upon those two limited auxiliaries as fire, which is their unlimited divine form, is liberation. This liberation which consists in looking upon (the Hotṛ and the organ of speech) in their divine aspect is also spoken of as the resulting emancipation—becoming one with fire, their divine form—which takes one beyond the death that consists in attachment to limitations relating to the body and the elements. It is called emancipation, because that liberation itself is a means to it. It has already been explained in the section on the Udgītha that the identification of the organ of speech etc. with fire and so on is itself the emancipation of the sacrificer.

[1] As also the Hotṛ's.

There it has been said in a general way that identity with the vital force in the mouth is the means of liberation, but the particulars have not been given. Here some details, viz. the viewing of the organ of speech etc. as fire and so on, are given. The emancipation from death here dealt with is the same as that which has been described as a result in the section on the Udgītha in the words, '(That fire) having transcended death shines,' etc. (I. iii. 12).

याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, यदिदं सर्वमहोरात्राभ्यामाप्तम्, सर्वमहोरात्राभ्यामभिपन्नम्, केन यजमानोऽहोरात्रयोराप्तिमतिमुच्यत इति। अध्वर्युणर्त्विजा चक्षुषादित्येन; चक्षुर्वै यज्ञस्याध्वर्युः, तद्यदिदं चक्षुः सोऽसावादित्यः, सोऽध्वर्युः, स मुक्तिः, सातिमुक्तिः ॥ ४ ॥

4. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'since all this is overtaken by day and night, and swayed by them, by what means does the sacrificer go beyond the clutches of day and night?' 'Through the eye—through the sun, which is the (real) priest called Adhvaryu.[1] The eye of the sacrificer is the Adhvaryu. This eye is the sun; this sun is the Adhvaryu; this (sun) is liberation; this (liberation) is emancipation.'

'Yājñavalkya,' said he. The emancipation from death, which is another name for ritualistic work

[1] Whose duty it is to get ready the various accessories of a sacrifice and offer the oblations, reciting from the Yajur-Veda.

directed by our natural attachment due to ignorance, has been explained. Time is the cause of changes in the accessories of rites such as the new and full moon sacrifices, on which death, that is to say, ritualistic work with attachment, rests. This paragraph is introduced, as emancipation from that time should be separately indicated ; because even without the performance of rites, we notice before and after it the action of time as the cause of changes in the accessories of the rites. So the text goes on: *Since all this is overtaken by day and night.* That time has two forms: one consisting of day, night, etc., and the other consisting of lunar days etc. The emancipation from the former type of time is being first indicated, since everything is born, grows and dies because of the day and night ; so also with the means of a sacrifice. *The eye of the sacrificer is the Adhvaryu ;* here too 'sacrifice' means the sacrificer. The rest of the paragraph is to be explained as before. When the two accessories viz. the sacrificer's eye and the Adhvaryu, are stripped of their limitations relating to the body and the elements, and are looked upon in their divine aspect, *this is liberation.* In other words, the viewing of the Adhvaryu as the sun is liberation. *This* liberation *is emancipation,* as in the preceding paragraph ; because there can be no day and night for one who has identified himself with the sun.

याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, यदिदं सर्वं पूर्वपक्षापरपक्षाभ्यामाप्तम्, सर्वं पूर्वपक्षापरपक्षाभ्यामभिपन्नम्, केन यजमानः पूर्वपक्षापरपक्षयोराप्तिमतिमुच्यत इति । उद्गात्रर्त्विजा वायुना

प्राणेन ; प्राणो वै यज्ञस्योद्गाता ; तद्योऽयं प्राणः स वायुः, स उद्गाता, स मुक्तिः, सातिमुक्तिः ॥ ५ ॥

5. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'since all this is overtaken by the bright and dark fortnights, and swayed by them, by what means does the sacrificer go beyond the bright and dark fortnights?' 'Through the vital force—through air, which is the (real) priest called Udgātṛ.[1] The vital force of the sacrificer is the Udgātṛ. This vital force is air, and it is the Udgātṛ; this (air) is liberation; this (liberation) is emancipation.'

Now the emancipation from time represented by lunar days etc. is being indicated: *Since all this,* etc. The sun is the cause of the days and nights, which are alike, but not of the lunar days from the first to the fifteenth ; these are subject to increase and decrease, and are caused by the moon. Therefore through identification with the moon one goes beyond the bright and dark fortnights, just as through identification with the sun one goes beyond day and night. Now the *vital force* of the sacrificer *is air. It* again *is the Udgātṛ,* as we know from the section on the Udgītha, where it has been settled: 'Indeed he chanted through speech and the vital force' (I. iii. 24). Also, 'Water is the body of this vital force, and that moon is its luminous organ' (I. v. 13). Since the vital force, air and moon are one, the Śruti considers that there is no difference between summing up with the

[1] Who chants hymns from the Sāma-Veda.

moon[1] and summing up with air, and mentions air as the divine form. Moreover, the changes of the moon are due to air.[2] Therefore air is the cause even of that (moon) which makes the division of time into lunar days etc. Hence it all the more stands to reason that one who has identified oneself with air goes beyond time as divided into lunar days etc. For this reason another Śruti (the Mādhyandina recension) states that the viewing (of the accessories of a sacrifice) as the moon is liberation and emancipation; while here, in the Kāṇva recension, the viewing of the two accessories as their cause, viz. air, is called liberation and emancipation. So there is no contradiction between the two Śrutis.

याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, यदिदमन्तरिक्षमनारम्बणमिव, केनाक्रमेण यजमानः स्वर्गं लोकमाक्रमत इति ; ब्रह्मणर्त्विजा मनसा चन्द्रेण ; मनो वै यज्ञस्य ब्रह्मा ; तद्यदिदं मनः सोऽसौ चन्द्रः, स ब्रह्मा, स मुक्तिः, सातिमुक्तिः—इत्यतिमोक्षाः ; अथ संपदः ॥ ६ ॥

6. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'since the sky is, as it were, without a support, through what support does the sacrificer go to heaven?' 'Through the mind—through the moon, which is the (real) priest called Brahman.[3] The mind of the sacrificer is the Brahman. This mind is the moon; the moon is the Brahman; this

[1] As the Mādhyandina recension does.

[2] Really, cosmic force (Sūtrātman), of which air is the conventional symbol.

[3] Who supervises the functions. In this sense the word is masculine.

(moon) is liberation; this (liberation) is emancipation.' So far about the ways of emancipation; now about the meditation based on resemblance.

The way the sacrificer transcends the form of death known as time has been explained. Now what is that support by means of which he attains a result transcending death, which is a limitation—in other words, is emancipated? This paragraph answers the point: *Since the sky,* so familiar to us, *is, as it were, without a support,* etc. The words 'as it were' indicate that there *is* a support to it, but it is not known. An inquiry is being made about this unknown support by the use of the pronominal adjective 'Kena' (through what); otherwise the attainment of result would be impossible. What is that support by means of which the sacrificer attains the result of his rites and is released?—is the question. *Through what support does the sacrificer go to heaven* as the result (of his rites)—in other words, is released? *Through the mind—through the moon, which is the* (real) *priest called Brahman;* this is to be explained as before. Now what is familiar to us as *the mind* of the sacrificer with reference to the body, *is the moon* with reference to the gods; for it is a well-known fact that the mind in the body is the same as the moon among the gods. *The moon* again *is the* priest called *Brahman.* Hence the sacrificer beholds the limited form of the Brahman among the elements, and that of his own mind in the body, as the unlimited moon. That is to say, through

the support of the mind viewed as the moon he attains heaven as the result of his rites—in other words, is released. The word 'iti' indicates the conclusion of the topic ; that is, such are the various ways of emancipation from death. The topic is concluded, because all kinds of meditation regarding the accessories of a sacrifice have been dealt with in this connection. *So far about the ways of emancipation,* i.e. such are the various ways of emancipation.

Now the meditation based on resemblance is being spoken of. By this is meant a meditation, by virtue of some point of resemblance, on rites with inferior results like the Agnihotra, as rites with superior results, in order to obtain these results ; or it is a meditation on some part of the lesser rite as those very results. Even when people try with all their ardour to undertake measures to bring about certain ends, they may fail of their object through some defect. So a man who regularly tends the sacrificial fire takes up any rite such as the Agnihotra that suits him, and if he happens to know the results of particular rites, meditates that the rite before him will produce the results he seeks. Otherwise it would be impossible for people of even the upper three castes, who are qualified for them, to perform the Rājasūya,[1] Aśvamedha, Naramedha and Sarvamedha sacrifices. And even the reciting of scriptures relating to them would merely be devotional

[1] A sacrifice usually performed by emperors. The other three are sacrifices in which a horse, some substitute for a man, and animals in general are respectively sacrificed. All the four are elaborate and expensive undertakings beyond the means of most people.

study, unless there be some means of attaining the results of those rites. Those people can attain these results only by means of the meditation based on resemblance ; hence such meditation is fruitful, and is therefore being described.

याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, कतिभिरयमद्यर्ग्भिर्होतास्मिन्यज्ञे करिष्यतीति ; तिसृभिरिति ; कतमास्तास्तिस्र इति ; पुरोनुवाक्या च याज्या च शस्यैव तृतीया ; किं ताभिर्जयतीति ; यत्किंचेदं प्राणभृदिति ॥ ७ ॥

7. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'with how many kinds of Ṛc will the Hotṛ do his part in this sacrifice to-day?' 'With three kinds.' 'Which are those three?' 'The preliminary, the sacrificial, and the eulogistic hymns as the third.' 'What does he win through them?' 'All this that is living.'[1]

'Yājñavalkya,' said he, to draw his attention, *'with how many kinds of Ṛc will the Hotṛ do his part*—recite hymns—*in this sacrifice to-day?'* The other said, *'With three kinds* of Ṛc.' When he said this, Aśvala asked him again, *'Which are those three?'* The first question was about the number, the second about the Ṛces themselves. *The preliminary,* that class of hymns which are used before a sacrifice ; *the sacrificial,* those hymns that are used for the purpose of the sacrifice ; *and the eulogistic hymns,* that class of hymns which are used in praise. Every kind of Ṛc, whether

[1] That is, the three worlds.

used in praise or otherwise, is included in these three classes. *'What does he win through them?' 'All this that is living.'* On account of this parity of number he wins whatever is living (in the three worlds). On account of the similarity in number etc. he obtains all this result through meditation.

याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, कत्ययमद्याध्वर्युरस्मिन्यज्ञ आहुतीर्होष्यतीति ; तिस्र इति ; कतमास्तास्तिस्र इति ; या हुता उज्ज्वलन्ति, या हुता अतिनेदन्ते, या हुता अधिशेरते ; किं ताभिर्जयतीति ; या हुता उज्ज्वलन्ति देवलोकमेव ताभिर्जयति, दीप्यत इव हि देवलोकः ; या हुता अतिनेदन्ते पितृलोकमेव ताभिर्जयति, अतीव हि पितृलोकः ; या हुता अधिशेरते मनुष्यलोकमेव ताभिर्जयति, अध इव हि मनुष्यलोकः ॥ ८ ॥

8. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'how many kinds of oblations will the Adhvaryu offer in this sacrifice to-day?' 'Three.' 'Which are those three?' 'Those that blaze up on being offered, those that make a great noise, and those that sink.' 'What does he win through them?' 'Through those that blaze up on being offered he wins the world of the gods, for this world shines, as it were. Through those that make a great noise he wins the world of the Manes, for this world is full of uproar. And through those that sink he wins the human world, for this world is lower.'

'Yājñavalkya,' said he, etc. This has already been explained. *'How many kinds of oblations will the Adhvaryu offer in this sacrifice to-day?' 'Three.' 'Which are those three?'* etc.—already explained. Yājñavalkya replied: *Those that blaze up on being offered,* such as oblations of wood and clarified butter. *Those that make a great noise,* such as flesh. *And those that sink in,* penetrate the earth, e.g. milk and Soma juice. *'What does he win through them,'* through the oblations thus offered? *Through those that blaze up on being offered,* etc.—The offerings made are bright, and the result, *the world of the gods,* is also bright. On account of this similarity he meditates that the bright offerings he is making are the very form of the result he seeks through his rites. viz. the world of the gods—that he is achieving that very result, the world of the gods. *Through those* oblations *that make a great noise he wins the world of the Manes,* because of the similarity in producing horrible noises. For, attached to the world of the Manes is the city of Yama, where people subjected to tortures by him cry, 'Alas, we are undone, release us, oh, release us!' So also do the offerings of meat etc. make a noise. On account of this similarity with the world of the Manes he meditates that he is actually attaining that world. *Through those* offerings *that sink he wins the human world,* because both are equally related to the surface of the earth. *For this world is lower* than the higher worlds, which are to be attained ; or 'lower' because of the similarity in going down.[1] Therefore, while offering oblations of

[1] Too often men having evil tendencies degrade.

milk or Soma, he meditates that he is actually attaining the human world.

याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, कतिभिरयमद्य ब्रह्मा यज्ञं दक्षिणतो देवताभिर्गोपायतीति ; एकयेति ; कतमा सैकेति ; मन एवेति, अनन्तं वै मनः, अनन्ता विश्वे देवाः, अनन्तमेव स तेन लोकं जयति ॥ ९ ॥

9. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'through how many gods does this Brahman from the right protect the sacrifice to-day?' 'Through one.' 'Which is that one?' 'The mind. The mind is indeed infinite, and infinite are the Viśvadevas. Through this meditation the aspirant wins an infinite world.'

'Yājñavalkya,' said he, etc., is to be explained as before. *Through how many gods does this* priest called *Brahman from the right,* sitting in his particular seat, *protect the sacrifice?* The plural number in 'gods' is merely for the sake of conformity. To explain: The priest protects the sacrifice through one god only ; so one who knows this should not put a question using the plural. But because the plural number was used in the questions and answers in the two preceding paragraphs—'Through how many?' 'Through three.' 'How many?' 'Three'—here too the plural is used in the question ; or the plural form is used in order to puzzle the opponent. *'Through one,'* replied Yājñavalkya ; the god through whom the Brahman protects the sacrifice from his seat on the right is one. *'Which is that one?' The mind* is that god ; it is through the

mind, through meditation, that the Brahman does his function. 'The mind and speech are the two ways of a sacrifice ; the Brahman rectifies one of them (speech) through the mind (or silence),' so says another Śruti (Ch. IV. xvi. 1-2). Therefore the mind is that god, and through it the Brahman protects the sacrifice. And that *mind is indeed infinite,* because of its modifications. The word 'indeed' signifies that it is a well-known fact. Everybody knows that the mind is infinite. The gods identify themselves with its infinity: *And infinite are the Viśvadevas ;* for another Śruti says, 'In which (mind) all the gods become one,' etc. *Through this meditation the aspirant wins an infinite world,* because of the similarity as regards infinitude.

याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, कत्ययमद्योद्गातास्मिन्यज्ञे स्तोत्रियाः स्तोष्यतीति ; तिस्र इति ; कतमास्तास्तिस्र इति ; पुरोनुवाक्या च याज्या च शस्यैव तृतीया ; कतमास्ता या अध्यात्ममिति ; प्राण एव पुरोनुवाक्या, अपानो याज्या, व्यानः शस्या ; किं ताभिर्जयतीति ; पृथिवीलोकमेव पुरोनुवाक्यया जयति, अन्तरिक्षलोकं याज्यया, द्युलोकं शस्यया ; ततो ह होताश्वल उपरराम ॥ १० ॥ इति प्रथमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

10. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'how many classes of hymns will the Udgātṛ chant in this sacrifice to-day?' 'Three classes.' 'Which are those three?' 'The preliminary, the sacrificial, and the eulogistic hymns as the third.' 'Which

are those that have reference to the body?' 'The Prāṇa is the preliminary hymn, the Apāna is the sacrificial hymn, and the Vyāna is the eulogistic hymn.' 'What does he win through them?' 'Through the preliminary hymns he wins the earth, through the sacrificial hymns he wins the sky, and through the eulogistic hymns he wins heaven.' Thereupon the Hotṛ Aśvala kept silent.

'Yājñavalkya,' said he, etc., is to be explained as before. *'How many classes of hymns will the Udgātṛ chant?'* By the word 'hymns' is meant a collection of Ṛces that can be chanted. All Ṛces whatsoever, whether capable of being chanted or not, are comprised in just *three classes,* says Yājñavalkya; and they are explained as *the preliminary, the sacrificial and the eulogistic hymns as the third.* It has already been said that the aspirant wins 'All this that is living.' One may ask, 'Through what similarity?' The answer is being given: *'Which are those* three Ṛces *that have reference to the body?' 'The Prāṇa is the preliminary hymn,'* because both begin with the letter *p. 'The Apāna is the sacrificial hymn,'* because it comes next in order. Also, the gods eat the oblations offered through the Apāna[1], and a sacrifice is also an offering. *'The Vyāna is the eulogistic hymn,'* for another Śruti says, 'He utters the Ṛc without the help of the Prāṇa or the Apāna'[2] (Ch. I. iii. 4). *'What*

[1] Which has its seat between the heart and the navel (p. 216), and carries things down.

[2] That is, through the Vyāna.

does he win through them?'—already explained. The similarity with regard to particular relations that was not mentioned before is being given here ; the rest has already been explained. Because of the similarity[1] of relation to a particular world (viz. the earth), *through the preliminary hymns he wins the earth ; through the sacrificial hymns he wins the sky,* because both occupy an intermediate position ; *through the eulogistic hymns he wins heaven,* because both occupy the highest position. *Thereupon,* i.e. when his questions were answered, *the Hotṛ Aśvala kept silent, realising* that his opponent was too deep for him.

[1] Both come in first.

SECTION II

The relation of the story to the subject has already been dealt with. The emancipation from death in the form of time as well as rites has been explained. Now what is this death, the emancipation from which has been explained? It consists of the Grahas (organs) and Atigrahas (objects), which are centred in the attachment due to our natural ignorance, and are limited by the objects relating to the body and the elements. The forms such as fire and the sun of one who has been freed from that death consisting in limitation have been explained in the section on the Udgītha, and some details about them have been set forth in reply to Aśvala's questions ; all that is the result of rites coupled with meditation. Liberation from this relative existence consisting of ends and means has to be effected ; hence the nature of death is being described, for it is the man in bondage who has to be liberated. It is true that the nature of an emancipated man has also been described, but such a man is not yet free from death in the form of the organs and objects. So it has been said with reference to the being who is in the sun, 'For hunger is death' (I. ii. 1) and 'This indeed is death' (Ś. X. v. ii. 2) ; also, 'Death, though one, has many forms' (Ś. X. v. ii. 16). In other words, he alone who has attained identity with the sun is spoken of as escaping from the clutches of death ; and the organs and objects, which are but forms of death, are not absent in the

sun. It has already been said, 'Heaven is the body of this mind, and that sun is its luminous organ' (I. v. 12), and it will be said further on, 'The mind is also the Graha (organ) ; it is controlled by the Atigraha (object), desire' (III. ii. 7), 'The Prāṇa (nose) is the Graha ; it is controlled by the Atigraha, the Apāna (odour)' (III. ii. 2), and 'The organ of speech indeed is the Graha ; it is controlled by the Atigraha, name' (III. ii. 3). We have thus explained it in the passage bearing on the three kinds of food ; and we have fully argued the point that what causes the starting of bondage cannot lead to its cessation.

Some, however, consider every rite to be leading to the cessation of bondage. Therefore, they say, he who resorts to the succeeding forms of death (bodies) is freed from the preceding forms of it: he resorts to the former not to cling to them, but to turn away from them ; so everything is a form of death until duality is at an end, and when this takes place, he really transcends death. Hence, they say, the intermediate liberation is but a relative and secondary one.

All this, we say, is unwarranted by the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.

Objection : Does not liberation consist in identity with all, as is borne out by the Śruti text, 'Therefore It became all' (I. iv. 10)?

Reply : Yes, it does, but such Śruti texts as, 'One who desires villages must sacrifice' (Tā. XVII. x. 4), and 'One who desires animals must sacrifice' (Tā. XVI. xii. 8), do not convey liberation. If they did, they would not signify villages, cattle, heaven, etc.,

and hence the latter would not be understood as such. But they are considered to be the varied results of our past actions. Moreover, if the Vedic rites conveyed liberation, there would be no relative existence[1] at all.

Objection : We maintain that although identity is the purport of those passages, yet relative existence is the very nature of rites, which follow automatically (from a knowledge of the Vedic injunctions), as when a lamp is lighted to show a particular form, everything in that place is brought to light.

Reply : Not so, for it is unwarranted by any means of knowledge. In other words, if the Vedic rites together with meditation convey only identity, there is nothing to prove that bondage follows automatically (from a knowledge of the Vedic injunctions). There is neither perception, nor for that very reason inference[2], nor scriptural evidence.

Objection : But both identity and relative existence may be conveyed by the same sentence, as light or the digging of a canal, for instance, serves multiple purposes.

Reply : It cannot be, for it would be against the laws of sentences. Nor can you say that the import of a sentence (here, rites) serves both to initiate bondage and to stop it. The examples of light, the

[1] This is the result of one's merit and demerit, which again depend on the observance or non-observance of scriptural injunctions. Now, if these convey liberation, relative existence, having no cause, is nullified.

[2] Because inference is based on perception.

digging of a canal, and so forth are in order, because their uses are matters of perception.[1]

You may say that there are Mantras[2] in support of your view ; but it is just this view of yours that is untenable. We have to find out whether these Mantras mean this or something else. Therefore we conclude that death in the form of the organs and objects is bondage, and this section is introduced to show a way out of that bondage. We do not know the trick of taking up an intermediate position,[3] as between waking and sleeping states ; it would be as absurd as the same woman being one-half old and one-half young. The reason why after the words 'go beyond death' (III. i. 3, adapted), the organs and objects are mentioned, is that these latter also really mean death. In other words, the whole range of ends and means constitutes bondage, because it is not free from the organs and objects. Only when the fetters are known, can the fettered man try to get rid of them. Hence the present section is introduced to describe the nature of bondage.

अथ हैनं जारत्कारव आर्तभागः पप्रच्छ ; याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, कति ग्रहाः, कत्यतिग्रहा इति । अष्टौ ग्रहाः, अष्टावतिग्रहा इति ; ये तेऽष्टौ ग्रहाः, अष्टावतिग्रहाः, कतमे त इति ॥ १ ॥

1. Then Ārtabhāga, of the line of Jarat-

[1] Which do not admit of any discussion.

[2] For example: 'He who knows meditation and rites together transcends death' (Īś. 10).

[3] That the ritualistic portion of the Vedas leads neither to bondage nor directly to liberation.

kāru asked him. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'how many are the Grahas,[1] and how many are the Atigrahas[2]?' 'There are eight Grahas and eight Atigrahas.' 'Which are those eight Grahas and eight Atigrahas?'

Then, i.e. when Aśvala stopped, *Ārtabhāga,* the son of Ṛtabhāga, *of the line of Jaratkāru, asked* Yājñavalkya, already introduced. '*Yājñavalkya,*' *said he*—this is to draw his attention. The particle 'ha' suggests the narration of a past incident. As before, comes the question, '*How many are the Grahas, and how many are the Atigrahas?*' The particle 'iti' marks the close of the speech.

Objection: The subject-matter of the question, viz. the Grahas and Atigrahas, may be either known or not known. If they are known, then their number, which is an attribute, is also known. In that case, the question regarding it, 'How many are the Grahas, and how many are the Atigrahas?' is out of place. If, on the other hand, the Grahas and Atigrahas are not known, then the question should be regarding their nature: 'What are the Grahas, and what are the Atigrahas?' and not, 'How many are the Grahas, and how many are the Atigrahas?' Again, questions may be asked regarding the particulars of things about which we have a general knowledge, as for instance:

[1] One of the root-meanings of the word 'Graha' is: that which perceives; hence an organ.

[2] Atigraha—lit. that which is greater than a Graha; here it means a sense-object, which determines the nature of the perception.

'Which of these belong to the Kaṭha recension and which to the Kalāpa?' But no such things as Grahas and Atigrahas are known in life. If they were, the question might be regarding the particulars about them.

Reply: It has been asked (III. i. 3) how the sacrificer 'goes beyond' death. It is only one who is controlled by a Graha (that which seizes) that can be liberated. It has been mentioned twice—'This is liberation; this is emancipation' (Ibid.). Therefore the Grahas and Atigrahas are known things.

Objection: Even in that case four Grahas and Atigrahas have been mentioned, viz. the vocal organ, eye, vital force and mind. So the question 'how many' is not to the point, for the number is already known.

Reply: Not so, because there the number was indefinite. The passage in question did not seek to fix it at four. Here, however, in the meditation on the Grahas and Atigrahas, the attribute of number is sought to be fixed at eight; so the question is quite in order. Therefore liberation and emancipation have been mentioned twice in the passage. 'This is liberation; this is emancipation.' The Grahas and Atigrahas too are settled facts. Hence Ārtabhāga asked, 'How many are the Grahas, and how many are the Atigrahas?' Yājñavalkya replied, *'There are eight Grahas and eight Atigrahas.'* *'Which,* in particular, *are those eight Grahas and eight Atigrahas* that you have spoken of?'

प्राणो वै ग्रहः, सोऽपानेनातिग्राहेण गृहीतः, अपानेन हि गन्धाञ्जिघ्रति ॥ २ ॥

2. The Prāṇa (nose) indeed is the Graha; it is controlled by the Atigraha, the Apāna, (odour), for one smells odours through the Apāna (the air breathed in).

Yājñavalkya replied: *The Prāṇa indeed is the Graha.* 'Prāṇa' here means the nose, from the context. *It,* the nose, is connected with air. 'Apāna' here means odour ; it is so called because it always accompanies odour, for everybody smells with the nose odours presented by the air that is breathed in (Apāna). This is expressed by the sentence: *For one smells odours through the Apāna.*

वाग्वै ग्रहः, स नाम्नातिग्राहेण गृहीतः, वाचा हि नामान्यभिवदति ॥ ३ ॥

3. The organ of speech indeed is the Graha; it is controlled by the Atigraha, name, for one utters names through the organ of speech.

The organ of speech indeed is the Graha. The organ of speech, as confined to one particular body, deals with things to which people are attached, and makes utterances which are untrue, pernicious, rude, offensive, and so on. It thus controls or captures people ; hence it is a Graha. *It,* this Graha called the organ of speech, *is controlled by the Atigraha, name,* that is, by whatever is uttered.—The long vowel in 'Atigrāha' is a Vedic licence.—For the organ of speech is meant to express things ; it is used by them for just

that purpose ; hence it is controlled by them, and there is no deliverance for it until it has done this function. Therefore the organ of speech is said to be controlled by the Atigraha, name, for it is a fact that people, impelled by their attachment to things capable of expression, get into all sorts of troubles.

जिह्वा वै ग्रहः, स रसेनातिग्राहेण गृहीतः, जिह्वया हि रसान्विजानाति ॥ ४ ॥

4. The tongue indeed is the Graha; it is controlled by the Atigraha, taste, for one knows tastes through the tongue.

चक्षुर्वै ग्रहः, स रूपेणातिग्राहेण गृहीतः, चक्षुषा हि रूपाणि पश्यति ॥ ५ ॥

5. The eye indeed is the Graha; it is controlled by the Atigraha, colour, for one sees colours through the eye.

श्रोत्रं वै ग्रहः, स शब्देनातिग्राहेण गृहीतः, श्रोत्रेण हि शब्दाञ्शृणोति ॥ ६ ॥

6. The ear indeed is the Graha; it is controlled by the Atigraha, sound, for one hears sounds through the ear.

मनो वै ग्रहः, स कामेनातिग्राहेण गृहीतः, मनसा हि कामान्कामयते ॥ ७ ॥

7. The mind indeed is the Graha; it is controlled by the Atigraha, desire, for one wishes desires through the mind.

हस्तौ वै ग्रहः, स कर्मणातिग्राहेण गृहीतः, हस्ताभ्यां हि कर्म करोति ॥ ८ ॥

8. The hands indeed are the Graha; they are controlled by the Atigraha, work, for one does work through the hands.

त्वग्वै ग्रहः, स स्पर्शेनातिग्राहेण गृहीतः, त्वचा हि स्पर्शान्वेदयते—इत्येतेऽष्टौ ग्रहाः, अष्टावतिग्रहाः ॥ ९ ॥

9. The skin indeed is the Graha; it is controlled by the Atigraha, touch, for one feels touch through the skin. These are the eight Grahas and eight Atigrahas.

The rest is to be explained as before. *These*, the organs up to the skin, *are the eight Grahas and* the objects up to touch are the *eight Atigrahas.*

याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, यदिदं सर्वं मृत्योरन्नम्, का स्वित्सा देवता यस्या मृत्युरन्नमिति ; अग्निर्वै मृत्युः, सोऽपामन्नम्, अप पुनर्मृत्युं जयति ॥ १० ॥

10. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'since all this is the food of death, who is that god whose food is death?' 'Fire is death; it is the food of water. (One who knows thus) conquers further death.'

When the topic of the Grahas and Atigrahas (organs and objects) was concluded, Ārtabhāga spoke again. *'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'since all this* manifested universe *is the food of death*—everything is born

and imperilled, being swallowed by death in the form of the Grahas and Atigrahas—*who is that god whose food is death* even?'—for another Śruti says, 'Whose sauce is death' (Ka. II. 25). The intention of the questioner is this: If Yājñavalkya mentions the death of death, it will lead to a *regressus in infinitum*. If, on the other hand, he does not mention it, liberation from this death in the form of the Grahas and Atigrahas will be impossible. For liberation can take place only when this form of death is destroyed, and this last would be possible if there be the death of death even. Hence, considering the question unanswerable, he asks, 'Who is that god?'

(Yājñavalkya said): There *is* the death of death.

Objection: This will lead to *a regressus in infinitum*, since that death too may have its death.

Reply: No, because you cannot conceive another destroyer for that which is the death of all.

Objection: How do you know that there is the death of death?

Reply: We see it. *Fire*, for instance, *is* the *death* of all, being a destroyer. But it is swallowed by water; hence *it is the food of water*. So believe that there is the death of death, and it swallows all the Grahas and Atigrahas. When these fetters are destroyed—swallowed by that death—liberation from relative existence becomes possible, for it has already been said that the Grahas and Atigrahas are the fetters. So it is clear that we can get rid of these; hence our efforts to get rid of bondage are fruitful. Therefore (one who knows thus) *conquers further death*.

याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, यत्रायं पुरुषो म्रियत उदस्मा-त्प्राणाः क्रामन्त्याहो३ नेति ; नेति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः, अत्रैव समवनीयन्ते, स उच्छ्वयति, आध्मायति, आध्मातो मृतः शेते ॥ ११ ॥

11. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'when this (liberated) man dies, do his organs go up from him, or do they not?' 'No,' replied Yājñavalkya, '(they) merge in him only. The body swells, is inflated, and in that state lies dead.'

'*When,* after death[1] has been swallowed by another death, viz. the realisation of the Supreme Self, *this* liberated *man* of realisation *dies, do his organs* such as those of speech, called the Grahas, and the Atigrahas such as name, which in the form of impressions are in him and impel him to action, *go up from him,* the dying knower of Brahman, *or do they not?*' *'No,' replied Yājñavalkya,* 'they do not. The organs and objects, becoming one with the Supreme Self, attain identity with, or *merge in him only*, their cause, the man of realisation who is the Reality of the Supreme Brahman—like waves in the ocean.' The following passage from another Śruti shows the dissolution of the organs, designated by the word 'digit,' in the Supreme Self, 'So do these sixteen digits of the seer, which have the Self as their merging place, dissolve on reaching

[1] That is, the organs and objects.

It' (Pr. VI. 5). Here their identification with the Supreme Self is shown. Does not the man die then? 'No, it is *the body* that dies, for it *swells, is inflated* by the external air like a pair of bellows, *and in that state lies dead,* motionless.' The gist of the passage is that the liberated man, after his bondage has been destroyed, does not go anywhere.

याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, यत्रायं पुरुषो म्रियते किमेनं न जहातीति ; नामेति, अनन्तं वै नाम, अनन्ता विश्वे देवाः ; अनन्तमेव स तेन लोकं जयति ॥ १२ ॥

12. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'when this man dies, what is it that does not leave him?' 'Name. The name indeed is infinite, and infinite are the Viśvadevas. He (who knows thus) wins thereby verily an infinite world.'

Is it only the organs of a liberated man that are merged, or is it also all[1] that moves them to action? If it is only the former, but not the latter, then with the presence of these stimulating causes the organs would again be likely to function. If, on the other hand, everything such as desire and action is merged, then only liberation is possible. It is to bring this out that the next question is put: *'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'when this man dies, what is it that does not leave him?'* The other said: *Name.* That is, everything is merged; only the name[2] is left because of its relation

[1] That is, the objects.

[2] That he is a liberated man. This too as others see it.

to the type, for the name is eternal. *The name indeed is infinite*—the infinity of the name is its eternity—*and infinite are the Viśvadevas,* because they possess the infinity of the name. *He* (who knows thus) *wins thereby verily an infinite world.* Having identified himself with the Viśvadevas who possess the infinity of the name, he wins through this realisation only an infinite world.

याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, यत्रास्य पुरुषस्य मृतस्याग्निं वागप्येति, वातं प्राणः, चक्षुरादित्यम्, मनश्चन्द्रम्, दिशः श्रोत्रम्, पृथिवीं शरीरम्, आकाशमात्मा, ओषधी-र्लोमानि, वनस्पतीन्केशाः, अप्सु लोहितं च रेतश्च निधीयते, क्वायं तदा पुरुषो भवतीति; आहर सोम्य हस्तमार्तभाग, आवामेवैतस्य वेदिष्यावः, न नावेतत् सजन इति। तौ होत्क्रम्य मन्त्रयांचक्राते; तौ ह यदूचतुः कर्म हैव तदूचतुः, अथ यत्प्रशशंसतुः कर्म हैव तत्प्रशशंसतुः; पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति, पापः पापेनेति। ततो ह जारत्कारव आर्तभाग उपरराम ॥ १३ ॥ इति द्वितीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

13. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'when the vocal organ[1] of a man who dies is merged in fire, the nose in air, the eye in the sun, the mind in the moon, the ear in the quarters, the body in the earth, the ether of the heart in the external ether, the hair on the body in the herbs, that on the head in the trees, and the blood and the seed are deposited in water, where is then the man?' 'Give me your hand, dear Ārtabhāga, we will

[1] All these refer to (the limited manifestations of) their presiding deities.

decide this between ourselves, we cannot do it in a crowd.' They went out and talked it over. What they mentioned there was only work, and what they praised there was also only work. (Therefore) one indeed becomes good through good work and evil through evil work. Thereupon Ārtabhāga, of the line of Jaratkāru, kept silent.

The death that consists in bondage in the form of the Grahas and Atigrahas (organs and objects) has been described, and because that death has its death, liberation is possible. This liberation is the dissolution, here itself, of the Grahas and Atigrahas, like the extinction of a light. It is to ascertain the nature of the stimulating cause of that death which consists in the bondage called the Grahas and Atigrahas that this paragraph is introduced. *'Yājñavalkya,' said he.*

Here some[1] say: Even though the Grahas and Atigrahas together with their stimulating cause are rooted out, a man is not liberated. Separated from the Supreme Self by ignorance, which springs from himself and is comparable to a desert (on earth), and at the same time turning away from the world of enjoyment, he, with his name only left and his desires and past work rooted out, remains in an intermediate stage. His perception of duality should be removed by the realisation of the unity of the Supreme Self. So now meditation on the Supreme Self has to be introduced. Thus this school conceives an inter-

[1] The reference is to Bhartṛprapañca.

mediate stage called Apavarga or release, and establishes a link with the next section.

Now we ask these people how it is that the disembodied man, after his organs have been destroyed, attains the realisation of the Supreme Self through hearing, reflection and meditation. They themselves maintain that a man whose organs have been dissolved has only his name left ; the Śruti too says, '(The body) lies dead' (III. ii. 11). So they cannot even in imagination establish their position. If, on the other hand, they think that a man, during his very lifetime, has only ignorance left in him and turns away from the world of enjoyment, they should explain what this is due to. If they would attribute it to his identification with the whole universe, individual and collective, it has already been refuted (e.g. on p. 235). (Only two courses are open:) Either the sage, endowed with meditation on his identity with the universe, individual and collective, combined with rites, may, after death, with his organs dissolved, attain identity with the universe or with Hiraṇyagarbha. Or in his very lifetime he may, with his organs intact, turn away—become averse—from the world of enjoyment and be inclined towards the realisation of the Supreme Self. But both cannot be attained through means requiring one and the same effort: If the effort be the means of attaining the state of Hiraṇyagarbha, it cannot be the means of turning away from the world of enjoyment ; and if it be the means of turning away from the world of enjoyment, and inclination towards the Supreme Self, it cannot be the means of attaining the state of

Hiraṇyagarbha, for what helps to cause motion cannot at the same time help to stop it. If, on the other hand, he after death attains the state of Hiraṇyagarbha, and then, with his organs dissolved and only the name left, is qualified (as Hiraṇyagarbha) for the knowledge of the Supreme Self, then instruction about the knowledge of the Supreme Self for us ordinary people would be meaningless; whereas such Śruti passages as, 'Whoever among the gods knew It (also became That),' etc. (I. iv. 10), teach that the knowledge of Brahman is for bringing the highest end of life within the reach of all. Therefore the above conceit is very poor and altogether contrary to the teachings of the scriptures. Now let us return to our subject.

In order to ascertain what starts the bondage known as the Grahas and Atigrahas (organs and objects) the text says: *When the vocal organ of a man who dies* without attaining the highest knowledge and possessed of the idea that he has a head, hands, etc., *is merged in fire, the nose* is merged *in air, the eye in the sun*—the verb 'is merged' is understood in each case—*the mind in the moon, the ear in the quarters, the body in the earth.* The word 'Ātman' here means *the ether of the heart,* which is the seat of *the self*: it is merged *in the external ether. The hair on the body* is merged *in the herbs, that on the head* is merged *in the trees, and the blood and the seed are deposited in water:* The word 'deposited' indicates that they are again withdrawn.[1] In every case the

[1] When a new body is taken.

words 'vocal organ' etc. refer to their presiding deities ; the organs themselves do not depart before liberation. When the presiding deities cease to work, the organs become like tools, such as a bill-hook, laid down ; and the agent, man, being disembodied, is helpless. So the question is being asked regarding his support, *'Where is then the man?'*—i.e. on what does he then rest? The question is: 'What is that support resting on which he again takes the body and organs, and which starts the bondage known as the Grahas and Atigrahas?'

The answer is being given: 'Exponents of different schools have put forward different things, viz. nature,[1] chance, time, work, destiny, mere consciousness and void, as the support in question. Therefore, being open to various disputes, the truth cannot be ascertained by the usual method of defeating the opponent. If you want to know the truth in this matter, *give me your hand, dear Ārtabhāga, we will decide* this question that you have asked *between ourselves.* Why? Because *we cannot* decide *it in a crowd,* and we must retire to a solitary place to discuss it.' *They went out,* etc., is the narration of the Śruti. What Yājñavalkya and Ārtabhāga did after retiring to the solitary place is being stated: *They went out* of the crowded place and *talked it over.* First they took up one after another the different conventional views on the subject and discussed them. Listen

[1] These are advocated respectively by the Mīmāṁsakas, materialists, astrologers, Vaidikas, believers in the gods, idealists and nihilists—the last two being Buddhist schools.

what they mentioned at the end of the discussion, after refuting all the tentative views. *There* they mentioned *only work* as the support which caused the repeated taking of the body and organs. Not only this ; having accepted time, work, destiny and God as causes, *what they praised there was also only work.* Since it is decided that the repeated taking of the body and organs, known also as the Grahas and Atigrahas, is due to work, therefore *one indeed becomes good through good work* enjoined by the scriptures, *and* becomes its opposite, *evil, through* the opposite or *evil work.* When Yājñavalkya thus answered his questions, *Ārtabhāga, of the line of Jaratkāru, thereupon,* finding it impossible to dislodge him, *kept silent.*

SECTION III

Bondage in the form of the Grahas and Atigrahas (organs and objects) has been described ; that which together with its cause binds a man so that he transmigrates, and freed from which he is liberated, is death ; and liberation from this is possible, because there is the death of death. The liberated man does not go anywhere ; it has been decided that everything about him is gone, leaving only the name, as when a light goes out. Though the bodies and organs of those that transmigrate and those that are going to be liberated (at death) are equally connected with their causes, the bodies and organs of the liberated are for ever discarded, while those of the transmigrating are repeatedly taken up—owing, as has been decided after a discussion, to work ; and when that is exhausted, everything is destroyed save only the name, and this is liberation. That work is either good or evil, for it has been decided: 'One indeed becomes good through good work, and evil through evil work' (III. ii. 13). Relative existence is due to these. Of these, evil work subjects a man to sufferings through repeated births and deaths in moving and stationary bodies—naturally full of pain—including those of lower animals, spirits and the denizens of hell. All this is as well known to anybody as the royal road ; the Śruti here pays attention only to good work, which is in harmony with the scriptures: 'One indeed becomes good through good

work.' And the Śrutis and Smṛtis are unanimous on the point that good work alone leads to all that man aspires after. Now liberation is a cherished object with man ; so one may think that it too is attainable through work.[1] Moreover, as the work is better and better, the result also is so ; hence one may presume that a high degree of excellence in the work may lead to liberation ; this idea has to be removed. The result of excellent work coupled with meditation is this much only, for work and its result are confined to the manifested universe of name and form. Work has no access to that (liberation) which is not an effect, is eternal, unmanifested, beyond name and form, and devoid of the characteristics of action with its factors and results. And where it has access, it is just the relative world. It is to bring out this idea that the present section is introduced.

Some say: Disinterested work coupled with meditation may produce a different kind of effect, as poison or curd, for instance, may (with the help of charms or sugar, respectively).

Reply : No, for liberation is not an effect—it is but the destruction of bondage, not a created thing. And we have already said that bondage is ignorance, which cannot be destroyed by work, for work can function only in the visible realm. Production, attainment, modification and purification are the functions of work. In other words, work can produce, or bring within reach, or modify, or purify something ; it has

[1] Scriptural or ritualistic work is meant ; so throughout the following discussion.

no other function besides these, since nobody knows about it. And liberation is not one of these ; we have already said that it is simply hidden by ignorance.

Objection : True. We admit that work alone is of such a nature ; but disinterested work coupled with meditation is of a different nature. It is common experience that things known to have a particular property, such as poison or curd, display, in combination with special knowledge, charms or sugar, for instance, quite a different property. Why not admit the same about work?

Reply : No, for there is no evidence in support. In other words, there is not one evidence—neither perception, nor inference, nor comparison, nor presumption, nor scriptural statement to prove that work has any other function but those enumerated above.

Objection : Since there is no other result (but liberation), the injunctions (about rites) would otherwise be meaningless ; this, to be sure, is a proof. To be explicit: The regular rites must not be supposed to have heaven as the result, on the analogy of the Viśvajit sacrifice.[1] Nor is any specific result mentioned in the Śrutis ; all the same they are enjoined. So on the principle of the residuum, liberation is understood to be their result, for otherwise people will not care to perform them.

Reply : Is it not the analogy of the Viśvajit

[1] The scriptures enjoin the performance of the Viśvajit sacrifice, but do not mention any specific result of it. Yet there must be some result to induce people to perform it. In all such cases the practice is to consider heaven as that result.

sacrifice over again, since liberation is supposed to be the result in question? Unless some result, be it liberation or anything else, is presumed, people would not care to perform them ; so liberation is presumed to be that result by presumption from scriptural statements,[1] as in the case of the Viśvajit sacrifice. Such being the case, how do you say that the analogy of the Viśvajit sacrifice will not apply here? You presume a result, and yet deny that it is on the analogy of the Viśvajit sacrifice. This is self-contradiction.

Objection : Suppose we say that liberation is not a result at all?

Reply : You cannot, for then you will be giving up your proposition. You have stated that work, like poison, curd, etc., can produce a different result. Now, if liberation is not at all a result, the effect of work, it will go against your proposition ; and if it is the effect of work, you must show where it differs from other results of the kind such as heaven. If, on the other hand, it is not the effect of work, you must explain what you mean by saying that it is the result of the regular rites ; and you cannot maintain that there is a difference merely because of the use of two different words, 'effect' and 'result.' If you say that liberation is not a result and yet it is produced by the regular rites, or that it is the 'result' of the regular rites, but not their 'effect,' you will be contradicting yourself, as if you said, 'Fire is cold.'

Objection : Suppose we say that it is like knowl-

[1] To uphold the power of scriptural injunctions to induce people to perform the regular rites.

edge? Just as liberation, although not produced by knowledge, is yet said to be the effect of knowledge, so why not take it to be the effect of work in that sense?

Reply: No, for knowledge dispels ignorance. Because knowledge removes the obstruction of ignorance, liberation is metaphorically said to be the effect of knowledge; but work cannot dispel ignorance. And we cannot imagine any other obstruction to liberation but ignorance that can be removed by work, for it is eternal and identical with the self of the aspirant.

Objection: Suppose we say work removes that ignorance?

Reply: No, for it is something quite different. Ignorance, which is non-manifestation, is the opposite of knowledge, which is manifestation; but work is not the opposite of ignorance, and is therefore entirely different from knowledge. Ignorance, whether it means the want of knowledge, or doubt, or a false notion, is always removable by knowledge, but not by work in any of its forms, for there is no contradiction between ignorance and work.

Objection: Let us then presume that work has an unseen power of dispelling ignorance.

Reply: No; when it is clear that knowledge will dispel ignorance, it is unreasonable to presume such an unseen power in work. As when it is clear that threshing will husk paddy, we do not presume that it will be done without our knowledge by the regular rites like the Agnihotra, similarly we do not attribute the cessation of ignorance to the unseen power of the regular

rites ; and we have repeatedly said that knowledge and work are contradictory. That kind of knowledge which does not clash with work has been mentioned as leading to the world of the gods, as in the Śruti passage, 'Through knowledge (meditation) the world of the gods (is attained)' (I. v. 16). Moreover, if some result must be presumed for the regular rites mentioned in the Śrutis, should it be that which clashes with work, which cannot possibly be the effect of substance, attribute, or action, and over which work is never known to have any power, or should it rather be that result over which work is known to have power, and which harmonises with work? If those rites must be presumed to have some result to induce people to perform them, then, since presumption from scriptural statements is fulfilled by the assumption of a result that harmonises with them, neither liberation, which is eternal, nor the cessation of the ignorance that obstructs it, can be supposed to be this result ; for the former kind of result would be in keeping with the nature of work, and would be a subject where it is known to function.

Objection : We maintain that on the principle of the residuum liberation must be supposed to be this result. To explain: All rites produce those results (heaven, animals, children, etc.). Barring the other kind of result, however, we do not find anything else that can be supposed to be the result of the regular rites ; only liberation is left, and it is a result coveted by the knowers of the Vedas. Therefore that must be supposed to be the result in question.

Reply: No, for since the individual results of those rites may be infinite in number, you cannot apply the principle of the residuum. No one who is not omniscient can assert that the objects desired by men as the results of their work, or the means of attaining them, or the desires themselves are so many in number; for they have no fixed place, time, or cause, and are regulated by the kind of result that men seek. Again, as each individual has various desires, the results, as also their means, are necessarily infinite; and because they are infinite, it is impossible for any one to know exactly how many they are. So, when the exact number of the results and their means is unknown, how can liberation be proved to be the only remaining item?

Objection: But it is the only remaining item outside the results of work as a class. To be explicit: Although the objects desired and their means are infinite, they all alike fall within the category of results of work; but liberation, not being the result of work, would be left out; hence, being the only remaining item, it should be taken to be the result in question.

Reply: No, for according to you it is the result of the regular rites, and therefore belongs to the same category as the other results of work; hence it cannot be counted as the residuum. Therefore we must conclude that presumption from scriptural statements is fulfilled, since there is another way of solving the problem, viz. by supposing that any one of the functions of production, attainment, modification and purification is the result of the regular rites.

Objection : Suppose we say that liberation is one of the four?

Reply : No, for being eternal, it cannot be produced, and cannot also be modified ; for the same reason, as also not being of the nature of a means, it cannot be purified either ; for only a thing that serves as a means can be purified, as the sacrificial vessel or clarified butter by the sprinkling of water, and so on. Nor is liberation purified in the sense of being the effect of a process of improvement, as a sacrificial post etc. (carved out of a block of wood and the like).

Objection : Then by the principle of the residuum it must be attainable.

Reply : Not attainable either, because it is identical with the Self and one.

Objection : Since the regular rites differ from other kinds of work, their results too ought to be different.

Reply : No ; since they are equally work, why should not their results be similar to those of other kinds of work?

Objection : Suppose we say, because different causes operate in the two cases?

Reply : No, for the case is analogous to that of the Kṣāmavatī sacrifice etc. For instance, when the sacrificial fire burns a house, this particular sacrifice is performed ; we have also the injunction, 'When a vessel containing oblations is broken, or when the contents are spilt, an offering should be made in the fire'; and in these occasional rites liberation is not supposed to be the result. Similarly the regular rites,

not being different from them, on account of their dependence on certain circumstances—the Śrutis, for instance, enjoin them for life—cannot have liberation as their result. (To give a different illustration:) Light is an auxiliary to everyone's vision of colour; but owls etc. cannot see in light—their eyes differing in this respect from those of others. But because of this difference we do not suppose that their eyes can also perceive taste etc., for we have no knowledge of any such power on their part. Any peculiarity is admissible only in that respect about which—maybe after going far afield[1] in the search—we have certain knowledge.

You spoke of the regular rites producing a different effect like poison, curd, and so forth in conjunction with special knowledge, charms, sugar, etc. Let them do so; we accept this view, and there is no dispute over this point. In other words, if you maintain that disinterested work coupled with meditation produces a different kind of effect, we do not contest this point; for between two persons, one sacrificing to the gods and the other sacrificing to the Self, the Śrutis state the superiority of the latter in the following passages: 'One who sacrifices to the Self is better than one who sacrifices to the gods,' etc. (Ś. XI, II. vi. 13, adapted), and 'That alone which is performed with the help of meditation (is stronger),' etc. (Ch. I. i. 10). The phrase 'sacrificer to the Self,' used by Manu in connection with the knowledge of the Supreme Self in the stanza, 'Seeing (himself in all and all in

[1] From the human kingdom, as in the present case.

himself) he becomes a sacrificer to the Self (and attains independence)' (M. XII. 91), means that simply by his sameness of vision he becomes a sacrificer to the Self.[1] Or the phrase may have been used having regard to the aspirant's former condition. The sacrificer to the Self performs the regular rites for self-purification, as we know from the Śruti text, 'This particular part of my body is being purified by this (rite)' (Ś. XI. ii. vi. 13). Similarly the Smṛtis too in the passage, 'Through the sacrifices relating to conception,' etc. (M. II. 27), show that the regular rites purify the body and organs. Purified by those rites, the sacrificer to the Self attains the sameness of vision; either in this or in some future life he attains Self-realisation. The meaning is that by his sameness of vision he becomes independent. The phrase 'sacrificer to the Self' has been used having regard to his former condition—to show that the regular rites combined with meditation help towards realisation.

Moreover, passages like, 'Sages are of opinion that the attainment of oneness with Virāj, the world-projectors, Yama, Hiraṇyagarbha and the Undifferentiated is the highest result produced by Sattva or pure materials (rites coupled with meditation)' (M. XII. 50), and '(They) are merged in the five elements' (Ibid. 90), show the mergence in the elements in addition to the attainment of the status of the gods. Those who read the latter passage as, '(They) transcend the five elements,' betray a very poor knowledge of the Vedas,

[1] So it is a tribute to the knowledge of Brahman.

and as such may be left out of account. The passages in question are not to be dismissed as mere eulogy, for the chapter in which they occur treats of the results of work culminating in oneness with Hiraṇyagarbha, and of Self-knowledge, which is distinct from work, and these correspond exactly to the ritualistic portion (of the Vedas) and the Upaniṣads, respectively. Besides we find that the non-performance of prescribed rites and the doing of forbidden acts results in degradation to the state of stationary objects, dogs, hogs, or the like ; and we also come across spirit existences like the 'vomit-eaters.'

Besides, none can think of any prescribed or forbidden acts other than those mentioned in the Śrutis and Smṛtis, the non-performance or performance, respectively, of which would cause one to become a spirit, a dog, a hog, a stationary object, or the like—results the existence of which we know from perception or inference ; and none denies that these states are the results of past actions. Therefore, just as these lower states—spirit, animal, or stationary existences—are the results of one's non-performance of the prescribed rites or performance of the forbidden acts, similarly we must understand that the higher results culminating in oneness with Hiraṇyagarbha are as much the results of past actions. Hence the passages in question are not to be taken as mere stories concocted for the sake of eulogy, like 'He cut off his own omentum' (Tai. S. II. 1. i. 4), 'He cried' (Ibid. I. v. i. 1), and so on.

Objection : If those passages are not stories,

the subject under discussion (work and its results) also must be so.

Reply : Let it be ; this much only (the absence of examples to the contrary) does not contradict the reality of the subject under discussion, or invalidate our position. Nor can you say that the positions referred to in the passage, 'Virāj, the world-projectors,' etc. (M. XII. 50), are the results of rites with material ends ; for these are stated to produce an equality of status with the gods. Therefore the regular rites and rites like the Sarvamedha and horse sacrifice performed by persons with selfish motives lead to the attainment of oneness with Hiraṇyagarbha and so on. But in the case of those who perform the regular rites disinterestedly, just for the purification of the mind, they help towards realisation. The Smṛti says, 'This body is made fit for the realisation of Brahman (by them)' (M. II. 28). Because these rites indirectly help those people, they are aids to realisation as well ; so there is no contradiction. That this is the meaning, we shall explain at the end of the story of Janaka in Chapter IV (pp. 752, 754—755). You cited the examples of poison, curd, etc. (producing altogether different results under special circumstances); they are not open to disputation, being matters of perception and inference. But that[1] which is to be known exclusively from the scriptures, cannot, in the absence of explicit statements to that effect, be imagined to have properties similar to those of poison, curd, etc. Nor are the Śrutis

[1] Ritualistic work combined with meditation.

supposed to have authority in matters which are contradicted by other means of knowledge, as for instance if they said, 'Fire is cold and wets things.' If, however, a passage[1] is ascertained[2] to have the meaning given by the Śrutis, then the evidence[3] of the other means of knowledge must be held to be fallacious. For instance, the ignorant think of fire-fly as fire, or of the sky as a blue surface ; these are perceptions no doubt, but when the evidence of the other means of knowledge regarding them has been definitely known to be true, the perceptions of the ignorant, although they are definite experiences, prove to be fallacious. Therefore, the authority of the Vedas being inviolable, a Vedic passage must be taken exactly in the sense that it is tested to bear, and not according to the ingenuity of the human mind. The sun does not cease to reveal objects because of the ingenuity of the human mind ; similarly the Vedic passages cannot be made to give up their meaning. Therefore it is proved that work[4] does not lead to liberation. Hence the present section is introduced to show that the results of work are within the pale of relative existence.

अथ हैनं भुज्युर्लाह्यायनिः पप्रच्छ ; याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच । मद्रेषु चरकाः पर्यव्रजाम, ते पतञ्चलस्य काप्यस्य गृहानैम ; तस्यासीद्दुहिता गन्धर्वगृहीता, तमपृच्छाम

[1] For example, 'Thou art That.'

[2] By the six tests, viz. beginning, conclusion, repetition, originality, result, eulogy and demonstration. See the *Vedāntasāra*, paragraph 183 *et seq*.

[3] Dualistic evidence.

[4] Ritualistic work—even if combined with meditation.

कोऽसीति ; सोऽब्रवीत्सुधन्वाङ्गिरस इति ; तं यदा लोकानामन्तानपृच्छाम, अथैनमब्रूम, क्व पारिक्षिता अभवन्निति ; क्व पारिक्षिता अभवन्, स त्वा पृच्छामि याज्ञवल्क्य, क्व पारिक्षिता अभवन्निति ॥ १ ॥

1. Then Bhujyu, the grandson of Lahya, asked him. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'we travelled in Madra as students, and we came to the house of Patañcala, of the line of Kapi. His daughter was possessed by a Gandharva. We asked him, "Who are you?" He said, "I am Sudhanvan, of the line of Angiras." When we asked him about the limits of the world, we said to him, "Where were the descendants of Parikṣit?" And I ask you, Yājñavalkya, where were the descendants of Parikṣit? (Tell me) where were the descendants of Parikṣit?'

Then, when the descendant of Jaratkāru had stopped, *the grandson of Lahya* named *Bhujyu asked him,* Yājñavalkya, whom we are discussing. *'Yājñavalkya,' said he.* The meditation on the horse sacrifice has been spoken of at the beginning of the book, and this sacrifice produces both collective and individual results. Whether combined with meditation, or performed exclusively through it, it is the highest of all rites. The Smṛti says, 'There is nothing more heinous than killing a noble Brāhmaṇa nor anything more meritorious than the horse sacrifice,' for through it one attains the collective as well as individual results.

Of these, whatever[1] is within the universe has been shown to be the individual results of the horse sacrifice. While it has been said, 'Death[2] becomes his self, and he becomes one with these deities' (I. ii. 7). This Death is Hunger, and is variously called Cosmic Intelligence, the Aggregate, the First-born, Air, Cosmic Energy, Satya and Hiraṇyagarbha. That which is the essence of the whole universe, individual and collective, which is the inner self or subtle body of all beings, the essence of the subtle, in which the actions of all beings inhere, and which is the highest result of rites as well as of the meditations connected with them—has the manifested universe for its field. How far is its range—what is its extent, spreading all round like a globe, has to be stated. If this is done, the entire world of bondage will have been described. In order to show the extraordinary character of the meditation on the identity with that universe, collective and individual, Bhujyu mentions an incident of his own life. He thinks of confusing his oppenent by this means.

'We travelled in the territory called *Madra as students,* observing the appropriate vow for study, or as priests called Adhvaryus, *and we came to the house of Patañcala, of the line of Kapi. His daughter was possessed by a Gandharva,'* some being other than human; or the word may mean the fire that is worshipped in the house—the god who is a priest (to the gods). We conclude thus from his special knowledge, for an ordinary being cannot possibly have

[1] The reference is to the gods such as fire, sun and air.
[2] This is the collective result.

such knowledge. *'We all sat round him and asked him, "Who are you?*—What is your name, and what kind of being are you?" *He,* the Gandharva, *said, "I am* named *Sudhanvan, of the line of Angiras." When we asked him about the limits of the world, we,* among that group desirous of knowing the extent of the cosmic orb, priding ourselves upon our good fortune, *said to him*—what?—*"Where were the descendants of Parikṣit?"*[1] And the Gandharva told us all about it. So I have been instructed by a celestial being, and you do not have that knowledge; hence you are defeated.' This is his idea. 'Being possessed of this revealed knowledge from the Gandharva, *I ask you, Yājñavalkya, where were the descendants of Parikṣit?* Do you know this, Yājñavalkya? Tell me, I ask you, *where were the descendants of Parikṣit?'*

स होवाच, उवाच वै सः, अगच्छन्वै ते तद्यत्राश्वमेधयाजिनो गच्छन्तीति ; क न्वश्वमेधयाजिनो गच्छन्तीति ; द्वात्रिंशतं वै देवरथाह्न्यान्ययं लोकः ; तं समन्तं पृथिवी द्विस्तावत्पर्येति ; तां समन्तं पृथिवीं द्विस्तावत्समुद्रः पर्येति ; तद्यावती क्षुरस्य धारा, यावद्वा मक्षिकायाः पत्रम्, तावानन्तरेणाकाशः ; तानिन्द्रः सुपर्णो भूत्वा वायवे प्रायच्छत्, तान्वायुरात्मनि धित्वा तत्रागमयद्यत्राश्वमेधयाजिनोऽभवन्निति ; एवमिव वै स वायुमेव प्रशशंस ; तस्माद्वायुरेव व्यष्टिः, वायुः समष्टिः ; अप पुनर्मृत्युं जयति य एवं वेद । ततो ह भुज्युर्लाह्यायनिरुपरराम ॥ २ ॥ इति तृतीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

[1] Their names are given in S. XIII. v. iv. 1-3.

2. Yājñavalkya said, 'The Gandharva evidently told you that they went where the performers of the horse sacrifice go.' 'And where do the performers of the horse sacrifice go?' 'Thirty-two times the space covered by the sun's chariot in a day makes this world; around it, covering twice the area, is the earth; around the earth, covering twice the area, is the ocean. Now, as is the edge of a razor, or the wing of a fly, so is there just that much opening at the junction (of the two halves of the cosmic shell). (Through that they go out). Fire, in the form of a falcon, delivered them to the air; the air, putting them in itself, took them where the (previous) performers of the horse sacrifice were.' Thus did the Gandharva praise the air.[1] Therefore the air is the diversity of individuals, and the air is the aggregate. He who knows it as such conquers further death. Thereupon Bhujyu, the grandson of Lahya, kept silent.

Yājñavalkya said, 'The Gandharva evidently told you that they, the descendants of Parikṣit, *went where the performers of the horse sacrifice go.'* The particle 'vai' recalls a past incident. When his question was answered, Bhujyu asked, *'And where do the performers of the horse sacrifice go?'* With a view to telling where they go, Yājñavalkya described the dimensions

[1] As symbolising the cosmic vital force.

of the cosmic orb: *Thirty-two times the space covered by the sun's chariot in a day makes this world,* surrounded by the mountain Lokāloka. This is the world which constitutes the body of Virāj, and in which people reap the fruits of their past actions. This much is the Loka; beyond this is the Aloka. *Around it, covering twice the area* of this world *is the earth.* Similarly *around the earth, covering twice the area, is the ocean,* which the writers of the Purāṇas name after rain-water. Now the size of the opening at the junction of the two halves of the cosmic shell is being given. Through this opening as an exit the performers of the horse sacrifice go out and spread. *Now, as is the edge of a razor, or the wing of a fly* possessed of fineness, *so is there just that much opening at the junction* (of the two halves of the cosmic shell). The word 'Indra' is a synonym of God; here it refers to the fire which is kindled in the horse sacrifice, and the meditation on which has been described in the words, 'His head is the east,' etc. (I. ii. 3). *Fire, in the form of a falcon,* with wings, tails, etc., *delivered them,* the descendants of Parikṣit, who had performed the horse sacrifice and had attained fire *to the air,* because, being gross, it itself had no access there. *The air, putting them in itself,* making them a part of itself, *took them where the* previous *performers of the horse sacrifice were. Thus did the Gandharva praise the air,* which was the goal[1] of the performers of the horse sacrifice.

The story is finished; but the Śruti gives us the gist of it directly, stepping out of the garb of the story.

[1] Being the cosmic vital force.

Because the air (vital force) is the inner self of all beings, moving and stationary, and is also outside them, *therefore the air is the diversity of individuals,* in forms relating to the body, the elements and the gods ; similarly *the air is the aggregate,* as the one cosmic vital force. *He who knows it as such* attains identity with the air in its individual as well as collective form. What he gains by this is being stated: He *conquers further death,* i.e. after dying once he dies no more. *Thereupon,* when his question was answered, *Bhujya, the grandson of Lahya, kept silent.*

SECTION IV

It has been stated that a man under the control of the organs and objects (Grahas and Atigrahas), which are themselves directed by his merits and demerits, repeatedly takes up and discards the organs and objects and transmigrates. And the perfection of merits has been explained as being concerned with the manifested universe, collective and individual—being the identification with Hiraṇyagarbha in both those aspects. Now the question arises as to whether the entity that transmigrates under the control of the organs and objects exists or does not exist ; and if it exists, what it is like. So it is to teach about the Self as a distinct entity that the question of Uṣasta is introduced. If one knows It as unconditioned, naturally free from action and its factors, one is freed from the above-mentioned bondage together with its stimulating causes. The purpose of the story is already known.

अथ हैनमुषस्तश्चाक्रायणः पप्रच्छ ; याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म, य आत्मा सर्वान्तरः, तं मे व्याचक्ष्वेति ; एष त आत्मा सर्वान्तरः; कतमो याज्ञवल्क्य सर्वान्तरः ? यः प्राणेन प्राणिति स त आत्मा सर्वान्तरः, योऽपानेनापानिति स त आत्मा सर्वान्तरः, यो व्यानेन व्यानिति स त आत्मा सर्वान्तरः, य उदानेनोदानिति स त आत्मा सर्वान्तरः, एष त आत्मा सर्वान्तरः ॥ १ ॥

1. Then Uṣasta, the son of Cakra, asked

him. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'explain to me the Brahman that is immediate and direct—the self that is within all.' 'This is your self that is within all.' 'Which is within all, Yājñavalkya?' 'That which breathes through the Prāṇa is your self that is within all. That which moves downwards through the Apāna is your self that is within all. That which pervades through the Vyāna is your self that is within all. That which goes out through the Udāna is your self that is within all. This is your self that is within all.'

Then Uṣasta, the son of Cakra, asked him, Yājñavalkya, who has already been introduced. *The Brahman that is immediate,* not obstructed from the seer or subject by anything, *and direct,* not used in a figurative sense, like the ear and so forth, which are considered to be Brahman. What is that? *The self that is within all.* The word 'self' refers to the inner (individual) self, that being the accepted meaning of the term. The words 'Yat' and 'Yaḥ'[1] indicate that the self familiar to all is identical with Brahman. *Explain* that self *to me,* tell about it clearly, as one shows a cow by taking hold of its horns, as much as to say, 'This is it.'

Thus addressed, Yājñavalkya replied, *'This is your self that is within all.'* The qualification 'that is within all' is suggestive of all qualifications what-

[1] Neuter and masculine forms of the word meaning 'that'.

soever. That which is 'immediate' or unobstructed, and 'direct' or used in its primary sense, and which is 'Brahman' or the vastest, the self of all and within all—all these specifications refer to the self. 'What is this self of yours?' 'That by which your body and organs are ensouled is your self, i.e. the self of the body and organs.' 'There is first the body; within it is the subtle body consisting of the organs; and the third is that whose existence is being doubted. *Which* of these do you mean as my self that *is within all?*' Thus spoken to, Yājñavalkya said, '*That which breathes* (lit. does the function of the Prāṇa) *through the Prāṇa,* which operates in the mouth and nose, in other words, "which makes the Prāṇa breathe" (Ke. I. 9), *is your self,* i.e. the individual self of the body and organs.' The rest is similar in meaning. *That which moves downwards through the Apāna, Which pervades through the Vyāna*—the long *i* in the two verbs is a Vedic licence—by which the body and organs are made to breathe and do other functions, like a wooden puppet. Unless they are operated by an intelligent principle, they cannot do any function such as breathing, as is the case with the wooden puppet. Therefore it is by being operated by the individual self, which is distinct from them, that they breathe and do other functions, as does the puppet. Hence that principle distinct from the body and organs exists which makes them function.

स होवाचोषस्तश्चाक्रायणः, यथा विब्रूयात्, असौ गौः, असावश्व इति, एवमेवैतद्व्यपदिष्टं भवति ; यदेव

साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म, य आत्मा सर्वान्तरः, तं मे व्याचक्ष्वेति; एष त आत्मा सर्वान्तरः; कतमो याज्ञवल्क्य सर्वान्तरः? न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येः, न श्रुतेः श्रोतारं शृणुयात्, न मतेर्मन्तारं मन्वीथाः, न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः। एष त आत्मा सर्वान्तरः, अतोऽन्यदार्तम्। ततो होषस्तश्चाक्रायण उपरराम ॥ २ ॥ इति चतुर्थं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

2. Uṣasta, the son of Cakra, said, 'You have indicated it as one may say that a cow is such and such, or a horse is such and such. Explain to me the Brahman that is immediate and direct—the self that is within all.' 'This is your self that is within all.' 'Which is within all, Yājñavalkya?' 'You cannot see that which is the witness of vision; you cannot hear that which is the hearer of hearing; you cannot think that which is the thinker of thought; you cannot know that which is the knower of knowledge. This is your self that is within all; everything else but this is perishable.' Thereupon Uṣasta, the son of Cakra, kept silent.

Uṣasta, the son of Cakra, said: As somebody first proposes one thing and then, being in doubt, ***may say*** something else—for instance, having proposed to point out a cow or a horse, he merely describes them through certain characteristics of theirs such as walking and says, 'A cow is that which walks,' or 'A horse is that which runs'—so *you* too ***have indicated***

Brahman through certain characteristics such as breathing. To be brief, give up your trick prompted by your hankering after the cows, and *explain to me the Brahman that is immediate and direct—the self that is within all.* Yājñavalkya replied: I adhere to the proposition that I first made, that your self is such and such ; it is exactly as I have described it.

You asked me to present the self as one would a jar etc. I do not do so, because it is impossible. Why is it impossible? Owing to the very nature of the thing. What is that? Its being the witness of vision etc., for the self is the witness of vision. Vision is of two kinds, ordinary and real. Ordinary vision is a function of the mind as connected with the eye ; it is an act, and as such it has a beginning and an end. But the vision that belongs to the self is like the heat and light of fire ; being the very essence of the witness, it has neither beginning nor end. Because it appears to be connected with the ordinary vision, which is produced and is but a limiting adjunct of it, it is spoken of as the witness, and also as differentiated into witness and vision. The ordinary vision, however, is coloured by the objects seen through the eye, and of course has a beginning ; it appears to be connected with the eternal vision of the self, and is but its reflection ; it originates and ends, pervaded by the other. It is therefore that the eternal vision of the self is metaphorically spoken of as the witness, and although eternally seeing, is spoken of as sometimes seeing and sometimes not seeing. But as a matter of fact the vision of the seer never changes. So it will be

said in the fourth chapter, 'It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were' (IV. iii. 7), and 'The vision of the witness can never be lost' (IV. iii. 23).

This is the meaning of the following passage: *You cannot see that which is the witness of vision,* i.e. which pervades by its eternal vision the act of our ordinary vision. This latter, which is an act, is affected by the objects seen, and reveals only colour (form), but not the inner self that pervades it. Therefore you cannot see that inner self which is the witness of vision. Similarly *you cannot hear that which is the hearer of hearing ; you cannot think that which* pervades *thought,* the mere function of the mind ; *you cannot know that which* pervades *knowledge,* the mere function of the intellect. This is the very nature of the thing ; therefore it cannot be shown like a cow etc.

Some[1] explain the passage, 'You cannot see the witness of vision,' etc. differently. According to them 'the witness of vision' means 'that which sees,' the agent or cause of vision in general, without any distinction of kind. In other words, they regard the genitive case in 'of vision' as having an objective force. That vision is caused and is an effect, like a jar. The suffix in the word 'Draṣṭṛ' (witness) indicates agency. Therefore, these commentators opine, the expression 'the witness of vision' means 'the agent of vision.' But they fail to see that the words 'of vision' then become redundant ; or even if they see it, they take it as a repetition, or as a faulty reading not worth anything, and pay no attention to it.

[1] The reference is to Bhartṛprapañca.

How are the words redundant? They are redundant, because the word 'Draṣṭṛ' itself would be enough to indicate the agency of vision ; then one should only say, 'You cannot see the witness.' For the text uses the suffix 'tṛc' with the verb, and in grammar this always indicates agency of the act denoted by the verb. We only say, 'One is conducting the traveller or the cutter'; we should not, in the absence of any special meaning, say, 'the traveller of travelling,' or 'the cutter of cutting.' Nor should the extra words be dismissed as a mere elucidation, if there is any alternative explanation ; and it is not a faulty reading, since all[1] unanimously accept it. Therefore it is a defect of the commentators' understanding and not a mistake on the part of the students.

But the way we have explained it, viz. that the self endowed with eternal vision, as opposed to the ordinary vision, should be pointed out, accounts for the two words 'witness' and 'vision' (in 'the witness of vision') as describing the subject and the object, with a view to defining the nature of the self. It will also agree with the passage, 'The vision of the witness (can never be lost)' etc. (IV. iii. 23), occurring elsewhere, as also with the clauses, '(Through which) the eyes see' (Ke. I. 7), '(By which) this ear is heard' (Ke. I. 8), occurring in another text. It is also consonant with reason. In other words, the self can be eternal if only it is immutable ; it is a contradiction in terms to say that a thing is changeful and yet eternal. Moreover, the Śruti texts, 'It thinks, as it

[1] Students of both Kāṇva and Mādhyandina recensions.

were, and shakes, as it were' (IV. iii. 22), 'The vision of the witness can never be lost,' and 'This is the eternal glory of a knower of Brahman' (IV. iv. 23), would otherwise be inconsistent.

Objection : But such terms as 'witness,' 'hearer,' 'thinker' and 'knower' would also be inconsistent if the self is immutable.

Reply : Not so, for they only repeat conventional expressions as people think them. They do not seek to define the truth of the self. Since the expressions 'the witness of vision' etc. cannot otherwise be explained, we conclude that they mean what we have indicated. Therefore the opponents' rejection of the qualifying term 'of vision' is due only to ignorance. *This is your self* specified by all those above-mentioned epithets. *Everything else but this* self, whether it is the gross body or the subtle body consisting of the organs, *is perishable.* This only is imperishable, changeless. *Thereupon Uṣasta, the son of Cakra, kept silent.*

SECTION V

Bondage with its stimulating causes has been spoken of. The existence of that which is bound, as also its distinctness from the body etc., has also been known. Now the knowledge of the Self together with renunciation, which are the means of liberating it from that bondage, have to be described. Hence the question of Kahola is introduced.

अथ हैनं कहोलः कौषीतकेयः पप्रच्छ ; याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, यदेव साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म, य आत्मा सर्वान्तरः, तं मे व्याचक्ष्वेति ; एष त आत्मा सर्वान्तरः। कतमो याज्ञवल्क्य सर्वान्तरः? योऽशनायापिपासे शोकं मोहं जरां मृत्युमत्येति। एतं वै तमात्मानं विदित्वा ब्राह्मणाः पुत्रैषणायाश्च वित्तैषणायाश्च लोकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति ; या ह्येव पुत्रैषणा सा वित्तैषणा, या वित्तैषणा सा लोकैषणा, उभे ह्येते एषणे एव भवतः। तस्माद्ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत्। बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं च निर्विद्याथ मुनिः, अमौनं च मौनं च निर्विद्याथ ब्राह्मणः ; स ब्राह्मणः केन स्यात्? येन स्यात्तेनेदृश एव, अतोऽन्यदार्तम्। ततो ह कहोलः कौषीतकेय उपरराम ॥ १ ॥ इति पञ्चमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

1. Then Kahola, the son of Kuṣītaka, asked him. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'explain to me the Brahman that is immediate and direct—the

self that is within all.' 'This is your self that is within all.' 'Which is within all, Yājña-valkya?' 'That which transcends hunger and thirst, grief, delusion, decay and death. Knowing this very Self the Brāhmaṇas renounce the desire for sons, for wealth and for the worlds, and lead a mendicant life. That which is the desire for sons is the desire for wealth, and that which is the desire for wealth is the desire for the worlds, for both these are but desires. Therefore the knower of Brahman, having known all about scholarship, should try to live upon that strength which comes of knowledge; having known all about this strength as well as scholarship, he becomes meditative; having known all about both meditativeness and its opposite, he becomes a knower of Brahman. How does that knower of Brahman behave? Howsoever he may behave, he is just such. Except this everything is perishable.' Thereupon Kahola, the son of Kuṣītaka, kept silent.

Then Kahola, the son of Kuṣītaka, asked him, 'Yājñavalkya,' said he—to be explained as before—*'explain to me the Brahman that is immediate and direct—the self that is within all,'* knowing which one is freed from bondage. Yājñavalkya said, 'This is your self.'

Question: Do Uṣasta and Kahola ask about

one and the same self, or do they ask of different selves having similar characteristics?

Some[1] say: It ought to be different selves, for then only can the two questions be other than a repetition. Had Uṣasta and Kahola asked about the same self, then one question having dealt with that, the second would have been redundant; and the passage in question is not a mere elucidation. Therefore the two selves must be different, viz. the individual self and the Supreme Self.

Reply : No, because of the use of the word 'your.' It has been said in the reply, 'This is your self' (III. iv. 1-2 ; this text), and the same aggregate of body and organs cannot have two selves, for each aggregate possesses a single self. Nor can Uṣasta and Kahola mean selves essentially different from each other, since both cannot be primary, and self, and within all. If one of the two be Brahman in a primary sense, the other must be secondary ; similarly with selfhood and being within all, for these three terms are contradictory. If one of the two Brahmans be the self, primary, and within all, then the other must be non-self, secondary, and not within all. Therefore one and the same self has been mentioned twice with a view to telling something special about it. That part only of the second question which is common to the first is a repetition of the latter, and the second question is introduced in order to furnish some detail not mentioned before.

Objection : What is this detail?

[1] Bhartṛprapañca is meant.

Reply : It is this. In the first question it has been stated that there is a self distinct from the body, whose bondage together with its stimulating causes has been spoken of ; but in the second something more is added, viz. that this self is beyond relative attributes such as hunger—a detail, by knowing which, together with renunciation, one is freed from the bondage above spoken of. Therefore we conclude that in both cases the question and answer, ending with the words, 'This is your self that is within all,' have an identical meaning.

Objection : How can the same self possess contradictory attributes such as being beyond hunger etc. and having them?

Reply : The objection is not valid, having already been refuted (p. 306). We have repeatedly said that the relative existence of the self is but a delusion caused by its association with limiting adjuncts such as the body and organs, which are but the modifications of name and form. We have also made this clear while explaining the apparently contradictory passages of the Śrutis (p. 393). For instance, a rope, a mother-of-pearl, or the sky, becomes a snake, silver, or blue respectively, owing to attributes imputed by people, but in themselves they are just a rope, a mother-of-pearl, or the sky. Thus there is no contradiction if things possess contradictory attributes.

Objection : Will not such Upaniṣadic texts as, 'One only without a second' (Ch. VI. ii. 1), and 'There is no difference whatsoever in It' (IV. iv. 19 ;

K. IV. 11), be contradicted if you admit the existence of the limiting adjuncts, name and form?

Reply: No; this has already been refuted by the illustrations of the foam of water and (the modifications of) clay etc. But when name and form are tested from the standpoint of the highest truth in the light of the above Śruti texts, as to whether they are different from the Supreme Self or not, they cease to be separate entities, like the foam of water, or like the modifications (of clay) such as a jar. It is then that such passages as, 'One only without a second,' and 'There is no difference whatsoever in It,' have scope from the standpoint of the Supreme Self as referring to the highest realisation. But when on account of our primordial ignorance the reality of Brahman, although remaining as it is, naturally untouched by anything—like the reality of the rope, the mother-of-pearl and the sky—is not discriminated from the limiting adjuncts such as the body and organs, which are created by name and form, and our natural vision of those adjuncts remains, then this phenomenal existence consisting of things different from Brahman has full play. This unreal phenomenal existence created by differentiation is indeed a fact for those who do not believe in things as different from Brahman as well as for those who do believe. But the believers of the highest truth, while discussing in accordance with the Śrutis the actual existence or non-existence of things apart from Brahman, conclude that Brahman alone is the one without a second, beyond all finite relations. So there is no contradiction between the two views. We do not maintain the existence of

things different from Brahman in the state when the highest truth has been definitely known, as the Śrutis say, 'One only without a second,' and 'Without interior or exterior' (II. v. 19 ; III. viii. 8). Nor do we deny the validity, for the ignorant, of actions with their factors and results while the relative world of name and form exists. Therefore scriptural or conventional outlook depends entirely on knowledge or ignorance. Hence there is no apprehension of a contradiction between them. In fact, all schools must admit the existence or non-existence of the phenomenal world according as it is viewed from the relative or the absolute standpoint.

Regarding the nature of the self as it is in reality once more the question is asked: *'Which is within all, Yājñavalkya?'* The other replied, *'That which transcends hunger and thirst.'*—The word 'which' in the text should be construed with 'transcends' coming shortly after.—As the sky, fancied by the ignorant as being concave and blue, is really without these qualities, being naturally untouched by them, similarly Brahman, although fancied as being subject to hunger, thirst, etc., by the ignorant, who think that they are hungry or thirsty, really transcends these qualities, being naturally untouched by them, for the Śruti says, 'It is not affected by human misery, being beyond it' (Ka. V. 11)—i.e. by misery attributed by ignorant people. Hunger and thirst have been compounded in the text, as both are vital functions.

Grief is desire. The discomfort that one feels as

one reflects on some covetable thing is the seed of desire for one afflicted with a hankering, because it kindles desire ; while *delusion* is a mistake, a confusion, arising from a false notion ; it is ignorance, the fruitful source of all troubles. The two words are not compounded, as grief and delusion produce different results. They have their seat in the mind. (The self also transcends) *decay and death,* which centre in the body. 'Decay' is that modification of the body and organs which is marked by wrinkles, grey hair, etc. 'Death' is the fall of the body, the last modification to overtake it. These, the hunger and the rest, which centre in the vital force, mind and body, and are present in beings in an unbroken succession like days and nights, etc., and like the waves of an ocean, are called the relative or transmigratory existence with regard to them. But that which is described as the witness of vision and so forth, is immediate or unobstructed and direct or used in a primary sense, which is within all, and is the self of all beings from Hiraṇyagarbha down to a clump of grass, is ever untouched by such relative attributes as hunger and thirst, as the sky is untouched by impurities like the clouds etc.

Knowing this very Self, their own reality, as 'I am this, the Supreme Brahman, eternally devoid of relative attributes, and ever satisfied,' *the Brāhmaṇas* —they are mentioned because they alone are qualified for renunciation—*renounce,* lit. rise up in an opposite direction to—what?—*the desire for sons,* as means to winning this world, thinking, 'We will win this world through sons,' in other words, marriage ; hence

the meaning is, they do not marry. (The desire) *for wealth :* procuring cattle etc., which are the means of rites, in order that one may perform rites through them and win the world of the Manes, or that one may win the world of the gods either by combining rites with meditation, which is divine wealth, or solely through meditation on Hiraṇyagarbha. Some say that one cannot renounce divine wealth, since it is through this that renunciation is possible. But this view is wrong, for divine wealth also falls within the category of desires, as we know from the Śruti passage, 'This much indeed is desire' (I. iv. 17). It is the meditation on the gods such as Hiraṇyagarbha which is spoken of as wealth, because it leads to the world of the gods. The knowledge of Brahman, which concerns the unconditioned Pure Intelligence, cannot certainly be the means of attaining the world of the gods. Witness the Śruti texts, 'Therefore It became all' (I. iv. 10), and 'For he becomes their self' (Ibid.). It is through the knowledge of Brahman that renunciation takes place, for there is the specific statement, 'Knowing this very Self.' Therefore they renounce all these three objects of desire which lead to worlds that are not the Self.—'Eṣaṇā' means desire, for the Śruti says, 'This much indeed is desire.'—That is to say, they cease to hanker after all this threefold means of attaining worlds that are not the Self.

Every desire for means is a desire for results ; therefore the text says that desire is one. How? *That which is the desire for sons is the desire for wealth,* for

both are alike means to tangible results. *And that which is the desire for wealth is the desire for the worlds,* for it is directed towards results. People adopt different means, actuated by the desire for results. Hence desire is one, because the desire for the worlds cannot be attained without the requisite means, *for both these are but desires,* one being but a means to the other. Therefore the knower of Brahman has nothing to do with rites or their accessories.—'Brāhmaṇas' in the text means those of past times.—The rites and their accessories here spoken of refer to the holy thread etc., which are means to the performance of rites pertaining to the gods, the Manes and men, for through them these rites are performed. Compare the Śruti, 'The holy thread that hangs straight down from the neck is for rites pertaining to men' (Tai. S. II. v. 11. 1). Therefore the ancient Brāhmaṇas—knowers of Brahman—renouncing rites and their accessories such as the holy thread, embrace the life of a monk (of the highest class) known as the Paramahaṁsa, *and lead a mendicant life,* live upon begging—giving up the insignia of a monk's life prescribed by the Smṛtis, which are the means of livelihood for those who have merely taken recourse to that life. Witness the Smṛtis: 'The knower of Brahman wears no signs,' 'Therefore the knower of religion, who wears no signs, (should practise its principles)' (cf. Mbh. XIV. xlvi. 51), and 'His signs are not manifest, nor his behaviour' (cf. Va. X.). And the Śruti: 'Then he becomes a monk, wears the ochre robe, shaves his head, and does not accept (superfluous)

gifts,' etc. (Jā. 5); also, 'Having cut off his hair together with the tuft and giving up the holy thread,' etc. (Kś. I., II. 3).

Objection: Because of the use of the present tense in it, the passage, 'The Brāhmaṇas renounce . . . . and live a mendicant life,' should be taken as a mere eulogy; it has none of the three suffixes denoting an injunction. Therefore on the strength of a mere eulogy the abandonment of the holy thread and other such accessories of rites prescribed by the Śrutis and Smṛtis cannot be urged. 'He only who wears the holy thread may study the Vedas, officiate in sacrifices, or perform them' (Tai. Ā. II. i. 1). In the first place, the study of the Vedas is enjoined in the mendicant life: 'By giving up the study of the Vedas one becomes a Śūdra; therefore one must not do it' (Quoted in Va. X). Also Āpastamba: 'Uttering speech only when studying the Vedas' (Āp. II. xxi. 10, 21). The scriptures condemn giving up the study of the Vedas in the verse, 'Quitting the study of the Vedas, condemning the Vedas, deceitful evidence, murder of a friend, and eating forbidden or uneatable food—these six acts are equivalent to drinking' (M. XI. 56). Secondly, the passage, 'One should wear the holy thread while serving the preceptors, old people and guests, performing sacrifices, repeating sacred formulæ, eating, rinsing one's mouth and studying the Vedas' (Āp. I. xv. 1), enjoins the holy thread as an accessory of those acts, and the Śrutis and Smṛtis prescribe such acts as the attending on the preceptors, study of the

Vedas, eating and rinsing one's mouth among the duties of a monk ; therefore we cannot understand the passage in question as advocating the giving up of the holy thread. Although the renunciation of desires is enjoined, yet it means the renunciation of only the three desires, viz. those concerning sons and so forth, and not of all rites and their means. If all rites are abandoned, it will be doing something not enjoined by the Śrutis, and discarding the holy thread etc., actually enjoined by them. This omission of acts enjoined and performance of those forbidden would be a grave offence. Therefore the assumption that the insignia such as the holy thread should be abandoned is merely an instance of the blind following the blind (thoughtless procedure).

Reply : No, for the Śruti says, 'The monk should give up the holy thread, the study of the Vedas, and all such things' (Kś. 4 ; Kr. 2). Moreover the ultimate aim of the Upaniṣads is to teach Self-knowledge. It has already been stated, 'The Self is to be realised—to be heard of, reflected on,' etc. (II. iv. 5); and it is common knowledge that that very Self is to be known as immediate and direct, as being within all, and devoid of the relative attributes of hunger etc. Since this entire Upaniṣad sets itself to bringing this out, the passage in question cannot form a part of some other (ritualistic) injunction, and is therefore not a eulogy. For Self-knowledge is to be attained, and the Self, being devoid of the attributes of hunger etc., is to be known as different from the means and results of an action. To know the Self as identified with these is

ignorance. Witness the Śrutis: 'He (who worships another god thinking), "He is one, and I am another," does not know' (I. iv. 10), 'He goes from death to death who sees difference, as it were, in It' (IV. iv. 19 ; Ka. IV. 10), 'It should be realised in one form only' (IV. iv. 20), 'One only without a second' (Ch. VI. ii. 1), 'Thou art That' (Ch. VI. viii. 7), etc. The means and results of an action are different from the Self that is beyond the relative attributes such as hunger, and fall within the category of ignorance, as is proved by hundreds of texts like the following: 'When there is duality, as it were' (II. iv. 14 ; IV. v. 15), 'He who worships another god thinking, "He is one, and I am another," does not know,' 'While those who know It as otherwise (become dependent and attain perishable worlds),' etc. (Ch. VII. xxv. 2).

Knowledge and ignorance cannot co-exist in the same individual, for they are contradictory like light and darkness. Therefore the knower of the Self must not be supposed to have relations with the sphere of ignorance consisting of actions, their factors and their results, for it has been deprecated in such passages as, 'He goes from death to death,' etc. All actions with their factors and results, which fall within the category of ignorance, are meant to be shunned through the help of knowledge, the opposite of ignorance ; and such auxiliaries as the holy thread fall within the same category. Therefore desire is different from and associated with things other than the Self, which by Its

nature is neither the means nor the result of an action. They, the means and the result of an action, are both desires, and the holy thread etc. and the ceremonies to be performed through them are classed under means. This has been clenched by a reason in the clause, 'For both these are but desires' (this text). Since the means such as the holy thread, and the ceremonies to be performed through them are within the range of ignorance, are forms of desires, and are things to be shunned, the renunciation of them is undoubtedly enjoined.

Objection: Since this Upaniṣad seeks to inculcate Self-knowledge, the passage relating to the renunciation of desires is just a eulogy on that, and not an injunction.

Reply: No, for it is to be performed by the same individual on whom Self-knowledge is enjoined. The Vedas can never connect with the same individual something that is enjoined and something that is not enjoined. Just as the Śrutis connect pressing, pouring and drinking (of the Soma juice) with the same individual—that he should press the juice out, pour it into the fire, and drink what is left—because all the three are obligatory, similarly Self-knowledge, renunciation of desires and begging would be connected with the same individual if only these were obligatory.

Objection: Suppose we say that being under the category of ignorance and being (auxiliaries of) desires, the abandonment of the holy thread etc. is a mere corollary of the injunction on Self-knowledge, and not a separate injunction?

Reply : No. Since it is connected with the same individual along with the injunction of Self-knowledge, the obligatory nature of this renunciation as well as the begging is all the more clearly established ; and the objection that it is a mere eulogy because of the use of the present tense does not hold, since it is analogous to such injunctions as that the sacrificial post is[1] made of fig-wood.

Objection : We admit that the passage, '(The Brāhmaṇas) renounce desires . . . . and lead a mendicant life,' enjoins monasticism. In this life, however, means such as the holy thread and certain insignia are enjoined by the Śrutis and Smṛtis. Therefore the passage in question means that accessories other than these, although the latter are (auxiliaries of) desires, should be renounced.

Reply : Not so, for we know that there is another kind of monasticism different from this one. The latter is connected with the same individual as Self-knowledge, and is characterised by the renunciation of desires. This monasticism is a part of Self-knowledge, because it is the renunciation of desires, which contradict Self-knowledge and are within the province of ignorance. Besides this there is another kind of monasticism, which is an order of life and leads to the attainment of the world of Hiraṇyagarbha and so on ; it is about this that means such as the holy thread and particular insignia are enjoined. When there is this other kind of monasticism in which the adoption of means like the (auxiliaries of) desires

[1] Here 'is' means 'must be.'

is just a duty peculiar to that life, it is wrong to contradict Self-knowledge that is enjoined by all the Upaniṣads. If one seeks to adopt means such as the holy thread, which are within the province of ignorance and are (auxiliaries of) desires, it would certainly be contradicting the knowledge of one's self—which is neither the means nor the result of an action, and is devoid of such relative attributes as hunger—as identical with Brahman. And it is wrong to contradict this knowledge, for all the Upaniṣads aim at this.

Objection : Does not the Śruti itself contradict this by teaching the adoption of desires in the words, '(The Brāhmaṇas) lead a mendicant life'? That is to say, after enjoining the renunciation of desires it teaches in the same breath the adoption of a part of them, viz. begging. Does this not imply the adoption of other connected things as well?

Reply : No, the begging does not imply other things as well, just as the drinking of the remnant (of Soma juice) after the oblation has been offered does not include any additional things ; since it relates only to the disposal[1] of what is left, it implies nothing else. Moreover, the begging has no purifying effect ; the drinking of the juice might purify a person, but not the begging. Though there may be some merit in observing the rules regarding it, yet its application to the knower of Brahman is inadmissible.

[1] *Pratipatti-karma* is the disposal of the accessories of a rite after they have served their purpose, to prevent their interfering with other work.

Objection : If this is so, why should there be mention of his begging his food?

Reply : It is quite in order, because the passage thereby enjoins the rejection of other means of subsistence.

Objection : Still what is the necessity for that?

Reply : None, if his realisation has reached that point of inaction ; we accept that view. As to the texts regarding monasticism such as, 'He only who wears the holy thread may study (the Vedas),' etc. (Tai Ā. II. i. 1), we have already answered your objection by saying that they concern only the monasticism of those who have not known Brahman: we have pointed out that Self-knowledge would otherwise be contradicted. That the knower of Brahman has no work[1] to do is shown by the following Smṛti passage, 'The gods consider him a knower of Brahman who has no desires, who undertakes no work, who does not salute or praise anybody, and whose work has been exhausted, but who himself is unchanged' (Mbh. XII. cclxix. 34). Also, 'The knower of Brahman wears no signs,' and 'Therefore the knower of religion, who wears no signs,' etc. (cf. Mbh. XIV. xlvi. 51). Therefore the knower of the Self should embrace that vow of the highest order of monks which is characterised by the renunciation of desires and the abandonment of all work together with its means.

Since the ancient Brāhmaṇas, knowing this Self as naturally different from the means and result of an action, renounced all desires, which are such means

[1] 'Work' in this connection means ritualistic work.

and results, and led a mendicant life, giving up work producing visible and invisible results, together with its means, *therefore* to this day *the knower of Brahman, having known all about scholarship* or this knowledge of the Self from the teacher and the Śrutis—having fully mastered it—should renounce desires. This is the culmination of that scholarship, for it comes with the elimination of desires, and is contradictory to them. Since scholarship regarding the Self cannot come without the elimination of desires, therefore the renunciation of these is automatically enjoined by the knowledge of the Self. This is emphasised by the use of the suffix 'ktvāc' in the passage in question, as referring to the same individual who has the knowledge of the Self. Therefore the knower of Brahman, after renouncing desires, *should try to live upon that strength which comes of knowledge.* Those others who are ignorant of the Self derive their strength from the means and results of actions. The knower of Brahman avoids that and resorts simply to that strength which comes of the knowledge of the Self, which is naturally different from the means and results of an action. When he does this, his organs have no more power to drag him down to the objects of desire. It is only the fool without the strength of knowledge, who is attracted by his organs to desires concerning objects, visible or invisible. Strength is the total elimination of the vision of objects by Self-knowledge ; hence the knower of Brahman should try to live upon that strength. As another Śruti puts it, 'Through the Self one attains strength'

(Ke. II. 4); also, 'This Self is unattainable by the weak' (Mu. III. ii. 4).

Having known all about this strength as well as scholarship, he becomes meditative, in other words, a Yogin. What a knower of Brahman should do is to eliminate all ideas of the non-Self; doing this he accomplishes his task and becomes a Yogin. After having known all about scholarship and strength, which respectively mean Self-knowledge and the elimination of ideas of the non-Self, he knows *all about meditativeness* too—which is the culminating result of the latter—*and its opposite,* and *becomes a knower of Brahman,* or accomplishes his task: he attains the conviction that all is Brahman. Because he has reached the goal, therefore he is a Brāhmaṇa, a knower of Brahman; for then his status as a knower of Brahman is literally true. Therefore the text says: *How does that knower of Brahman behave? Howsoever he may behave, he is just such*—a knower of Brahman as described above. The expression, 'Howsoever he may behave,' is intended for a tribute to this state of a knower of Brahman, and does not mean reckless behaviour. *Except this* state of realisation of Brahman, which is the true state of one's self which is beyond hunger etc., and is eternally satisfied, *everything,* i.e. desires, which are within the category of ignorance, *is perishable*—lit. beset with troubles—unsubstantial like a dream, an illusion, or a mirage; the Self alone is detached and eternally free. *Thereupon Kahola, the son of Kuṣītaka, kept silent.*

SECTION VI

अथ हैनं गार्गी वाचक्नवी पप्रच्छ ; याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, यदिदं सर्वमप्स्वोतं च प्रोतं च, कस्मिन्नु खल्वाप ओताश्च प्रोताश्चेति ; वायौ गार्गीति ; कस्मिन्नु खलु वायुरोतश्च प्रोतश्चेति ; अन्तरिक्षलोकेषु गार्गीति ; कस्मिन्नु खल्वन्तरिक्षलोका ओताश्च प्रोताश्चेति ; गन्धर्वलोकेषु गार्गीति ; कस्मिन्नु खलु गन्धर्वलोका ओताश्च प्रोताश्चेति ; आदित्यलोकेषु गार्गीति ; कस्मिन्नु खल्वादित्यलोका ओताश्च प्रोताश्चेति ; चन्द्रलोकेषु गार्गीति ; कस्मिन्नु खलु चन्द्रलोका ओताश्च प्रोताश्चेति ; नक्षत्रलोकेषु गार्गीति ; कस्मिन्नु खलु नक्षत्रलोका ओताश्च प्रोताश्चेति ; देवलोकेषु गार्गीति ; कस्मिन्नु खलु देवलोका ओताश्च प्रोताश्चेति ; इन्द्रलोकेषु गार्गीति ; कस्मिन्नु खल्विन्द्रलोका ओताश्च प्रोताश्चेति ; प्रजापतिलोकेषु गार्गीति ; कस्मिन्नु खलु प्रजापतिलोका ओताश्च प्रोताश्चेति ; ब्रह्मलोकेषु गार्गीति ; कस्मिन्नु खलु ब्रह्मलोका ओताश्च प्रोताश्चेति ; स होवाच, गार्गि मातिप्राक्षीः, मा ते मूर्धा व्यपप्तत्, अनतिप्रश्न्यां वै देवतामतिपृच्छसि गार्गि, मातिप्राक्षीरिति ; ततो ह गार्गी वाचक्नव्युपरराम ॥ १ ॥ इति षष्ठं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

1. Then Gārgī, the daughter of Vacaknu, asked him. 'Yājñavalkya,' she said, 'if all this is pervaded by water, by what is water

pervaded?' 'By air, O Gārgi.' 'By what is air pervaded?' 'By the sky, O Gārgī.' 'By what is the sky pervaded?' 'By the world of the Gandharvas,[1] O Gārgī.' 'By what is the world of the Gandharvas pervaded?' 'By the sun, O Gārgī.' 'By what is the sun pervaded?' 'By the moon, O Gārgī.' 'By what is the moon pervaded?' 'By the stars, O Gārgī.' 'By what are the stars pervaded?' 'By the world of the gods, O Gārgī.' 'By what is the world of the gods pervaded?' 'By the world of Indra, O Gārgī.' 'By what is the world of Indra pervaded?' 'By the world of Virāj, O Gārgī.' 'By what is the world of Virāj pervaded?' 'By the world of Hiraṇyagarbha, O Gārgī.' 'By what is the world of Hiraṇyagarbha pervaded?' He said, 'Do not, O Gārgī, push your inquiry too far, lest your head should fall off. You are questioning about a deity that should not be reasoned about. Do not, O Gārgī, push your inquiry too far.' Thereupon Gārgī, the daughter of Vacaknu, kept silent.

To describe the nature of that which has been stated to be the immediate and direct Brahman—the self that is within all, the three sections up to that dealing with the story of Śākalya are being introduced.

[1] Celestial minstrels.

The elements from earth up to the ether are arranged one within the other. The idea is to show how an aspirant—the subject or seer—can realise his own self, which is immediate and direct, is within all, and beyond all relative attributes, by taking up each relatively external element and eliminating it. *Then Gārgī, the daughter of Vacaknu, asked him. 'Yājñavalkya,' she said, 'if all this,* all that is composed of earth, *is pervaded* within and without (lit. placed like the warp and woof—or woof and warp—in a cloth) *by water.'* Otherwise it would be scattered like a handful of fried barley flour. The following inference is suggested: We observe that whatever is an effect, limited and gross is respectively pervaded by that which is the cause, unlimited and subtle, as earth is pervaded by water. Similarly (in the series from earth to the ether) each preceding element must be pervaded by the succeeding one, till we come to the self that is within all. This is the import of the question.

Now these five elements are so arranged that each preceding one is held together by the succeeding element, which is its cause and is more subtle and pervasive. And there is nothing below the Supreme Self which is different from the elements,[1] for the Śruti says, 'The Truth of truth' (II. i. 20 ; II. iii. 6). The truth is the five elements, and the Truth of truth is the Supreme Self. *'By what is water pervaded?'* Since it too is an effect, gross and limited, it must be

[1] So the different worlds enumerated in this paragraph are included in them.

pervaded by something ; and what is that? All the subsequent questions are to be construed in this way. *'By air, O Gārgī.'* One may object that the answer should be fire ; to which we reply that the answer is all right. Fire cannot independently manifest itself like the other elements ; it must take the help of particles of earth or water ; hence it is not mentioned as pervading water. *'By what is air pervaded?'* *'By the sky, O Gārgī.'* The same elements combining with one another form the sky ; this is pervaded *by the world of the Gandharvas, this again by the sun, the sun by the moon, the moon by the stars, the stars by the world of the gods,* this *by the world of Indra,* this again *by the world of Virāj,* i.e. by the elements composing the body of Virāj ; *the world of Virāj* is pervaded *by the world of Hiraṇyagarbha,* i.e. by the elements composing the universe. The plural is used in the text ('worlds' instead of 'world') because these worlds, arranged in an ascending order of subtlety, are each composed of the same five elements transformed so as to become fit abodes for the enjoyment of beings. *'By what is the world of Hiraṇyagarbha pervaded?'* Yājñavalkya *said, 'Do not, O Gārgī, push your inquiry too far*—disregarding the proper method of inquiry into the nature of the deity[1] ; that is, do not try to know through inference about a deity that must be approached only through oral instruction (Āgama), *lest* by so doing *your head should fall off.'* The nature of the deity is to be known from the scriptures alone,

[1] The Sūtra, which is described in the next section.

and Gārgī's question, being inferential, disregarded this particular means of approach. *'You are questioning about a deity that should not be reasoned about,* but known only through its special means of approach, the scriptures. Therefore *do not, O Gārgī, push your inquiry too far,* unless you wish to die.' *Thereupon Gārgī, the daughter of Vacaknu, kept silent.*

SECTION VII

अथ हैनमुद्दालक आरुणिः पप्रच्छ ; याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच, मद्रेष्ववसाम पतञ्चलस्य काप्यस्य गृहेषु यज्ञमधीयानाः ; तस्यासीद्भार्या गन्धर्वगृहीता, तमपृच्छाम कोऽसीति ; सोऽब्रवीत्कबन्ध आथर्वण इति ; सोऽब्रवीत्पतञ्चलं काप्यं याज्ञिकांश्च, वेत्थ नु त्वं काप्य तत्सूत्रं येनायं च लोकः परश्च लोकः सर्वाणि च भूतानि संदृब्धानि भवन्तीति ; सोऽब्रवीत्पतञ्चलः काप्यः, नाहं तद्भगवन्वेदेति, सोऽब्रवीत्पतञ्चलं काप्यं याज्ञिकांश्च, वेत्थ नु त्वं काप्य तमन्तर्यामिणं य इमं च लोकं परं च लोकं सर्वाणि च भूतानि योऽन्तरो यमयतीति ; सोऽब्रवीत्पतञ्चलः काप्यः, नाहं तं भगवन्वेदेति ; सोऽब्रवीत्पतञ्चलं काप्यं याज्ञिकांश्च, यो वै तत्काप्य सूत्रं विद्यात्तं चान्तर्यामिणमिति स ब्रह्मवित्, स लोकवित्, स देववित्, स वेदवित्, स भूतवित्, स आत्मवित्, स सर्वविदिति ; तेभ्योऽब्रवीत् ; तदहं वेद ; तच्चेत्त्वं याज्ञवल्क्य सूत्रमविद्वांस्तं चान्तर्यामिणं ब्रह्मगवीरुदजसे, मूर्धा ते विपतिष्यतीति ; वेद वा अहं गौतम तत्सूत्रं तं चान्तर्यामिणमिति ; यो वा इदं कश्चिद्ब्रूयाद्वेद वेदेति, यथा वेत्थ तथा ब्रूहीति ॥ १ ॥

1. Then Uddālaka, the son of Aruṇa, asked him. 'Yājñavalkya,' he said, 'in Madra we lived in the house of Patañcala Kāpya (descendant of Kapi), studying the scriptures on sacri-

fices. His wife was possessed by a Gandharva. We asked him who he was. He said, "Kabandha, the son of Atharvan." He said to Patañcala Kāpya and those who studied the scriptures on sacrifices, "Kāpya, do you know that Sūtra[1] by which this life, the next life, and all beings are held together?" Patañcala Kāpya said, "I do not know it, sir." The Gandharva said to him and the students, "Kāpya, do you know that Internal Ruler who controls this and the next life and all beings from within?" Patañcala Kāpya said, "I do not know Him, sir." The Gandharva said to him and the students, "He who knows that Sūtra and that Internal Ruler as above indeed knows Brahman, knows the worlds, knows the gods, knows the Vedas, knows the beings, knows the self, and knows everything." He explained it all to them. I know it. If you, Yājñavalkya, do not know that Sūtra and that Internal Ruler, and still take away the cows that belong only to the knowers of Brahman, your head shall fall off.' 'I know, O Gautama, that Sūtra and that Internal Ruler.' 'Any one can say, "I know, I know." Tell us what you know.'

Now the Sūtra, the innermost entity of the world of Hiraṇyagarbha, has to be described; hence this

[1] Lit. thread. Hence the word is metaphorically used for Prāṇa or the cosmic force.

section. This Sūtra should be approached through oral instruction, which is therefore being introduced through an anecdote: *Then Uddālaka, the son of Aruṇa, asked him. 'Yājñavalkya,' he said, 'in* the territory called *Madra we lived in the house of Patañcala Kāpya*—of the line of Kapi—*studying the scriptures on sacrifices. His wife was possessed by a Gandharva. We asked him who he was. He said, "Kabandha, the son of Atharvan." He,* the Gandharva, *said to Patañcala Kāpya and* his pupils *who studied the scriptures on sacrifices, " Kāpya, do you know that Sūtra by which this life, the next life and all beings,* from Virāj down to a clump of grass, *are held together,* strung like a garland with a thread?" Thus addressed, *Kāpya* reverentially *said, "I do not know it,* the Sūtra, *sir." The Gandharva* again *said to* the teacher and us: *Kāpya, do you know that Internal Ruler*—this is being specified—*who controls this and the next life and all beings from within,* causes them to move like wooden puppets, i.e. makes them perform their respective functions? Thus addressed, *Patañcala Kāpya* reverentially said, *"I do not know Him, sir." The Gandharva* again *said*— this is in praise of the meditation on the Sūtra and the Internal Ruler within it—"Kāpya, *he who knows that Sūtra and that Internal Ruler* who is within the Sūtra and governs it, *as* described *above, indeed knows Brahman* or the Supreme Self, *knows the worlds* such as the earth controlled by the Internal Ruler, *knows the gods* such as Fire presiding over those worlds, *knows the Vedas,* which are the authority for all, *knows the beings* such

as Hiraṇyagarbha[1] and the rest. who are held together by the Sūtra and controlled by the Internal Ruler who is within it, *knows the self*, which is the agent and experiencer and is controlled by the same Internal Ruler, *and knows everything*—the whole world also similarly controlled.'' This praise of the meditation on the Sūtra and the Internal Ruler tempted Kāpya and us to hear of it ; and the Gandharva *explained* the Sūtra and the Internal Ruler *to them* and us. *I know* this meditation on the Sūtra and the Internal Ruler, having been instructed by the Gandharva. *If you, Yājñavalkya, do not know that Sūtra and that Internal Ruler*, i.e. do not know Brahman, *and still* wrongly *take away the cows that belong only to the knowers of Brahman*, I will burn you with my curses, and *your head shall fall off*.' Thus addressed, Yājñavalkya said, '*I know, O Gautama* (descendant of Gotama), *that Sūtra* about which the Gandharva told you, *and that Internal Ruler* about whom you have known from him.' At this Gautama retorted: '*Any one*, any fool, *can say* what you have said—what?—'' *I know, I know*,'' lauding himself. What is the good of that bluster? Show it in action ; *tell us what you know* about them.'

स होवाच, वायुर्वै गौतम तत्सूत्रम्; वायुना वै गौतम सूत्रेणायं च लोकः परश्च लोकः सर्वाणि च भूतानि संदृब्धानि भवन्ति ; तस्माद्वै गौतम पुरुषं प्रेतमाहुर्व्य-

[1] The word used is 'Brahman,' which means Virāj as well, in which sense it is to be taken in connection with the next clause, for Hiraṇyagarbha, being the same as the Sūtra, cannot be held together by it.

ध्वंसिषतास्याङ्गानीति ; वायुना हि गौतम सूत्रेण संदृब्धानि भवन्तीति ; एवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य, अन्तर्यामिणं ब्रूहीति ॥ २ ॥

2. He said, 'Vāyu, O Gautama, is that Sūtra. Through this Sūtra or Vāyu this and the next life and all beings are held together. Therefore, O Gautama, when a man dies, they say that his limbs have been loosened, for they are held together, O Gautama, by the Sūtra or Vāyu.' 'Quite so, Yājñavalkya. Now describe the Internal Ruler.'

He, Yājñavalkya, *said,* etc. The Sūtra, by which the world of Hiraṇyagarbha is at the present moment pervaded, as earth by water, and which can be known only through oral instruction, has to be described. It is for this that Uddālaka's question in the preceding paragraph has been introduced. So Yājñavalkya answers it by saying, *'Vāyu, O Gautama, is that Sūtra,* and nothing else.' 'Vāyu' is that subtle entity which like the ether supports earth etc., which is the material of the subtle body—with its seventeen constituents[1]—in which the past actions and impressions of beings inhere, which is collective as well as individual, and whose external forms, like the waves of an ocean, are the forty-nine Maruts. That principle of Vāyu is called the Sūtra. *'Through this Sūtra or Vāyu this and the next life and all beings are held* or strung *together.* This is well known (to those who know the Sūtra); it is also

[1] The five elements, ten organs, vital force (with its five-fold function) and mind (in its fourfold aspect). Or the ten organs, five vital forces, Manas and Intellect.

common knowledge. How? Because Vāyu is the Sūtra and supports everything, *therefore, O Gautama, when a man dies, they say that his limbs have been loosened.'* When the thread (Sūtra) is gone, gems etc. that are strung on it are scattered ; similarly Vāyu is the Sūtra. If the limbs of a man are strung on it, like gems on a thread, it is but natural that they will be loosened when Vāyu is gone. Hence it is concluded: *'For they are held together, O Gautama, by the Sūtra or Vāyu.' 'Quite so, Yājñvalkya,* you have rightly described the Sūtra. *Now describe the Internal Ruler,* who is within it and controls it.'. Thus addressed, Yājñavalkya said:

यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् पृथिव्या अन्तरः, यं पृथिवी न वेद, यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम्, यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ ३ ॥

3. He who inhabits the earth but is within it, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, and who controls the earth from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

He who inhabits the earth . . . . is the Internal Ruler. Now all people inhabit the earth ; so there may be a presumption that the reference is to anyone of them. To preclude this the text specifies Him by saying, 'Who *is within* the earth.' One may think that the deity identified with the earth is the Internal Ruler ; hence the text says, *'Whom* even the deity identified with *the earth does not know* as a distinct entity dwelling within her.' *Whose body is the earth*

itself and none other—whose body is the same as that of the deity of the earth. The 'body' implies other things as well ; i.e. the organs of this deity are also those of the Internal Ruler. The body and organs of the deity of the earth are the result of her own past actions ; they are the body and organs of the Internal Ruler as well, for He has no past actions, being ever free. Since He is by nature given to doing things for others, the body and organs of the latter serve as His ; He has no body and organs of His own. This is expressed as follows: 'Whose body is the earth.' The body and organs of the deity of the earth are regularly made to work or stop work by the mere presence of the Lord as witness. Such an Īśvara, called Nārāyana, *who controls* the deity of *the earth,* i.e. directs her to her particular work, *from within, is the Internal Ruler* about whom you have asked, *your own immortal self,* as also mine and that of all beings. 'Your' implies *'others'* as well. 'Immortal,' that is to say, devoid of all relative attributes.

योऽप्सु तिष्ठन्नद्भ्योऽन्तरः, यमापो न विदुः, यस्यापः शरीरम्, योऽपोऽन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ ४ ॥

4. He who inhabits water but is within it, whom water does not know, whose body is water, and who controls water from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

योऽग्नौ तिष्ठन्नग्नेरन्तरः, यमग्निर्न वेद, यस्याग्निः शरीरम्, योऽग्निमन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ ५ ॥

5. He who inhabits fire but is within it, whom fire does not know, whose body is fire, and who controls fire from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

योऽन्तरिक्षे तिष्ठन्नन्तरिक्षादन्तरः, यमन्तरिक्षं न वेद, यस्यान्तरिक्षं शरीरम्, योऽन्तरिक्षमन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ ६ ॥

6. He who inhabits the sky but is within it, whom the sky does not know, whose body is the sky, and who controls the sky from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

यो वायौ तिष्ठन्वायोरन्तरः, यं वायुर्न वेद, यस्य वायुः शरीरम्, यो वायुमन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ ७ ॥

7. He who inhabits the air but is within it, whom the air does not know, whose body is the air, and who controls the air from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

यो दिवि तिष्ठन्दिवोऽन्तरः, यं द्यौर्न वेद, यस्य द्यौः शरीरम्, यो दिवमन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ ८ ॥

8. He who inhabits heaven but is within it, whom heaven does not know, whose body

is heaven, and who controls heaven from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

य आदित्ये तिष्ठन्नादित्यादन्तरः, यमादित्यो न वेद, यस्यादित्यः शरीरम्, य आदित्यमन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ ९ ॥

9. He who inhabits the sun but is within it, whom the sun does not know, whose body is the sun, and who controls the sun from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

यो दिक्षु तिष्ठन्दिग्भ्योऽन्तरः, यं दिशो न विदुः, यस्य दिशः शरीरम्, यो दिशोऽन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ १० ॥

10. He who inhabits the quarters but is within them, whom the quarters do not know, whose body is the quarters, and who controls the quarters from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

यश्चन्द्रतारके तिष्ठंश्चन्द्रतारकादन्तरः, यं चन्द्रतारकं न वेद, यस्य चन्द्रतारकं शरीरम्, यश्चन्द्रतारकमन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ ११ ॥

11. He who inhabits the moon and stars but is within them, whom the moon and stars do not know, whose body is the moon and stars, and who controls the moon and stars from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

य आकाशे तिष्ठन्नाकाशादन्तरः, यमाकाशो न वेद, यस्याकाशः शरीरम्, य आकाशमन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ १२ ॥

12. He who inhabits the ether but is within it, whom the ether does not know, whose body is the ether, and who controls the ether from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

यस्तमसि तिष्ठंस्तमसोऽन्तरः, यं तमो न वेद, यस्य तमः शरीरम्, यस्तमोऽन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ १३ ॥

13. He who inhabits darkness but is within it, whom darkness does not know, whose body is darkness, and who controls darkness from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

यस्तेजसि तिष्ठंस्तेजसोऽन्तरः, यं तेजो न वेद, यस्य तेजः शरीरम्, यस्तेजोऽन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः—इत्यधिदैवतम्; अथाधिभूतम् ॥ १४ ॥

14. He who inhabits light but is within it, whom light does not know, whose body is light, and who controls light from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self. This much with reference to the gods. Now with reference to the beings.

The rest is to be similarly explained. *He who inhabits water, fire, the sky, the air, heaven, the sun,*

the quarters, the moon and stars, the ether, darkness —the external darkness which obstructs vision, and *light,* light in general, which is the opposite of darkness. *This much with reference to the gods,* i.e. the meditation on the Internal Ruler as pertaining to the gods. *Now with reference to the beings,* i.e. the meditation on the Internal Ruler as pertaining to the different grades of beings from Hiraṇyagarbha down to a clump of grass.

यः सर्वेषु भूतेषु तिष्ठन् सर्वेभ्यो भूतेभ्योऽन्तरः, यं सर्वाणि भूतानि न विदुः, यस्य सर्वाणि भूतानि शरीरम्, यः सर्वाणि भूतान्यन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः—इत्यधिभूतम्; अथाध्यात्मम् ॥ १५ ॥

15. He who inhabits all beings but is within them, whom no being knows, whose body is all beings, and who controls all beings from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self. This much with reference to the beings. Now with reference to the body.

यः प्राणे तिष्ठन् प्राणादन्तरः, यं प्राणो न वेद, यस्य प्राणः शरीरम्, यः प्राणमन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ १६ ॥

16. He who inhabits the nose but is within it, whom the nose does not know, whose body is the nose, and who controls the nose from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

यो वाचि तिष्ठन्वाचोऽन्तरः, यं वाङ् न वेद, यस्य वाक्

शरीरम्, यो वाचमन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्य-
मृतः ॥ १७ ॥

17. He who inhabits the organ of speech but is within it, whom the organ of speech does not know, whose body is the organ of speech, and who controls the organ of speech from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

यश्चक्षुषि तिष्ठंश्चक्षुषोऽन्तरः, यं चक्षुर्न वेद, यस्य चक्षुः शरीरम्, यश्चक्षुरन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्य-
मृतः ॥ १८ ॥

18. He who inhabits the eye but is within it, whom the eye does not know, whose body is the eye, and who controls the eye from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

यः श्रोत्रे तिष्ठञ्छ्रोत्रादन्तरः, यं श्रोत्रं न वेद, यस्य श्रोत्रं शरीरम्, यः श्रोत्रमन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मा-
न्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ १९ ॥

19. He who inhabits the ear but is within it, whom the ear does not know, whose body is the ear, and who controls the ear from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

यो मनसि तिष्ठन्मनसोऽन्तरः, यं मनो न वेद, यस्य मनः शरीरम्, यो मनोऽन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्त-
र्याम्यमृतः ॥ २० ॥

20. He who inhabits the mind (Manas) but is within it, whom the mind does not know, whose body is the mind, and who controls the mind from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

यस्त्वचि तिष्ठंस्त्वचोऽन्तरः, त्वङ् न वेद, यस्य त्वक् शरीरम्, यस्त्वचमन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ २१ ॥

21. He who inhabits the skin but is within it, whom the skin does not know, whose body is the skin, and who controls the skin from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

यो विज्ञाने तिष्ठन्विज्ञानादन्तरः, यं विज्ञानं न वेद, यस्य विज्ञानं शरीरम्, यो विज्ञानमन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥ २२ ॥

22. He who inhabits the intellect but is within it, whom the intellect does not know, whose body is the intellect, and who controls the intellect from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self.

यो रेतसि तिष्ठन् रेतसोऽन्तरः, यं रेतो न वेद, यस्य रेतः शरीरम्, यो रेतोऽन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ; अदृष्टो द्रष्टा, अश्रुतः श्रोता, अमतो मन्ता, अविज्ञातो विज्ञाता ; नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा, नान्योऽतोऽस्ति श्रोता, नान्योऽतोऽस्ति मन्ता, नान्योऽतोऽस्ति विज्ञाता, एष

त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः, अतोऽन्यदार्तम् ; ततो होद्दालक आरुणिरुपरराम ॥ २३ ॥ इति सप्तमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

23. He who inhabits the organ of generation but is within it, whom the organ does not know, whose body is the organ, and who controls the organ from within, is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self. He is never seen, but is the Witness; He is never heard, but is the Hearer; He is never thought, but is the Thinker; He is never known, but is the Knower. There is no other witness but Him, no other hearer but Him, no other thinker but Him, no other knower but Him. He is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self. Everything else but Him is mortal. Thereupon Uddālaka, the son of Aruṇa, kept silent.

Now with reference to the body. He who inhabits the nose together with the vital force, *the organ of speech, the eye, the ear, the mind* (Manas), *the skin, the intellect* and *the organ of generation* (lit. the seed). Why is it that the deities of the earth etc., in spite of their exceptional powers, fail to see, like men etc., the Internal Ruler who lives in them and controls them? This is being answered: *He is never seen*, never the object of anybody's ocular perception, *but* being close to the eye as Pure Intelligence, He Himself *is the Witness.* Similarly *He is never heard,* or perceived by anybody through the ear, *but* He Himself, with His never-failing power of hearing, *is the Hearer,* being close to all ears. Likewise *He is never thought,* never

becomes the object of deliberation by the mind, for people think of those things that they have seen or heard, and the Internal Ruler, never being seen or heard, is never thought ; *but* He *is the Thinker,* for His thinking power never wanes, and He is close to all minds. Similarly *He is never known* or definitely grasped like colour etc., or like pleasure and so forth ; *but* He Himself *is the Knower,* for His intelligence never fails, and He is close to the intellect. Now the statements, 'Whom the earth does not know,' and 'Whom no being knows.' may mean that the individual selves (the earth etc.) that are controlled are different from the Internal Ruler who controls. To remove this presumption of difference the text goes on to say: *There is no other witness but Him,* this Internal Ruler ; similarly, *no other hearer but Him, no other thinker but Him,* and *no other knower but Him. He,* except whom there is no other witness, hearer, thinker and knower, who is never seen but is the Witness, who is never heard but is the Hearer, who is never thought but is the Thinker, who is never known but is the Knower, who is immortal, devoid of all relative attributes, and is the distributor of the fruits of everybody's actions—*is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal self. Everything else but Him,* this Īśvara or Ātman, *is mortal. Thereupon Uddālaka, the son of Aruṇa, kept silent.*

SECTION VIII

Now Brahman, which is devoid of hunger etc., unconditioned, immediate and direct, and is within all, has to be described. Hence the present section.

अथ ह वाचक्नव्युवाच, ब्राह्मणा भगवन्तो हन्ताहमिमं द्वौ प्रश्नौ प्रक्ष्यामि, तौ चेन्मे वक्ष्यति, न वै जातु युष्माकमिमं कश्चिद्ब्रह्मोद्यं जेतेति ; पृच्छ गार्गीति ॥ १ ॥

1. Then the daughter of Vacaknu said, 'Revered Brāhmaṇas, I shall ask him two questions. Should he answer me those, none of you can ever beat him in describing Brahman.' 'Ask, O Gārgī.'

Then the daughter of Vacaknu said. Having previously been warned by Yājñavalkya, she had desisted lest her head should fall off. Now she asks the permission of the Brāhmaṇas to interrogate him once more. *'Revered Brāhmaṇas,* please listen to what I say. *I shall ask him,* Yājñavalkya, *two* more *questions,* if you will permit it. *Should he answer me those, none of you can ever* possibly *beat him in describing Brahman.'* Thus addressed, the Brāhmanas gave her the permission. *'Ask, O Gārgī.'*

सा होवाच, अहं वै त्वा याज्ञवल्क्य यथा काश्यो वा वैदेहो वोग्रपुत्र उज्ज्यं धनुरधिज्यं कृत्वा द्वौ बाणवन्तौ सपत्नातिव्याधिनौ हस्ते कृत्वोपोत्तिष्ठेत्, एवमेवाहं त्वा

द्वाभ्यां प्रश्नाभ्यामुपोदस्थाम्, तौ मे ब्रूहीति; पृच्छ गार्गीति ॥ २ ॥

2. She said, 'I (shall ask) you (two questions). As a man of Benares or the King of Videha, scion of a warlike dynasty, might string his unstrung bow and appear close by, carrying in his hand two bamboo-tipped arrows highly painful to the enemy, even so, O Yājñavalkya, do I confront you with two questions. Answer me those.' 'Ask, O Gārgī.'

Having received the permission, *she said* to Yājñavalkya, '*I* shall ask *you* two questions.' The extra words are to be supplied from the preceding paragraph. Yājñavalkya was curious to know what they were. So, in order to indicate that the questions were hard to answer, she said through an illustration: *As a man of Benares*—the inhabitants of which are famous for their valour—*or the King of Videha, scion of a warlike dynasty, might string his unstrung bow and appear close by, carrying in his hand two bamboo-tipped arrows*—an arrow might be without this bamboo-tip ; hence the specification—*highly painful to the enemy, even so, O Yājñavalkya, do I confront you with two questions,* comparable to arrows. *Answer me those,* if you are a knower of Brahman. The other said, '*Ask, O Gārgī.*'

सा होवाच, यदूर्ध्वं याज्ञवल्क्य दिवः, यदवाक् पृथिव्याः,

यदन्तरा द्यावापृथिवी इमे, यद्भूतं च भवच्च भविष्यच्चे-
त्याचक्षते, कस्मिंस्तदोतं च प्रोतं चेति ॥ ३ ॥

3. She said, 'By what, O Yājñavalkya, is that pervaded which is above heaven and below the earth, which is this heaven and earth as well as between them, and which they say was, is and will be?'

She said: By what, O Yājñavalkya, is that Sūtra, already referred to, *pervaded,* as the element earth is by water, *which is above heaven,* or the upper half of the cosmic shell, *and below the earth,* or the lower half of the cosmic shell, *which is this heaven and earth as well as between them,* the two halves of the cosmic shell, *and which they say,* on the authority of the scriptures, *was* in the past, *is* doing its function at the present moment, *and will be* continuing in future, as is inferable from indications—which (Sūtra) is described as all this, in which, in other words, the whole dualistic universe is unified?

स होवाच, यदूर्ध्वं गार्गि दिवः, यदवाक् पृथिव्याः,
यदन्तरा द्यावापृथिवी इमे, यद्भूतं च भवच्च भविष्य-
च्चेत्याचक्षते, आकाशे तदोतं च प्रोतं चेति ॥ ४ ॥

4. He said, 'That, O Gārgī, which is above heaven and below the earth, which is this heaven and earth as well as between them, and which they say was, is and will be, is pervaded by the unmanifested ether.'

Yājñavalkya *said, 'That, O Gārgī, which* you have referred to as being *above heaven,* etc.—all that

which is called the Sūtra—*is pervaded by the unmanifested ether:* This manifested universe consisting of the Sūtra exists in the unmanifested ether, like earth in water, in the past, present and future, in its origin, continuance and dissolution.'

सा होवाच, नमस्तेऽस्तु याज्ञवल्क्य यो म एतं व्यवोचः, अपरस्मै धारयस्वेति ; पृच्छ गार्गीति ॥ ५ ॥

5. She said, 'I bow to you, Yājñavalkya, who have fully answered this question of mine. Now be ready for the other question.' 'Ask, O Gārgī.'

She again *said, 'I bow to you*—these and the following words indicate the difficult nature of the question—*who have fully answered this question of mine.* The reason why it is difficult to answer is that the Sūtra itself is inscrutable to ordinary people and difficult to explain; how much more so, then, is that which pervades it! Therefore I bow to you. *Now be ready,* hold yourself steady, *for the other question.'* Yājñavalkya said, *'Ask, O Gārgī.'*

सा होवाच, यदूर्ध्वं याज्ञवल्क्य दिवः, यदवाक् पृथिव्याः, यदन्तरा द्यावापृथिवी इमे, यद्भूतं च भवच्च भविष्यच्चेत्याचक्षते, कस्मिंस्तदोतं च प्रोतं चेति ॥ ६ ॥

6. She said, 'By what, O Yājñavalkya, is that pervaded which is above heaven and below the earth, which is this heaven and earth as well as between them, and which they say was, is and will be?'

All this has been explained. The question and the answer are repeated in this and the next paragraph in order to emphasise the truth already stated by Yājñavalkya. Nothing new is introduced.

स होवाच, यदूर्ध्वं गार्गि दिवः, यदवाक् पृथिव्याः, यदन्तरा द्यावापृथिवी इमे, यद्भूतं च भवच्च भविष्यच्चे-त्याचक्षते, आकाश एव तदोतं च प्रोतं चेति, कस्मिन्नु खल्वाकाश ओतश्च प्रोतश्चेति ॥ ७ ॥

7. He said, 'That, O Gārgī, which is above heaven and below the earth, which is this heaven and earth as well as between them, and which they say was, is and will be, is pervaded by the unmanifested ether.' 'By what is the unmanifested ether pervaded?'

Yājñavalkya repeated Gārgī's question as it was, and emphasised what he had already stated by saying, *'By the unmanifested ether.'* Gārgī said, *'By what is the unmanifested ether pervaded?'* She considered the question unanswerable, for the unmanifested ether itself, being beyond time past, present and future, was difficult to explain; much more so was the Immutable (Brahman) by which the unmanifested ether was pervaded; hence It could not be explained. Now, if Yājñavalkya did not explain It for this reason, he would lay himself open to the charge of what is called in the system of logic 'non-comprehension', if, on the other hand, he tried to explain It, notwithstanding the fact that It was a thing that could not be explained, he would be guilty of what is called 'a contradiction'; for

the attempt to explain what cannot be explained is such a contradiction.

स होवाच, एतद्वै तदक्षरं गार्गि ब्राह्मणा अभिवदन्ति, अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वमदीर्घमलोहितमस्नेहमच्छायमतमोऽवाय्वनाकाशमसङ्गमरसमगन्धमचक्षुष्कमश्रोत्रमवागमनोऽतेजस्कमप्राणममुखममात्रमनन्तरमबाह्यम्, न तदश्नाति किंचन, न तदश्नाति कश्चन ॥ ८ ॥

8. He said: O Gārgī, the knowers of Brahman say, this Immutable (Brahman) is that. It is neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long, neither red colour nor oiliness, neither shadow nor darkness, neither air nor ether, unattached, neither savour nor odour, without eyes or ears, without the vocal organ or mind, non-luminous, without the vital force or mouth, not a measure, and without interior or exterior. It does not eat anything, nor is It eaten by anybody.

With a view to evading both the charges, Yājñavalkya *said: O Gārgī, the knowers of Brahman say, this is that* about which you have asked, 'By what is the unmanifested ether pervaded?' What is it? The *Immutable,* i.e. which does not decay or change. By referring to the opinion of the knowers of Brahman, he evades both the charges by suggesting that he will say nothing objectionable, nor that he has failed to comprehend the question. When he thus answered her question, Gārgī must have rejoined, 'Tell me, what

is that Immutable which the knowers of Brahman speak of?' Thus addressed, Yājñavalkya said: *It is not gross,* i.e. is other than gross. Then It must be minute? No, *nor minute.* Then is It short? *Neither short.* Then It must be long? No, *nor long.* By this fourfold negation of size all the characteristics of a substance are denied of It; in other words, this Immutable is not a substance. Is It then red colour, which is a quality? No, It is different from that too—*neither red colour;* red colour is a quality of fire. Is It then the oiliness of water[1]? No, *nor oiliness.* Is It then a shadow, being altogether indescribable? No, It is different from that too—*neither shadow.* Is It then darkness? No, *nor darkness.* Let It then be air. No, *neither air.* May It then be the ether? No, *nor ether.* Is It then sticky like lac? No, It is *unattached.* Is It then savour? *Neither savour.* Let It then be odour. No, *nor odour.* Has It then eyes? No, It is *without eyes,* for It has not that instrument of vision; as the Mantra says, 'He sees without eyes' (Śv. III. 19). Similarly It is without *ears,* as the Śruti puts it: 'He hears without ears' (Ibid.). Let It then have the vocal organ. No, It is *without the vocal organ.* Similarly It is without the *mind.* Likewise It is *non-luminous,* for It has no lustre like that of fire etc. It is *without the vital force;* the vital force in the body is denied of It. Has It then a mouth or opening? No, It is without a *mouth. Not a measure:* It does not measure anything. Is It then porous? No, It is *without interior.*

[1] It is an assumption of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy that oiliness is the quality of water.

Then may be It has an exterior? No, It has no *exterior*. Is It then an eater? No, *It does not eat anything*. Then is It anybody's food? No, *nor is It eaten by anybody*. In other words, It is devoid of all attributes, for It is one only without a second ; so what is there that can be specified, and through what?

एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठतः, एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि द्यावापृथिव्यौ विधृते तिष्ठतः, एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि निमेषा मुहूर्ता अहोरात्राण्यर्धमासा मासा ऋतवः संवत्सरा इति विधृतास्तिष्ठन्ति ; एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि प्राच्योऽन्या नद्यः स्यन्दन्ते श्वेतेभ्यः पर्वतेभ्यः, प्रतीच्योऽन्याः, यां यां च दिशमनु ; एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि ददतो मनुष्याः प्रशंसन्ति, यजमानं देवाः, दर्वीं पितरोऽन्वायत्ताः ॥ ९ ॥

9. Under the mighty rule of this Immutable, O Gārgī, the sun and moon are held in their positions ; under the mighty rule of this Immutable, O Gārgī, heaven and earth maintain their positions ; under the mighty rule of this Immutable, O Gārgī, moments, Muhūrtas,[1] days and nights, fortnights, months, seasons and years are held in their respective places ; under the mighty rule of this Immutable, O Gārgī, some rivers flow eastward from the White Mountains, others flowing westward continue in that direction,

[1] Equivalent to about 48 minutes.

and still others keep to their respective courses; under the mighty rule of this Immutable, O Gārgī, men praise those that give, the gods depend on the sacrificer, and the Manes on independent offerings (Darvīhoma).[1]

The Śruti, by attempting to negate various attributes of the Immutable, has indicated Its existence. Yet, anticipating the popular misconception about It, it adduces an inferential evidence in favour of Its existence: *Under the mighty rule of this Immutable,* the Brahman that has been known to be within all, immediate and direct—the self that is devoid of all attributes such as hunger, *O Gārgī, the sun and moon,* which are like two lamps giving light to all beings at day and night respectively, *are held in their positions,* as a kingdom remains unbroken and orderly under the mighty rule of a king. They must have been created for the purpose of giving light by a Universal Ruler who knows of what use they will be to all, for they serve the common good of all beings by giving light, as we see in the case of an ordinary lamp.[2] Therefore That exists which has made the sun and moon and compels them, although they are powerful and independent, to rise and set, increase and decrease, according to fixed place, time and causes.[3] Thus there

[1] A class of offerings which have neither any subsidiary parts nor are themselves subsidiary to any sacrifice.

[2] As from a lamp we infer the existence of its maker, so from the sun and moon we infer the existence of an omniscient God, 'the Immutable.'

[3] Adṛṣṭa or the resultant of the past work of beings.

exists their mighty Ruler, the Immutable, as the lamp has its maker and regulator. *Under the mighty rule of this Immutable, O Gārgī, heaven and earth maintain their positions,* although they are by nature subject to disruption because of having parts, inclined to fall owing to their weight, liable to separate, being a compound, and are independent, being each presided over by a conscious deity identifying itself with it. It is this Immutable which is like a boundary wall that preserves the distinctions among things—keeps all things within their limits ; hence the sun and moon do not transgress the mighty rule of this Immutable. Therefore Its existence is proved. The unfailing sign of this is the fact that heaven and earth obey a fixed order ; this would be impossible were there not a conscious, transcendent Ruler. Witness the Mantra, 'Who has made heaven powerful and the earth firm' (Ṛ. X. cxxi. 5).

Under the mighty rule of this Immutable, O Gārgī, moments, Muhūrtas, etc.—all these divisions of time, which count all things past, present and future that are subject to birth—*are held in their respective places.* As in life an accountant appointed by his master carefully calculates all items of income and expenditure, so are these divisions of time controlled by their master, the Immutable. Similarly *some rivers,* such as the Ganges, *flow eastward from the White Mountains,* the Himalayas, for instance, and they, notwithstanding their power to do otherwise,[1] keep to their original

[1] Since the deities identifying themselves with these are sentient beings.

courses; this too indicates a Ruler. *Others flowing westward,* such as the Indus, *continue in that direction, and still others keep to their respective courses,* do not deviate from the courses they have taken ; this is another indication.

Moreover, even learned *men praise those that give* gold etc., even at a personal sacrifice. Now the conjunction and disjunction of gifts, their donors and their recipients are seen to take place before our eyes in this very life. But the subsequent recombination (of the donor and the fruit of his gift) is a matter we do not directly see. Still people praise the charitable, for they observe on other evidence that those that give are rewarded. This would be impossible were there no Ruler who, knowing the various results of actions, brought about this union of the giver and the reward, for the act of giving obviously perishes then and there. Therefore there must be someone who connects the givers with the results of their charity.

Objection : Cannot the extraordinary result of an action (Apūrva) serve this purpose?

Reply : No, for there is nothing to prove its existence

Objection : Does not the same objection apply to the Ruler too?

Reply : No. for it is an established fact that the Śrutis seek to posit His existence. We have already (p. 53) said that the Śruits aim at delineating the Reality. Besides, the implication on which the theory of the extraordinary result depends is out of place, for the fruition can be otherwise accounted for. We

observe that the reward of service is obtained from the person served ; and as service is an act, and sacrifices, gifts, offering oblations in the fire, etc., are just as much acts, it stands to reason that the reward for their performance should come from those in whose honour they are performed, viz. God and so forth. Since we can explain the obtaining of rewards without sacrificing the directly observed inherent power of acts, it is improper to sacrifice that power. Moreover, it involves a superfluity of assumptions. We must assume either God or the extraordinary result. Now we observe that it is the very nature of an act of service that it is rewarded by the person served, not by the extraordinary result ; and no one has ever actually experienced this result. So (in your view) we have to assume that the extraordinary result, which nobody has ever observed, exists ; that it has the power to confer rewards ; and that having this power, it does in addition confer them. On our side, however, we have to assume only the existence of the person served, viz. God, but neither His power to confer rewards nor His exercise of it, for we actually observe that the person served rewards the service. The grounds for inferring His existence have already been shown in the text: 'Heaven and earth maintain their positions,' etc. (this text). Likewise *the gods,* although they are so powerful, *depend on the sacrificer* for their livelihood—for such means of subsistence as the porridge and cakes. That in spite of their ability to live otherwise they have taken to this humiliating course of life, is possible only because of the mighty rule of the Lord. Similarly *the Manes* depend for

their subsistence *on independent offerings.* The rest is to be explained as before.

यो वा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यविदित्वास्मिँल्लोके जुहोति यजते तपस्तप्यते बहूनि वर्षसहस्राणि, अन्तवदेवास्य तद्भवति ; यो वा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यविदित्वास्माल्लोकात्प्रैति स कृपणः; अथ य एतदक्षरं गार्गि विदित्वास्माल्लोकात्प्रैति स ब्राह्मणः ॥ १० ॥

10. He, O Gārgī, who in this world, without knowing this Immutable, offers oblations in the fire, performs sacrifices and undergoes austerities even for many thousand years, finds all such acts but perishable ; he, O Gārgī, who departs from this world without knowing this Immutable, is miserable. But he, O Gārgī, who departs from this world after knowing this Immutable, is a knower of Brahman.

Here is another reason for the existence of the Immutable, because until one knows It one is bound to suffer transmigration ; and That must exist, the knowledge of which puts a stop to it, for this is but logical.

Objection : May not rites alone do this?

Reply : No, *he, O Gārgī, who in this world, without knowing this Immutable, offers oblations in the fire, performs sacrifices and undergoes austerities even for many thousand years, finds all such acts but perishable.* After he has enjoyed their fruits, those rites are inevitably exhausted. Besides, that mighty

Ruler, the Immutable, exists, by knowing which misery is at an end—transmigration is stopped, and not knowing which the ritualist is miserable—enjoys only the results of his rites and moves in an endless series of births and deaths. So the text says: *He, O Gārgī, who departs from this world without knowing this Immutable, is miserable,* like a slave etc. bought for a price. *But he, O Gārgī, who departs from this world after knowing this Immutable, is a knower of Brahman.*

It may be contended that like the heat and light of fire, the rulership of the Immutable is natural to the insentient Pradhāna (of the Sāṁkhyas, and not to Brahman). The reply is being given:

तद्वा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यदृष्टं द्रष्टृ, अश्रुतं श्रोतृ, अमतं मन्तृ, अविज्ञातं विज्ञातृ ; नान्यदतोऽस्ति द्रष्टृ, नान्यदतोऽस्ति श्रोतृ, नान्यदतोऽस्ति मन्तृ, नान्यदतोऽस्ति विज्ञातृ ; एतस्मिन्नु खल्वक्षरे गार्ग्याकाश ओतश्च प्रोतश्चेति ॥ ११ ॥

11. This Immutable, O Gārgī, is never seen but is the Witness ; It is never heard, but is the Hearer ; It is never thought, but is the Thinker ; It is never known, but is the Knower. There is no other witness but This, no other hearer but This, no other thinker but This, no other knower but This. By this Immutable, O Gārgī, is the (unmanifested) ether pervaded.

This Immutable, O Gārgī, is never seen by anybody, not being a sense-object, *but is* Itself *the*

Witness, being vision itself. Likewise *It is never heard,* not being an object of hearing, *but is* Itself *the Hearer,* being hearing itself. So also *It is never thought,* not being an object of the mind, *but is* Itself *the Thinker,* being thought itself. Similarly *It is never known,* not being an object of the intellect, *but is* Itself *the Knower,* being intelligence itself. Further, *there is no other witness but This,* the Immutable ; this Immutable Itself is everywhere the Witness, the subject of vision. Similarly there is *no other hearer but This ;* this Immutable Itself is everywhere the Hearer. There is *no other thinker but This ;* this Immutable Itself is everywhere the Thinker, thinking through all minds. There is *no other knower but This ;* this Immutable Itself—neither the insentient Pradhāna nor anything else—is the Knower, knowing through all intellects. *By this Immutable, O Gārgī, is the* (unmanifested) *ether pervaded.* The Brahman which is immediate and direct, which is the self within all and is beyond the relative attributes of hunger etc., and by which the (unmanifested) ether is pervaded, is the extreme limit, the ultimate goal, the Supreme Brahman, the Truth of truth (the elements) beginning with earth and ending with the ether.

सा होवाच, ब्राह्मणा भगवन्तस्तदेव बहु मन्येध्वं यदस्मान्नमस्कारेण मुच्येध्वम् ; न वै जातु युष्माकमिमं कश्चिद्ब्रह्मोद्यं जेतेति ; ततो ह वाचक्नव्युपरराम ॥ १२ ॥

इत्यष्टमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

12. She said, 'Revered Brāhmaṇas, you

should consider yourselves fortunate if you can get off from him through salutations. Never shall any of you beat him in describing Brahman.' Then the daughter of Vacaknu kept silent.

She said: 'Revered Brāhmaṇas, listen to my words. *You should consider yourselves fortunate if you can get off from him,* Yājñavalkya, *through salutations,* by saluting him. You must never even think of defeating him, much less do it. Why? Because *never shall any of you beat him,* Yājñavalkya, *in describing Brahman.* I already said that if he answered my two questions, none could beat him. I still have the conviction that in describing Brahman he has no match.' *Then the daughter of Vacaknu kept silent.*

In the section dealing with the Internal Ruler it has been said, 'Whom the earth does not know,' and 'Whom no being knows.' Now what is the similarity as well as difference among the Internal Ruler whom they do not know, those who do not know Him, and the conscious Principle which, being the subject of the activities of vision etc. of all things, is spoken of as the Immutable?

Regarding this[1] some say: The Internal Ruler is the slightly agitated state of the ocean of Supreme Brahman, the Immutable, which never changes its nature. The individual self, which does not know that

[1] Some one-sided views within the Vedāṇtic school itself are being presented.

Internal Ruler, is the extremely agitated state of that ocean. They also imagine five[1] other states of Brahman; again they maintain that Brahman has eight[2] states. Others say that these are but the powers of the Immutable, which, according to them, has unlimited powers. Still others maintain that these are modifications of the Immutable.

Now the states and powers are inadmissible, for the Śrutis declare the Immutable to be beyond the relative attributes of hunger etc. Certainly one and the same thing cannot simultaneously be both beyond hunger etc. and subject to those conditions. The same argument applies to the Immutable having powers, while the flaws in attributing modifications and parts to the Immutable have already been pointed out in the second chapter (p. 300). Hence all these views are wrong.

What then is the difference among them? It is all due to the limiting adjuncts, we reply: intrinsically there is neither difference nor identity among them, for they are by nature Pure Intelligence, homogeneous like a lump of salt. Witness the Śruti texts: 'Without prior or posterior, without interior or exterior' (II. v. 19), and 'This self is Brahman' (Ibid.); also in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad: 'It includes the interior and exterior, and is unborn' (II. i. 2). Therefore the unconditioned Self, being beyond speech and mind, undifferentiated and one, is designated as 'Not this, not this'; when It has the limiting adjuncts of the body

[1] Viz. the individual, species, Virāj, Sūtra and destiny.

[2] Viz. the above five together with the Undifferentiated, the Witness and the individual self.

and organs, which are characterised by ignorance, desire and work, It is called the transmigrating individual self ; and when the Self has the limiting adjunct of the power of (Māyā manifesting through) eternal and unlimited knowledge, It is called the Internal Ruler and Īśvara. The same Self as by nature transcendent, absolute and pure, is called the Immutable and Supreme Self. Similarly, having the limiting adjuncts of the bodies and organs of Hiraṇyagarbha, the Undifferentiated, the gods, the species, the individual, men, animals, spirits, etc., the Self assumes those particular names and forms. Thus have we explained this through the Śruti passage: 'It moves, and does not move' (Īś. 5). In this light alone such texts as, 'This is your self (that is within all)' (III. iv. 1-2 ; III. v. 1), 'He is the inner Self of all beings' (Mu. II. i. 4), 'This (self) being hidden in all beings,' etc. (Ka. III. 12), 'Thou art That' (Ch. VI. viii. 7), 'I Myself am all this' (Ch. VII. xxv. 1), 'All this is but the Self' (Ibid. 2), and 'There is no other witness but Him' (III. vii. 23), do not prove contradictory ; but in any other view they cannot be harmonised. Therefore they differ only because of their limiting adjuncts, but not otherwise, for all the Upaniṣads conclude : 'One only without a second' (Ch. VI. ii. 1).

SECTION IX

The Brahman that is within all has been indicated by a description of how, in the series of things beginning with earth ranged according to their density, each preceding item is pervaded by the succeeding one. And that Brahman has been described as the Ruler of the diverse forms of the Sūtra (such as earth) which are comprised in the differentiated universe, because in it the indications of this relation are so much more patent. The present section, named after Śākalya, is introduced in order to convey the immediacy and directness of that Brahman by a reference to the contraction and expansion of the different gods who are ruled by It.

अथ हैनं विदग्धः शाकल्यः पप्रच्छ, कति देवा याज्ञवल्क्येति; स हैतयैव निविदा प्रतिपेदे, यावन्तो वैश्वदेवस्य निविद्युच्यन्ते—त्रयश्च त्री च शता, त्रयश्च त्री च सहस्रेति; ओमिति होवाच, कत्येव देवा याज्ञवल्क्येति; त्रयस्त्रिंशदिति; ओमिति होवाच, कत्येव देवा याज्ञवल्क्येति; षडिति; ओमिति होवाच, कत्येव देवा याज्ञवल्क्येति; त्रय इति; ओमिति होवाच, कत्येव देवा याज्ञवल्क्येति; द्वाविति; ओमिति होवाच, कत्येव देवा याज्ञवल्क्येति; अध्यर्ध इति; ओमिति होवाच, कत्येव देवा याज्ञवल्क्येति; एक इति; ओमिति होवाच, कतमे ते त्रयश्च त्री च शता, त्रयश्च त्री च सहस्रेति ॥ १ ॥

1. Then Vidagdha, the son of Śakala, asked him. 'How many gods are there, Yājñavalkya?' Yājñavalkya decided it through this (group of Mantras known as) Nivid (saying), 'As many as are indicated in the Nivid of the Viśvadevas—three hundred and three, and three thousand and three.' 'Very well,' said Śākalya, 'how many gods are there, Yājñavalkya?' 'Thirty-three.' 'Very well,' said the other, 'how many gods are there, Yājñavalkya?' 'Six.' 'Very well' said Śākalya, 'how many gods are there, Yājñavalkya?' 'Three.' 'Very well,' said the other, 'how many gods are there, Yājñavalkya?' 'Two.' 'Very well,' said Śākalya, 'how many gods are there, Yājñavalkya?' 'One and a half.' 'Very well,' said the other, 'how many gods are there, Yājñavalkya?' 'One.' 'Very well,' said Śākalya, 'which are those three hundred and three and three thousand and three?'

Then Vidagdha, the son of Śakala, asked him, 'How many gods are there, Yājñavalkya?' Yājñavalkya decided the number asked for by Śākalya *through this Nivid* that is just going to be mentioned. '*As many* gods *as are indicated in the Nivid of* the eulogistic hymn on *the Viśvadevas.*' The Nivid is a group of verses giving the number of the gods, which are recited in the eulogistic hymn on the Viśvadevas. 'There are as many gods as are mentioned in that

Nivid.' Which is that Nivid? The words of that Nivid are quoted: *'Three hundred and three* gods, *and* again *three thousand and three* gods. So many gods are there.' *'Very well,' said Śākalya,* 'you know their intermediate number correctly.' He next asks the smaller number of these very gods, *'How many gods are there, Yājñavalkya?'* (Yājñavalkya answers one by one:) *Thirty-three, six, three, two, one and a half,* and *one.* After asking the larger and the smaller number of the gods, he now asks about their identity, *'Which are those three hundred and three, and three thousand and three?'*

स होवाच, महिमान एवैषामेते, त्रयस्त्रिंशत्त्वेव देवा इति ; कतमे ते त्रयस्त्रिंशदिति ; अष्टौ वसवः, एकादश रुद्राः, द्वादशादित्याः, ते एकत्रिंशत्, इन्द्रश्चैव प्रजापतिश्च त्रयस्त्रिंशाविति ॥ २ ॥

2. Yājñavalkya said, 'These are but the manifestations of them, but there are only thirty-three gods.' 'Which are those thirty-three?' 'The eight Vasus, the eleven Rudras and the twelve Ādityas—these are thirty-one, and Indra and Prajāpati make up the thirty-three.'

Yājñavalkya said, 'These, the three hundred and three etc., *are but the manifestations of them,* the thirty-three gods. *But* really *there are only thirty-three gods.' 'Which are those thirty-three?'* The reply is being given: *'The eight Vasus, the eleven Rudras and the twelve Ādityas—these are thirty-one, and Indra and Prajāpati make up the thirty-three.'*

कतमे वसव इति ; अग्निश्च पृथिवी च वायुश्चान्तरिक्षं चादित्यश्च द्यौश्च चन्द्रमाश्च नक्षत्राणि चैते वसवः ; एतेषु हीदं सर्वं हितमिति तस्माद्वसव इति ॥ ३ ॥

3. 'Which are the Vasus?' 'Fire, the earth, the air, the sky, the sun, heaven, the moon and the stars—these are the Vasus, for in these all this is placed ; therefore they are called Vasus.'

'Which are the Vasus?' The identity of each group of the gods is being asked. *'Fire, the earth,'* etc.—from fire up to the stars are the Vasus. Transforming themselves into the bodies and organs of all beings, which serve as the support for their work and its fruition, as also into their dwelling-places, these gods help every being to live, and they themselves live too. Because they help others to live, *therefore they are called Vasus.*

कतमे रुद्रा इति ; दशेमे पुरुषे प्राणाः, आत्मैकादशः ; ते यदास्माच्छरीरान्मर्त्यादुत्क्रामन्त्यथ रोदयन्ति ; तद्यद्रोदयन्ति तस्माद्रुद्रा इति ॥ ४ ॥

4. 'Which are the Rudras?' 'The ten organs in the human body, with the mind as the eleventh. When they depart from this mortal body, they make (one's relatives) weep. Because they then make them weep, therefore they are called Rudras.'

'Which are the Rudras?' 'The ten sensory and motor *organs in the human body, with the mind as*

the eleventh. When they, these organs, *depart from this mortal body,* after a person has completely experienced the results of his past work, *they make* his relatives *weep. Because they then make them weep* (Rud), *therefore they are called Rudras.*'

कतम आदित्या इति ; द्वादश वै मासाः संवत्सरस्य, एत आदित्याः, एते हीदं सर्वमाददाना यन्ति ; ते यदिदं सर्वमाददाना यन्ति तस्मादादित्या इति ॥ ५ ॥

5. 'Which are the Ādityas?' 'The twelve months (are parts) of a year ; these are the Ādityas, for they go taking all this with them. Because they go taking all this with them, therefore they are called Ādityas.'

'Which are the Ādityas?' 'It is well known that *the twelve months* are parts *of a year ; these are the Ādityas.* How? *For* as they rotate *they go taking* a person's longevity and the results of his work *with them. Because they go taking* (Ādā) *all this with them, therefore they are called Ādityas.*'

कतम इन्द्रः, कतमः प्रजापतिरिति ; स्तनयित्नुरेवेन्द्रः, यज्ञः प्रजापतिरिति ; कतमः स्तनयित्नुरिति ; अशनिरिति ; कतमो यज्ञ इति ; पशव इति ॥ ६ ॥

6. 'Which is Indra, and which is Prajāpati?' 'The cloud is Indra, and the sacrifice is Prajāpati.' 'Which is the cloud?' 'Thunder (strength).' 'Which is the sacrifice?' 'Animals.'

'Which is Indra, and which is Prajāpati?' 'The cloud is Indra, and the sacrifice is Prajāpati.' 'Which is the cloud?' 'Thunder,' i.e. vigour or strength, which kills others ; that is Indra, for it is his function. *'Which is the sacrifice?' 'Animals,'* for they are the means of a sacrifice. Because a sacrifice has no form of its own and depends on its means, the animals, therefore they are called sacrifice.

कतमे षडिति ; अग्निश्च पृथिवी च वायुश्चान्तरिक्षं चादित्यश्च द्यौश्च, एते षट्, एते हीदं सर्वं षडिति ॥ ७ ॥

7. 'Which are the six (gods)?' 'Fire, the earth, the air the sky, the sun and heaven—these are the six. Because all those (gods) are (comprised in) these six.'

'Which are the six (gods)?' The same gods, fire and the rest, that are classed as Vasus, leaving out the moon and the stars, become six in number. *'Because all those* (thirty-three and other gods) that have been spoken of *are these six.'* In other words, the Vasus and others that have been enumerated as details are included in these six.

कतमे ते त्रयो देवा इति ; इम एव त्रयो लोकाः, एषु हीमे सर्वे देवा इति ; कतमौ तौ द्वौ देवाविति ; अन्नं चैव प्राणश्चेति ; कतमोऽध्यर्ध इति ; योऽयं पवत इति ॥ ८ ॥

8. 'Which are the three gods?' 'These three worlds, because in these all those gods are comprised.' 'Which are the two gods?'

'Matter and the vital force.[1]' 'Which are the one and a half?' 'This (air) that blows.'

'Which are the three gods?' 'These three worlds.' The earth and fire taken together make one god, the sky and air make another, and heaven and the sun make a third: these are the three gods. *Because in these* three gods *all* the *gods are comprised,* therefore these are the three gods; this is the view of a certain section of philologists. *'Which are the two gods?' 'Matter and the vital force'*—these are the two gods; that is to say, these include all the gods that have been enumerated. *'Which are the one and a half?' 'This* air *that blows.'*

तदाहुः, यदयमेक इवैव पवते, अथ कथमध्यर्ध इति ; यदस्मिन्निदं सर्वमध्यार्ध्नोत्, तेनाध्यर्ध इति ; कतम एको देव इति ; प्राण इति, स ब्रह्म त्यदित्याचक्षते ॥ ९ ॥

9. 'Regarding this some say, "Since the air blows as one substance, how can it be one and a half?" It is one and a half because through its presence all this attains surpassing glory.' 'Which is the one god?' 'The vital force (Hiraṇyagarbha); it is Brahman, which is called Tyat (that).'

'Regarding this some say in objection, *"Since the air blows as one substance. how can it be one and a half?" It is one and a half because through its presence all this attains surpassing glory.' 'Which is the one god?' 'The vital force; it,* the vital force, *is*

[1] The vital force in its cosmic aspect, or Hiraṇyagarbha, is meant. So also in the next paragraph.

Brahman, for it is vast, being the sum total of all the gods. And this Brahman *is called Tyat* (that),' which is a word denoting remoteness. Thus the gods are one as well as many. The infinite number of gods are included in the limited number mentioned in the Nivid ; these again are included in the successive (smaller) numbers, thirty-three and so on, up to the one vital force. It is this one vital force which expands into all those numbers up to the infinite. Thus the vital force alone is one and infinite as well as possessed of the intermediate numbers. That this one god, the vital force, has different names, forms, activities, attributes and powers is due to individual differences of qualification.[1]

Now eight other forms of that same vital force which is a form of Brahman are being set forth:

पृथिव्येव यस्यायतनम्, अग्निर्लोकः, मनोज्योतिः, यो वै तं पुरुषं विद्यात्सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणम्, स वै वेदिता स्याद्याज्ञवल्क्य। वेद वा अहं तं पुरुषं सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणं यमात्थ ; य एवायं शारीरः पुरुषः स एषः, वदैव शाकल्य ; तस्य का देवतेति ; अमृतमिति होवाच ॥ १० ॥

10. 'He who knows that being whose abode is the earth, whose instrument of vision is fire, whose light is the Manas, and who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs, knows truly, O Yājñavalkya.' 'I know that being of

[1] People perform different kinds of meditation and rites. and acquire different grades of mental culture, thereby attaining identity with fire etc. which are all parts of the cosmic vital force. Hence the above differences.

whom you speak—who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs. It is the being who is identified with the body. Go on, Śākalya.' 'Who is his deity (cause)?' 'Nectar (chyle),' said he.

He who knows that being or god *whose abode is the earth, whose instrument of vision is fire*: 'Loka' here means that through which one sees; that is to say, who sees through fire. *Whose light is the Manas,* who considers the pros and cons of a thing through the Manas. In other words, this god has the earth for his body and fire for his eye, weighs things through the mind, identifies himself with the earth, and is possessed of a body and organs. *And who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs.* The idea is this: As the skin, flesh and blood derived from the mother, which stand for the field, he is the ultimate resort of the bone, marrow and sperm derived from the father, which stand for the seed, as well as of the organs. He who knows it as such *knows truly,* is a scholar. You do not know him, Yājñavalkya, but still pose as a scholar. This is his idea.

'If knowing him confers scholarship, *I know that being of whom you speak—who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs.*' Then Śākalya must have said, 'If you know that being, tell me what his description is.' 'Listen what it is,' says the other, '*it is the being who is identified with the body,* which preponderates in earthy elements, i.e. who is represented by the three constituents of the body, or sheaths, as

they are called, derived from the mother—that is the god about whom you have asked, Śākalya. 'But there is something more to be said about him by way of description ; *go on, Śākalya,* i.e. ask about it.' Thus challenged, he was furious like a goaded elephant and said, '*Who is his deity,* the deity of that god identified with the body?' That from which something emanates has been spoken of in this section as the deity of that thing. *'Nectar,' said he.* 'Nectar' here means chyle, or the watery essence of the food that is eaten, which produces the blood derived from the mother ; for it generates the blood stored in a woman, and this blood produces the skin, flesh and blood of the fœtus, which are the support of its bone, marrow, etc. The common portions of the next seven paragraphs need no explanation.

काम एव यस्यायतनम्, हृदयं लोकः, मनोज्योतिः, यो वै तं पुरुषं विद्यात्सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणम्, स वै वेदिता स्याद्याज्ञवल्क्य । वेद वा अहं तं पुरुषं सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणं यमात्थ ; य एवायं काममयः पुरुषः स एषः, वदैव शाकल्य ; तस्य का देवतेति ; स्त्रिय इति होवाच ॥ ११ ॥

11. 'He who knows that being whose abode is lust, whose instrument of vision is the intellect, whose light is the Manas, and who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs, knows truly, O Yājñavalkya.' 'I know that being of whom you speak—who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs. It is the being who

is identified with lust. Go on, Śākalya.' 'Who is his deity?' 'Women,' said he.

'Whose abode is lust,' or the desire for sex pleasures; that is, who has lust as his body. *'Whose instrument of vision is the intellect,'* i.e. who sees through the intellect. *'It is the being identified with lust,'* and the same in the body as well. *'Who is his deity?' 'Women,' said he,* for men's desire is inflamed through them.

रूपाण्येव यस्यायतनम्, चक्षुर्लोकः, मनोज्योतिः, यो वै तं पुरुषं विद्यात्सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणम्, स वै वेदिता स्याद्याज्ञवल्क्य। वेद वा अहं तं पुरुषं सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणं यमात्थ; य एवासावादित्ये पुरुषः स एषः, वदैव शाकल्य; तस्य का देवतेति; सत्यमिति होवाच ॥ १२ ॥

12. 'He who knows that being whose abode is colours, whose instrument of vision is the eye, whose light is the Manas, and who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs, knows truly, O Yājñavalkya.' 'I know that being of whom you speak—who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs. It is the being who is in the sun. Go on, Śākalya.' 'Who is his deity?' 'Truth (the eye),' said he.

'Whose abode is colours,' white, black, etc. *'It is the being who is in the sun,'* for he is the particular effect of all colours.'[1] *'Who is his deity?' 'Truth,'*

[1] Being produced by them for their own manifestation

said he. 'Truth' here means the eye, for the sun among the gods is the product[1] of the eye in one's body.

आकाश एव यस्यायतनम्, श्रोत्रं लोकः, मनोज्योतिः, यो वै तं पुरुषं विद्यात्सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणम्, स वै वेदिता स्याद्याज्ञवल्क्य। वेद वा अहं तं पुरुषं सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणं यमात्थ; य एवायं श्रौत्रः प्रातिश्रुत्कः पुरुषः स एषः, वदैव शाकल्य; तस्य का देवतेति; दिश इति होवाच ॥ १३ ॥

13. 'He who knows that being whose abode is the ether, whose instrument of vision is the ear, whose light is the Manas, and who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs, knows truly, O Yājñavalkya.' 'I know that being of whom you speak—who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs. It is the being who is identified with the ear and with the time of hearing. Go on, Śākalya.' 'Who is his deity?' 'The quarters,' said he.

'Whose abode is the ether,' etc. *'It is the being who is identified with the ear and* particularly *with the time of hearing.' 'Who is his deity?' 'The quarters,' said he,* for (the Śrutis say) it is from the quarters that this particular being within the body is produced.

तम एव यस्यायतनम्, हृदयं लोकः, मनोज्योतिः, यो

[1] So says the Śruti (e.g. Ṛ. X. xc. 13).

वै तं पुरुषं विद्यात्सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणम्, स वै वेदिता स्याद्याज्ञवल्क्य। वेद वा अहं तं पुरुषं सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणं यमात्थ; य एवायं छायामयः पुरुषः स एषः, वदैव शाकल्य; तस्य का देवतेति; मृत्युरिति होवाच ॥ १४ ॥

14. 'He who knows that being whose abode is darkness, whose instrument of vision is the intellect, whose light is the Manas, and who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs, knows truly, O Yājñavalkya.' 'I know that being of whom you speak—who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs. It is the being who is identified with shadow (ignorance). Go on, Śākalya.' 'Who is his deity?' 'Death,' said he.

'Whose abode is darkness' such as that of the night. In the body *'it is the being identified with shadow,* or ignorance.' *'Who is his deity?' 'Death,' said he.* Among the gods this is his cause (according to the Śrutis).

रूपाण्येव यस्यायतनम्, चक्षुर्लोकः, मनोज्योतिः, यो वै तं पुरुषं विद्यात्सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणम्, स वै वेदिता स्याद्याज्ञवल्क्य। वेद वा अहं तं पुरुषं सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणं यमात्थ; य एवायमादर्शे पुरुषः स एषः, वदैव शाकल्य; तस्य का देवतेति; असुरिति होवाच ॥ १५ ॥

15. 'He who knows that being whose abode is (particular) colours, whose instrument of vision is the eye, whose light is the Manas, and who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs,

knows truly, O Yājñavalkya.' 'I know that being of whom you speak—who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs. It is the being who is in a looking-glass. Go on, Śākalya.' 'Who is his deity?' 'The vital force,' said he.

'Whose abode is colours.' In paragraph 12 colours in general were referred to; but here particular colours, those that reflect, are meant. The particular abode of the god who dwells in these colours is reflecting objects such as a looking-glass. *'Who is his deity?' 'The vital force,' said he.* That being called reflection emanates from the vital force.[1]

आप एव यस्यायतनम्, हृदयं लोकः, मनोज्योतिः, यो वै तं पुरुषं विद्यात्सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणम्, स वै वेदिता स्याद्याज्ञवल्क्य। वेद वा अहं तं पुरुषं सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणं यमात्थ; य एवायमप्सु पुरुषः स एषः, वदैव शाकल्य; तस्य का देवतेति; वरुण इति होवाच ॥ १६ ॥

16. 'He who knows that being whose abode is water, whose instrument of vision is the intellect, whose light is the Manas, and who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs, knows truly, O Yājñavalkya.' 'I know that being of whom you speak—who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs. It is the being who is in water. Go on, Śākalya.' 'Who is his deity?' 'Varuṇa (rain),' said he.

[1] Being dependent on friction etc., which require strength.

'Whose abode is water' in general. He specially lives in the water of reservoirs, wells, tanks, etc. *'Who is his deity?' 'Varuṇa* (rain).' Because the water that is (drunk and) forms the body comes from rain ; it is again the cause of the water of reservoirs etc.[1]

रेत एव यस्यायतनम्, हृदयं लोकः, मनोज्योतिः, यो वै तं पुरुषं विद्यात्सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणम्, स वै वेदिता स्याद्याज्ञवल्क्य। वेद वा अहं तं पुरुषं सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणं यमात्थ ; य एवायं पुत्रमयः पुरुषः स एषः, वदैव शाकल्य ; तस्य का देवतेति ; प्रजापतिरिति होवाच ॥ १७ ॥

17. 'He who knows that being whose abode is the seed, whose instrument of vision is the intellect, whose light is the Manas, and who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs, knows truly, O Yājñavalkya.' 'I know that being of whom you speak—who is the ultimate resort of the entire body and organs. It is the being who is identified with the son. Go on, Śākalya.' 'Who is his deity?' 'Prajāpati (the father),' said he.

'Whose abode is the seed.' 'It is the being identified with the son,' who is the particular abode of the being who inhabits the seed. 'The being identified with the son' here means the bones, marrow and seed derived from the father. *'Who is his deity?'*

[1] Through the person who digs them.

'Prajāpati,' said he. 'Prajāpati' here means the father, for from him the son is born.

शाकल्येति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः, त्वां स्विदिमे ब्राह्मणा अङ्गारावक्षयणमक्रता३ इति ॥ १८ ॥

18. 'Śākalya,' said Yājñavalkya, 'have these Vedic scholars made you their instrument for burning charcoals?'

For the sake of meditation one and the same vital force has been inculcated in eight different forms ; each god having three divisions, viz. abode (general form), being (special manifestation) and deity (cause), is but a form of the vital force. The text now goes on to show how the same vital force, divided into five forms according to the different quarters, is unified in the mind. When Śākalya kept silent, Yājñavalkya addressed him, subjecting him to the spell of an evil spirit, as it were. *'Śākalya,' said* he, *'have these Vedic scholars made you their instrument for burning charcoals* such as fire-tongs?' The particle 'svid' denotes deliberation. He means, 'They must have done so, but you do not perceive that you are being consumed by me.'

याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच शाकल्यः, यदिदं कुरुपञ्चालानां ब्राह्मणानत्यवादीः, किं ब्रह्म विद्वानिति ; दिशो वेद सदेवाः सप्रतिष्ठा इति ; यद्दिशो वेत्थ सदेवाः सप्रतिष्ठाः ॥ १९ ॥

19. 'Yājñavalkya,' said Śākalya, 'is it because you know Brahman that you have thus flouted these Vedic scholars of Kuru and Pañcāla?' 'I know the quarters with their

deities and supports.' 'If you know the quarters with their deities and supports—

'Yājñavalkya,' said Śākalya, 'is it because you know Brahman that you have thus flouted these Vedic scholars of Kuru and Pañcāla by suggesting that they themselves were afraid and made me their fire-tongs?' Yājñavalkya said, 'This is my knowledge of Brahman —what is it?—that *I know the quarters,* i.e. the meditation concerning them ; not the quarters alone, but *with their* presiding *deities and supports* as well.' The other said, *'If you know the quarters with their deities and supports,* i.e. if you say you know the meditation with its results—

किंदेवतोऽस्यां प्राच्यां दिश्यसीति ; आदित्यदेवत इति ; स आदित्यः कस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठित इति ; चक्षुषीति ; कस्मिन्नु चक्षुः प्रतिष्ठितमिति ; रूपेष्विति, चक्षुषा हि रूपाणि पश्यति ; कस्मिन्नु रूपाणि प्रतिष्ठितानीति ; हृदय इति होवाच, हृदयेन हि रूपाणि जानाति, हृदये ह्येव रूपाणि प्रतिष्ठितानि भवन्तीति ; एवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य ॥ २० ॥

20. 'What deity are you identified with in the east?' 'With the deity, sun.' 'On what does the sun rest?' 'On the eye.' 'On what does the eye rest?' 'On colours, for one sees colours with the eye.' 'On what do colours rest?' 'On the heart (mind),' said Yājñavalkya, 'for one knows colours through the heart ; it is on the heart that colours rest.' 'It is just so, Yājñavalkya.'

'What deity are you identified with in the east?

—what deity have you who are identified with the quarters?' Yājñavalkya, realising his own heart or mind—divided in five forms according to the quarters and identified with the quarters—and through it the whole universe, as his own self, stood facing the east, with the conviction that he was the quarters. We gather this from his claim that he knew the quarters with their supports. Śākalya according to Yājñavalkya's statement asks, 'What deity are you identified with in this quarter?' Everywhere in the Vedas it is stated that in this very life one becomes identified with and attains the god one meditates upon. It will be stated further on, 'Being a god, he attains the gods' (IV. i. 2). The idea is this: You are identified with the quarters; who is your presiding deity in the east?—as the east, which deity are you united with? Yājñavalkya said: *'With the deity, sun*—the sun is my deity in the east.' This is in substantiation of his claim that he knew the quarters with their deities; the other part, that relating to their supports, remains to be dealt with; so the text goes on: *'On what does the sun rest?' 'On the eye,'* for the Vedic Mantras and their explanatory portions—for instance, 'From the eye the sun was produced' (R. X. xc. 13, etc.) and 'From the eye came the sun' (Ai. I. 4)—say that the sun is produced from the eye that is in the body; and an effect rests on its cause. *'On what does the eye rest?' 'On colours.'* The eye, itself a modification of colours, is directed by them so as to perceive them; it is produced by those very colours that direct it to perceive them. Therefore the eye, together with the sun, and

the east, and all that lie in the east, rests on colours; the entire east, together with the eye, is but colours. *'On what do* these *colours rest?' 'On the heart,' said Yājñavalkya.* Colours are made by the heart; it is the heart that is transformed into them, *'for* everybody *knows colours through the heart.'* 'Heart' here refers to the intellect and Manas taken together (i.e. mind). Therefore *'it is on the heart that colours rest.'* The idea is that since one remembers colours, lying as impressions, through the heart, therefore colours rest on the heart. *'It is just so, Yājñavalkya.'*

किंदेवतोऽस्यां दक्षिणायां दिश्यसीति ; यमदेवत इति ; स यमः कस्मिन्प्रतिष्ठित इति ; यज्ञ इति ; कस्मिन्नु यज्ञः प्रतिष्ठित इति ; दक्षिणायामिति ; कस्मिन्नु दक्षिणा प्रतिष्ठितेति ; श्रद्धायामिति, यदा ह्येव श्रद्धत्तेऽथ दक्षिणां ददाति, श्रद्धायां ह्येव दक्षिणा प्रतिष्ठितेति ; कस्मिन्नु श्रद्धा प्रतिष्ठितेति ; हृदय इति होवाच, हृदयेन हि श्रद्धां जानाति, हृदये ह्येव श्रद्धा प्रतिष्ठिता भवतीति ; एवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य ॥ २१ ॥

21. 'What deity are you identified with in the south?' 'With the deity, Yama (the god of justice).' 'On what does Yama rest?' 'On the sacrifice.' 'On what does the sacrifice rest?' 'On the remuneration (of the priests).' 'On what does the remuneration rest?' 'On faith, because whenever a man has faith, he gives remuneration to the priests; therefore it is on faith that the remuneration rests.' 'On what does faith rest?' 'On the heart,' said Yājña-

valkya, 'for one knows faith through the heart; therefore it is on the heart that faith rests.' 'It is just so, Yājñavalkya.'

'What deity are you identified with in the south?' etc., should be explained as before: Who is your deity in the south? *'With the deity, Yama*—I am the south, and Yama is my deity.' *'On what does Yama rest?' 'On the sacrifice.'* Yama together with the south rests on the sacrifice, his cause. How can Yama be the effect of a sacrifice? This is being answered: The priests officiate in the sacrifice, and the sacrificer redeems it from them by means of the remuneration, and wins the south together with Yama through that sacrifice. Hence Yama, being its effect, rests on the sacrifice, together with the south. *'On what does the sacrifice rest?' 'On the remuneration* (of the priests).' The sacrifice is redeemed through the remuneration; therefore it is the effect of the remuneration. *'On what does the remuneration rest?' 'On faith.'* 'Faith' means liberality—faith in the Vedas coupled with devotion. How does the remuneration rest on faith? *'Because whenever a man has faith, he gives remuneration to the priests*; if he has no faith, he does not give it. *Therefore it is on faith that the remuneration rests.' 'On what does faith rest?' 'On the heart,' said Yājñavalkya,* 'faith is a modification of the heart, *for one knows faith through the heart,* and a modification rests on that which has it; *therefore it is on the heart that faith rests.' 'It is just so, Yājñavalkya.'*

किंदेवतोऽस्यां प्रतीच्यां दिश्यसीति ; वरुणदेवत इति ;

स वरुणः कस्मिन्प्रतिष्ठित इति ; अप्स्विति ; कस्मिन्न्वापः प्रतिष्ठिता इति ; रेतसीति ; कस्मिन्नु रेतः प्रतिष्ठितमिति ; हृदय इति, तस्मादपि प्रतिरूपं जातमाहुः, हृदयादिव सृप्तः, हृदयादिव निर्मित इति, हृदये ह्येव रेतः प्रतिष्ठितं भवतीति ; एवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य ॥ २२ ॥

22. 'What deity are you identified with in the west?' 'With the deity, Varuṇa (the god of rain).' 'On what does Varuṇa rest?' 'On water.' 'On what does water rest?' 'On the seed.' 'On what does the seed rest?' 'On the heart. Therefore do they say of a new-born child who closely resembles (his father), that he has sprung from (his father's) heart, as it were—that he has been made out of (his father's) heart, as it were. Therefore it is on the heart that the seed rests.' 'It is just so, Yājñavalkya.'

'What deity are you identified with in the west?' 'With the deity, Varuṇa—Varuṇa is my presiding deity in that direction.' *'On what does Varuṇa rest?' 'On water,'* for Varuṇa is the effect of water. Witness the Śrutis, 'Faith is water' (Tai. S. I. vi. 8. 1), and 'From faith he created Varuṇa.' *'On what does water rest?' 'On the seed,'* for the Śruti says, 'From the seed was water created' (cf. Ai. I. i. 4). *'On what does the seed rest?' 'On the heart,'* because the seed is the effect of the heart. Lust is a modification of the heart, for the seed issues from the heart of a man under its influence. *'Therefore do they say of a new-born child,*

who closely resembles (his father), *that he has sprung from* his father's *heart, as it were, that he has been made out of* (his father's) *heart, as it were,* as an ear-ring is made out of gold. *Therefore it is on the heart that the seed rests.' 'It is just so, Yājñavalkya.'*

किंदेवतोऽस्यामुदीच्यां दिश्यसीति ; सोमदेवत इति ; स सोमः कस्मिन्प्रतिष्ठित इति ; दीक्षायामिति ; कस्मिन्नु दीक्षा प्रतिष्ठितेति ; सत्य इति, तस्मादपि दीक्षितमाहुः सत्यं वदेति, सत्ये ह्येव दीक्षा प्रतिष्ठितेति ; कस्मिन्नु सत्यं प्रतिष्ठितमिति ; हृदय इति होवाच, हृदयेन हि सत्यं जानाति, हृदये ह्येव सत्यं प्रतिष्ठितं भवतीति ; एवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य ॥ २३ ॥

23. 'What deity are you identified with in the north?' 'With the deity, Soma (the moon and the creeper)' 'On what does Soma rest?' 'On initiation.' 'On what does initiation rest?' 'On truth. Therefore do they say to one initiated, "Speak the truth"; for it is on truth that initiation rests.' 'On what does truth rest?' 'On the heart,' said Yājñavalkya, 'for one knows truth through the heart; therefore it is on the heart that truth rests.' 'It is just so, Yājñavalkya.'

'What deity are you identified with in the north?' 'With the deity, Soma.' 'Soma' here means both moon and creeper. *'On what does Soma rest?' 'On initiation,'* for the initiated sacrificer purchases the Soma creeper, and sacrificing with that creeper along

with meditation, attains (his identity with) the north, presided over by the moon and named after her. *'On what does initiation rest?' 'On truth.'* How? Because initiation rests on truth, *'therefore do they say to one initiated: Speak the truth,'* lest the cause being spoilt, the effect also be spoilt. Therefore *'it is on truth that initiation rests.' 'On what does truth rest?' 'On the heart,' said Yājñavalkya, 'for one knows truth through the heart; therefore it is on the heart that truth rests.' 'It is just so, Yājñavalkya.'*

किंदेवतोऽस्यां ध्रुवायां दिश्यसीति ; अग्निदेवत इति ; सोऽग्निः कस्मिन्प्रतिष्ठित इति ; वाचीति ; कस्मिन्नु वाक् प्रतिष्ठितेति ; हृदय इति ; कस्मिन्नु हृदयं प्रतिष्ठितमिति ॥ २४ ॥

24. 'What deity are you identified with in the fixed direction (above)?' 'With the deity, fire.' 'On what does fire rest?' 'On speech.' 'On what does speech rest?' 'On the heart.' 'On what does the heart rest?'

'What deity are you identified with in the fixed direction?' Being the same to all who dwell round Mount Meru,[1] the direction overhead is called the fixed direction. *'With the deity, fire,'* for overhead there is more light, and fire is luminous. *'On what*

[1] See footnote on p. 49. The directions east, west, etc., vary according to the relative position of the dwellers around this mountain, the east being that in which they see the sun rise. But the direction overhead is obviously constant to all of them.

does fire rest?' 'On speech.' 'On what does speech rest?' 'On the heart.' Now Yājñavalkya, through his heart extending in all directions, has realised all the quarters as his own self ; the quarters, with their deities and supports, are a part and parcel of him, and he is identified with name, colour (form) and action. Of these, colour together with the east is one with his heart. Mechanical rites, the act of procreation and rites combined with meditation, representing the south, west and north respectively, together with their results and presiding deities, are likewise unified in his heart. And all names together with the overhead direction also reach his heart through speech. The whole universe is comprised in these ; colour (form), action and name ; and all these are but (modifications of) the heart. Therefore Śākalya asks about the heart, which is the embodiment of everything: *'On what does the heart rest?'*

अहल्लिकेति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः, यत्रैतदन्यत्रास्मन्मन्यासै, यद्ध्येतदन्यत्रास्मत्स्यात्, श्वानो वैनदद्युः, वयांसि वैनद्विमथ्नीरन्निति ॥ २५ ॥

25. 'You ghost,'[1] said Yājñavalkya, 'when you think the heart is elsewhere than in us, (then the body is dead). Should it be elsewhere than in us, dogs would eat this body, or birds tear it to pieces.'[2]

'You ghost,' said Yājñavalkya, addressing him by a different name, *'when you think the heart,* or the

[1] Lit. that which vanishes at day-time.

[2] Lit. churn it.

mind, which is the self[1] of the body, *is elsewhere than in us,* (then the body is dead). *Should it be elsewhere than in us, dogs would* then *eat this body, or birds tear it to pieces.* Therefore the heart rests on me, i.e. the body'—this is the idea. The body also, as consisting of name, colour (form) and action, rests on the heart.

कस्मिन्नु त्वं चात्मा च प्रतिष्ठितौ स्थ इति ; प्राण इति ; कस्मिन्नु प्राणः प्रतिष्ठित इति ; अपान इति ; कस्मिन्न्वपानः प्रतिष्ठित इति ; व्यान इति ; कस्मिन्नु व्यानः प्रतिष्ठित इति ; उदान इति ; कस्मिन्नूदानः प्रतिष्ठित इति ; समान इति ; स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा, अगृह्यो नहि गृह्यते, अशीर्यो नहि शीर्यते, असङ्गो नहि सज्यते, असितो न व्यथते, न रिष्यति । एतान्यष्टावायतनानि, अष्टौ लोकाः, अष्टौ देवाः, अष्टौ पुरुषाः; स यस्तान्पुरुषान्निरुह्य प्रत्युह्यात्यक्रामत्, तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि ; तं चेन्मे न विवक्ष्यसि, मूर्धा ते विपतिष्यतीति । तं ह न मेने शाकल्यः ; तस्य ह मूर्धा विपपात, अपि हास्य परिमोषिणोऽस्थीन्यपजह्रुरन्यन्मन्यमानाः ॥ २६ ॥

26. 'On what do the body and the heart[2] rest?' 'On the Prāṇa.' 'On what does the Prāṇa rest?' 'On the Apāna.' 'On what does the Apāna rest?' 'On the Vyāna.' 'On what does the Vyāna rest?' 'On the Udāna.' 'On what does the Udāna rest?' 'On the Samāna.' This self is That which has been described as

[1] In a figurative sense

[2] Lit. you and (your) self.

'Not this, not this.' It is imperceptible, for It is never perceived; undecaying, for It never decays; unattached, for It is never attached; unfettered—It never feels pain, and never suffers injury. 'These are the eight abodes, the eight instruments of vision, the eight deities and the eight beings. I ask you of that Being who is to be known only from the Upaniṣads, who definitely projects those beings and (again) withdraws them into Himself, and who is at the same time transcendent. If you cannot clearly tell me of Him, your head shall fall off.' Śākalya did not know Him; his head fell off; and robbers snatched away his bones, mistaking them for something else.

'You have stated that the body and the heart—the effect and the instrument—rest on each other. I therefore ask you: *On what do the body and the heart rest?' 'On the Prāṇa'* : The body and the mind rest on the force called Prāṇa.[1] *'On what does the Prāṇa rest?' 'On the Apāna'* : That force called Prāṇa would go out (through the mouth and nostrils), were it not held back by the force called Apāna. *'On what does the Apāna rest?' 'On the Vyāna'* : That force called Apāna would also depart (through the lower orifice) as the Prāṇa would (through the mouth and nostrils), were they not both held back by the force

[1] For the functions of these see commentary on I. v. 3.

called Vyāna, which occupies an intermediate position. *'On what does the Vyāna rest?' 'On the Udāna'* : All the three forces would go out in all directions, were they not fixed, as to a post, to the Udāna. *'On what does the Udāna rest?' 'On the Samāna,'* for all these forces rest on the Samāna. The idea is this: The body, mind and the vital forces are interdependent and work together as an orderly aggregate, dominated by the purpose of the individual self. Now that transcendent Brahman, which is immediate and direct, by which all these up to the ether are regulated, on which they rest, and by which they are pervaded, has to be described. Hence the text goes on:

This self is That which has been described in the Madhukānda[1] *as 'Not this, not this'* (II. iii. 6). *It is imperceptible,* not perceivable. How? Because It is beyond the characteristics of effects, therefore It is imperceptible. Why? *For It is never perceived.* Only a differentiated object, which is within the range of the organs, can be perceived ; but the Self is the opposite of that. Similarly *undecaying*. What is gross and made up of parts decays, as for instance the body ; but the Self is the opposite of that ; hence *It never decays.* Likewise *unattached.* A gross object, being related to another gross object, is attached to it ; but the Self is the opposite of that ; hence *It is never attached.* Similarly *unfettered,* or free. Whatever is gross becomes bound ; but *It,* being the opposite of that, is free, and for that reason *never feels pain.* Hence also It *never suffers injury*. Being beyond

[1] Consisting of chapters I and II.

such characteristics of effects as perception, decay, attachment and bondage. It never suffers injury, in other words, is never destroyed.

The Śruti, out of eagerness, has set aside the order (of the dialogue), stepped out of the story and described in its own form the Being who is to be known only from the Upaniṣads. Then it resumes the garb of the story and says (through Yājñavalkya): *These are the eight abodes*, described above (in paragraphs 10 to 17) in the words, 'Whose abode is the earth,' etc.; *the eight instruments of vision*, fire etc.; *the eight deities*, referred to in, ' "Nectar (chyle)," said he,' etc. (par. 10); *the eight beings*, mentioned in, 'The being who is identified with the body' (Ibid.), etc. *I ask you*, who are proud of your learning, *of that Being* devoid of hunger etc. *who is to be known only from the Upaniṣads*, and through no other means of knowledge, *who definitely projects those beings*, those identified with the body etc., divided into eight groups of four items[1] each, so as to constitute the universe as it is, *and* (again) *withdraws them* through the east etc. *into Himself*, i.e. into the heart (mind), *and who is at the same time transcendent*, beyond the attributes of the limiting adjuncts such as identification with the heart. *If you cannot clearly tell me of Him, your head shall fall off, said* Yājñavalkya. *Śākalya did not know* that Being who is to be known only from the Upaniṣads ; *his head fell off*. The story is ended. 'Śākalya did not know Him,' etc., is the narration of the Śruti.

[1] The abode, the instrument of vision, the light and the deity.

Further, *robbers snatched away* even *his bones* as they were being carried to his home by his disciples for the funeral rites—why?—*mistaking them for something else,* viz. treasure under transport. A previous anecdote is here referred to. In (Book XI of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa entitled) the Aṣṭādhyāī[1] there occurs a dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Śākalya with a similar ending. There Yājñavalkya gave a curse: ' "You shall die in an unholy place at an inauspicious time, and even your bones shall not reach home." He died exactly like that ; and robbers seized his bones too, mistaking them for something else' (Ś. XI. vi. 3. 11). The moral of the story is that one should not be disrespectful, but rather obedient to a true knower of Brahman. That story is here referred to in order to teach conduct and also to extol the knowledge of Brahman.

How can that Brahman which has been indicated as 'Not this, not this' by the elimination of everything else, be positively indicated? In order to answer this, as also to state the cause of the universe, the Śruti again resorts to the story. The point of the story is that one should take away cattle by defeating Vedic scholars who do not truly know Brahman. In view of the customary procedure[2] Yājñavalkya said:

अथ होवाच, ब्राह्मणा भगवन्तो यो वः कामयते स मा पृच्छतु, सर्वे वा मा पृच्छत, यो वः कामयते तं वः

[1] It treats of rituals and is so named because it consists of eight chapters.

[2] That things belonging to Brāhmaṇas must not be taken without their consent.

पृच्छामि, सर्वान्वा वः पृच्छामीति ; ते ह ब्राह्मणा न दधृषुः ॥ २७ ॥

27. Then he said, 'Revered Brāhmaṇas, whichsoever amongst you wishes may ask me questions, or all of you may. Or I shall ask questions of whichsoever amongst you wishes, or ask all of you. The Brāhmaṇas did not dare.

Then, after the Brāhmaṇas were silent, *he said,* addressing them, *'Revered Brāhmaṇas, whichsoever amongst you wishes* to ask me questions, *may* come forward and *ask me questions, or all of you may. Or I shall ask questions of whichsoever amongst you wishes* that I should ask him, *or ask all of you.' The Brāhmaṇas,* even though thus addressed, *did not dare* to give any reply whatsoever.

तान् हैतैः श्लोकैः पप्रच्छ—

यथा वृक्षो वनस्पतिस्तथैव पुरुषोऽमृषा ॥
तस्य लोमानि पर्णानि, त्वगस्योत्पाटिका बहिः ॥१॥

28. He asked them through these verses:

(1) As a large tree, so indeed is a man. (This is) true. His hair is its leaves, his skin its outer bark.

When the Brāhmaṇas were silent, *he asked them through* the following *verses: As* in the world *is a large tree*—the word 'Vanaspati' qualifies the word 'tree'—*so indeed is a man.* This is *true. His hair is its leaves:* A man's hair corresponds to the leaves of a tree. *His skin is its outer bark.*

त्वच एवास्य रुधिरं प्रस्यन्दि, त्वच उत्पटः ॥
तस्मात्तदातृण्णात्प्रैति रसो वृक्षादिवाहतात् ॥ २ ॥

(2) It is from his skin that blood flows, and from the bark sap. Therefore when a man is wounded, blood flows, as sap from a tree that is injured.

It is from a man's *skin that blood flows, and* it is *from the bark* of a large tree that *sap* exudes. Since a man and a large tree thus resemble each other in all respects, *therefore when a man is wounded, blood flows, as sap from a tree that is injured* or cut.

मांसान्यस्य शकराणि, किनाटं स्नाव, तत्स्थिरम् ॥
अस्थीन्यन्तरतो दारूणि, मज्जा मज्जोपमा कृता ॥ ३ ॥

(3) His flesh is its inner bark, and his sinews its innermost layer of bark; it is tough. His bones lie under, as does its wood; his marrow is comparable to its pith.

Similarly a man's *flesh is* the *inner bark* of a large tree. A man's sinews are the *innermost layer of bark* in a tree, that layer which is under the inner bark and attached to the wood ; *it is tough,* or strong, like the sinews. A man's *bones lie under* the sinews ; similarly under the innermost bark is the *wood.* A man's *marrow is comparable to* the *pith* of a large tree. There is no difference between the two ; they resemble each other.

यद्वृक्षो वृक्णो रोहति मूलान्नवतरः पुनः ॥
मर्त्यः स्विन्मृत्युना वृक्णः कस्मान्मूलात्प्ररोहति ॥ ४ ॥

(4) If a tree, after it is felled, springs again

from its root in a newer form, from what root does man spring forth after he is cut off by death?

If a tree, after it is felled, springs again from its root in a newer form, etc. We have seen that previous to this feature there was complete similarity between a tree and a man. We notice, however, this peculiarity in a tree that it springs again after it is felled, while we do not see that a man cut off by death springs forth again. But there must be a renascence from some source. Therefore I ask you, *from what root does man spring forth after he is cut off by death?* In other words, whence is a dead man reborn?

रेतस इति मा वोचत, जीवतस्तत्प्रजायते ॥
धानारुह इव वै वृक्षोऽञ्जसा प्रेत्य संभवः ॥ ५ ॥

(5) Do not say, 'From the seed,' (for) it is produced in a living man. A tree springs also from the seed; after it is dead it certainly springs again (from the seed as well).

If you say that he springs *from the seed, do not say* (so), you should not say so. Why? Because the seed *is produced in a living man,* not in a dead man. *A tree springs also from the seed,* not from the trunk only.—The particle 'iva' is expletive.—A large tree, *after it is dead, certainly springs again* from the seed as well.

यत्समूलमावृहेयुर्वृक्षं न पुनराभवेत् ॥
मर्त्यः स्विन्मृत्युना वृक्णः कस्मान्मूलात्प्ररोहति ॥ ६ ॥

(6) If a tree is pulled out with its root, it no more sprouts. From what root does a mortal spring forth after he is cut off by death?

If a tree is pulled out with its root or its seed, *it no more sprouts.* Therefore I ask you about the root of the whole universe: *From what root does a mortal spring forth after he is cut off by death?*

जात एव ; न, जायते, कोन्वेनं जनयेत्पुनः ॥
विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म, रातिर्दातुः परायणम् ,
तिष्ठमानस्य तद्विद इति ॥ ७ ॥ २८ ॥
इति नवमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥ इति तृतीयोऽध्यायः ॥

(7) If you think he is ever born, I say, no, he is again born. Now who should again bring him forth?—Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman, the supreme goal of the distributor of wealth as well as of him who has realised Brahman and lives in It.

If you think he is ever born, and there is nothing more to ask about him—a question about birth is possible only of one who is yet to be born, and not of one who is already born; but a man is ever born, so no question about his birth is admissible—*I say, no.* What happens then? After death *he is again born* of a certainty, for otherwise you would be assuming that a man reaps the fruits of actions that he has never done, and fails to obtain those of actions he has actually done. So I ask you, *who should again bring him*, the dead man, *forth?*

The Brāhmaṇas did not know that: that root of the universe out of which the dead man is again born was unknown to them. Hence, being the best of the knowers of Brahman, Yājñavalkya defeated the Brāhmaṇas and took away the cows. The story is finished. The Śruti in its own form now tells us of the root of the universe, about which Yājñavalkya asked the Brāhmaṇas, and gives the words that directly describe Brahman: *Knowledge,* or Pure Intelligence, which is also *Bliss,* not smitten with pain like sense-perception, but serene. beneficent, matchless, spontaneous, ever content and homogeneous. What is that? *Brahman,* which has both the characteristics (Knowledge and Bliss). *The supreme goal,* or the bestower of the fruits of actions, *of the distributor of wealth.* i.e. of the sacrificer who engages in rites—the word 'Rāti' (wealth) has a possessive force—*as well as* the supreme goal of *him who has realised Brahman and lives in It,* having renounced all desires and doing no (ritualistic) work.

Here is something to discuss. The word 'bliss' is generally known to denote pleasure ; and here we find the word 'bliss' used as an epithet of Brahman in the expression 'Bliss, Brahman.' Elsewhere in the Śrutis too we have: 'He knew bliss to be Brahman' (Tai. III. 6), 'Knowing the bliss of Brahman' (Tai. II. 7), 'If this Supreme Self were not bliss' (Tai. II. 7), 'That which is infinite is bliss' (Ch. VII. xxiii. 1), 'This is its supreme bliss,' etc. (IV. iii. 32). The word 'bliss' is also commonly known to refer to pleasure that is cognised. The use of the word 'bliss' in the above quotations would be justified if the bliss of Brahman

be an object of cognition. It may be urged: On the authority of the Śrutis, Brahman *is* bliss that is cognised; so what is there to discuss? The reply is: Not so, for we notice Śruti texts that are contradictory. It is true that in the Śrutis the word 'bliss' refers to Brahman; but there is also the negation of knowledge when there is oneness. For example: 'But when to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should one see and through what, . . what should one know and through what?' (II. vi. 14; IV. v. 15), 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is the infinite' (Ch. VII. xxiv. 1), 'Being fully embraced by the Supreme Self, he knows neither anything outside of himself,' etc. (IV. iii. 21). Therefore on account of the contradictory Śruti texts a discussion is necessary. Hence we should discuss in order to ascertain the true meaning of the Vedic passages. Moreover, there is a divergence of opinion among the advocates of liberation. The Sāṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika schools, for instance, while believing in liberation, hold that there is no joy to be cognised in it, thus differing from others, who maintain that there is surpassing joy in it, known only to the person concerned.

Now what is the correct position?

Prima facie view: There is joy to be cognised in liberation, for the Śrutis mention bliss etc. with regard to it, as in the following passages: 'Laughing (or eating), playing and enjoying' (Ch. VIII. xii. 3), 'If he desires to attain the world of the Manes, (by his mere wish they appear)' (Ch. VIII. ii. 1), 'That which

knows things in a general and particular way' (Mu. I. i. 9 and II. ii. 7), 'Enjoys all desires,' etc. (Tai. II. v. 1).

Objection : But is not knowledge impossible when there is oneness, since the different factors of an action are then absent? Every action depends on a number of factors, and cognition too is an action.

Tentative answer : The objection does not hold. On the authority of the Śrutis we must admit that there is knowledge of the bliss of Brahman. We have already said that such Śruti texts as, 'Knowledge, Bliss,' etc., would be meaningless if the bliss itself were incapable of being cognised.

Objection : But even a scriptural text cannot make fire cold or water hot, for these texts are merely informative. They cannot tell us that in some other country fire is cold, or that in some inaccessible country water is hot.

Tentative answer : Not so, for we observe bliss and knowledge in the individual self. Texts such as, 'Knowledge, Bliss,' etc., do not convey a meaning that clashes with perception and other means of knowledge, as for instance the sentence, 'Fire is cold,' does. On the contrary, we feel their agreement with them. One directly knows the self to be blissful, as when one feels, 'I am happy.' So the agreement in question with perception etc. is quite clear. Therefore Brahman, which is bliss, being knowledge as well, knows Itself. Thus would the Śruti texts cited above, viz. 'Laughing

(or eating), playing, enjoying,' etc., which prove the existence of bliss in the Self, be found to be consistent.

Advaitin's reply: You are wrong, for there can be no knowledge in the absence of the body and organs. Absolute separation from the body is liberation, and when there is no body there can be no organs, for they will have no support. Hence too there will be no knowledge, there being no body and organs. If knowledge could arise even in the absence of the body and organs, there would be no necessity for any one to possess them. Moreover (if Brahman as Knowledge Absolute cognises the bliss in liberation), it will contradict the oneness of Brahman.[1]

Objection: Suppose we say that the Supreme Brahman, being eternal Knowledge, ever knows Itself as Bliss Absolute?

Reply: No, (this has just been answered). Even the man under bondage, when freed from relative existence, would regain his real nature (Brahman). (So the same argument would apply to him also.) Like a quantity of water thrown into a tank, he does not retain a separate existence so as to know the blissful Brahman. Hence, to say that the liberated man knows the blissful Self is meaningless. If, on the other hand, the liberated man, being different from Brahman, knows the bliss of Brahman and the individual self as, 'I am the Bliss Absolute,' then the oneness of Brahman is contradicted, which would be against all Śrutis; and there is no third alternative. Moreover, if Brahman ever knows Its own bliss, it is

[1] By making It both subject and object.

superfluous to distinguish between awareness and unawareness. If It is constantly aware of this bliss, then that is Its nature ; hence there is no sense in maintaining that It cognises Its own bliss. Such a view would be tenable if ever there was the possibility of Its not knowing that bliss, as for instance a man knows himself and another (by an act of will). There is certainly no sense in distinguishing between a state of awareness and one of unawareness in the case of a man whose mind is uninterruptedly absorbed in an arrow, for instance. If, on the other hand, Brahman or the Self is supposed to be knowing Its bliss interruptedly, then in the intervals when It does not cognise Itself, It must know something else[1]; and the Self would become changeful, which would make It non-permanent. Hence the text, 'Knowledge, Bliss,' etc., must be interpreted as setting forth the nature of Brahman, and not signifying that the bliss of the Self is cognised.

Objection If this bliss is not cognised, such Śruti texts as 'Laughing (or eating), playing,' etc., will be contradicted.

Reply : No, for such texts only describe actions happening normally, because of the identity of the liberated man with all (infinite existence). That is to say, since the liberated man is identified with all, therefore wherever we observe the laughing etc.—in the Yogins or in the gods—the Śrutis merely describe them

[1] And thereby become finite and mortal (Ch. VII xxiv. 1), or else become unconscious.

as they are with regard to the liberated man, simply on account of his identity with all. It is but a eulogy on liberation, which is synonymous with such identity.

Objection: If those passages merely describe what happens normally, then there is the chance of the liberated man's being affected by misery also. If, in other words, he partakes of the laughing etc., happening normally to the Yogins and others, he may also suffer the misery that (plants and other) stationary existences experience.

Reply: No, all these objections have already (p. 306) been refuted on the ground that the distinctions of happiness, misery, etc., are but superimposed by the delusion created by contact with the limiting adjuncts, the body and organs, which are the products of name and form. We have also stated the respective spheres of the apparently contradictory Śruti texts (p. 393). Hence all passages containing the word 'bliss' should be interpreted like the sentence, 'This is its supreme bliss' (IV. iii. 32).

CHAPTER IV

SECTION I

The relation of this and the next section to the preceding one is as follows: There a Being, to be known only from the Upaniṣads, has been described as 'Not this, not this,' who projects eight beings, viz. the one identified with the body and the rest, and withdraws them into the heart (mind), again projects them in five forms according to the quarters and withdraws them into the heart, then unifies both heart and body, which depend on each other, in the Sūtra, the being identified with the universe, also called Samāna, with its fivefold function such as the Prāṇa, and who transcends the being identified with the universe with his three states—the body, heart and Sūtra. The same Being has been described both directly and as the material cause of the universe in the words, 'Knowledge, Bliss,' etc. (III. ix. 28. 7). Some more instruction about Him has to be given by a reference to the deities, that of speech and the rest. Hence this and the next section are being introduced in order to furnish another means of doing this. The story is meant to show the custom to be observed on such occasions.

ॐ । जनको ह वैदेह आसांचक्रे, अथ ह याज्ञवल्क्य आवव्राज । तं होवाच, याज्ञवल्क्य किमर्थमचारीः, पशूनिच्छन्, अण्वन्तानिति । उभयमेव सम्राडिति होवाच ॥१॥

1. Om. Janaka, Emperor of Videha, took his seat, when there came Yājñavalkya. Janaka said to him, 'Yājñavalkya, what has brought you here? To have some animals, or to hear some subtle questions asked?' 'Both, O Emperor,' said Yājñavalkya.

Janaka, Emperor of Videha, took his seat, i.e. gave audience to those who wanted to see him, *when there came Yājñavalkya,* either to have or maintain something of his own, or, in view of the Emperor's desire for knowledge, to do him a favour. Offering his guest adequate worship, *Janaka said to him, 'Yājñavalkya, what has brought you here?* Is it *to have some* more *animals, or to hear some subtle questions asked*—to hear from me questions on subtle subjects till decisions are arrived at ?' *'Both* animals and questions, *O Emperor.'* The word 'Emperor' indicates that Janaka must have performed the Vājapeya sacrifice. 'Emperor' also means one who rules over territories through his vassals, who obey his commands ; or the word may mean, 'Ruler of all India.'

यत्ते कश्चिदब्रवीत्तच्छृणवामेति ; अब्रवीन्मे जित्वा शैलिनिः, वाग्वै ब्रह्मेति ; यथा मातृमान्पितृमानाचार्यवान् ब्रूयात्, तथा तच्छैलिनिरब्रवीद्वाग्वै ब्रह्मेति, अवदतो हि किं स्यादिति ; अब्रवीत्तु ते तस्यायतनं प्रतिष्ठाम् ? न मेऽब्रवीदिति ; एकपाद्वा एतत्सम्राडिति ; स वै नो ब्रूहि याज्ञवल्क्य । वागेवायतनम्, आकाशः प्रतिष्ठा, प्रज्ञेत्येनदुपासीत ; का प्रज्ञता याज्ञवल्क्य ? वागेव सम्राडिति

होवाच । वाचा वै सम्राड्बन्धुः प्रज्ञायते, ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्वाङ्गिरस इतिहासः पुराणं विद्या उपनिषदः श्लोकाः सूत्राण्यनुव्याख्यानानि व्याख्यानानीष्टं हुतमाशितं पायितम्, अयं च लोकः, परश्च लोकः, सर्वाणि च भूतानि वाचैव सम्राट् प्रज्ञायन्ते; वाग्वै सम्राट् परमं ब्रह्म; नैनं वाग्जहाति, सर्वाण्येनं भूतान्यभिक्षरन्ति, देवो भूत्वा देवानप्येति, य एवं विद्वानेतदुपास्ते । हस्त्यृषभं सहस्रं ददामीति होवाच जनको वैदेहः । स होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः, पिता मेऽमन्यत नाननुशिष्य हरेतेति ॥ २ ॥

2. 'Let me hear what any one of your teachers may have told you.' 'Jitvan, the son of Śilina, has told me that the organ of speech (fire)[1] is Brahman.' 'As one who has a mother, father and teacher should say, so has the son of Śilina said this—that the organ of speech is Brahman, for what can a person have who cannot speak? But did he tell you about its abode (body) and support?' 'No, he did not.' 'This Brahman is only one-footed, O Emperor.' 'Then you tell us, Yājñavalkya.' 'The organ of speech is its abode, and the ether (the Undifferentiated) its support. It should be meditated upon as intelligence.' 'What is intelligence, Yājñavalkya?' 'The organ of speech itself, O Emperor,' said Yājñavalkya, 'through the

[1] Throughout this and the next six paragraphs, the organ means its presiding deity, except when it is the abode.

organ of speech, O Emperor, a friend is known; the Ṛg-Veda, Yajur-Veda, Sāma-Veda, Atharvāṅgirasa, (Vedic) history,[1] mythology, arts, Upaniṣads, verses, aphorisms, elucidations and explanations, (the effects of) sacrifices, (of) offering oblations in the fire and (of) giving food and drink, this world and the next, and all beings are known through the organ of speech alone, O Emperor. The organ of speech, O Emperor, is the Supreme Brahman. The organ of speech never leaves him who knowing thus meditates upon it, all beings eagerly come to him, and being a god, he attains the gods.' 'I give you a thousand cows with a bull like an elephant,' said Emperor Janaka. Yājñavalkya replied, 'My father was of opinion that one should not accept (wealth) from a disciple without fully instructing him.'

'But let me hear what any one of your teachers——for you serve several of them—*may have told you.'* The other said, 'My teacher *Jitvan, the son of Śilina, has told me that the organ of speech,* i.e. its presiding deity (fire), *is Brahman.'* Yājñavalkya said, *'As one who has a mother* adequately to instruct him in his childhood, a *father* to instruct him after that, *and* a *teacher* to instruct him from his initiation with the holy thread up to the completion of his studies, *should say*

[1] For an explanation of these terms see commentary on II. iv. 10.

to his disciple, *so has* Jitvan, *the son of Śilina, said this—that the organ of speech is Brahman.* One who has had the advantage of these three sources of purification is a teacher in the primary sense of the word, and never fails to be an authority himself. *For what can a person have who cannot speak?*—he achieves nothing either in this life or in the next.

'But did he tell you about the *abode and support* of that Brahman?' 'Abode' means the body ; 'support' is permanent resort. Janaka said, *'No, he did not.'* Yājñavalkya said, 'If so, *this Brahman is only one-footed,* and lacking the remaining three feet, it will not produce any effect, even though meditated upon.' *'Then you tell us, Yājñavalkya,* for you know (about them).' Yājñavalkya said, *'The organ of speech is its abode,* or the body of the deity of the organ of speech (fire), which is a form of Brahman, *and the ether* known as the Undifferentiated *its support* at its origin, during its continuance and at its dissolution. *It should be meditated upon as intelligence.* The secret name of intelligence is the fourth quarter of Brahman ; one should meditate upon this Brahman as intelligence.'

'What is intelligence, Yājñavalkya? Is intelligence itself meant, or its effect (speech)? Is it different from the organ of speech, like the body and support?' 'No.' 'What is it then?' *'The organ of speech itself, O Emperor,' said Yājñavalkya,* 'is intelligence: Intelligence is not different from the organ of speech.' How is it? The reply is being given: *Through the organ of speech, O Emperor, a friend is known,* when somebody

says, 'He is our friend.' Likewise *the Ṛg-Veda* etc. *Sacrifices* mean the spiritual effects produced by them; the same with *offering oblations,* as well as *giving food and drink. This world,* the present life, *the next* world, the life to come, *and all beings are known through the organ of speech alone, O Emperor.* Therefore *the organ of speech, O Emperor, is the Supreme Brahman. The organ of speech never leaves him,* the knower of the Brahman described above, *who knowing thus meditates upon it, all beings eagerly come to him* with offerings etc., *and being a god* in this very life, *he attains the gods,* is merged in them after death. *'I give you a thousand cows with a bull like an elephant,' said Emperor Janaka,* as a return for the instruction received. *Yājñavalkya replied, 'My father was of opinion that one should not accept* wealth *from a disciple without fully instructing* or satisfying *him.* I too hold that view.'

यदेव ते कश्चिदब्रवीत्तच्छृणवामेति ; अब्रवीन्म उदङ्कः शौल्बायनः, प्राणो वै ब्रह्मेति ; यथा मातृमान्पितृमानाचार्यवान्ब्रूयात्, तथा तच्छौल्बायनोऽब्रवीत्प्राणो वै ब्रह्मेति, अप्राणतो हि किं स्यादिति ; अब्रवीत्तु ते तस्यायतनं प्रतिष्ठाम्? न मेऽब्रवीदिति ; एकपाद्वा एतत्सम्राडिति ; स वै नो ब्रूहि याज्ञवल्क्य ; प्राण एवायतनम्, आकाशः प्रतिष्ठा, प्रियमित्येनदुपासीत ; का प्रियता याज्ञवल्क्य ? प्राण एव सम्राडिति होवाच, प्राणस्य वै सम्राट् कामायायाज्यं याजयति, अप्रतिगृह्यस्य प्रतिगृह्णात्यपि, तत्र वधाशङ्कं भवति यां दिशमेति प्राणस्यैव सम्राट् कामाय ;

प्राणो वै सम्राट् परमं ब्रह्म ; नैनं प्राणो जहाति, सर्वाण्येनं भूतान्यभिक्षरन्ति, देवो भूत्वा देवानप्येति, य एवं विद्वानेतदुपास्ते ; हस्त्यृषभं सहस्रं ददामीति होवाच जनको वैदेहः ; स होवाच याज्ञवल्क्य, पिता मेऽमन्यत नाननुशिष्य हरेतेति ॥ ३ ॥

3. 'Let me hear whatever any one may have told you.' 'Udaṅka, the son of Śulba, has told me that the vital force (Vāyu) is Brahman.' 'As one who has a mother, father and teacher should say, so has the son of Śulba said this— that the vital force is Brahman, for what can a person have who does not live? But did he tell you about its abode (body) and support?' 'No, he did not.' 'This Brahman is only one-footed, O Emperor.' 'Then you tell us, Yājñavalkya.' 'The vital force is its abode, and the ether (the Undifferentiated) its support. It should be meditated upon as dear.' 'What is dearness, Yājñavalkya?' 'The vital force itself, O Emperor,' said Yājñavalkya, 'for the sake of the vital force, O Emperor, one performs sacrifices for one for whom they should not be performed, and accepts gifts from one from whom they should not be accepted, and it is for the sake of the vital force, O Emperor, that one runs the risk of one's life in any quarter one may go to. The vital force, O Emperor, is

the Supreme Brahman. The vital force never leaves him who knowing thus meditates upon it, all beings eagerly come to him, and being a god, he attains the gods.' 'I give you a thousand cows with a bull like an elephant,' said Emperor Janaka. Yājñavalkya replied, 'My father was of opinion that one should not accept (wealth) from a disciple without fully instructing him.'

'Let me hear whatever,' etc. *'Udaṅka, the son of Śulba, has told me that the vital force is Brahman.'* 'The vital force' means the deity Vāyu, as 'the organ of speech' in the preceding paragraph meant the deity fire. *'The vital force is its abode, and the ether* (the Undifferentiated) *its support.'* Its secret name: *'It should be meditated upon as dear.' 'For the sake of the vital force, O Emperor, one performs sacrifices for one for whom they should not be performed,* such as even an outcast, *and* even *accepts gifts from one from whom they should not be accepted,* for instance, an Ugra[1]; and *one runs the risk of one's life in any quarter* infested by robbers etc. that *one may go to.* All this is possible because the vital force is dear: *It is for the sake of the vital force, O Emperor.* Therefore *the vital force, O Emperor, is the Supreme Brahman. The vital force never leaves him,'* etc. The rest has been explained.

यदेव ते कश्चिदब्रवीत्तच्छृणवामेति ; अब्रवीन्मे बर्कु-

[1] One born of a Kṣatriya father and a Śūdra mother, and generally characterised by cruelty.

र्वार्ष्णः, चक्षुर्वै ब्रह्मेति ; यथा मातृमान्पितृमानाचार्यवान्ब्रूयात्, तथा तद्वार्ष्णोऽब्रवीच्चक्षुर्वै ब्रह्मेति, अपश्यतो हि किं स्यादिति ; अब्रवीत्तु ते तस्यायतनं प्रतिष्ठाम् ? न मेऽब्रवीदिति ; एकपाद्वा एतत्सम्राडिति ; स वै नो ब्रूहि याज्ञवल्क्य ; चक्षुरेवायतनम्, आकाशः प्रतिष्ठा, सत्यमित्येनदुपासीत ; का सत्यता याज्ञवल्क्य ? चक्षुरेव सम्राडिति होवाच, चक्षुषा वै सम्राट् पश्यन्तमाहुरद्राक्षीरिति, स आहाद्राक्षमिति, तत्सत्यं भवति ; चक्षुर्वै सम्राट् परमं ब्रह्म ; नैनं चक्षुर्जहाति, सर्वाण्येनं भूतान्यभिक्षरन्ति, देवो भूत्वा देवानप्येति, य एवं विद्वानेतदुपास्ते ; हस्त्यृषभं सहस्रं ददामीति होवाच जनको वैदेहः ; स होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः, पिता मेऽमन्यत नाननुशिष्य हरेतेति ॥ ४ ॥

4. 'Let me hear whatever any one may have told you.' 'Barku, the son of Vṛṣṇa, has told me that the eye (sun) is Brahman.' 'As one who has a mother, father and teacher should say, so has the son of Vṛṣṇa said this—that the eye is Brahman. For what can a person have who cannot see? But did he tell you about its abode and support?' 'No, he did not.' 'This Brahman is only one-footed, O Emperor.' 'Then you tell us, Yājñavalkya.' 'The eye is its abode, and the ether (the Undifferentiated) its support. It should be meditated upon as truth.' 'What is truth, Yājñavalkya?' 'The eye itself, O Emperor,' said Yājñavalkya, 'if a

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person, O Emperor, says to one who has seen with the eyes, "Have you seen?" and one answers, "Yes, I have," then it is true. The eye, O Emperor, is the Supreme Brahman. The eye never leaves him who knowing thus meditates upon it; all beings eagerly come to him; and being a god, he attains the gods,' 'I give you a thousand cows with a bull like an elephant,' said Emperor Janaka. Yājñavalkya replied, 'My father was of opinion that one should not accept (wealth) from a disciple without fully instructing him.'

'Let me hear,' etc. *Barku, the son of Vṛṣṇa,* etc. *The eye is Brahman :* The sun is the presiding deity of the eye. The secret name is *truth.* 'Because what one hears with the ears may be false, but not what one sees with the eyes, therefore *if a person, O Emperor, says to one who has seen with the eyes, "Have you seen* the elephant?" *and he answers, "Yes, I have," then it is* considered *true* ; while if another says, "I have heard of it," it may not correspond with fact. But what is seen with the eyes is always true, as it corresponds with fact.'

यदेव ते कश्चिदब्रवीत्तच्छृणवामेति ; अब्रवीन्मे गर्दभीविपीतो भारद्वाजः, श्रोत्रं वै ब्रह्मेति ; यथा मातृमान्पितृमानाचार्यवान्ब्रूयात्, तथा तद्भारद्वाजोऽब्रवीच्छ्रोत्रं वै ब्रह्मेति, अशृण्वतो हि किं स्यादिति ; अब्रवीत्तु ते तस्यायतनं प्रतिष्ठाम्? न मेऽब्रवीदिति ; एकपाद्वा एतत्सम्राडिति ;

स वै नो ब्रूहि याज्ञवल्क्य ; श्रोत्रमेवायतनम्, आकाशः प्रतिष्ठा, अनन्त इत्येनदुपासीत ; कानन्तता याज्ञवल्क्य ? दिश एव सम्राडिति होवाच, तस्माद्वै सम्राडपि यां कां च दिशं गच्छति नैवास्या अन्तं गच्छति, अनन्ता हि दिशः ; दिशो वै सम्राट् श्रोत्रम्, श्रोत्रं वै सम्राट् परमं ब्रह्म ; नैनं श्रोत्रं जहाति, सर्वाण्येनं भूतान्यभिक्षरन्ति, देवो भूत्वा देवानप्येति, य एवं विद्वानेतदुपास्ते ; हस्त्यृषभं सहस्रं ददामीति होवाच जनको वैदेहः ; स होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः, पिता मेऽमन्यत नाननुशिष्य हरेतेति ॥ ५ ॥

5. 'Let me hear whatever any one may have told you.' 'Gardabhīvipīta, of the line of Bharadvāja, has told me that the ear (the quarters) is Brahman.' 'As one who has a mother, father and teacher should say, so has the descendant of Bharadvāja said this—that the ear is Brahman, for what can a person have who cannot hear? But did he tell you about its abode and support?' 'No, he did not.' 'This Brahman is only one-footed, O Emperor.' 'Then you tell us, Yājñavalkya.' 'The ear is its abode, and the ether (the Undifferentiated) its support. It should be meditated upon as infinite.' 'What is infinity, Yājñavalkya' 'the quarters themselves, O Emperor,' said Yājñavalkya, 'therefore, O Emperor, to whatever direction one may go, one never reaches its end. (Hence) the quarters are infinite. The quarters, O Emperor,

are the ear, and the ear, O Emperor, is the Supreme Brahman. The ear never leaves him who knowing thus meditates upon it; all beings eagerly come to him; and being a god, he attains the gods.' 'I give you a thousand cows with a bull like an elephant,' said Emperor Janaka. Yājñavalkya replied, 'My father was of opinion that one should not accept (wealth) from a disciple without fully instructing him.'

'Let me hear,' etc. *Gardabhīvipīta, of the line of Bharadvāja,* etc. *The ear is Brahman:* The quarters are the presiding deities of the ear. *'It should be meditated upon as infinite.' 'What is* the *infinity* of the ear?' 'Because *the quarters themselves* are the infinity, *therefore, O Emperor, to whatever direction,* east or north, *one may go, one never reaches its end.* Hence *the quarters are infinite. The quarters, O Emperor, are the ear.* Therefore the infinity of the quarters is also that of the ear.'

यदेव ते कश्चिदब्रवीत्तच्छृणवामेति ; अब्रवीन्मे सत्यकामो जाबालः मनो वै ब्रह्मेति ; यथा मातृमान्पितृमानाचार्यवान्ब्रूयात्, तथा तज्जाबालोऽब्रवीन्मनो वै ब्रह्मेति, अमनसो हि किं स्यादिति ; अब्रवीत्तु ते तस्यायतनं प्रतिष्ठाम् ? न मेऽब्रवीदिति ; एकपाद्वा एतत्सम्राडिति ; स वै नो ब्रूहि याज्ञवल्क्य ; मन एवायतनम्, आकाशः प्रतिष्ठा, आनन्द इत्येनदुपासीत ; कानन्दता याज्ञवल्क्य ? मन एव सम्राडिति होवाच, मनसा वै सम्राट् स्त्रियम-

भिहार्यते, तस्यां प्रतिरूपः पुत्रो जायते, स आनन्दः; मनो वै सम्राट् परमं ब्रह्म; नैनं मनो जहाति, सर्वाण्येनं भूतान्यभिक्षरन्ति, देवो भूत्वा देवानप्येति, य एवं विद्वानेतदुपास्ते; हस्त्यृषभं सहस्रं ददामीति होवाच जनको वैदेहः; स होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः, पिता मेऽमन्यत नाननुशिष्य हरेतेति ॥ ६ ॥

6. 'Let me hear whatever any one may have told you.' 'Satyakāma, the son of Jabālā, has told me that the Manas (here, the moon) is Brahman.' 'As one who has a mother, father and teacher should say, so has the son of Jabālā said this—that the Manas is Brahman, for what can a person without the Manas have? But did he tell you about its abode and support?' 'No, he did not.' 'This Brahman is only one-footed, O Emperor.' 'Then you tell us, Yājñavalkya.' 'The Manas is its abode, and the ether (the Undifferentiated) its support. It should be meditated upon as bliss.' 'What is bliss, Yājñavalkya?' 'The Manas itself, O Emperor,' said Yājñavalkya, 'with the Manas, O Emperor, a man (fancies and) woos a woman. A son resembling him is born of her, and he is the cause of bliss. The Manas, O Emperor, is the Supreme Brahman. The Manas never leaves him who knowing thus meditates upon it; all beings eagerly come to him; and being a god, he

attains the gods.' 'I give you a thousand cows with a bull like an elephant,' said Emperor Janaka. Yājñavalkya replied, 'My father was of opinion that one should not accept (wealth) from a disciple without fully instructing him.'

'Satyakāma, the son of Jabālā,'* etc. The moon is the presiding deity of the Manas. The secret name is *bliss*. 'Because the Manas itself is bliss, therefore *with the Manas a man* fancies and *woos a woman*. From that *a son resembling him is born* of that woman, *and* that son *is the cause of bliss;* therefore the Manas, which brings this son into being, is bliss.'

यदेव ते कश्चिदब्रवीत्तच्छृणवामेति ; अब्रवीन्मे विदग्धः शाकल्यः, हृदयं वै ब्रह्मेति ; यथा मातृमान्पितृमानाचार्यवान्ब्रूयात्, तथा तच्छाकल्योऽब्रवीद्धृदयं वै ब्रह्मेति, अहृदयस्य हि किं स्यादिति ; अब्रवीत्तु ते तस्यायतनं प्रतिष्ठाम् ? न मेऽब्रवीदिति ; एकपाद्वा एतत्सम्राडिति, स वै नो ब्रूहि याज्ञवल्क्य ; हृदयमेवायतनम्, आकाशः प्रतिष्ठा, स्थितिरित्येनदुपासीत ; का स्थितता याज्ञवल्क्य ? हृदयमेव सम्राडिति होवाच, हृदयं वै सम्राट् सर्वेषां भूतानामायतनम्, हृदयं वै सम्राट् सर्वेषां भूतानां प्रतिष्ठा, हृदये ह्येव सम्राट् सर्वाणि भूतानि प्रतिष्ठितानि भवन्ति ; हृदयं वै सम्राट् परमं ब्रह्म ; नैनं हृदयं जहाति, सर्वाण्येनं भूतान्यभिक्षरन्ति, देवो भूत्वा देवानप्येति, य एवं विद्वानेतदुपास्ते ; हस्त्यृषभं सहस्रं ददामीति होवाच जनको

वैदेहः ; स होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः, पिता मेऽमन्यत नाननुशिष्य हरेतेति ॥ ७ ॥ इति प्रथमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

7. 'Let me hear whatever any one may have told you.' 'Vidagdha, the son of Śakala, has told me that the heart (mind, here, Prajāpati) is Brahman.' 'As one who has a mother, father and teacher should say, so has the son of Śakala said this—that the heart is Brahman. For what can a person without the heart have? But did he tell you about its abode and support?' 'No, he did not.' 'This Brahman is only one-footed, O Emperor.' 'Then you tell us, Yājñavalkya.' 'The heart is its abode, and the ether (the Undifferentiated) its support. It should be meditated upon as stability.' 'What is stability, Yājñavalkya?' 'The heart itself, O Emperor,' said Yājñavalkya, 'the heart, O Emperor, is the abode of all beings, and the heart, O Emperor, is the support of all beings; on the heart, O Emperor, all beings rest; the heart, O Emperor, is the Supreme Brahman. The heart never leaves him who knowing thus meditates upon it; all beings eagerly come to him; and being a god, he attains the gods.' 'I give you a thousand cows with a bull like an elephant,' said Emperor Janaka. Yājñavalkya replied, 'My father was of opinion that one should not

accept (wealth), from a disciple without fully instructing him.'

Vidagdha, the son of Śakala, etc. *The heart is Brahman. The heart, O Emperor, is the abode of all beings.* We have already said in the section relating to Śākalya that all beings consisting of name, form and action depend on the heart (mind) and rest on it.[1] 'Therefore *on the heart, O Emperor, all beings rest.* Hence *it should be meditated upon as stability.*' Prajāpati (Hiraṇyagarbha) is the presiding deity of the heart.

[1] See commentary on III. ix. 24.

SECTION II

जनको ह वैदेहः कूर्चादुपावसर्पन्नुवाच, नमस्तेऽस्तु याज्ञवल्क्य, अनु मा शाधीति ; स होवाच, यथा वै सम्राण्महान्तमध्वानमेष्यन् रथं वा नावं वा समाददीत, एवमेवैताभिरुपनिषद्भिः समाहितात्मासि ; एवं वृन्दारक आढ्यः सन्नधीतवेद उक्तोपनिषत्क इतो विमुच्यमानः क्व गमिष्यसीति ; नाहं तद्भगवन्वेद यत्र गमिष्यामीति ; अथ वै तेऽहं तद्वक्ष्यामि यत्र गमिष्यसीति ; ब्रवीतु भगवानिति ॥ १ ॥

1. Janaka, Emperor of Videha, rose from his lounge and approaching Yājñavalkya said, 'Salutations to you, Yājñavalkya, please instruct me.' Yājñavalkya replied, 'As one wishing to go a long distance, O Emperor, should secure a chariot or a boat, so have you fully equipped your mind with so many secret names (of Brahman). You are likewise respected and wealthy, and you have studied the Vedas and heard the Upaniṣads; (but) where will you go when you are separated from this body ?' 'I do not know, sir, where I shall go.' 'Then I will tell you where you will go.' 'Tell me, sir.'

Janaka, Emperor of Videha, etc. As Yājñavalkya knew all aspects of Brahman with their attributes,

Janaka gave up his pride of teachership, *rose from his lounge,* a particular kind of seat, *and approaching Yājñavalkya,* i.e. prostrating himself at his feet, *said, 'Salutations to you, Yājñavalkya, please instruct me.'* The word 'iti' marks the close of his speech. *Yājñavalkya replied, 'As* in the world *one wishing to go a long distance should secure a chariot,* if he wants to go by land, *or a boat,* if he wants to go by water, *so have you fully equipped your mind with so many secret names* (of Brahman)—by meditating upon Brahman in so many aspects bearing those names. Not only that, *you are likewise respected and wealthy,* not poor, *and you have studied the Vedas and heard the Upaniṣads* from teachers. Although you are thus endowed with all glories, you are but in the midst of fear owing to the absence of Self-knowledge, i.e. you are far from achieving the object of your life, till you realise the Supreme Brahman. With all this outfit serving as a boat or chariot, *where will you go when you are separated from this body?* What will you attain?' *'I do not know, sir, where I shall go.'* 'If thus you do not know where you will go to achieve the object of your life, *then I will tell you where you will go.' 'Tell me, sir,* if you are gracious to me.' 'Listen.'

इन्धो ह वै नामैष योऽयं दक्षिणेऽक्षन्पुरुषः ; तं वा एतमिन्धं सन्तमिन्द्र इत्याचक्षते परोक्षेणैव ; परोक्षप्रिया इव हि देवाः प्रत्यक्षद्विषः ॥ २ ॥

2. This being who is in the right eye is named Indha. Though he is Indha, he is

indirectly called Indra, for the gods have a fondness, as it were, for indirect names, and hate to be called directly.

This being who is specially located *in the right eye* —the being in the sun who has been described before in the dictum, 'The eye is Brahman' (IV. i. 4), and is called Satya—*is named Indha.* This being, on account of his resplendence, has an obvious name, Indha. *Though he is Indha, he is indirectly called Indra, for the gods have a fondness, as it were, for indirect names, and hate to be called directly.* Thus you have attained the self called Vaiśvānara.

अथैतद्वामेऽक्षणि पुरुषरूपमेषास्य पत्नी विराट्; तयोरेष संस्तावो य एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशः; अथैनयोरेतदन्नं य एषोऽन्तर्हृदये लोहितपिण्डः; अथैनयोरेतत्प्रावरणं यदेतदन्तर्हृदये जालकमिव; अथैनयोरेषा सृतिः संचरणी यैषा हृदयादूर्ध्वा नाड्युच्चरति; यथा केशः सहस्रधा भिन्न एवम्; अस्यैता हिता नाम नाड्योऽन्तर्हृदये प्रतिष्ठिता भवन्ति, एताभिर्वा एतदास्रवदास्रवति; तस्मादेष प्रविविक्ताहारतर इवैव भवत्यस्माच्छारीरादात्मनः ॥ ३ ॥

3. The human form that is in the left eye is his wife, Virāj (matter). The space that is within the heart is their place of union. Their food is the lump of blood (the finest essence of what we eat) in the heart. Their wrap is the net-like structure in the heart. Their road for moving is the nerve that goes upward from the

heart ; it is like a hair split into a thousand parts. In this body there are nerves called Hitā, which are placed in the heart. Through these the essence of our food passes as it moves on. Therefore the subtle body has finer food than the gross body.

The human form that is in the left eye is his wife, Virāj. Of Indra or the self called Vaiśvānara whom you have attained, Virāj, or matter, is the wife, both being objects of enjoyment. This couple, matter and its enjoyer, is united in dreams.[1] How? *The space that is within* the lump of flesh called *the heart is their place of union,* the place where Indra and his wife enjoy each other's company. *Their food,* or means of sustenance, *is* the following. What is it? *The lump of blood*—(lit.) blood in the form of a lump—*in the heart.* The food we eat takes two forms ; the gross part goes down (and is excreted), and the rest is metabolised in two ways under the action of the internal heat. That part of the chyle which is of medium fineness passes through the successive stages of blood etc., and nourishes the gross body made up of the five elements. The finest part of the chyle is 'the lump of blood,' which, penetrating our fine nerves, causes Indra—identified with the subtle body and called Taijasa—who is united with his wife in the heart, to stay in the

[1] Viśva (or Vaiśvānara), Taijasa and Prājña are the names of the self as identified with the gross, the subtle and the causal body, respectively, in the states of wakefulness, dream and dreamless sleep. Hence the Vaiśvānara itself is now being described as the Taijasa for the purpose of meditation.

body. This is what is expressed by the passage, 'Their food,' etc.

There are other things also. *Their wrap is,* etc. People who sleep after their meals use wraps ; the Śruti is fancying that similarity here. What is the wrap of this couple? *The net-like structure in the heart.* 'Net-like,' because of the numerous openings of the nerves. *Their road for moving,* or coming from the dream to the waking state, *is the nerve that goes upward from the heart.* Its size is being given: As in the world *a hair split into a thousand parts* is extremely fine, so is it. *In this body there are nerves called Hitā, which are placed in* that lump of flesh, *the heart.* From it they branch off everywhere like the filaments of a Kadamba flower. *Through these* extremely fine nerves *the food passes as it moves on.* The body of Indra (the subtle body) is nourished by this food and held fast as by a cord. Because the gross body is nourished by gross food, but this subtle body, the body of Indra, is sustained by fine food. The food that nourishes the gross body is also fine, in comparison with the gross substances in the body that are eliminated ; but the food that sustains the subtle body is finer than that. Hence the gross body has fine food, but *the subtle body has finer food than the gross body.* 'Śārīra' in the text is the same as 'Śarīra' (body). The idea is that the Taijasa is nourished by finer food than the Vaiśvānara.

तस्य प्राची दिक् प्राञ्चः प्राणाः, दक्षिणा दिग्दक्षिणे प्राणाः, प्रतीची दिक् प्रत्यञ्चः प्राणाः, उदीची दिगुदञ्चः प्राणाः, ऊर्ध्वा दिगूर्ध्वाः प्राणाः, अवाची दिगवाञ्चः

प्राणाः, सर्वा दिशः सर्वे प्राणाः ; स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा ; अगृह्यो नहि गृह्यते, अशीर्यो नहि शीर्यते, असङ्गो न हि सज्यते, असितो न व्यथते न रिष्यति ; अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसीति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः । स होवाच जनको वैदेहः, अभयं त्वा गच्छताद्याज्ञवल्क्य यो नो भगवन्नभयं वेदयसे ; नमस्तेऽस्तु ; इमे विदेहाः, अयमहमस्मि ॥ ४ ॥

इति द्वितीयं ब्राह्मणम्

4. Of the sage (who is identified with the vital force[1]), the east is the eastern vital force, the south the southern vital force, the west the western vital force, the north the northern vital force, the direction above the upper vital force, the direction below the nether vital force, and all the quarters the different vital forces. This self is That which has been described as 'Not this, not this,' 'It is imperceptible, for It is never perceived ; undecaying, for It never decays ; unattached, for It is never attached ; unfettered—It never feels pain, and never suffers injury. You have attained That which is free from fear, O Janaka,' said Yājñavalkya. 'Revered Yājñavalkya,' said Emperor Janaka, 'may That which is free from fear be yours, for you have made That which is free from fear known to us.

[1] That is, the Prājña, of which the vital force is a limiting adjunct.

Salutations to you! Here is this (empire of) Videha, as well as myself at your service!'

This Taijasa which is identified with the heart (mind) is supported by the subtle vital force, and becomes the vital force, (here, the Prājña). *Of the sage* who has first attained the Vaiśvānara, then the Taijasa, or the self identified with the mind, and after that the self identified with the vital force (Prājña), *the east is the eastern vital force;* similarly *the south the southern vital force,* likewise *the west the western vital force, the north the northern vital force, the direction above the upper vital force, the direction below the nether vital force, and all the quarters the different vital forces.* Thus the sage identifies himself, by stages, with the vital force that comprises everything. Then withdrawing this all-comprising vital force into the inner self, he next attains the natural state of the Witness, the transcendent Self that is described as 'Not this, not this.' *This self* which the sage thus attains *is That which has been described as 'Not this, not this.'* This passage, up to 'never suffers injury,' has already been explained (III. ix. 26). *'You have attained That which is free from fear* due to birth, death, etc., *O Janaka,' said Yājñavalkya.* This is in fulfilment of the statement, 'Then I will tell you where you will go.' *'Revered Yājñavalkya,' said Emperor Janaka, 'may That which is free from fear be yours* too, *for you have made That which is free from fear,* the Brahman, *known* or accessible *to us,* by the removal of the veil of ignorance created by the limiting

adjuncts. What else can I give you in return for this knowledge, for you have presented the Ātman Itself? Hence *salutations to you! This* (empire of) *Videha* is yours—enjoy it just as you will: I *myself* too am *at your service*. Please use me as well as the empire just as you like.'

SECTION III

The connection of the present section with the preceding portion is as follows: The individual self—the Brahman that is immediate and direct, the self that is within all—is identical with the Supreme Self. We know this from such Śruti texts as, 'There is no other witness but Him' (III. vii. 23), and 'There is no other witness but This' (III. viii. 11), as well as 'This self has entered into these bodies' (I. iv. 7), and it is inferred from its functions of speech etc. That it exists and is different from the body, has been known in the dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru (II. i.) in the Madhukāṇḍa from the denial of agency and enjoyment to the vital force etc. Nevertheless, in the section dealing with the question of Uṣasta, in the words, 'That which breathes through the Prāṇa,' etc. (III. iv. 1), it has been known in a general way, from the introduction of the functions of breathing etc., that the self is to be inferred from these functions, and in the words, 'Witness of vision,' etc. (III. iv. 2), it has been more particularly known as being by nature constant intelligence. It suffers transmigration owing to adventitious limiting adjuncts,[1] as for instance the appearance of a rope, a desert, a mother-of-pearl, and the sky as a snake, water, silver and blue respectively, is due to the superimposition of foreign elements, not intrinsically. But devoid of the limiting adjuncts, it is known as

[1] Ignorance and its effects.

indefinable, to be described only as 'Not this, not this,' the Brahman that is immediate and direct, the self that is within all, the Immutable, the Internal Ruler, the mighty Ruler, the Being who is to be known only through the Upaniṣads, Knowledge, Bliss and Brahman. That same Brahman which is immediate and within all has again been taught (by the mention of some particular ways of attaining It). (Lastly, it has been stated:) He who is called Indha (Vaiśvānara) takes fine food ; beyond it, in the heart, is the self identified with the subtle body, which takes finer food ; higher still is the self identified with the universe, which has the vital force for its limiting adjunct (i.e. the Prājña). By dissolving (in the Supreme Self) through knowledge even this self identified with the universe, which is but a limiting adjunct, like the snake, for instance, in the rope, (the transcendent Brahman referred to in the passage), 'This self is That which has been described as "Not this, not this" ' (III. ix. 26), has been known. Thus did Yājñavalkya set Janaka beyond fear by a brief reference to scriptural evidence. Here, in a different connection,[1] the states of wakefulness, dream, profound sleep and transcendence have been introduced in the words, 'Indha,' 'Has finer food,' 'The different vital forces,' and 'This self is That which has been described as "Not this, not this," ' Now Brahman is to be studied at length through those very states of wakefulness etc., with the help of valid reasoning ; Janaka is to be helped to attain the

[1] To show the order of gradual emancipation.

Brahman that is beyond fear ; the existence of the self should be established by the removal of the doubts raised against it ; and it should be known as being different from the body, pure, self-effulgent, by nature identical with constant intelligence and superlative bliss, and beyond duality. For this purpose the present section is introduced. The story is meant to indicate the method of imparting and receiving the instruction, and is particularly a eulogy on knowledge, as is suggested by the granting of the boon etc.[1]

जनकं ह वैदेहं याज्ञवल्क्यो जगाम ; स मेने न वदिष्य इति ; अथ ह यज्जनकश्च वैदेहो याज्ञवल्क्यश्चाग्निहोत्रे समूदाते, तस्मै ह याज्ञवल्क्यो वरं ददौ ; स ह कामप्रश्नमेव वव्रे, तं हास्मै ददौ ; तं ह सम्राडेव पूर्वं पप्रच्छ ॥१॥

1. Yājñavalkya went to Janaka, Emperor of Videha. He thought he would not say anything. Now Janaka and Yājñavalkya had once talked on the Agnihotra, and Yājñavalkya had offered him a boon. He had begged the liberty of asking any questions he liked ; and Yājñavalkya had granted him the boon. So it was the Emperor who first asked him.

Yājñavalkya went to Janaka, Emperor of Videha. While going, *he thought he would not say anything* to the Emperor. The object of the visit was to get more wealth and maintain that already possessed. Yājña-

[1] Since the Emperor chose this very boon, in preference to any other.

valkya, although he had resolved not to say anything, explained whatever Janaka asked. Why did he act contrary to his intentions? The answer to this is given by the story here related. Sometime in the past there had been a talk between Janaka and Yājñavalkya *on* the subject of *the Agnihotra.* On that occasion *Yājña-valkya,* pleased with Janaka's knowledge on the subject, *had offered him a boon.* Janaka thereupon *had begged the liberty of asking any questions he liked; and Yājñavalkya had granted him the boon.* On the strength of that boon *it was the Emperor* Janaka *who first asked him,* although Yājñavalkya was in no mood to explain and was silent. That Janaka had not put his question on the previous occasion was due to the fact that the knowledge of Brahman is contradictory to rituals (hence the topic would be out of place), and is independent: It is not the effect of anything, and serves the highest end of man independently of any auxiliary factors.

याज्ञवल्क्य किंज्योतिरयं पुरुष इति। आदित्यज्योतिः सम्राडिति होवाच, आदित्येनैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीति; एवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य ॥ २ ॥

2. 'Yājñavalkya, what serves as the light for a man?' 'The light of[2] the sun, O Emperor,' said Yājñavalkya, 'it is through the light of the sun that he sits, goes out, works and returns.' 'Just so, Yājñavalkya.'

Yājñavalkya—Janaka addresses him by name to

[1] Offering oblations in the sacred fire.
[2] The 'of' is here appositional.

draw his attention—*what serves as the light for a man,* which he uses in his everyday life? The question is about the ordinary man, with head, hands, etc., identifying himself with the body and organs. Does he use a light extraneous to his body, which is made up of parts, or does some light included in this aggregate of parts serve the purpose of a light for him? This is the question.

Question : What difference does it make if he uses a light extraneous to his body or one forming a part of it?

Reply : Listen. If it is decided that he by his very nature has to use a light extraneous to his body, then with regard to the effects of a light that is invisible we shall infer that they are also due to an extraneous light. If, on the other hand, he acts through a light not extraneous to the body, but part and parcel of himself, then, where the effects of a light are visible, although the light itself is invisible, we can infer that the light in question must be an inner one. If, however, there is no restriction as to whether the light which a person uses is within or without himself, then there is no decision on the matter of the light. Thinking thus Janaka asks Yājñavalkya. 'What is the light for a man?'

Objection : Well, if Janaka is so clever at reasoning, what is the use of his asking questions? Why does he not decide it for himself?

Reply : True, but here the thing to be inferred, the grounds of inference, and their various relations are so subtle that they are considered a puzzle even for a number of scholars, not to speak of one. It is for

this reason that in deciding subtle religious matters deliberation by a conference is sought. A good deal also depends upon individual qualifications. A conference may accordingly consist of ten persons, or three, or one. Therefore, though the Emperor is skilled in reasoning, yet it is quite proper for him to ask Yājñavalkya, because *people may have varying capacities for understanding. Or it may be that the Śruti itself teaches us through the garb of a story, by* setting forth a mode of reasoning in conformity with our ways of thinking.

Yājñavalkya too, knowing Janaka's intention, desired to teach him about the light of the self that is other than the body, and took up a ground of inference that would establish this extracorporeal light. For instance, he *said, 'The light of the* well-known *sun, O Emperor.'* How? *'It is through the light of the sun,* which is outside his body and helps the function of the eyes, *that* the ordinary man *sits, goes out* to the field or forest, and going there *works and returns* the way he went.' The use of many specifications is to indicate that the light[1] is well known to be essentially different from the body; and the citing of many external lights is to show that the ground of inference is unfailing. *'Just so, Yājñavalkya.'*

अस्तमित आदित्ये याज्ञवल्क्य किंज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष इति, चन्द्रमा एवास्य ज्योतिर्भवतीति, चन्द्रमसैवायं

[1] Which remains the same under all these varying circumstances.

ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीति ; एवमेवैत-
द्याज्ञवल्क्य ॥ ३ ॥

3. 'When the sun has set, Yājñavalkya, what serves as the light for a man?' 'The moon serves as his light. It is through the light of the moon that he sits, goes out, works and returns.' 'Just so, Yājñavalkya.'

Likewise, *'When the sun has set, Yājñavalkya, what serves as the light for a man?' 'The moon serves as his light.'*

अस्तमित आदित्ये याज्ञवल्क्य, चन्द्रमस्यस्तमिते किं-
ज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष इति ; अग्निरेवास्य ज्योतिर्भवतीति,
अग्निनैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीति ;
एवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य ॥ ४ ॥

4. 'When the sun and the moon have both set, Yājñavalkya, what serves as the light for a man?' 'The fire serves as his light. It is through the fire that he sits, goes out, works and returns.' 'Just so, Yājñavalkya.'

When the sun and the moon have both set, the fire serves as the *light.*

अस्तमित आदित्ये याज्ञवल्क्य, चन्द्रमस्यस्तमिते,
शान्तेऽग्नौ किंज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष इति ; वागेवास्य
ज्योतिर्भवतीति, वाचैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म
कुरुते विपल्येतीति ; तस्माद्वै सम्राडपि यत्र स्वः पाणिर्न

विनिर्ज्ञायते, अथ यत्र वागुच्चरति, उपैव तत्र न्येतीति ; एवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य ॥ ५ ॥

5. 'When the sun and the moon have both set, and the fire has gone out, Yājñavalkya, what serves as the light for a man?' 'Speech (sound) serves as his light. It is through the light of speech that he sits, goes out, works and returns. Therefore, O Emperor, even when one's own hand is not clearly visible, if a sound is uttered, one manages to go there.' 'Just so, Yājñavalkya.'

When the fire has gone out, speech serves as the *light*. 'Speech' here means sound. Sound, which is the object of hearing, stimulates the ear, its organ ; this gives rise to discrimination in the mind ; through that mind a man engages in an outward action. Elsewhere it has been said, 'It is through the mind that one sees and hears' (I. v. 3). How can speech be called a light, for it is not known to be such? The answer is being given: *'Therefore, O Emperor,'* etc. Because a man lives and moves in the world helped by the light of speech, therefore it is a well-known fact that speech serves as a light. How? *'Even when*, as in the rainy season, owing to the darkness created by clouds generally blotting out all light, *one's own hand is not clearly visible*—though every activity is then stopped owing to the want of external light—*if a sound is uttered*, as for instance a dog barks or an ass brays, *one manages to go there*. That sound acts as a light

and connects the ear with the mind; thus speech (sound) does the function of a light there. With the help of that sound serving as a light, the man actually goes there, works at that place and returns.' The mention of the light of speech includes odour etc. For when odour and the rest also help the nose and other organs, a man is induced to act or dissuaded from it, and so on. So they too help the body and organs. 'Just so, Yājñavalkya.'

अस्तमित आदित्ये याज्ञवल्क्य, चन्द्रमस्यस्तमिते, शान्तेऽग्नौ, शान्तायां वाचि किंज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष इति; आत्मैवास्य ज्योतिर्भवतीति, आत्मनैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीति ॥ ६ ॥

6. 'When the sun and the moon have both set, the fire has gone out, and speech has stopped, Yājñavalkya, what serves as the light for a man?' 'The self serves as his light. It is through the light of the self that he sits, goes out, works and returns.' 'Just so, Yājñavalkya.'

When speech also *has stopped* and other external aids too, such as odour, all the activities of the man would stop. The idea is this: When the eyes and other organs, which are outgoing in their tendencies, are helped in the waking state by lights such as the sun, then a man vividly lives and moves in the world. So we see that in the waking state a light extraneous to his body, which is an aggregate of parts, serves as the light for him. From this we conclude that when

all external light is blotted out in the states of dream and profound sleep, as well as in similar circumstances of the waking state, a light extraneous to his body serves the purpose of a light for him. We see also that the purpose of a light is served in dreams, as for instance meeting and parting from friends, going to other places, etc.; and we awake from deep sleep with the remembrance[1] that we slept happily and knew nothing. Therefore there exists some extraneous light. What is that light which acts when speech has stopped? The reply is being given: *'The self serves as his light.'* By the word 'self' is meant that light which is different from one's body and organs, and illumines them like the external lights such as the sun, but is itself not illumined by anything else. And on the principle of the residuum it is inside the body ; for it has already been proved that it is different from the body and organs, and we have seen that a light which is different from the body and organs and helps their work is perceived by the organs such as the eye , but the light that we are discussing (the self) is not perceived by the eye etc., when lights such as the sun have ceased to work. Since, however, we see that the usual effects of a light are there, we conclude that *'it is through the light of the self that he sits, goes out, works and returns.'* Therefore we understand that this light must be inside the body. But it is different from lights such as the sun, and immaterial. That is why, unlike the sun etc., it is not perceived by the eye and so forth.

[1] Which shows that the light in question was there.

Objection (by the materialist): No, for we see that only things of the same class help each other. You are wrong to state as a proved fact that there is an inner light different from the sun etc. Why? Because we observe that the body and organs, which are material, are helped by lights such as the sun, which also are material and of the same class as the things helped. Here too we must infer in accordance with observed facts. Supposing that the light that helps the work of the body and organs is different from them like the sun etc., still it must be inferred as being of the same class as these, for the very reason that it helps them, as is the case with lights such as the sun. Your statement that because it is internal and is not perceived, it is different (from lights such as the sun), is falsified in the case of the eye etc.; for lights such as the eye are not perceived and are internal, but they are material just the same. Therefore it is only your imagination that you have proved the light of the self to be essentially different from the body etc.

Moreover, as the existence of the light in question depends on that of the body and organs, it is presumed to possess the characteristics of the latter. Your inference,[1] being of the kind that is not based on a causal relation, is fallacious, because it is contradicted[2]; and it is by means of such an inference that you establish the light in question (the self) to be different

[1] For example, whatever reveals another thing is different from it.

[2] For instance, the eye, which (according to the materialists) reveals the body, is not different from it.

from the body and organs, like the sun and so forth (being different from the objects they reveal). Besides, perception cannot be nullified by inference ; and we see that this aggregate of body and organs sees, hears, thinks and knows. If that other light helps this aggregate like the sun etc., it cannot be the self, any more than the sun and the rest are. Rather it is the aggregate of body and organs, which directly does the functions of seeing etc., that is the self, and none else, for inference is invalid when it contradicts perception.

Reply : If this aggregate be the self that does the functions of seeing etc., how is it that, remaining as it is, it sometimes performs those functions and sometimes does not?

Objection : There is nothing wrong in it, because it is an observed fact. You cannot challenge facts on the ground of improbability. When you actually observe a fire-fly to be both luminous and non-luminous, you do not have to infer some other cause for it. If, however, you do infer it from some common feature, you may as well infer anything about everything, and nobody wants that. Nor must one deny the natural property of objects, for the natural heat of fire or the cold of water is not due to any other cause.

Reply : Suppose we say it all depends on the merits or demerits of people?

Objection : Then those merits or demerits themselves might habitually depend on some other cause.

Reply : What if they do?

Objection: It would lead to a *regressus in infinitum*, which is not desirable.

Reply: Not so, for in dreams and remembrance we notice only things seen before. What the advocate of the nature theory has said about the functions of sight etc. belonging to the body, and not to the self, which is different from it, is wrong, for if these functions really belonged to the body, one would not see in a dream only things already seen. A blind man dreaming sees only things that he has already seen, and not unfamiliar forms, which one would find in Śākadvīpa,[1] for instance. This proves that he alone who sees in a dream only familiar things also saw things before, while the eyes were there—and not the body. If the body were the seer, it would not see in a dream only familiar sights when the eyes, the instruments of its vision, are taken out. And we know that even blind men, who have had their eyes taken out, say, 'To-day I saw in a dream the Himalayan peak that I had seen before.' Therefore it is clear that it is not the body, but he who dreams, that also saw things when the eyes were intact.

Similarly, in the case of remembrance, he who remembers being also the one who saw, the two are identical. Thus only can a person, after shutting his eyes, remember the forms he has seen before, just as he saw them. Therefore that which is shut is not the seer; but that which, when the eyes are shut, sees forms in remembrance, must have been the seer when

[1] One of the divisions of the earth situated round Mt. Meru.

the eyes were open. This is further proved by the fact that when the body is dead, no vision takes place, although the body is intact. If the body itself were the seer, even a dead body would continue to see and do similar functions. Therefore it is clear that the real agent of seeing etc. is not the body, but that whose absence deprives the body of the power of vision, and whose presence gives it that power.

Objection : Suppose the eyes and other organs themselves were the agents of vision and so forth?

Reply : No : the remembrance that one is touching the very thing that one has seen, would be impossible if there were different agents for these two acts.

Objection : Then let us say, it is the mind.

Reply : No ; the mind also, being an object, like colour etc., cannot be the agent of vision and so forth. Therefore we conclude that the light in question is inside the body, and yet different from it like the sun etc.

You said, 'Some light which is of the same class as the body and organs must be inferred, since the sun and the like are of the same class as the things they help.' This is wrong, for there is no hard and fast rule about this help. To explain: We see that fire is kindled with the help of straw, grass and other fuel, which are all modifications of earth. But from this we must not conclude that everywhere it is the modifications of earth that help to light a fire, for we notice that water, which belongs to a different class, helps to kindle the fire of lightning and the fire in the stomach.

Therefore, when something is helped by another, there is no restriction about their being of the same class or of different classes. Sometimes men are helped by men, their own species, and sometimes by animals, plants, etc., which are of different species. Therefore the reason you adduced for your contention, that the body and organs are helped by lights that are of the same class as they, like the sun etc., falls to the ground.

Further you said that the argument put forward by us[1] does not prove the light in question to be either internal or different from the body and organs, because the reason stated is falsified in the case of the eye etc. This is wrong; all we have to do is to add to it the qualifying phrase 'except the eyes and other organs.' Your statement that the light in question must be a characteristic of the body is also incorrect, for it involves a contradiction with inference. The inference was that the light must be something else than the body and organs, like the sun etc.; and this premise of yours contradicts that. That the existence of the light depends on that of the body has been disproved by the fact that the light is absent in a dead body. If you challenge the validity of an inference of the kind not based on a causal relation, all our activities, including eating and drinking, would be impossible, which you certainly do not desire. We see in life that people who have experienced that hunger and thirst, for instance, are appeased by eating and drinking,

[1] Viz. that the light we are speaking of must be within the body and yet different from it, for unlike the sun etc. it is invisible.

proceed to adopt these means, expecting similar results ; all this would be impossible. As a matter of fact, however, people who have the experience of eating and drinking infer on the ground of similarity that their hunger and thirst would be appeased if they ate and drank again, and proceed to act accordingly.

Your statement that this very body performs the functions of seeing etc. has already been refuted on the ground that in dreams and remembrance the seer is other than the body. This also refutes the view that the light in question is something other than the self. Your reference to the fire-fly etc. being sometimes luminous and sometimes not, is not in point, for the appearance or disappearance of the glow is due to the contraction or expansion of its wings or other parts of its body. You said that we must admit merit and demerit to have the nature of inevitably producing results. If you admit this, it will go against your own assumption.[1] By this the objection of a *regressus in infinitum* is also refuted. Therefore we conclude that there is a light which is other than the body and within it, and it is the self.

कतम आत्मेति ; योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्त-ज्योतिः पुरुषः ; स समानः सन्नुभौ लोकावनुसंचरति, ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव ; स हि स्वप्नो भूत्वेमं लोकमति-क्रामति मृत्यो रूपाणि ॥ ७ ॥

7. 'Which is the self?' 'This infinite

[1] That there is no extracorporeal self acquiring in every birth merit and demerit which determine its future.

entity (Puruṣa) that is identified with the intellect and is in the midst of the organs, the (self-effulgent) light within the heart (intellect). Assuming the likeness (of the intellect), it moves between the two worlds; it thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were. Being identified with dreams, it transcends this world—the forms of death (ignorance etc.).'

Though the self has been proved to be other than the body and organs, yet, owing to a misconception caused by the observation that things which help others are of the same class as they, Janaka cannot decide whether the self is just one of the organs or something different, and therefore asks: *Which is the self?* The misconception is quite natural, for the logic involved is too subtle to grasp easily. Or, although the self has been proved to be other than the body, yet all the organs appear to be intelligent, since the self is not perceived as distinct from them ; so I ask you: Which is the self? Among the body, organs, vital force and mind, which is the self you have spoken of—through which light, you said, a man sits and does other kinds of work? Or, which of these organs is 'this self identified with the intellect' that you have meant, for all the organs appear to be intelligent? As when a number of Brāhmaṇas are assembled, one may ask, 'They are all highly qualified, but which of these is versed in all the six branches[1] of the Vedas?' In the first explanation, 'Which is the self?' is the question,

[1] Phonetics, ritual, grammar, philology, prosody and astronomy.

and 'This infinite entity that is identified with the intellect,' etc., is the answer ; in the second, 'Which of the organs is the self that is identified with the intellect?' is the question. Or the whole sentence, 'Which is this self that is identified with the intellect and is in the midst of the organs, the light within the heart?' is the question. The words, 'That is identified with the intellect,' etc. give the precise description of the self that has been known only in a general way. But the word 'iti' in, 'Which is the self,' ought to mark the end of the question, without its being connected with a remote word. Hence we conclude that the expression, 'Which is the self,' is really the question, and all the rest of the sentence, beginning with, 'This infinite entity that is identified with the intellect,' etc., is the answer.

The word '*this*' has been used with reference to the self, since it is directly known to us. 'Vijñānamaya' means *identified with the intellect ;* the self is so called because of our failure to discriminate its association with its limiting adjunct, the intellect, for it is perceived as associated with the intellect, as the planet Rāhu[1] is with the sun and the moon. The intellect is the instrument that helps us in everything, like a lamp set in front amidst darkness. It has been said, 'It is through the mind that one sees and hears' (I. v. 3). Every object is perceived only as associated with the light of the intellect, as objects in the dark are lighted up by a lamp placed in front ; the other organs are but the channels for the intellect. There-

[1] The ascending node of the moon.

fore the self is described in terms of that, as 'identified with the intellect.' Those[1] who explain the word 'Vijñānamaya' as a *modification* of the consciousness that is the Supreme Self, evidently go against the import of the Śrutis, since in the words 'Vijñānamaya,' 'Manomaya,' etc., the suffix 'mayaṭ' denotes something else than modification ; and where the meaning of a word is doubtful, it can be ascertained by a reference to a definite use of the word elsewhere, or from a supplementary statement ; or else on the strength of irrefutable logic.[2] From the use of the expression, 'Through its association with the intellect,'[3] a little further on, and from the words 'within the heart (intellect),' the word 'Vijñānamaya' ought to mean 'identified with the intellect.'

The locative case in the term *'in the midst of the organs'* indicates that the self is different from the organs, as 'a rock in the midst of the trees' indicates only nearness ; for there is a doubt about the identity or difference of the self from the organs. 'In the midst of the organs' means 'different from the organs,' for that which is in the midst of certain other things is of course different from them, as 'a tree in the midst of the rocks.' *Within the heart :* One may think that the intellect, which is of the same class as the organs, is meant, as being in the midst of the organs. This is refuted by the phrase 'within the heart.' 'Heart' is

[1] The reference is to Bhartṛprapañca.

[2] If the self be a modification of the intellect, liberation would be impossible.

[3] Śaṅkara here takes the Mādhyandina reading 'Sadhiḥ' instead of 'Sa hi,' as in the text he follows.

primarily the lotus-shaped lump of flesh ; here it means the intellect, which has its seat in the heart. The expression therefore means 'within the intellect.' The word 'within' indicates that the self is different from the modifications of the intellect. The self is called light, because it is self-effulgent, for through this light, the self-effulgent Ātman, this aggregate of body and organs sits, goes out and works, as if it were sentient, as a jar placed in the sun (shines). Or as an emerald or any other gem, dropped for testing into milk etc., imparts its lustre to them, so does this luminous self, being finer than even the heart or intellect, unify and impart its lustre to the body and organs, including the intellect etc., although it is within the intellect ; for these have varying degrees of fineness or grossness in a certain order,[1] and the self is the innermost of them all.

The intellect, being transparent and next to the self, easily catches the reflection of the intelligence of the self. Therefore even wise men happen to identify themselves with it first ; next comes the Manas, which catches the reflection of the self through the intellect ; then the organs, through contact with the Manas ; and lastly the body, through the organs. Thus the self successively illumines with its own intelligence the entire aggregate of body and organs. It is therefore that all people identify themselves with the body and organs and their modifications indefinitely according to their discrimination. The Lord also has said in the

[1] From the objects to the self we have an ascending order of fineness, and from the self to the objects an ascending order of grossness.

Gītā, 'As the one sun, O Arjuna, illumines the whole world, so the self, the owner of the field of this body, illumines the whole body' (G. XIII. 33) ; also, '(Know) the light of the sun (which illumines the entire world, to be Mine),' etc. (G. XV. 12). The Kaṭha Upaniṣad also has it, 'Eternal in the midst of transitory things, the intelligent One among all intelligent beings' (Ka. V. 13) ; also, 'It shining, everything else shines ; this universe shines through Its light' (Ka. V. 15). The Mantra also says, 'Kindled by which light, the sun shines' (Tai. B. III. xii. 9. 7). Therefore the self is the 'light within the intellect,' 'Puruṣa,' i.e. *infinite entity*, being all-pervading like the ether. Its self-effulgence is infinite, because it is the illuminer of everything, but is itself not illumined by anything else. This infinite entity of which you ask, 'Which is the self?' is self-effulgent.

It has been said that when the external lights that help the different organs have ceased to work, the self, the infinite entity that is the light within the intellect, helps the organs through the mind. Even when the external aids of the organs, viz. the sun and other lights, exist, since these latter (being compounds) subserve the purpose of some other agency, and the body and organs, being insentient, cannot exist for themselves, this aggregate of body and organs cannot function without the help of the self, the light that lives for itself. It is always through the help of the light of the self that all our activities take place. 'This intellect and Manas are consciousness. . . . (all these are but names of Intelligence or the Ātman)' (Ai. V. 2),

says another Śruti, for every act of people is attended with the ego, and the reason for this ego[1] we have already stated through the illustration of the emerald.

Though it is so, yet during the waking state that light called the self, being beyond the organs and being particularly mixed up in the diversity of functions of the body and the organs, internal and external, such as the intellect, cannot be shown extricated from them, like a stalk of grass from its sheath ; hence, in order to show it in the dream state, Yājñavalkya begins: *Assuming the likeness . . . it moves between the two worlds.* The infinite entity that is the self-effulgent Ātman, assuming the likeness—of what?—of the intellect, which is the topic, and is also contiguous. In the phrase, 'within the heart' there occurs the word 'heart,' meaning the intellect, and it is quite close ; therefore that is meant. And what is meant by 'likeness'? The failure to distinguish (between the intellect and the self) as between a horse and a buffalo. The intellect is that which is illumined, and the light of the self is that which illumines, like light ; and it is well known that we cannot distinguish the two. It is because light is pure that it assumes the likeness of that which it illumines. When it illumines something coloured, it assumes the likeness of that colour. When, for instance, it illumines something green, blue or red, it is coloured like them. Similarly the self, illumining the intellect, illumines through it the entire body and organs, as we have already stated through the illustra-

[1] The reflection of the self in the intellect constitutes this ego.

tion of the emerald. Therefore through the similarity of the intellect, the self assumes the likeness of everything. Hence it will be described later on as 'Identified with everything' (IV. iv. 5).

Therefore it cannot be taken apart from anything else, like a stalk of grass from its sheath, and shown in its self-effulgent form. It is for this reason that the whole world, to its utter delusion, superimposes all activities peculiar to name and form on the self, and all attributes of this self-effulgent light on name and form, and also superimposes name and form on the light of the self, and thinks, 'This is the self, or is not the self; it has such and such attributes, or has not such and such attributes; it is the agent, or is not the agent; it is pure, or impure; it is bound, or free; it is fixed, or gone, or come; it exists, or does not exist,' and so on. Therefore 'assuming the likeness (of the intellect) it moves' alternately 'between the two worlds'—this one and the next, the one that has been attained and the one that is to be attained—by successively discarding the body and organs already possessed, and taking new ones, hundreds of them, in an unbroken series. This movement between the two worlds is merely due to its resembling the intellect—not natural to it. That it is attributable to its resembling the limiting adjuncts of name and form created by a confusion, and is not natural to it, is being stated: Because, assuming the likeness (of the intellect), it moves alternately between the two worlds. The text goes on to show that this is a fact of experience. *It thinks, as it were:* By illumining the intellect, which does the thinking, through

its own self-effulgent light that pervades the intellect, the self assumes the likeness of the latter and seems to think, just as light (looks coloured). Hence people mistake that the self thinks ; but really it does not. Likewise it *shakes, as it were :* When the intellect and other organs as well as the Pranas move, the self, which illumines them, becomes like them, and therefore seems to move rapidly ; but really the light of the self has no motion.

How are we to know that it is owing to the delusive likeness of the intellect that the self moves between the two worlds and does other activities, and not by itself? This is being answered by a statement of reason: *Being identified with dreams,* etc. The self seems to become whatever the intellect, which it resembles, becomes. Therefore when the intellect turns into a dream, i.e. takes on the modification called a dream, the self also assumes that form ; when the intellect wants to wake up, it too does that. Hence the text says: *Being identified with dreams,* revealing the modification known as dreams assumed by the intellect, and thereby resembling them, *it transcends this world,* i.e. the body and organs, functioning in the waking state, round which our secular and scriptural activities are centred. Because the self stands revealing by its own distinct light the modification known as dreams assumed by the intellect, therefore it must really be self-effulgent, pure and devoid of agent and action with its factors and results. It is only the likeness of the intellect that gives rise to the delusion that the self moves between the two worlds and has

other such activities. *The forms of death,* i.e. work, ignorance, etc. Death has no other forms of its own; the body and organs are its forms. Hence the self transcends those forms of death, on which actions and their results depend.

Buddhist[1] *objection:* We say there is no such thing as the light of the self similar to the intellect and revealing it, for we experience nothing but the intellect either through perception or through inference, just as we do not experience a second intellect at the same time. You say that since the light that reveals and the jar, for instance, that is revealed are not distinguishable in spite of their difference, they resemble each other. We reply that in that particular case, the light being perceived as different from the jar, there may well be similarity between them, because they are merely joined together, remaining all the while different. But in this case we do not similarly experience either through perception or through inference any other light revealing the intellect, just as the light reveals the jar. It is the intellect which, as the consciousness that

[1] There are four schools of Buddhism, viz. the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika, all maintaining that the universe consists only of ideas and is momentary—every idea lasting only for a moment and being immediately replaced by another exactly like it. The first two schools both believe in an objective world, of course ideal; but whereas the first holds that that world is cognisable through perception, the second maintains that it can only be inferred. The third school, also called Vijñānavādin, believes that there is no external world, and that the subjective world alone is real. The last school, called also Śūnyavādin (nihilist), denies both the worlds.

reveals, assumes its own form as well as those of the objects. Therefore neither through perception nor through inference is it possible to establish a separate light which reveals the intellect.

What has been said above by way of example, viz. that there may be similarity between the light that reveals and the jar, for instance, that is revealed, because they are merely joined together, remaining all the while different, has been said only tentatively[1]; it is not that the jar that is revealed is different from the light that reveals it. In reality it is the self-luminous jar that reveals itself ; for (each moment) a new jar is produced, and it is consciousness that takes the form of the self-luminous jar or any other object. Such being the case, there is no instance of an external object, for everything is mere consciousness.

Thus the Buddhists, after conceiving the intellect as tainted by assuming a double form, the revealer and the revealed (subject and object), desire to purify it. Some of them,[2] for instance, maintain that consciousness is untrammelled by the dualism of subject and object, is pure and momentary ; others want to deny that even. For instance, the Mādhyamikas hold that consciousness is free from the dual aspect of subject and object, hidden and simply void, like the external objects such as a jar.

All these assumptions are contradictory to this Vedic path of well-being that we are discussing, since

[1] This is the view of the Yogācāra school as opposed to that of the first two.

[2] The Yogācāras.

they deny the light of the self as distinct from the body and illumining the consciousness of the intellect. Now to those who believe in an objective world we reply: Objects such as a jar are not self-luminous: a jar in darkness never reveals itself, but is noticed as being regularly revealed by coming in contact with the light of a lamp etc. Then we say that the jar is in contact with light. Even though the jar and the light are in contact, they are distinct from each other, for we see their difference, as between a rope and a jar, when they repeatedly come in contact and are disjoined. This distinction means that the jar is revealed by something else; it certainly does not reveal itself.

Objection: But do we not see that a lamp reveals itself? People do not use another light to see a lamp, as they do in the case of a jar etc. Therefore a lamp reveals itself.

Reply: No, for there is no difference as regards its being revealed by something else (the self). Although a lamp, being luminous, reveals other things, yet it is, just like a jar etc., invariably revealed by an intelligence other than itself. Since this is so, the lamp cannot but be revealed by something other than itself.

Objection: But there is a difference. A jar, even though revealed by an intelligence, requires a light different from itself (to manifest it), while the lamp does not require another lamp. Therefore the lamp, although revealed by something else, reveals itself as well as the jar.

Reply: Not so, for there is no difference, directly

or indirectly (between a jar and a lamp). As the jar is revealed by an intelligence, so is equally the lamp. Your statement that the lamp reveals both itself and the jar is wrong. Why? Because what can its condition be when it does not reveal itself? As a matter of fact, we notice no difference in it, either directly or indirectly. A thing is said to be revealed only when we notice some difference in it through the presence or absence of the revealing agent. But there can be no question of a lamp being present before or absent from itself ; and when no difference is caused by the presence or absence, it is idle to say that the lamp reveals itself.

But as regards being revealed by an intelligence the lamp is on a par with the jar etc. Therefore the lamp is not an illustration in point to show that consciousness (of the intellect) reveals itself ; it is revealed by an intelligence just as much as the external objects are. Now, if consciousness is revealed by an intelligence, which consciousness is it?—the one that is revealed (the consciousness of the intellect), or the one that reveals (i.e. the consciousness of the self)? Since there is a doubt on the point, we should infer on the analogy of observed facts, not contrary to them. Such being the case, just as we see that external objects such as a lamp are revealed by something different from them (the self), so also should consciousness—although it reveals other things like a lamp—be inferred, on the ground of its being revealed by an intelligence, to be revealed not by itself, but by an intelligence different from it. And that other entity

which reveals consciousness is the self—the intelligence which is different from that consciousness.

Objection : But that would lead to a *regressus in infinitum.*

Reply : No ; it has only been stated on logical grounds that because consciousness is an object revealed by something, the latter must be distinct from that consciousness. Obviously there cannot be any infallible ground for inferring that the self literally reveals the consciousness in question, or that, as the witness, it requires another agency to reveal it. Therefore there is no question of a *regressus in infinitum.*

Objection : If consciousness is revealed by something else, some means of revelation is required, and this would again lead to a *regressus in infinitum.*

Reply : No, for there is no such restriction ; it is not a universal rule. We cannot lay down an absolute condition that whenever something is revealed by another, there must be some means of revelation besides the two—that which reveals and that which is revealed, for we observe diversity of conditions. For instance, a jar is perceived by something different from itself, viz. the self ; here light such as that of a lamp, which is other than the perceiving subject and the perceived object, is a means. The light of the lamp etc. is neither a part of the jar nor of the eye. But though the lamp, like the jar, is perceived by the eye, the latter does not require any external means corresponding to the light, over and above the lamp (which is the object). Hence we can never lay down

the rule that wherever a thing is perceived by something else, there must be some means besides the two. Therefore, if consciousness is admitted to be revealed by a subject different from it, the charge of a *regressus in infinitum*, either through the means or through the perceiving subject (the self), is altogether untenable. Hence it is proved that there is another light, viz. the light of the self, which is different from consciousness.

Objection (by the idealist): We say there is no external object like the jar etc., or the lamp, apart from consciousness ; and it is commonly observed that a thing which is not perceived apart from something else is nothing but the latter ; as for instance things such as the jar and cloth seen in dream consciousness. Because we do not perceive the jar, lamp and so forth seen in a dream, apart from the dream consciousness, we take it for granted that they are nothing but the latter. Similarly in the waking state, the jar, lamp and so forth, not being perceived apart from the consciousness of that state, should be taken merely as that consciousness and nothing more. Therefore there is no external object such as the jar or lamp, and everything is but consciousness. Hence your statement that since consciousness is revealed, like the jar etc., by something else, there is another light besides consciousness, is groundless ; for everything being but consciousness, there is no illustration to support you.

Reply : No, for you admit the existence of the

external world to a certain extent. You do not altogether deny it.

Objection : We deny it absolutely.

Reply : No. Since the words 'consciousness,' 'jar' and 'lamp' are different and have different meanings, you cannot help admitting to a certain extent the existence of external objects. If you do not admit the existence of objects different from consciousness, words such as 'consciousness,' 'jar' and 'cloth,' having the same meaning, would be synonymous. Similarly, the means being identical with the result, your scriptures inculcating a difference between them would be useless, and their author (Buddha) would be charged with ignorance.

Moreover, you yourself admit that a debate between rivals as well as its defects are different from consciousness. You certainly do not consider the debate and its defects to be identical with one's consciousness, for the opponent, for instance, has to be refuted. Nobody admits that it is either his own consciousness or his own self that is meant to be refuted ; were it so, all human activities would stop. Nor do you assume that the opponent perceives himself ; rather you take it for granted that he is perceived by others. Therefore we conclude that the whole objective world is perceived by something other than itself, because it is an object of our perception in the waking state, just like other objects perceived in that state, such as the opponent—which is an easy enough illustration ; or as one series[1] of (momentary) con-

[1] The series called Hari, for instance, is perceived by the series called Rāma.

sciousness, or any single one[1] of them, is perceived by another of the same kind. Therefore not even the idealist can deny the existence of another light different from consciousness.

Objection: You are wrong to say that there is an external world, since in dreams we perceive nothing but consciousness.

Reply: No, for even from this absence of external objects we can demonstrate their difference from consciousness. You yourself have admitted that in dreams the consciousness of a jar or the like is real; but in the same breath you say that there is no jar apart from that consciousness! The point is, whether the jar which forms the object of that consciousness is unreal or real, in either case you have admitted that the consciousness of the jar is real,[2] and it cannot be denied, for there is no reason to support the denial. By this[3] the theory of the voidness of everything is also refuted; as also the Mīmāṁsaka view that the Self is perceived by the individual self as the 'I'.[4]

Your statement that every moment a different jar in contact with light is produced, is wrong, for even at a subsequent moment we recognise it to be the same jar.

[1] Buddha's knowledge, for instance, perceives that of any ordinary mortal.

[2] The reality of the consciousness presupposes the existence of external objects, which alone determine the form of that consciousness.

[3] The impossibility of doing away with the distinction between knowledge and the object known.

[4] For the same thing cannot be both subject and object.

Objection : The recognition may be due to similarity, as in the case of hair, nails, etc. that have been cut and have grown anew.

Reply : No, for even in that case the momentariness is disproved. Besides, the recognition is due merely to an identity of species. When the hair, nails, etc. have been cut and have grown again, there being an identity of species as hair, nails, etc., their recognition as such due to that identity is unquestionable. But when we see the hair, nails, etc. that have grown again after being cut, we never have the idea that they are, individually, those identical hairs or nails. When after a great lapse of time we see on a person hair, nails, etc. of the same size as before, we perceive that the hair, nails, etc. we see at that particular moment are like those seen on the previous occasion, but never that they are the same ones. But in the case of a jar etc. we perceive that they are identical. Therefore the two cases are not parallel.

When a thing is directly recognised as identical, it is improper to infer that it is something else, for when an inference contradicts perception, the ground of such inference becomes fallacious. Moreover, the perception of similarity is impossible because of the momentariness of knowledge (held by you). The perception of similarity takes place when one and the same person sees two things at different times. But according to you the person who sees a thing does not exist till the next moment to see another thing, for consciousness, being momentary, ceases to be as soon as it has seen some one thing. To explain: The

perception of similarity takes the form of 'This is like that.' 'That' refers to the remembrance of something seen ; 'this' to the perception of something present. If after remembering the past experience denoted by 'that,' consciousness should linger till the present moment referred to by 'this,' then the doctrine of momentariness would be gone. If, however, the remembrance terminates with the notion of 'that,' and a different perception relating to the present (arises and) dies with the notion of 'this,' then no perception of similarity expressed by, 'This is like that,' will result, as there will be no single consciousness perceiving more than one thing (so as to draw the comparison). Moreover, it will be impossible to describe our experiences. Since consciousness ceases to be just after seeing what was to be seen, we cannot use such expressions as, 'I see this,' or 'I saw that,' for the person who has seen them will not exist till the moment of making these utterances. Or, if he does, the doctrine of momentariness will be contradicted. If, on the other hand, the person who makes these utterances and perceives the similarity is other than the one who saw those things, then, like the remarks of a man born blind about particular colours and his perception of their similarity, the writing of scriptural books by the omniscient Buddha and other such things will all become an instance of the blind following the blind. But this is contrary to your views. Moreover, the charges of obtaining results of actions not done and not obtaining those of actions already done, are quite patent in the doctrine of momentariness.

Objection : It is possible to describe a past experience by means of a single chain-like perception that takes place so as to include both the preceding and the succeeding perception, and this also accounts for the comparison, 'This is like that.'

Reply : Not so, for the past and the present perceptions belong to different times. The present perception is one link of the chain and the past perception another, and these two perceptions belong to different times. If the chain-like perception touches the objects of both these perceptions, then the same consciousness extending over two moments, the doctrine of momentariness again falls to the ground. And such distinctions as 'mine' and 'yours' being impossible,[1] all our dealings in the world will come to naught.

Moreover, since you hold everything to be but consciousness perceptible only to itself, and at the same time say that consciousness is by nature but the reflection of pellucid knowledge, and since there is no other witness to it, it is impossible to regard it as various such as transitory, painful, void and unreal. Nor can consciousness be treated as having many contradictory parts, like a pomegranate etc., for according to you it is of the nature of pellucid knowledge. Moreover, if the transitoriness, painfulness, etc. are parts of consciousness, the very fact that they are perceived will throw them into the category of objects, different from the subject. If, on the other hand, consciousness is essentially transitory, painful

[1] Since there is only one consciousness, and that also momentary.

and so on, then it is impossible to conceive that it will become pure by getting rid of those characteristics; for a thing becomes pure by getting rid of the impurities that are connected with it, as in the case of a mirror etc., but it can never divest itself of its natural property. Fire, for instance, is never seen to part with its natural light or heat. Although the redness and other qualities of a flower are seen to be removed by the addition of other substances, yet even there we infer that those features were the result of previous combinations, for we observe that by subjecting the seeds to a particular process, a different quality is imparted to flowers, fruits, etc. Hence consciousness cannot be conceived to be purified.

Besides you conceive consciousness to be impure when it appears in the dual character of subject and object. That too is impossible, since it does not come in contact with anything else. A thing cannot surely come in contact with something that does not exist; and when there is no contact with anything else, the properties that are observed in a thing belong naturally to it, and cannot be separated from it, as the heat of fire, or the light of the sun. Therefore we conclude that your assumption that consciousness becomes impure by coming temporarily in contact with something else, and is again free from this impurity, is merely an *instance of the blind following the* blind, and is unsupported by any evidence.

Lastly, the Buddhistic assumption that the extinction of that consciousness is the highest end of human life, is untenable, for there is no recipient of

results. For a person who has got a thorn stuck into him, the relief of the pain caused by it is the result (he seeks); but if he dies, we do not find any recipient of the resulting cessation of pain. Similarly, if consciousness is altogether extinct and there is nobody to reap that benefit, to talk of it as the highest end of human life is meaningless. If that very entity or self, designated by the word 'person'—consciousness, according to you—whose well-being is meant, is extinct, for whose sake will the highest end be? But those who (with us) believe in a self different from consciousness and witnessing many objects, will find it easy to explain all phenomena such as the remembrance of things previously seen and the contact and cessation of pain—the impurity, for instance, being ascribed to contact with extraneous things, and the purification to dissociation from them. As for the view of the nihilist, since it is contradicted by all the evidences of knowledge, no attempt is being made to refute it.

स वा अयं पुरुषो जायमानः—शरीरमभिसंपद्यमानः—पाप्मभिः संसृज्यते ; स उत्क्रामन्—म्रियमाणः—पाप्मनो विजहाति ॥ ८ ॥

8. That man,[1] when he is born, or attains a body, is connected with evils (the body and organs) ; and when he dies, or leaves the body, he discards those evils.

[1] The individual self. So also in the next few paragraphs.

Just as in this world a man, in the same body, is identified with dreams and in that state lives in the light that is his own self, transcending the body and organs, so is *that man* who is being discussed, *when he is born, connected with evils,* i.e. with their inseparable concomitants or effects, the body and organs, which are the support of merit and demerit. How is he born? When he *attains a body,* with the organs and all, i.e. identifies himself with it. *When* that very person *dies, or leaves the body,* to take another body in turn, *he discards those evils,* i.e. the body and organs, which are but forms of evil and have fastened themselves on him. The phrase 'leaves the body' is an explanation of 'dies.' Just as in his present body he, resembling the intellect, continuously moves between the waking and dream states by alternately taking and giving up the body and organs, which are but forms of evil, so does he continuously move between this and the next world by alternately taking and giving up the body and organs, by way of birth and death, until he attains liberation. Therefore it is proved from this conjunction and disjunction that the light of the self about which we have been talking is distinct from these evils, the body and organs.

It may be contended that there are not those two worlds between which the man can move alternately through birth and death as between the waking and dream states. The latter of course are matters of experience, but the two worlds are not known through any means of knowledge. Therefore these waking and dream states themselves must be the two worlds in

question. This is being answered by the following text:

तस्य वा एतस्य पुरुषस्य द्वे एव स्थाने भवतः—इदं च परलोकस्थानं च ; सन्ध्यं तृतीयं स्वप्नस्थानं ; तस्मिन्सन्ध्ये स्थाने तिष्ठन्नेते उभे स्थाने पश्यति—इदं च परलोकस्थानं च । अथ यथाक्रमोऽयं परलोकस्थाने भवति तमाक्रममाक्रम्यो-भयान्पाप्मन आनन्दांश्च पश्यति ; स यत्र प्रस्वपिति, अस्य लोकस्य सर्वावतो मात्रामपादाय स्वयं विहत्य, स्वयं निर्माय, स्वेन भासा, स्वेन ज्योतिषा प्रस्वपिति ; अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयं ज्योतिर्भवति ॥ ९ ॥

9. That man has only two abodes, this and the next world. The dream state, which is the third, is at the junction (of the two). Staying at that junction he surveys the two abodes, this and the next world. Whatever outfit he may have for the next world, providing himself with that he sees both evils (sufferings) and joys. When he dreams, he takes away a little of (the impressions of) this all-embracing world (the waking state), himself puts the body aside and himself creates (a dream body in its place), revealing his own lustre by his own light—and dreams. In this state the man himself becomes the light.

That man has only two abodes, no third or fourth. Which are they? *This and the next world.* The present life, consisting of the body, organs, objects

and their impressions, which we now perceive, and the future life to be experienced after we have given up the body and the rest.

Objection : Is not the dream state also the next world? In that case the assertion about 'only two abodes' is wrong.

Reply : No, *the dream state, which is the third, is at the junction* of this and the next world ; hence the definite pronouncement about two abodes. The junction of two villages does not certainly count as a third village. How do we know about the existence of the next world, in relation to which the dream state may be at the junction? Because *staying at that junction he surveys the two abodes.* Which are the two? *This and the next world.* Therefore, over and above the waking and dream states, there are the two worlds between which the man (the individual self), resembling the intellect, moves, in an unbroken series of births and deaths.

How does he, staying in the dream state, survey the two worlds, what help does he take, and what process does he follow? This is being answered: Listen how he surveys them. *Whatever outfit*—'Ākrama' is that by means of which one proceeds, i.e. support or outfit—the man *may have for* the attainment of *the next world,* i.e. whatever knowledge, work and previous experience he may have for this end, *providing himself with that*—just ready to take him to the next world, like a seed about to sprout—*he sees both evils and joys.* The plural is due to the varied results of virtue and vice, meaning both kinds. 'Evils' refer to their results, or sufferings, for they

themselves cannot be directly experienced; the joys are the results of virtue. He feels both sufferings and joys consisting of the impressions of experiences of previous lives; while those glimpses of the results of merits and demerits that are to come in his future life, he experiences through the urge of those merits and demerits, or through the grace of the gods. How are we to know that in dreams one experiences the sufferings and joys that are to come in the next life? The answer is: Because one dreams many things that are never to be experienced in this life. Moreover, a dream is not an entirely new experience, for most often it is the memory of past experiences. Hence we conclude that the two worlds exist apart from the waking and dream states.

An objection is raised: It has been said that in the absence of the external lights such as the sun, the man identified with the body and organs lives and moves in the world with the help of the light of the self, which is different from the body and organs. But we say that there is never an absence of lights such as the sun to make it possible for one to perceive this self-effulgent light as isolated from the body and organs, because we perceive these as always in contact with those external lights. Therefore the self as an absolute, isolated light is almost or wholly a nonentity. If, however, it is ever perceived as an absolute, isolated light free from the contact of the elements and their derivatives, external and internal, then all your statements will be correct. This is being answered as follows:

When he, the self that is being discussed, *dreams* freely, what is his outfit then, and in what way does he dream, or attain the junction between this world and the next? The answer is being given: *He takes away a little of this all-embracing world,* or the world we experience in the waking state. 'All-embracing' (Sarvāvat[1]): Lit. protecting or taking care of everything ; it refers to the body and organs in contact with sense-objects and their reactions. Their all-embracing character has been explained in the section dealing with the three kinds of food in the passage beginning with, 'Now this self,' etc. (I. iv. 16). Or the word may mean, possessing all the elements and their derivatives, which[2] serve to attach him to the world ; in other words, the waking state.—'Sarvāvat' is the same as 'Sarvavat.'—He detaches a portion of these, i.e. is tinged by the impressions of the present life. *Himself puts the body aside,* lit. kills it, i.e. makes it inert or unconscious. In the waking state the sun and other deities help the eyes etc. so that the body may function, and the body functions because the self experiences the results of its merits and demerits. The cessation of the experience of those results in this body is due to the exhaustion of the work done by the self ; hence the self is described as killing the body. *And himself creates* a dream body composed of past impressions, like one created by magic. This creation

[1] Two derivations are given. In the first 'Sarva' (all) is joined to the verb 'Ava,' to protect ; in the second it takes the suffix 'vat,' denoting possession.

[2] In their threefold division, pertaining to the body etc.

too is the consequence of his past work ; hence it is spoken of as being created by him. *Revealing his own lustre,* consisting in the perception of sense-objects, the mind itself being modified in the form of diverse impressions of the latter. It is these modifications that then take the place of objects, and are spoken of as being themselves of the nature of lustre in that state. With this his own lustre as object, and revealing it (the mass of impressions of sense-objects) *by his own light,* i.e. as the detached subject or witness possessing constant vision, he *dreams.* Being in this state is called dreaming. *In this state,* at this time, *the man,* or self, *himself becomes the* detached *light,* free from the contact of the elements and their derivatives, external and internal.

Objection : It is stated that the self then has glimpses of the impressions of the waking state. If so, how can it be said that 'in that state the man himself becomes the light'?

Reply : There is nothing wrong in it, because the glimpses are but objects (not the subject). In that way alone can the man be shown to be himself the light then, and not otherwise, when there is no object to be revealed as in profound sleep. When, however, that lustre consisting of the impressions of the waking state is perceived as an object, then, like a sword drawn from its sheath, the light of the self, the eternal witness, unrelated to anything and distinct from the body and the organs such as the eye, is realised as it is, revealing everything. Therefore it is proved that 'in that state the man himself becomes the light.'

Objection: How can the man himself be the light in dreams, when we come across at that time all the phenomena of the waking state dependent on the relation between the subject and object, and the lights such as the sun are seen to help the eye and other organs just the same as in the waking state? In the face of these how can the assertion be made that 'in that state the man himself becomes the light'?

Reply: Because the phenomena of dreams are different. In the waking state the light of the self is mixed up with the functions of the organs, intellect, Manas, (external) lights, etc. But in dreams, since the organs do not act and the lights such as the sun that help them are absent, the self becomes distinct and isolated. Hence the dream state is different.

Objection: The sense-objects are perceived in dreams just the same as in the waking state. How then do you adduce their difference on the ground that the organs do not function then?

Reply: Listen—

न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानो भवन्ति, अथ रथान्रथयोगान्पथः सृजते; न तत्रानन्दा मुदः प्रमुदो भवन्ति, अथानन्दान् मुदः प्रमुदः सृजते; न तत्र वेशान्ताः पुष्करिण्यः स्रवन्त्यो भवन्ति, अथ वेशान्तान् पुष्करिणीः स्रवन्तीः सृजते; स हि कर्ता ॥ १० ॥

10. There are no chariots, nor animals to be yoked to them, nor roads there, but he creates

the chariots, animals and roads. There are no pleasures, joys, or delights there, but he creates the pleasures, joys and delights. There are no pools, tanks, or rivers there, but he creates the pools, tanks and rivers. For he is the agent.

There are no objects such as *chariots there,* in dreams. *Nor* are there *animals to be yoked to them,* such as horses ; *nor roads* for the chariots. *But he* himself *creates the chariots, animals and roads.* But how does he create them, since there are no trees etc., which are the means of the chariots and so forth? The reply is being given: It has been said (par. 9), 'He takes away a little of this all-embracing world, himself puts the body aside, and himself creates.' The modifications of the mind are a little of this world, i.e. are its impressions ; the former, detaching the latter—in other words, being transformed into the impressions of chariots etc.—and being stimulated by the individual's previous work, which is the cause of their perception, appear as the sense-objects ; this is expressed by the words 'and himself creates,' and also by the clause, 'He creates the chariots,' etc. Really there are neither activities of the organs nor lights such as the sun that help them, nor objects such as the chariots to be illumined by them, but only their impressions are visible, having no existence apart from the palpable modifications of the mind that are stimulated by the individual's previous work, which is the cause of

the perception of those impressions. The light with constant vision that witnesses them, the light of the self, is perfectly isolated in this state, like a sword separated from its sheath.

Likewise *there are no pleasures,* kinds of happiness, *joys* such as those caused by the birth of a son etc., *or delights,* which are those very joys magnified, *but he creates the pleasures,* etc. Likewise *there are no pools, tanks or rivers there, but he creates the pools* etc. in the form of impressions only. *For he is the agent.* We have already said that his agency consists in merely being the cause of the work that generates the modifications of the mind representing those impressions. Direct activity is then out of the question, for there are no means. Activity is impossible without its factors. In dreams there cannot be any factors of an action such as hands and feet. But in the waking state, when they are present, the body and organs, illumined by the light of the self, perform work that (later on) produce the modifications of the mind representing the impressions of the chariot etc. Hence it is said, 'For he is the agent.' This has been stated in the passage, 'It is through the light of the self that he sits, goes out, works and returns' (IV. iii. 6). There too, strictly speaking, the light of the self has no direct agency, except that it is the illuminer of everything. The light of the self, which is Pure Intelligence, illumines the body and organs through the mind, and they perform their functions being illumined by it ; hence in the passage quoted the agency of the self is merely figurative. What has been stated in the passage, 'It thinks, as it were, and

shakes, as it were' (IV. iii. 7), is here repeated in the clause, 'For he is the agent,' in order to furnish a reason.[1]

तदेते श्लोका भवन्ति ।

स्वप्नेन शारीरमभिप्रहत्या-
सुप्तः सुप्तानभिचाकशीति ।
शुक्रमादाय पुनरैति स्थानं
हिरण्मयः पुरुष एकहंसः ॥ ११ ॥

11. Regarding this there are the following verses:

'The radiant infinite being (Puruṣa) who moves alone puts the body aside in the dream state, and himself awake and taking the shining functions of the organs with him, watches those that are asleep. Again he comes to the waking state.

Regarding this subject that has just been treated of, *there are the following verses* or Mantras:

The radiant—lit. golden ; the light that is Pure Intelligence—*infinite being who moves alone* through the waking and dream states, this world and the next, and so on, *puts the body aside,* makes it inert, *in the dream state, and himself awake,* being possessed of the constant power of vision etc., *and taking the shining* —lit. pure—*functions of the organs with him, watches*

[1] For the creation of chariots etc. in dreams.

those that are asleep, all external and internal things that are centred in the modifications of the mind and appear as impressions—things that have ceased to be in their own forms. In other words, he reveals them through his own constant vision. *Again he comes to the waking state,* to work.

प्राणेन रक्षन्नवरं कुलायं
बहिष्कुलायादमृतश्चरित्वा ।
स ईयतेऽमृतो यत्र कामं
हिरण्मयः पुरुष एकहंसः ॥ १२ ॥

12. 'The radiant infinite being who is immortal and moves alone preserves the unclean nest (of a body) with the help of the vital force, and roams out of the nest. Himself immortal, he goes wherever he likes.

Likewise he *preserves the unclean*—lit. worthless—*nest,* the body, extremely loathsome as consisting of many filthy things, *with the help of the vital force* that has a fivefold function—otherwise it would be taken for dead—but he himself *roams out of* that *nest.* Though he dreams staying in the body, yet, having no connection with it like the ether in the body, he is said to be roaming out. *Himself immortal, he goes wherever he likes:* For whatever objects his desire is roused, he attains them in the form of impressions.

स्वप्नान्त उच्चावचमीयमानो
रूपाणि देवः कुरुते बहूनि ।

उतेव स्त्रीभिः सह मोदमानो
जक्षदुतेवापि भयानि पश्यन् ॥ १३ ॥

13. 'In the dream world, the shining one, attaining higher and lower states, puts forth innumerable forms. He seems to be enjoying himself in the company of women, or laughing, or even seeing frightful things.

Further, *in the dream world, the shining one, attaining higher and lower states,* as gods and animals, for instance, *puts forth innumerable forms,* as impressions. *He seems to be enjoying himself in the company of women, or laughing* with friends, *or even seeing frightful things,* such as lions and tigers.

आराममस्य पश्यन्ति, न तं पश्यति कश्चन ॥ इति । तं नायतं बोधयेदित्याहुः । दुर्भिषज्यं हास्मै भवति यमेष न प्रतिपद्यते । अथो खल्वाहुः, जागरितदेश एवास्यैष इति ; यानि ह्येव जाग्रत्पश्यति तानि सुप्त इति ; अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयं ज्योतिर्भवति ; सोऽहं भगवते सहस्रं ददामि, अत ऊर्ध्वं विमोक्षाय ब्रूहीति ॥ १४ ॥

14. 'Everybody sees his sport, but nobody sees him.' They say, 'Do not wake him up suddenly.' If he does not find the right organ, the body becomes difficult to doctor. Others, however, say that the dream state of a man is nothing but the waking state, because he sees in dreams only those things that he sees in the

waking state. (This is wrong.) In the dream state the man himself becomes the light. 'I give you a thousand (cows), sir. Please instruct me further about liberation.'

Everybody sees his sport, consisting of the impressions of villages, cities, women, eatables, etc., conjured by the self, *but nobody sees him.* What a pity that although the self is totally distinct from the body and organs and is present before their very eyes, people are yet unfortunate enough not to see it, notwithstanding its capacity of being seen! This is how the Śruti is sympathising with mankind. The idea is that in dreams the self becomes altogether distinct and is itself the light.

They say, 'Do not wake him up suddenly.' There is also a popular belief that proves the self to be distinct from the body and organs in dreams. What is that? Physicians and others say, 'Do not wake up a sleeping man suddenly or violently.' They say so only because they see that (in dreams) the self goes out of the body of the waking state through the gates of the organs and remains isolated outside. They also see the possibility of harm in this, viz. that if the self is violently roused, it may not find those gates of the organs. This is expressed as follows: *If he does not find the right organ, the body becomes difficult to doctor.* The self may not get back to those gates of the organs through which it went out, taking the shining functions of the latter, or it may misplace these functions. In that case defects such as blindness and deafness may result, and the body may find it difficult

to treat them. Therefore from the above popular notion also we can understand the self-luminosity of the Ātman in dreams.

Being identified with dreams, the self transcends the forms of death ; therefore in dreams it is itself the light. *Others, however, say that the dream state of a man is nothing but the waking state*—that the dream state, which is the junction between this world and the next, is not a state distinct from either of them, but identical with this world, i.e. the waking state. Supposing this is so, what follows from this? Listen. If the dream state is nothing but the waking state, the self is not dissociated from the body and organs, but rather mixed up with them ; hence the self is not itself the light. So in order to refute the self-luminosity of the Ātman, these people say that the dream state is identical with the waking state. And they state their reason for taking it as the waking state: *Because* a man *sees in dreams only those things,* elephants etc., *that he sees in the waking state.* All this is wrong, because then the organs are at rest. One dreams only when the organs have ceased to function. Therefore no other light (than the self) can exist in that state. This has been expressed by the words, 'There are no chariots, nor animals,' etc. (IV. iii. 10). Therefore *in the dream state the maṇ himself* undoubtedly *becomes the light.*

By the illustration of dreams it has been proved that there is the self-luminous Ātman, and that it transcends the forms of death. Since it alternately moves between this world and the next, and so on, it is distinct from them. Likewise it is distinct from

the nests of the waking and dream states. And Yājñavalkya has proved that since it moves alternately from one to the other, it is eternal. Hence, to requite the knowledge received, Janaka offers a thousand cows. 'Because you have thus instructed me, *I give you a thousand cows, sir.* You have permitted me to ask any question I like, and I want to ask about liberation. What you have told me about the self is helpful for that ; as subserving that end, however, it is only a part of what I want. Hence I request you to *instruct me further about liberation,* so that I may hear the decision about the whole of my desired question, and through your grace be altogether free from this relative existence.' The gift of a thousand cows is for the solution of a part of the meaning of the term 'liberation.'

What was stated at the beginning of this section, viz. 'It is through the light of the self that he sits,' etc. (IV. iii. 6), has been proved in the dream state by a reference to the experiences of that state in the passage, 'In this state the man (self) himself becomes the light' (IV. iii. 9). But regarding the statement, 'Being identified with dreams, it transcends this world —the forms of death (ignorance etc.)' (IV. iii. 7), it is contended that the self transcends merely the forms of death, not death itself. We see it plainly in dreams that although the self is separated from the body and organs, it experiences joy, fear, etc.; therefore it certainly does not transcend death, for we see the effects of death (i.e. work) such as joy and fear at the time. If it is naturally handicapped by death, then it cannot attain liberation, for nobody can part with

his nature. If, however, death is not the nature of the self, then liberation from it will be possible. In order to show that death is not the natural characteristic of the self, Yājñavalkya, already prompted by Janaka with the words, 'Please instruct me further about liberation' (IV. iii. 14), sets himself to this task:

स वा एष एतस्मिन्संप्रसादे रत्वा चरित्वा, दृष्ट्वैव पुण्यं च पापं च, पुनः प्रतिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याद्रवति स्वप्नायैव ; स यत्तत्र किंचित्पश्यत्यनन्वागतस्तेन भवति ; असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुष इति ; एवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य, सोऽहं भगवते सहस्रं ददामि, अत ऊर्ध्वं विमोक्षायैव ब्रूहीति ॥ १५ ॥

15. After enjoying himself and roaming, and merely seeing (the results of) good and evil (in dreams), he (stays) in a state of profound sleep, and comes back in the inverse order to his former condition, the dream state. He is untouched by whatever he sees in that state, for this infinite being is unattached. 'It is just so, Yājña-valkya. I give you a thousand (cows), sir. Please instruct me further about liberation itself.'

He, the self-luminous being who is under consideration, and who has been pointed out in the dream state, (stays) *in a state of profound sleep,* 'Samprasāda'—the state of highest serenity. In the waking state a man gets impurities due to the commingling of in-

numerable activities of the body and organs ; he gets a little joy by discarding them in dreams ; but in profound sleep he gets the highest serenity ; hence this state is called 'Samprasāda.' The self in a state of profound sleep will be later on described as, 'For he is then beyond all the woes of his heart' (IV. iii. 22), and 'Pure like water, one, and the witness' (IV. iii. 32). He stays in a state of profound sleep, having gradually attained the highest serenity. How does he attain it? *After enjoying himself*—just before passing into the state of profound sleep—in the dream state itself, by having a sight etc. of his friends and relatives, *and roaming,* sporting in various ways, i.e. experiencing the fatigue due to it, *and merely seeing,* not doing, *good and evil,* i.e. their results (pleasure and pain). We have already said (p. 633) that good and evil cannot be directly visualised. Hence he is not fettered by them. Only one who does good and evil is so fettered ; one certainly cannot come under their binding influence by merely seeing them. Therefore, being identified with dreams, the self transcends death also, not merely its forms. Hence death cannot be urged to be its nature. Were it so, the self would be doing things in dreams ; but it does not. If activity be the nature of the self, it will never attain liberation ; but it is not, for it is absent in dreams. Hence the self can get rid of death in the form of good and evil.

Objection : But is not activity its nature in the waking state?

Reply : No, that is due to its limiting adjuncts, the intellect etc. This has been proved on the ground

of apparent activity from the text, 'It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were' (IV. iii. 7). Therefore, since the self wholly transcends the forms of death in dreams, death can never be urged to be natural to it, nor is liberation an impossibility. 'Roaming' in that state, i.e. experiencing the resulting fatigue, and afterwards experiencing the state of profound sleep, he *comes back in the inverse order* of that by which he went, i.e. retracing his steps, *to his former condition,* viz. *the dream state.* It was out of this that he passed into the state of profound sleep, and now he returns to it.

It may be asked, how is one to know that a man does not do good and evil in dreams, but merely sees their results? Rather the presumption is that as he does good and evil in the waking state, so he does them in the dream state also, for the experience is the same in both cases. This is being answered: *He,* the self, *is untouched by whatever* results of good and evil *he sees in that* dream *state.* If he actually did anything in dreams, he would be bound by it ; and it would pursue him even after he woke up. But it is not known in everyday life that he is pursued by deeds done in dreams. Nobody considers himself a sinner on account of sins committed in dreams ; nor do people who have heard of them condemn or shun him. Therefore he is certinly untouched by them. Hence he only appears to be doing things in dreams, but actually there is no activity. The verse has been quoted: 'He seems to be enjoying himself in the company of women' (IV. iii. 13). And those who describe their dream experiences use the words 'as if' in this connec-

tion, as, for instance, 'I saw to-day as if a herd of elephants was running.' Therefore the self has no activity (in dreams).

How is it that it has no activity? (This is being explained:) We see that an action is caused by the contact of the body and organs, which have form, with something else that has form. We never see a formless thing being active; and the self is formless, hence it is unattached. And because this self is unattached, it is untouched by what it sees in dreams. Therefore we cannot by any means attribute activity to it, since activity proceeds from the contact of the body and organs, and that contact is non-existent for the self, *for this infinite being* (self) *is unattached.* Therefore it is immortal. *'It is just so, Yājñavalkya. I give you a thousand* (cows), *sir,* for you have fully shown that the self is free from action—which is a part of the meaning of the term "liberation." *Please instruct me further about liberation itself.'*

स वा एष एतस्मिन्स्वप्ने रत्वा चरित्वा, दृष्ट्वैव पुण्यं च पापं च, पुनः प्रतिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याद्रवति बुद्धान्तायैव ; स यत्तत्र किंचित्पश्यत्यनन्वागतस्तेन भवति, असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुष इति ; एवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य, सोऽहं भगवते सहस्रं ददामि, अत ऊर्ध्वं विमोक्षायैव ब्रूहीति ॥ १६ ॥

16. After enjoying himself and roaming in the dream state, and merely seeing (the results of) good and evil, he comes back in the inverse

order to his former condition, the waking state. He is untouched by whatever he sees in that state, for this infinite being is unattached. 'It is just so, Yājñavalkya. I give you a thousand (cows), sir. Please instruct me further about liberation itself.'

Objection : In the preceding paragraph the non-attachment of the self has been stated as the cause of its inactivity in the passage, 'For this infinite being is unattached.' It has also been stated before that under the sway of past work 'he goes wherever he likes' (IV. iii. 12). Now desire is an attachment; hence the reason adduced—'For this infinite being is unattached'—is fallacious.

Reply : It is not. How? This is how the self is unattached: On his return from the state of profound sleep, *after enjoying himself and roaming in the dream state, and merely seeing* (the results of) *good and evil, he comes back in the inverse order to his former condition*—all this is to be explained as before—*the waking state*; therefore this infinite being (self) is unattached. If he were attached, or smitten by desire, in the dream state, he would, on his return to the waking state, be affected by the evils due to that attachment.

Just as, being unattached in the dream state, he is not affected, on his return to the waking state, by the evils due to attachment in the dream state, so he is not affected by them in the waking state either. This is expressed by the following text:

स वा एष एतस्मिन्बुद्धान्ते रत्वा चरित्वा, दृष्ट्वैव पुण्यं च पापं च, पुनः प्रतिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याद्रवति स्वप्नान्तायैव ॥ १७ ॥

17. After enjoying himself and roaming in the waking state, and merely seeing (the results of) good and evil, he comes back in the inverse order to his former condition, the dream state (or that of profound sleep).

After enjoying himself and roaming in the waking state, etc.—to be explained as before. 'He is untouched by whatever he sees in that—waking—state, for this infinite being is unattached.'[1]

Objection : How is the assertion made about his 'merely seeing'? As a matter of fact, he does good and evil in the waking state, and sees their results too.

Reply : Not so, for his agency is attributable to his merely revealing the different factors of an action. Such texts as, 'It is through the light of the self that he sits,' etc. (IV. iii. 6), show that the body and organs work, being revealed by the light of the self. For this reason agency is figuratively attributed to the self, which naturally has none. So it has been said, 'It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were' (IV. iii. 7). The agency is simply due to its limiting adjuncts, the intellect etc., and is not natural to it. Here, however, the self is described from the standpoint of reality independently of the limiting adjuncts:

[1] Śaṅkara supplies this from the preceding paragraphs.

'Merely seeing (the results of) good and evil,' not actually doing them. Hence there is no fear of contradiction between this and the previous text, because the self, freed from its limiting adjuncts, really neither does anything nor is affected by the results of any action. As the Lord has said, 'The immutable Supreme Self, O Arjuna, being without beginning and without attributes, neither does anything nor is affected by its results although It is in the body' (G. XIII. 31). And the gift of a thousand cows is made because Yājñavalkya has shown the self to be free from desire. Similarly this and the preceding paragraph prove the non-attachment of the self. Because, passing into the dream state and that of profound sleep, it is not affected by what it did in the waking state—for we do not then find actions such as theft—therefore in all the three states the self is naturally unattached. Hence it is immortal, or distinct from the attributes of the three states.

He comes back to his former condition, the state of profound sleep (Svapnānta). Since the dream state, with its function of seeing visions, has already been mentioned by the word 'Svapna,' the addition of the word 'Anta' (end) will be appropriate if we take the word 'Svapnānta' in the sense of dreamless sleep, which state will also be referred to in the passage, 'He runs for this state' (IV. iii. 19). If, however, it is argued by a reference to the following passages,[1] 'After enjoying himself and roaming in the dream state'

[1] Where the word 'Anta' occurs thrice, meaning not end, but state.

(IV. iii. 34), and 'Moves to both these states, the dream and waking states' (IV. iii. 18), that here also the word 'Svapnānta' means the dream state, with its function of seeing visions, there is nothing wrong in that interpretation too, for non-attachment of the self, which is sought to be established, certainly is established thereby. Therefore, on returning to the dream state 'after enjoying himself and roaming in the waking state, and merely seeing (the results of) good and evil,' he is not pursued by the evils of the waking state.

Thus the idea that has been established by the last three paragraphs is that this self is itself the light and distinct from the body and organs and their stimulating causes, desire and work, on account of its non-attachment—'For this infinite being is unattached.' How do we know that the self is unattached? Because it moves by turn from the waking to the dream state, from this to the state of profound sleep, from that again to the dream state, then to the waking state, from that again to the dream state, and so on, which proves that it is distinct from the three states. This idea has also been previously introduced in the passage, 'Being identified with dreams, it transcends this world—the forms of death' (IV. iii. 7). Having treated this at length, the Śruti now proceeds to give an illustration, which is the only thing that remains.

तद्यथा महामत्स्य उभे कूलेऽनुसंचरति पूर्वं चापरं च, एवमेवायं पुरुष एतावुभावन्तावनुसंचरति स्वप्नान्तं च बुद्धान्तं च ॥ १८ ॥

18. As a great fish swims alternately to both the banks (of a river), eastern and western, so does this infinite being move to both these states, the dream and waking states.

In support of the idea set forth above, the following illustration is being given: *As* in the world *a great fish* that moves freely, never being swayed by the river-currents, but rather stemming them, *swims alternately to both the banks* of a river, *eastern and western*, and while swimming between them, is not overpowered by the intervening current of water, *so does this infinite being move to both these states*—which are they?—*the dream and waking states*. The point of the illustration is that the body and organs, which are forms of death, together with their stimulating causes, desire and work, are the attributes of the non-self, and that the self is distinct from them. All this has already been exhaustively explained.

In the preceding paragraphs the self-luminous Ātman, which is different from the body and organs, has been stated to be distinct from desire and work, for it moves alternately to the three states. These relative attributes do not belong to it *per se*; its relative existence is only due to its limiting adjuncts, and is superimposed by ignorance; this has been stated to be the gist of the whole passage. There, however, the three states of waking, dream and profound sleep have been described separately—not shown together as a group. For instance, it has been shown that in the waking state the self appears,

through ignorance, as connected with attachment, death (work), and the body and organs ; in the dream state it is perceived as connected with desire, but free from the forms of death ; and in the state of profound sleep it is perfectly serene and unattached, this non-attachment being the additional feature. If we consider all these passages together, the resulting sense is that the self is by nature eternal, free, enlightened and pure. This comprehensive view has not yet been shown ; hence the next paragraph. It will be stated later on that the self becomes such only in the state of profound sleep: 'That is his form—beyond desires, free from evils, and fearless' (IV. iii. 21). As it is such, i.e. unique, the self desires to enter this state. How is that? The next paragraph will explain it. As the meaning becomes clear through an illustration, one is being put forward.

तद्यथास्मिन्नाकाशे श्येनो वा सुपर्णो वा विपरिपत्य श्रान्तः संहत्य पक्षौ संलयायैव ध्रियते, एवमेवायं पुरुष एतस्मा अन्ताय धावति यत्र सुप्तो न कंचन कामं कामयते, न कंचन स्वप्नं पश्यति ॥ १९ ॥

19. As a hawk or a falcon flying in the sky becomes tired, and stretching its wings, is bound for its nest, so does this infinite being run for this state, where falling asleep he craves no desires and sees no dreams.

As a hawk or a falcon (Suparṇa), a swifter kind of hawk, *flying* or roaming *in the* external *sky be-*

comes tired, exhausted with undertaking different flights, *and stretching its wings, is bound for,* directs itself towards, *its nest*—lit. where it has a perfect rest —*so does this infinite being run for this state, where falling asleep he craves no desires and sees no dreams.* This last clause describes what is denoted by the word 'state.' The words 'craves no desires' shut out all desires of the dream and waking states without reservation, the negative particle having that all-inclusive force. Similarly with 'and sees no dreams.' The experiences of the waking state also are considered by the Śruti to be but dreams ; hence it says, 'And sees no dreams.' Another Śruti passage bears this out: 'He has three abodes, three dream states' (Ai. III. 12). As the bird in the illustration goes to its nest to remove the fatigue due to flight, so the Jīva (self), connected with the results of action done by the contact of the body and organs in the waking and dream states, is fatigued, as the bird with its flight, and in order to remove that fatigue enters his own nest or abode, that is, his own self, distinct from all relative attributes and devoid of all exertion caused by action with its factors and results.

It may be questioned: If this freedom from all relative attributes is the nature of the Jīva, and his relative existence is due to other things, viz. the limiting adjuncts, and if it is ignorance that causes this relative existence through those extraneous limiting adjuncts, is that ignorance natural to him, or is it adventitious, like desire, work, etc? If it is the latter, then liberation is possible. But what are the proofs

of its being adventitious, and why should ignorance not be the natural characteristic of the self? Hence, in order to determine the nature of ignorance, which is the root of all evil, the next paragraph is introduced.

ता वा अस्यैता हिता नाम नाड्यो यथा केशः सहस्रधा भिन्नस्तावताणिम्ना तिष्ठन्ति, शुक्लस्य नीलस्य पिङ्गलस्य हरितस्य लोहितस्य पूर्णाः; अथ यत्रैनं घ्नन्तीव जिनन्तीव, हस्तीव विच्छाययति, गर्तमिव पतति, यदेव जाग्रद्भयं पश्यति तदत्राविद्यया मन्यते; अथ यत्र देव इव राजेव, अहमेवेदं सर्वोऽस्मीति मन्यते, सोऽस्य परमो लोकः ॥ २० ॥

20. In him are those nerves called Hitā, which are as fine as a hair split into a thousand parts, and filled with white, blue, brown, green and red (serums). (They are the seat of the subtle body, in which impressions are stored.) Now when (he feels) as if he were being killed or overpowered, or being pursued by an elephant, or falling into a pit, (in short) conjures at the time through ignorance whatever terrible things he has experienced in the waking state, (that is the dream state). And when (he becomes) a god, as it were, or a king, as it were, or thinks, 'This (universe) is myself, who am all,' that is his highest state.

In him, in this man with a head, hands, etc., *are those nerves called Hitā,*[1] *which are as fine as a hair split into a thousand parts, and* they are *filled with*

[1] Referred to in II. i. 19 and IV. ii. 3.

white, blue, brown, green and red serums. Many and various are the colours of the serums, owing to the intermixture, in various proportions, of nerve matter, bile and phlegm. The subtle body with its seventeen constituents[1] has its seat in these nerves, which have the fineness of the thousandth part of the tip of a hair, are filled with serums, white and so on, and spread all over the body.

All impressions due to the experience of high and low attributes of the relative universe are centred in this. This subtle body, in which the impressions are stored, is transparent like a crystal because of its fineness; but owing to its contact with foreign matter, viz. the serums in the nerves, it undergoes modifications under the influence of past merit and demerit, and manifests itself as impressions in the form of women, chariots, elephants, etc. *Now,* such being the case, ***when*** a man has the false notion called ignorance based on past impressions, that some people—enemies or robbers—have come and are going to kill him. This is being described by the text: *As if he,* the dreamer, ***were being killed or overpowered.*** Nobody is killing or overpowering him; it is simply his mistake due to the past impressions created by ignorance. *Or being* ***pursued*** or chased *by an elephant, or falling into a pit,* a dilapidated well, for instance. He fancies himself in this position. Such are the false impressions that arise in him—extremely low ones, resting on the modifications of the mind brought about by his past iniquity, as is evidenced by their painful nature.

1 See footnote on p. 3.

In short, he *conjures at the time,* i.e. in dreams, when there is no elephant or the like, *through* the impressions created by *ignorance,* which have falsely manifested themselves, *whatever terrible things* such as an elephant *he has experienced in the waking state.*

Then when ignorance decreases and knowledge increases, (the result is as follows). The text describes the content and nature of the knowledge: *And when* he himself becomes *a god, as it were.* When, in the waking state, meditation regarding the gods prevails, he considers himself a god, as it were, on account of the impressions generated by it. The same thing is being said of the dream state too: He becomes 'a god, as it were.' *Or a king, as it were:* Having been installed as the ruler of a state (in the waking state), he thinks in his dreams also that he is a king, for he is imbued with the impressions of his kingly state. Similarly, when (in the waking state) his ignorance is extremely attenuated, and the knowledge that he comprises all arises, he *thinks* under the influence of these impressions in the dream state also, *'This* (universe) *is myself, who am all.' That,* this identity with all, *is his highest state,* the Ātman's own natural, supreme state. When, prior to this realisation of identity with all, he views the latter as other than himself even by a hair's breadth, thinking, 'This is not myself,' that is the state of ignorance. The states divorced from the self that are brought on by ignorance, down to stationary existence, are all inferior states. Compared with these—states with which the Jīva has relative dealings—the above state of identity

with all, infinite and without interior or exterior, is his supreme state. Therefore, when ignorance is eliminated and knowledge reaches its perfection, the state of identity with all, which is another name for liberation, is attained. That is to say, just as the self-effulgence of the Ātman is directly perceived in the dream state, so is this result of knowledge.

Similarly, when ignorance increases and knowledge vanishes, the results of ignorance are also directly perceived in dreams: 'Now when (he feels) as if he were being killed or overpowered,' etc. Thus the results of knowledge and ignorance are identity with all and identity with finite things, respectively. Through pure knowledge a man is identified with all, and through ignorance he is identified with finite things, or separated from something else. He is in conflict with that from which he is separated, and because of this conflict he is killed, overpowered or pursued. All this takes place because the results of ignorance, being finite things, are separated from him. But if he is all, what is there from which he may be separated, so as to be in conflict; and in the absence of conflict by whom would he be killed, overpowered or pursued? Hence the nature of ignorance proves to be this, that it represents that which is infinite as finite, presents things other than the self that are non-existent, and makes the self appear as limited. Thence arises the desire for that from which he is separated; desire prompts him to action, which produces results. This is the gist of the whole passage. It will also be stated later on, 'When there is duality, as it were, then one sees something,' etc. (II. iv. 14; IV. v. 15). Thus

the nature of ignorance with its effects has been set forth ; and as opposed to these, the effect of knowledge also, viz. the attainment of identity with all, has been shown. That ignorance is not the natural characteristic of the self, since it automatically decreases as knowledge increases, and when the latter is at its highest, with the result that the self realises its identity with all, ignorance vanishes altogether, like the notion of a snake in a rope when the truth about it is known. This has been stated in the passage, 'But when to the knower of Brahman everything has become the self, then what should one see and through what?' etc. (Ibid.). Therefore ignorance is not a natural characteristic of the self, for that which is natural to a thing can never be eliminated, as the heat and light of the sun. Therefore liberation from ignorance is possible.

तद्वा अस्यैतदतिच्छन्दा अपहतपाप्माभयं रूपम्। तद्यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम्, एवमेवायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम्; तद्वा अस्यैतदाप्तकाममात्मकाममकामं रूपं शोकान्तरम् ॥ २१ ॥

21. That is his form—beyond desires, free from evils, and fearless. As a man, fully embraced by his beloved wife, does not know anything at all, either external or internal, so does this infinite being (self), fully embraced by the Supreme Self, not know anything at all,

either external or internal. That is his form—in which all objects of desire have been attained and are but the self, and which is free from desires and devoid of grief.

Now liberation in the form of identity with all, which is the result, devoid of action with its factors and results, of knowledge, and in which there is no ignorance, desire, or work, is being directly pointed out. This has already been introduced in the passage, 'Where falling asleep it craves no desires and sees no dreams' (par. 19). *That,* this identity with all which has been spoken of as 'his highest state,' *is his form —beyond desires* (Aticchandā). This word is to be turned into neuter, since it qualifies the word 'Rūpa' (form). 'Chanda' means desire ; hence 'Aticchanda' means transcending desires. There is another word 'Chandas' ending in *s,* which means metres such as the Gāyatrī. But here the word means desire ; hence it must end in a vowel. Nevertheless the reading 'Aticchandā' should be taken as the usual Vedic licence. In common parlance too the word 'Chanda' is used in the sense of desire, as in 'Svacchanda' (free), 'Paracchanda' (dependent on others' will), etc. Hence the word must be turned into 'Aticchandam' (neuter) to mean that this form of the self is free from desires. Likewise, *free from evils.* 'Evils' mean both merits and demerits, for it has elsewhere (par. 8) been said, 'Is connected with evils,' and 'Discards those evils.' 'Free from evils' means 'devoid of merits

and demerits.' Also, *fearless*. Fear is an effect of ignorance, for it has already been said that through ignorance he conjures terrible things (par. 20). Hence the word must be construed as denying the cause through the effect. 'Fearless form' means one that is bereft of ignorance. This identity with all which is the result of knowledge is this form—beyond desires, free from evils and fearless. It is fearless because it is devoid of all relative attributes. This has already been introduced at the conclusion of the preceding section, by the scriptural statement, 'You have attained That which is free from fear, O Janaka' (IV. ii. 4). But here it is elaborated by argument to impress the meaning conveyed by the scriptural passage in question.

This Ātman is itself the light that is Pure Intelligence, and reveals everything by its own intelligence. It has been said (pars. 15 and 16) that (he is untouched by) the roaming or by whatever he sees, or enjoys, or knows in that (dream) state. And it is also proved by reasoning that the eternal nature of the self is that it is the light of Pure Intelligence. (Now an objection is being raised:) If the self remains intact in its own form in the state of profound sleep, why does it not know itself as 'I am this,' or know all those things that are outside, as it does in the waking and dream states? The answer is being given: Listen why it does not know. Unity is the reason. How is that? This is explained by the text. As the intended meaning is vividly realised through an illustration, it goes on to say: *As* in the world ***a man, fully embraced by his beloved wife***, both desiring each other's com-

pany, *does not know anything at all, either external* to himself, as, 'This is something other than myself,' *or internal,* as 'I am this, or I am happy or miserable'—but he knows everything outside and inside when he is not embraced by her and is separated, and fails to know only during the embrace owing to the attainment of unity—*so,* like the example cited, *does this infinite being,* the individual self, who is separated (from the Supreme Self), like a lump of salt, through contact with a little of the elements (the body and organs) and enters this body and organs, like the reflection of the moon etc. in water and so forth, being *fully embraced by,* or unified with, *the Supreme Self,* his own real, natural, supremely effulgent self, and being identified with all, without the least break, *not know anything at all, either external,* something outside, *or internal,* within himself, such as, 'I am this, or I am happy or miserable.'

You asked me why, in spite of its being the light that is Pure Intelligence, the self fails to know in the state of profound sleep. I have told you the reason—it is unity, as of a couple fully embracing each other. Incidentally it is implied that variety is the cause of particular consciousness ; and the cause of that variety is, as we have said, ignorance, which brings forward something other than the self. Such being the case, when the Jīva is freed from ignorance, he attains but unity with all. Therefore, there being no such division among the factors of an action as knowledge and

known, whence should particular consciousness arise, or desire manifest itself, in the natural, immutable light of the self?

Because this identity with all is his form, therefore *that is his form,* the form of this self-effulgent Ātman, *in which all objects of desire have been attained,* because it comprises all. That from which objects of desire are different has hankering after them, as the form called Devadatta, for instance, in the waking state. But this other form is not so divided from anything; hence in it all objects of desire have been attained. It may be asked, can that form not be divided from other things that exist, or is the self the only entity that exists? The answer is, there is nothing else but the self. How? Because all objects of desire *are but the self* in this form. In states other than that of profound sleep, i.e. in the waking and dream states, things are separated, as it were, from the self and are desired as such. But to one who is fast asleep, they become the self, since there is no ignorance to project the idea of difference. Hence also *is* this form *free from desires,* because there is nothing to be desired, *and devoid of grief* (Śokāntara). 'Antara' means a break or gap; or it may mean the inside or core.[1] In either case, the meaning is that this form of the self is free from grief.

अत्र पितापिता भवति, मातामाता, लोका अलोकाः, देवा अदेवाः, वेदा अवेदाः। अत्र स्तेनोऽस्तेनो भवति, भ्रूणहाभ्रूणहा, चाण्डालोऽचाण्डालः, पौल्कसोऽपौल्कसः,

[1] Hence grief cannot hurt it, for it is its very self.

श्रमणोऽश्रमणः, तापसोऽतापसः; अनन्वागतं पुण्येना-
नन्वागतं पापेन, तीर्णो हि तदा सर्वाञ्छोकान्हृदयस्य
भवति ॥ २२ ॥

22. In this state a father is no father, a mother no mother, the worlds no worlds, the gods no gods, the Vedas no Vedas. In this state a thief is no thief, the killer of a noble Brāhmaṇa no killer, a Caṇḍāla no Caṇḍāla, a Pulkasa no Pulkasa, a monk no monk, a hermit no hermit. (This form of his) is untouched by good work and untouched by evil work, for he is then beyond all the woes of his heart (intellect).

It has been said that the self-effulgent Ātman which is being described is free from ignorance, desire and work, for it is unattached, while they are adventitious. Here an objection is raised: The Śruti has said that although the self is Pure Intelligence, it does not know anything (in the state of profound sleep) on account of its attaining unity, as in the case of a couple in each other's embrace. The Śruti has thereby practically said that like desire, work, etc., the self-effulgence of the Ātman is not its nature, since it is not perceived in the state of profound sleep. This objection is refuted by a reference to the illustration of the couple in each other's embrace, and it is asserted that the self-effulgence is certainly present in profound sleep, but it is not perceived on account of

unity; it is not adventitious like desire, work, etc. Having mentioned this incidentally, the text takes up the topic under discussion, viz. that the form of the self that is directly perceived in the state of profound sleep is free from ignorance, desire and work. So it is a statement of fact to describe this form as beyond all relations. Since in the state of profound sleep the self has a form that is 'beyond desires, free from evils and fearless,' therefore *in this state a father is no father*. His fatherhood towards the son, as being the begetter, is due to an action, from which he is dissociated in this state. Therefore the father, notwithstanding the fact of his being such, is no father, because he is entirely free from the action that relates him to the son. Similarly we understand by implication that the son also ceases to be a son to his father, for the relation of both is based on an action, and he is beyond it then, since it has been said, 'Free from evils' (IV. iii. 21).

Likewise *a mother* is *no mother, the worlds,* which are either won or to be won through rites, are *no worlds,* owing to his dissociation from those rites. Similarly *the gods,* who are a part of the rites, are *no gods,* because he transcends his relation to those rites. The Vedas also, consisting of the Brāhmaṇas, which describe the means, the goal and their relation, as well as the Mantras, and forming part of the rites, since they deal with them, whether already read or yet to be read, are connected with a man through those rites. Since he transcends those rites, *the Vedas* too then are *no Vedas*.

Not only is the man beyond his relation to his good actions, but he is also untouched by his terribly

evil actions. So the text says: *In this state a thief*, one who has stolen a Brāhmaṇa's gold—we know this from his mention along with one who has killed a noble Brāhmaṇa—is free from this dire action, for which he is called a thief, a despicable sinner. Similarly *the killer of a noble Brāhmaṇa* is *no killer*. Likewise a *Caṇḍāla*, etc. Not only is a man free from the actions done by him in his present life, but he is also free from those dire actions of his past life that degrade him to an exceedingly low birth. A Caṇḍāla is one born of a Śūdra father and a Brāhmaṇa mother. —'Caṇḍāla' is but a variant of the same word.—Not being connected with the work that caused his low birth, he is *no Caṇḍāla*. *A Pulkasa* is one born of a Śūdra father and a Kṣatriya mother.—'Paulkasa' is a variant of the same word.—He too is *no Pulkasa*. Similarly a man is dissociated from the duties of his particular order of life. For instance, *a monk* is *no monk*, being free from the duties that make him one. Likewise *a hermit* or recluse is *no hermit*. The two orders mentioned are suggestive of all the castes, orders, and so on.

In short, (this form of his) *is untouched by good work*, rites enjoined by the scriptures, as well as *by evil work*, the omission to perform such rites, and the doing of forbidden acts. The word 'untouched' is in the neuter gender as it qualifies 'form,' the 'fearless form' of the preceding paragraph. What is the reason of its being untouched by them? The reason is being stated: *For he*, the self of a nature described above, *is then beyond all the woes*, or desires. It is these

desires for wished-for things that in their absence are converted into woes. A man who has either failed to attain those things or lost them keeps thinking of their good qualities and suffers. Hence woe, attachment and desire are synonyms. (The clause therefore means:) Because in the state of profound sleep he transcends all desires; for it has been said, 'He craves no desires' (IV. iii. 21), and 'Beyond desires.' Coming in the wake of those terms, the word 'woe' ought to mean desires. Desires again are the root of action; it will be stated later on, 'What it desires, it resolves; and what it resolves, it works out' (IV. iv. 5). Therefore, since he transcends all desires, it has been well said, 'It is untouched by good work,' etc.

Of his heart: The heart is the lotus-shaped lump of flesh, but being the seat of the internal organ, intellect, it refers to that by a metonymy, as when we speak of cries from the chairs (meaning persons occupying them). The woes of his heart, or intellect—for they abide there, since it has been said, 'Desire, resolve, (etc. are but the mind)' (I. v. 3). It will also be said later on, 'The desires that dwell in his heart' (IV. iv. 7). This and the other statement about 'the woes of his heart' repudiate the error that they dwell in the self, for it has been said that being no more related to the heart in the state of profound sleep, the self transcends the forms of death. Therefore it is quite appropriate to say that being no more related to the heart, it transcends the relation to desires abiding in the heart.

Those[1] who maintain that the desires and impressions dwelling in the heart go farther and affect the self, which is related to it, and even when it is dissociated from the self, they dwell in the latter, like the scent of flowers etc. in the oil in which they have been boiled, can find no meaning whatsoever for such scriptural statements as, 'Desire, resolve,' 'It is on the heart (mind) that colours rest' (III. ix. 20), 'The woes of his heart,' etc.

Objection: They are referred to the intellect merely because they are produced through this organ.

Reply: No, for they are specified in the words, '(That) dwell in (his) heart.' This and the other statement, 'It is on the heart that colours rest,' would hardly be consistent if the intellect were merely the instrument of their production. Since the purity of the self is the meaning intended to be conveyed, the statement that desires abide in the intellect is truly appropriate. It admits of no other interpretation, for the Śruti says, 'It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were' (IV. iii. 7).

Objection: The specification about 'desires that dwell in his heart' implies that there are others that dwell in the self too.

Reply: No, for it demarcates these desires from those that are not then in the heart. In other words, the epithet 'that dwell in his heart' contrasts not this particular seat of desires with some other seats, but contrasts these desires with those that are not in the heart at the time. For instance, those that have not

[1] The reference is to Bhartṛprapañca.

yet sprung up—the future ones—or those that are past, having been checked by contrary ideas, are surely not in the intellect ; and yet they may crop up in future. Hence the specification in contradistinction to them is quite in order, meaning those desires regarding some object that have sprung up and are present in the intellect.

Objection : Still the specification would be redundant.

Reply : No, because more attention should be paid to them as objects to be shunned. Otherwise, by ascribing the desires to the self, you would be holding a view which is contrary to the wording of the Śruti and is undesirable.[1]

Objection : But does not the negation of a fact of normal experience in the passage, 'He craves no desires' (IV. iii. 19), mean that the Śruti mentions the desires as being in the self?

Reply : No, for the experience in question about the self being the seat of desires is due to an extraneous agency (the intellect), as is evidenced by the Śruti passage, 'Being identified with dreams through its association with the intellect'[2] (IV. iii. 7). Besides there is the statement about the self being unattached, which would be incongruous if the self were the seat of desires ; we have already said that attachment is desire.

Objection : May we not say from the Śruti passage, 'To whom all objects of desire are but the Self'

[1] As standing in the way of liberation.

[2] See footnote 2 on p. 611.

(IV. iv. 6), that the self has desires regarding itself?

Reply : No, that passage only means the absence of any other object of desire than the self.

Objection : Does not the reasoning of the Vaiśeṣika and other systems support the view that the self is the seat of desires etc.?

Reply : No ; the arguments of the Vaiśeṣika and other systems are to be disregarded, since they contradict specific statements of the Śrutis such as, '(That) dwell in (his) heart' (IV. iv. 7). Any reasoning that contradicts the Śrutis is a fallacy. Moreover, the self-effulgence of the Ātman is contradicted. That is to say, since in the dream state desires etc. are witnessed by Pure Intelligence only, the views in question would contradict the self-effulgence of the Ātman, which is stated as a fact by the Śrutis and is also borne out by reason ; for if the desires etc. inhere in the self,[1] they cannot again be its objects, just as the eye cannot see its own particulars. The self-effulgence of the witness, the self, has been proved on the ground that objects are different entities from the subject. This would be contradicted if the self be supposed to be the seat of desires etc. Besides it contradicts the teachings of all scriptures. If the individual self be conceived as a part of the Supreme Self and possessing desires etc., the meaning of all the scriptures would be set at naught. We have explained this at length in the second chapter (p. 300). In order to establish the meaning of

[1] As qualities do in a substance.

the scriptures that the individual self is identical with the Supreme Self, the idea that it is the seat of desires etc. must be refuted with the greatest care. If, however, that view is put forward, the very meaning of the scriptures would be contradicted. Just as the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas, holding that wish and so forth are attributes of the self, are in disharmony with the meaning of the Upaniṣads, so also is this view not to be entertained, because it contradicts the meaning of the Upaniṣads.

It has been said that the self does not see (in the state of profound sleep) on account of unity, as in the case of the couple, and that it is self-effulgent. Self-effulgence is being Pure Intelligence by nature. Now the question is, if this intelligence is the very nature of the self, like the heat etc. of fire, how should it, in spite of the unity, give up its nature, and fail to know? And if it does not give up its nature, how is it that it does not see in the state of profound sleep? It is self-contradictory to say that intelligence is the nature of the self and, again, that it does not know. The answer is, it is not self-contradictory; both these are possible. How?—

यद्वै तन्न पश्यति पश्यन्वै तन्न पश्यति, न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात् । न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यत्पश्येत् ॥ २३ ॥

23. That it does not see in that state is because, although seeing then, it does not see; for the vision of the witness can never be lost,

because it is immortal. But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can see.

That it does not see in that state of profound sleep *is because, although seeing then, it does not see.* You think that it does not see in the state of profound sleep ; but do not think so. Why? Because it is *seeing then.*

Objection : But we know that in the state of profound sleep it does not see, because then neither the eye nor the mind, which are the instruments of vision, is working. It is only when the eye, ear, etc. are at work that we say one is seeing or hearing. But we do not find the organs working. Therefore we conclude that it must surely not be seeing.

Reply : Certainly not ; it *is* seeing ; *for the vision of the witness can never be lost.* As the heat of fire lasts as long as the fire, so is the witness, the self, immortal, and because of this its vision too *is immortal ;* it lasts as long as the witness does.

Objection : Do you not contradict yourself by saying in the same breath that it is a vision of the witness, and that it is never lost? Vision is an act of the witness ; one is called a witness just because one sees. Hence it is impossible to say that vision, which depends on an act of the witness, is never lost.

Reply : It must be immortal, because the Śruti says it is never lost.

Objection : No, a Śruti text merely informs (it cannot alter a fact). The destruction of something that is artificially made is a logical necessity, and

cannot be prevented even by a hundred texts, because a text only informs about a thing just as it is.

Reply : The objection does not hold. The vision of the witness is possible, like the sun etc. revealing things. Just as the sun and the like are naturally always luminous and reveal things through their natural, constant light, and when we speak of them as revealing things, we do not mean that they are naturally non-luminous and only reveal things by a fresh act each time, but that they do so through their natural, constant light, so is the self called a witness on account of its imperishable, eternal vision.

Objection : Then its function as a witness is secondary.

Reply : No. Thus only can it be shown to be a witness in the primary sense of the word, because if the self were observed to exercise the function of seeing in any other way, then the former way might be secondary. But the self has no other method of seeing. Therefore thus only can we understand its being a witness in the primary sense, not otherwise. Just as the sun and the like reveal things through their constant, natural light, and not through one produced for the time being, (so is the self a witness through its eternal, natural intelligence), and that is its function as a witness in the primary sense, for there cannot be any other witness besides it. Therefore there is not the least trace of self-contradiction in the statement that the vision of the witness is never lost.

Objection : We observe that the suffix 'tṛc' is

used in words denoting an agent of temporary acts, such as 'Chettṛ' (cutter), 'Bhettṛ' (breaker) and 'Gantṛ' (traveller). So why not in the word 'Draṣṭṛ' (seer or witness) also in that sense?

Reply : No, for we see it otherwise in the word 'Prakāśayitṛ' (revealer).

Objection : We admit this in the case of luminous agencies, for there it can have no other sense, but not in the case of the self.

Reply : Not so, for the Śruti says its vision is never lost.

Objection : This is contradicted by our experience that we sometimes see and sometimes do not see.

Reply : No, for this is simply due to particular activities of our organs. We observe also that those who have had their eyes removed keep the vision that belongs to the self intact in dreams. Therefore the vision of the self is imperishable, and through that imperishable, self-luminous vision the Ātman continues to see in the state of profound sleep.

How is it, then, that it does not see? This is being answered: *But there is not that second thing,* the object, *separate from it which it can see,* or perceive. Those things that caused the particular visions (of the waking and dream states), viz. the mind (with the self behind it), the eyes, and forms, were all presented by ignorance as something different from the self. They are now unified in the state of profound sleep, as the individual self has been embraced by the Supreme Self. Only when the self is under limitations, do the organs stand as something different to help it to particular experiences. But it is now

embraced by its own Supreme Self, which is Pure Intelligence and the Self of all, as a man is by his beloved wife. Hence the organs and objects do not stand as different entities; and since they are absent, there is no particular experience, for it is the product of the organs etc., not of the self, and only appears as the product of the self. Therefore it is a mistake due to this (absence of particular experience) that the vision of the self is lost.

यद्वै तन्न जिघ्रति जिघ्रन्वै तन्न जिघ्रति, न हि घ्रातुर्घ्राते-र्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात्; न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यज्जिघ्रेत् ॥ २४ ॥

24. That it does not smell in that state is because, although smelling then, it does not smell; for the smeller's function of smelling can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can smell.

यद्वै तन्न रसयते रसयन्वै तन्न रसयते, न हि रसयितू रसयतेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात्; न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यद्रसयेत् ॥ २५ ॥

25. That it does not taste in that state is because, although tasting then, it does not taste; for the taster's function of tasting can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can taste.

यद्वै तन्न वदति, वदन्वै तन्न वदति, न हि वक्तुर्वक्ते-

र्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात्; न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यद्वदेत्॥ २६॥

26. That it does not speak in that state is because, although speaking then, it does not speak; for the speaker's function of speaking can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can speak.

यद्वै तन्न शृणोति शृण्वन्वै तन्न शृणोति, न हि श्रोतुः श्रुतेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात्; न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यच्छृणुयात्॥ २७॥

27. That it does not hear in that state is because, although hearing then, it does not hear; for the listener's function of hearing can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can hear.

यद्वै तन्न मनुते मन्वानो वै तन्न मनुते, न हि मन्तुर्मतेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात्; न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यन्मन्वीत॥ २८॥

28. That it does not think in that state is because, although thinking then, it does not think; for the thinker's function of thinking can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can think.

यद्वै तन्न स्पृशति स्पृशन्वै तन्न स्पृशति, नहि स्प्रष्टुः

स्पृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात्; न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यत्स्पृशेत् ॥ २९ ॥

29. That it does not touch in that state is because, although touching then, it does not touch; for the toucher's function of touching can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can touch.

यद्वै तन्न विजानाति विजानन्वै तन्न विजानाति, न हि विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात्; न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यद्विजानीयात् ॥ ३० ॥

30. That it does not know in that state is because, although knowing then, it does not know; for the knower's function of knowing can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can know.

The rest is to be similarly explained: *That it does not smell, That it does not taste, That it does not speak, That it does not hear, That it does not think, That it does not touch, That it does not know,* etc. Though thinking and knowing are aided by vision etc., yet they have activities concerning objects past, present and future that do not depend on the eyes etc. Hence they are separately mentioned.

Now the question is, are the vision and so forth attributes different from the self and from one another, like the heat, light, combustion, etc. of fire, or are they

different phases of an attribute identical with the self, the difference being caused only by extraneous limiting adjuncts? On this some[1] say: The self is an entity that by itself has both unity and difference, just as a cow is one as a substance, but its features, the dewlap etc., are different from one another. As gross substances have both unity and difference, so we can infer that formless substances without parts also have both unity and difference. Since this is observed to be the universal rule, the vision and so forth belonging to the self are different from one another, but as the self they are one. To this we reply: No, for the passage in question has a different meaning. The passage, 'That it does not see in that state,' etc. does not mean to show that the vision and so forth are attributes different from the self, but is introduced in order to answer the following objection: If the Ātman is self-luminous intelligence, how is it that it does not know in the state of profound sleep? Surely then it must be otherwise. This is how it is being answered: Its natural self-luminous intelligence manifests itself in the waking and dream states through many limiting adjuncts such as the eyes, and comes to be designated as vision etc. But in the state of profound sleep, owing to the cessation of the different activities of the mind and organs, these latter do not appear, and therefore the nature of the self cannot be perceivd as differentiated by them. Yet it is spoken of as being present in a way that is a

[1] Bhartṛprapañca is meant.

mere recapitulation of normal experience. Hence the view that the passage in question presents the attributes such as vision as different from the self, is based on an ignorance of its true meaning.

Moreover, it would be in conflict with the Śruti text that speaks of the self as homogeneous Pure Intelligence, like a lump of salt, and also with texts like the following: 'Knowledge, Bliss' (III. ix. 28), 'Truth, Knowledge' (Tai. II. i. 1), and 'Intelligence is Brahman' (Ai. V. 3). From the common use of words also we know this. We often use such expressions as, 'One knows colour through the eyes,' 'One knows sound through the ears,' 'One knows the taste of food through the tongue,' etc., which show that the objects denoted by the words 'vision' etc. can be designated as knowledge alone. And the use of words is a means of knowledge. Examples also corroborate this view. Just as in the world a crystal is naturally transparent, and only for that reason assumes different colours by coming in contact with different limiting adjuncts such as green, blue, or red colour, and no one can imagine that crystal has any other attribute but its natural transparency, such as green, blue, or red colour, similarly the different powers of vision etc. are observed in the light called the self, which is naturally Pure Intelligence, simply owing to its contact with the limiting adjuncts such as the eyes, because Pure Intelligence, like the crystal, is naturally transparent. The self-luminosity of the Ātman is another reason. Just as the light of the sun, coming in contact with things to be illumined, appears as green, blue,

yellow, red, etc., although in reality it cannot be so divided, so does the light called the self, revealing the whole universe as well as the eyes etc., assume their form. This has been stated in the passage, 'It is through the light of the self that he sits,' etc. (IV. iii. 6).

Besides, substances that have no parts cannot be conceived as multiple, for there is no such example. Although the ether is conceived as possessing diverse attributes such as all-pervasiveness, and atoms as possessing various qualities such as odour and savour, yet, when discriminated, these prove to be due only to extraneous limiting adjuncts. The ether, for instance, has no attribute of its own called all-pervasiveness: it is through its association with all as limiting adjuncts that it is designated as all-pervading, when as a matter of fact it is present everywhere in its natural form. The quesion of going or not going does not arise with regard to the ether in itself, for going is an action that connects something existing at a particular place with some other place, and this action is impossible in a thing that admits of no differentiation. Similarly different attributes can never be in the ether. The same is also true of atoms etc. An atom, say of earth, which consists only of odour, is the minutest particle of it, and is *itself* odour ; one cannot conceive that it again has a property called odour. It may be urged that an atom can have savour etc. But that is due to its contact with water and so on. Therefore there is no example to prove that a substance which has no parts can possess many attributes. This also refutes the view that the powers of vision and so forth

of the Supreme Self can have different modifications such as the eyes and colours.

यत्र वान्यदिव स्यात्, तत्रान्योऽन्यत्पश्येत्, अन्योऽन्यज्जिघ्रेत्, अन्योऽन्यद्रसयेत्, अन्योऽन्यद्वदेत्, अन्योऽन्यच्छृणुयात्, अन्योऽन्यन्मन्वीत, अन्योऽन्यत्स्पृशेत्, अन्योऽन्यद्विजानीयात् ॥ ३१ ॥

31. When there is something else, as it were, then one can see something, one can smell something, one can taste something, one can speak something, one can hear something, one can think something, one can touch something, or one can know something.

It has been said that in the state of profound sleep there is not, as in the waking and dream states, that second thing differentiated from the self which it can know; hence it knows no particulars in profound sleep. Here it is objected: If this is its nature, why does it give up that nature and have particular knowledge? If, on the other hand, it is its nature to have this kind of knowledge, why does it not know particulars in the state of profound sleep? The answer is this: *When,* in the waking or dream state, *there is something else* besides the self, *as it were,* presented by ignorance, *then one,* thinking of oneself as different from that something—although there is nothing different from the self, nor is there any self different from it—*can see something.* This has been shown by a reference to one's experience in the dream state in the passage, 'As if he were being killed, or overpowered'

(IV. iii. 20). Similarly *one can smell, taste, speak, hear, think, touch* and *know something.*

सलिल एको द्रष्टाद्वैतो भवति, एष ब्रह्मलोकः सम्राडिति हैनमनुशशास याज्ञवल्क्यः, एषास्य परमा गतिः, एषास्य परमा संपत्, एषोऽस्य परमो लोकः, एषोऽस्य परम आनन्दः ; एतस्यैवानन्दस्यान्यानि भूतानि मात्रामुपजीवन्ति ॥ ३२ ॥

32. It becomes (transparent) like water, one, the witness, and without a second. This is the world (state) of Brahman, O Emperor. Thus did Yājñavalkya instruct Janaka: This is its supreme attainment, this is its supreme glory, this is its highest world, this is its supreme bliss. On a particle of this very bliss other beings live.

When, however, that ignorance which presents things other than the self is at rest, in that state of profound sleep, there being nothing separated from the self by ignorance, what should one see, smell, or know, and through what? Therefore, being fully embraced by his own self-luminous Supreme Self, the Jīva becomes infinite, perfectly serene, with all his objects of desire attained, and the self the only object of his desire, transparent *like water, one,* because there is no second: It is ignorance which separates a second entity, and that is at rest in the state of profound sleep ; hence 'one.' *The witness,* because the vision that is identical with the light of the self is never lost. *And without a second,* for there is no second entity

different from the self to be seen. This is immortal and fearless. *This is the world of Brahman,* the world that is Brahman: In profound sleep the self, bereft of its limiting adjuncts, the body and organs, remains in its own supreme light of the Ātman, free from all relations, *O Emperor. Thus did Yājñavalkya instruct Janaka.* This is spoken by the Śruti.

How did he instruct him? *This is its supreme attainment,* the attainment of the individual self. The other attainments, characterised by the taking of a body, from the state of Hiraṇyagarbha down to that of a clump of grass, are created by ignorance and therefore inferior to this, being within the sphere of ignorance. But this identification with all, in which one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, is the highest of all attainments such as identity with the gods, that are achieved through meditation and rites. *This* too *is its supreme glory,* the highest of all its splendours, being natural to it ; other glories are artificial. Likewise *this is its highest world*; the other worlds, which are the result of its past work, are inferior to it ; this, however, is not attainable by any action, being natural ; hence 'this is its highest world.' Similarly *this is its supreme bliss,* in comparison with the other joys that are due to the contact of the organs with their objects, since it is eternal ; for another Śruti says, 'That which is infinite is bliss' (Ch. VII. xxiii. 1). 'That in which one sees something, . . . knows something, is puny,' mortal, secondary joy. But this is the opposite of that ; hence 'this is its supreme bliss.' *On*

a particle of this very bliss, put forward by ignorance, and perceived only during the contact of the organs with their objects, *other beings live.* Who are they? Those that have been separated from that bliss by ignorance, and are considered different from Brahman. Being thus different, they subsist on a fraction of that bliss which is perceived through the contact of the organs with their objects.

स यो मनुष्याणां राद्धः समृद्धो भवति, अन्येषामधिपतिः, सर्वैर्मानुष्यकैर्भोगैः, संपन्नतमः, स मनुष्याणां परम आनन्दः; अथ ये शतं मनुष्याणामानन्दाः स एकः पितृणां जितलोकानामानन्दः; अथ ये शतं पितृणां जितलोकानामानन्दाः स एको गन्धर्वलोक आनन्दः; अथ ये शतं गन्धर्वलोक आनन्दाः स एकः कर्मदेवानामानन्दः—ये कर्मणा देवत्वमभिसंपद्यन्ते; अथ ये शतं कर्मदेवानामानन्दाः स एक आजानदेवानामानन्दः, यश्च श्रोत्रियोऽवृजिनोऽकामहतः; अथ ये शतमाजानदेवानामानन्दाः स एकः प्रजापतिलोक आनन्दः, यश्च श्रोत्रियोऽवृजिनोऽकामहतः; अथ ये शतं प्रजापतिलोक आनन्दाः स एको ब्रह्मलोक आनन्दः, यश्च श्रोत्रियोऽवृजिनोऽकामहतः; अथैष एव परम आनन्दः, एष ब्रह्मलोकः सम्राडिति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः; सोऽहं भगवते सहस्रं ददामि, अत ऊर्ध्वं विमोक्षायैव ब्रूहीति; अत्र ह याज्ञवल्क्यो बिभयांचकार, मेधावी राजा सर्वेभ्यो मान्तेभ्य उदरौत्सीदिति ॥ ३३ ॥

33. He who is perfect of body and prosperous among men, the ruler of others, and most lavishly supplied with all human enjoy-

ments, represents the greatest joy among men. This human joy multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy for the Manes who have won that world of theirs. The joy of these Manes who have won that world multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy in the world of the celestial minstrels. This joy in *the world of the celestial minstrels multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy for the* gods by action—those who attain their godhead by their actions. This joy of the gods by action multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy for the gods by birth, as well as of one who is versed in the Vedas, sinless and free from desire. This joy of the gods by birth multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy in the world of Prajāpati (Virāj), as well as of one who is versed in the Vedas, sinless and free from desire. This joy in the world of Prajāpati multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy in the world of Brahman (Hiraṇyagarbha), as well as of one who is versed in the Vedas, sinless and free from desire. This indeed is the supreme bliss. This is the state of Brahman, O Emperor, said Yājñavalkya. 'I give you a thousand (cows), sir. Please instruct me further about liberation itself.' At this Yājñavalkya was afraid that the intelligent Emperor

was constraining him to finish with all his conclusions.

(It has been said that) all beings from Hiraṇyagarbha down to men live on particles or fractions of the supreme bliss. In order to convey an idea of this bliss as a whole through its parts, as of a rock of salt through its grains, the present paragraph is introduced. *He who is perfect of body,* having no physical defects, *and prosperous,* provided with luxuries, *among men* ; also *the ruler of others,* the independent lord of people of the same class, not a mere provincial ruler ; *and most lavishly supplied with all human enjoyments*—the adjective 'human' excludes the materials of heavenly enjoyment ; he is the foremost among those who possess all these human luxuries—*represents* (lit. is) *the greatest joy among men.* The identity of joy and its possessor in this sentence ('joy' meaning 'enjoyer') indicates that this joy is not different from the self. For it has been said in the passage, 'When there is something else, as it were,' etc. (IV. iii. 31), that the lower degrees of bliss have only emanated from the supreme bliss in the dual form of subject and object ; hence it is but proper to bring out this identity in the phrase 'greatest joy.' Kings like Yudhiṣṭhira are examples in point. The Śruti teaches us about this supreme bliss, in which differences cease, by making a start with human joy, which we all know, and multiplying it a hundred times in successive steps. Now, where this joy increasing a hundred times at each step reaches its limit, and where mathe-

matical differences cease, there being nothing else but the self to see, hear or think, that is the supreme bliss, and in order to describe this the text proceeds:

This human joy multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy for the Manes. They are qualified by the clause *'who have won that world of theirs,'* i.e. who have pleased the Manes by the performance of obsequial rites etc., and have won their way to their world. Their measure of joy is the human joy multiplied a hundred times. That again *multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy in the world of the celestial minstrels.* That again *multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy for the gods by action —those who attain their godhead by their actions* such as the Agnihotra enjoined by the Śrutis. Similarly *one unit of joy for the gods by birth,* those who are gods from their very birth, *as well as of one who is versed in the Vedas, sinless,* i.e. doing what is prescribed by the scriptures, *and free from desire* for all objects below the level of the gods by birth. That his joy equals theirs is gathered from the word 'ca' (and) in the text. That *multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy in the world of Prajāpati,* i.e. in the body of Virāj, *as well as of one who is versed in the Vedas, sinless and free from desire*—this has already been explained—and who meditates on him. That *multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy in the world of Brahman,* i.e. in the body of Hiraṇyagarbha, *as well as of one who,* etc.—already explained. After this mathematical calculations cease.

This has been called the supreme bliss, of which the joys of the world of Hiraṇyagarbha etc. are but particles, like drops of an ocean That in which the other joys, increasing step by step in multiples of hundred, merge, and which is experienced by one versed in the Vedas, *is indeed the supreme bliss* called Samprasāda (that experienced in profound sleep); for in it one sees nothing else, hears nothing else (and so on). Hence it is infinite, and for that reason immortal ; the other joys are the opposite of that. The Vedic erudition and sinlessness (mentioned above) are common to the other joys too. It is the difference made by the absence of desire that leads to the increase of joy a hundred times. Here it is suggested by implication that Vedic erudition, sinlessness and the absence of desire are the means of attaining the particular types of joy ; as rites such as the Agnihotra are means to the attainment of godhead by the gods. Of these,. the two factors, Vedic erudition and sinlessness, are common to the lower planes too ; hence they are not regarded as means to the attainment of the succeeding kinds of joy. For this the absence of desire is understood to be the means, since it admits of degrees of renunciation. This supreme bliss is known to be the experience of the Vedic scholar who is free from desire. Vedavyāsa also says, 'The sense-pleasures of this world and the great joys of heaven are not worth one-sixteenth part of the bliss that comes of the cessation of desire' (Mbh. XII. clxxiii. 47).

This is the state of Brahman, O Emperor, said Yājñavalkya. For this instruction *I give you a*

thousand cows, *sir. Please instruct me further about liberation itself*—this has been explained. *At this* last request *Yājñavalkya was afraid*—the Śruti tells us the reason of his fear: he was afraid not for his lack of ability to teach or for ignorance, but—*that the intelligent Emperor was constraining him to finish with all his conclusions.* 'Whatever questions of his regarding liberation I answer, the Emperor, being intelligent, takes all to be but a part of the questions that he is at liberty to ask me, and puts me newer questions every time to answer. On the plea of asking his wished-for questions covered by the boon, he wants to possess all my knowledge'—this was the cause of Yājñavalkya's fear.

स वा एष एतस्मिन्स्वप्नान्ते रत्वा चरित्वा, दृष्ट्वैव पुण्यं च पापं च, पुनः प्रतिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याद्रवति बुद्धान्तायैव ॥ ३४ ॥

34. After enjoying himself and roaming in the dream state, and merely seeing the effects of merits and demerits, he comes back, in the inverse order, to his former condition, the waking state.

It has been shown (par. 9) that the individual self becomes itself the light in dreams. Further on it has also been shown, by a reference to its moving between the dream and waking states, that it is different from the body and organs, and by the illustration of the great fish, that it is free from desire and work, on account of its non-attachment. Again the effects of ignorance in the dream state have been shown in the

passage, 'As if he were being killed,' etc. By implication the nature of ignorance too has been ascertained as the superimposition of attributes other than the true ones, and as not being a natural attribute of the self. Similarly the effects of knowledge too have been shown in the dream state, by a reference to one's experience, as identity with all, in the passage, 'When he thinks, "This (universe) is myself, who am all," that is his highest state' (IV. iii. 20). It has also been stated that identity with all, which is its nature—its transcendent form, in which it is free from all such relative attributes as ignorance, desire and work—is directly experienced in the state of profound sleep. The Ātman is self-luminous and is the supreme bliss; this is the subject-matter of knowledge; this is the perfectly serene state, and the culmination of happiness—all this has been explained by the foregoing passages. And they are illustrations of liberation and bondage, which are the effects of knowledge and ignorance respectively. These two have been indicated with their causes and effects. But Janaka, mistaking that all that has merely been an illustration, thinks that liberation and bondage, which are the themes they seek to illustrate, are yet to be explained together with their causes by Yājñavalkya, as coming under his wished-for questions covered by the boon. Hence his further request: 'Please instruct me further about liberation itself.'

Now it has been said that the same self-luminous Ātman moves unattached like a great fish between the dream and waking states. As it moves like the great fish between these two states, alternately relinquishing

and taking up the body and organs, which are the forms of death, so at the time of death and birth it is alternately disconnected from and connected with those very forms of death. Its journey, referred to in the passage, 'It moves between the two worlds,' was barely indicated as the theme that was illustrated by its moving between the dream and waking states. That journey with its causes has to be described at length ; hence the rest of this section. In a preceding paragraph (par. 17) the self has been spoken of as going from the waking to the dream state, and thence to the state of profound sleep, which is the illustration for liberation. The present paragraph is related to that, since it seeks to show how, coming down from that state, it goes through the relative activities of the waking state. The Jīva, passing from the waking to the dream state, and thence to the state of profound sleep, stays there for a while; then he comes slightly down, and *after enjoying himself and roaming in the dream state,* etc.—all this has been explained—*he comes back to the waking state.*

तद्यथानः सुसमाहितमुत्सर्जद्यायात्, एवमेवायं शारीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेनात्मनान्वारूढ उत्सर्जन्याति, यत्रैतदूर्ध्वो-च्छ्वासी भवति ॥ ३५ ॥

35. Just as a cart, heavily loaded, goes on rumbling, so does the self that is in the body, being presided over by the Supreme Self, go making noises, when breathing becomes difficult.

From here onwards transmigration of the self is being described. To show that as the self came from the dream to the waking state, so it will pass from this body to the next, an example is being given: *Just as* in life *a cart,* fully or *heavily loaded* with utensils and other household effects such as a mortar and pestle, a winnowing-fan and cooking vessels, as well as eatables, *goes on rumbling* under the load, driven by the carter, *so does the self that is in the body,* i.e. the self that has the subtle body as its limiting adjunct, which moves between this and the next world, as between the waking and dream states, through birth and death, consisting respectively in the association with and dissociation from the body and organs, called evils, and the departure of which is immediately followed by that of the vital force etc., *being presided over,* or revealed, *by the* self-luminous *Supreme Self, go making noises.* As has been said, 'It is through the light of the self that he sits, goes out,' etc. (IV. iii. 6).

It should be noted here that when the subtle body, which has the vital force as its chief constituent, and is revealed by the self-luminous Ātman, goes, the self, of which it is the limiting adjunct, also seems to go. As another Śruti says, 'On whose (departure must I depart)?' (Pr. VI. 3), and 'It thinks, as it were' (IV. iii. 7). Hence the text says, 'Presided over by the Supreme Self.' Otherwise how can the self, being unified with the Supreme Self, go making noises like a cart? Therefore (the meaning is that) the self, with the subtle body as its limiting adjunct, goes making noises (the death rattle), afflicted by the feeling of pain as the vital parts are slashed. When does that happen?

When breathing becomes difficult—when the man is gasping for breath. The word 'etat' is an adverb (meaning 'thus'). Although this is an occurrence that is commonly observed, the Śruti repeats it only to create a spirit of renunciation in us. So miserable is this relative existence! Since at the time of death the vital parts are slashed, causing loss of memory and putting a man in a helpless state of mind on account of the pangs felt, so that he cannot adopt the requisite means for his well-being, therefore, before that crisis comes, he must be alert in practising the means conducive to that end. This is what the Śruti says out of compassion.

स यत्रायमणिमानं न्येति—जरया वोपतपता वाणिमानं निगच्छति—तद्यथाम्रं वोदुम्बरं वा पिप्पलं वा बन्धनात्प्रमुच्यते, एवमेवायं पुरुष एभ्योऽङ्गेभ्यः संप्रमुच्य पुनः प्रतिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याद्रवति प्राणायैव ॥ ३६ ॥

36. When this (body) becomes thin—is emaciated through old age or disease—then, as a mango, or a fig, or a fruit of the peepul tree is detached from its stalk, so does this infinite being, completely detaching himself from the parts of the body, again go, in the same way that he came, to particular bodies, for the unfoldment of his vital force.

When, and owing to what, does that difficulty of breath take place? How does it take place, and what for? The answers to these questions are being given:

When this human body that is a product of ignorance, with a head, hands, etc., *becomes thin.* Why? *Through old age,* being naturally worn out like a fruit ripened by time, *or disease,* literally, that which causes affliction, hence, fever etc. Afflicted with disease, the body, owing to impaired digestion, cannot digest the food that is eaten, and not being nourished by its essence, gets thin. This is what is meant by the expression 'or through disease.' When the body *is* extremely *emaciated* by fever and other causes, dyspnœa sets in, and at this stage the man goes making noises like the overloaded cart. Whosoever has a body must be overtaken by old age, suffer from disease etc., and have leanness ; these are inevitable evils. The fact is mentioned to generate a spirit of renunciation in us.

How he leaves the body when he goes making noises is being described through an illustration: *Then, as a mango, or a fig, or a fruit of the peepul tree,* etc. The citing of many and dissimilar examples is for the purpose of stating that death may come from any cause, since the causes of death are indefinite and innumerable. This too is for stimulating renunciation: Since he is subject to death from so many causes, he is always in the jaws of death. *Is detached from its stalk* (Bandhana): The word 'Bandhana' may mean the sap that binds it to the stalk, or it may mean the stalk to which it is attached. As the fruit is detached from the sap or the stalk by the wind and many other causes, *so does this infinite being,* the self that is identified with the subtle body, i.e. has this as its limiting adjunct, *completely detaching himself from*

the parts of the body such as the eye—not preserving the body through the vital force, as he does when he goes into the state of profound sleep, but withdrawing the organs together with the vital force—*again go,* etc. The word 'again' suggests that he has before this also gone many a time from one body to another, as he moves frequently between the dream and waking states. *In the same way that he came* to his present body, *to particular bodies,* according to his past work, knowledge, and so forth. What for? *For the unfoldment of his vital force:* Though literally it would mean 'for the vital force,' yet, since he goes along with it, the epithet would be meaningless. He goes from one body to another only for the unfoldment of the vital force. It is by this means, and not by the mere existence of the vital force, that he fulfils his object, viz. the enjoyment of the results of his work. Therefore in order that the vital force may be auxiliary to that, the specification 'for the unfoldment of his vital force' is appropriate.

Now it may be objected: When the Jīva goes leaving this body, he has no power to take up another, for he is dissociated from his body and organs. Nor are there others who, like servants, would wait for him with another body made ready, as a king's retinue waits for him with a house kept ready. How under the circumstances can he take up another body? The answer is: He has adopted the whole universe as his means to the realisation of the results of his work ; and

he is going from one body to another to fulfil this object. Therefore the whole universe, impelled by his work, waits for him with the requisite means for the realisation of the results of his work made ready. Witness the Śruti: 'A man is born into the body that has been made for him' (Ś. VI. ii. 2. 27). It is analogous to the case of a man about to return from the dream to the waking state. The process is being explained by a familiar illustration:

तद्यथा राजानमायान्तमुग्राः प्रत्येनसः सूतग्रामण्योऽन्नैः पानैरावसथैः प्रतिकल्पन्ते, अयमायाति, अयमागच्छतीति, एवं हैवंविदं सर्वाणि भूतानि प्रतिकल्पन्ते, इदं ब्रह्मायाति, इदमागच्छतीति ॥ ३७ ॥

37. Just as when a king is coming, the Ugras set against particular offences, the Sūtas and the leaders of the village wait for him with varieties of food and drink and mansions ready, saying, 'Here he comes, here he comes,' so for the person who knows about the results of his work, all the elements wait saying, 'Here comes Brahman, here comes Brahman.'

Just as when a king, duly installed on the throne, *is coming* to some place within his kingdom, *the Ugras,* a particular caste, or so called from their fierce deeds, *set against particular offences,* appointed to punish thieves etc., *the Sūtas,* a hybrid caste, *and the leaders of the village,* anticipating the king's visit, *wait for him with varieties of food* such as those that are chewed

or otherwise eaten, *and drink* such as wine, *and mansions* such as palaces *ready, saying, 'Here he comes, here he comes,' so for the person who knows about the results of his work,* i.e. the transmigrating self—for the results of one's work are the topic under consideration, and they are referred to by the word 'evam' (thus)—*all the elements* that make up his body, together with the presiding deities, Indra and the rest, who help the organs to function, *wait* with the means of enjoying the fruits of his work made ready—being impelled by that work.

तद्यथा राजानं प्रयियासन्तमुग्राः प्रत्येनसः सूतग्राम-ण्योऽभिसमायन्ति, एवमेवेममात्मानमन्तकाले सर्वे प्राणा अभिसमायन्ति, यत्रैतदूर्ध्वोच्छ्वासी भवति ॥ ३८ ॥ इति तृतीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

38. Just as when the king wishes to depart, the Ugras set against particular offences, the Sūtas and the leaders of the village approach him, so do all the organs approach the departing man at the time of death, when breathing becomes difficult.

Who accompany him as he thus wishes to go? And do those who accompany him go prompted by an act of his, or do they go of their own accord in conformity with his past work, together with the elements that make up his new body, called the next world? Regarding this an illustration is being given: *Just as when the king wishes to depart, the Ugras set against particular offences, the Sūtas and the leaders of the village approach him* in a body, unbidden by

the king, and simply knowing that he wishes to go, *so do all the organs approach the departing man,* the experiencer of the fruits of his work, *at the time of death, when breathing becomes difficult.* This last clause has been explained.

SECTION IV

The description of transmigration has been introduced. In that connection it has been said, 'The infinite being, completely detaching himself from the parts of the body,' etc. (IV. iii. 36). In order to state when that detachment takes place and how, it is necessary to describe the process of transmigration in detail. Hence the present section.

स यत्रायमात्माबल्यं नेत्य संमोहमिव न्येति, अथैनमेते प्राणा अभिसमायन्ति ; स एतास्तेजोमात्राः समभ्याददानो हृदयमेवान्ववक्रामति ; स यत्रैष चाक्षुषः पुरुषः पराङ् पर्यावर्ततेऽथारूपज्ञो भवति ॥ १ ॥

1. When this self becomes weak and senseless, as it were, the organs come to it. Completely withdrawing these particles of light, it comes to the heart. When the presiding deity of the eye turns back from all sides, the man fails to notice colour.

When this self, which is under consideration, *becomes weak.* Really it is the body that becomes weak, but its weakness is figuratively spoken of as that of the self ; for being formless, it can never by itself become weak. Similarly it becomes *senseless, as it were,* i.e. fails to discriminate. It cannot by itself be senseless or otherwise, for it is the eternal self-luminous Intelligence ; hence the expression 'as it were.' The state of helplessness noticeable at the time of death,

which is caused by the withdrawal of the organs, is attributed by ordinary people to the self. So they say, 'Oh, he has become senseless!'

Or the expression 'as it were' should be connected with both the adjectives, meaning 'becomes weak, as it were, and senseless, as it were,' for both states are alike due to extraneous limiting adjuncts, and both the verbs agree with the same subject. At this time *the organs* such as that of speech *come to it,* the self. Then this self that is in the body is detached from the parts of the body. How does this detachment take place, and how do the organs come to the self? This is being answered: *Completely withdrawing these particles of light,* i.e. the organs such as the eye, so called because they reveal colour etc. The adverb 'completely' shows the distinction of this state from a dream, when they are just drawn in, not absolutely, as in this case, as is known from such passages as, 'The organ of speech is absorbed, the eye is absorbed' (II. i. 17), 'He takes away a little of this all-embracing world (the waking state)' (IV. iii. 9), and 'Taking the shining functions of the organs with him,' etc. (IV. iii. 11). *It comes to the heart,* i.e. the ether in the lotus of the heart; in other words, its intelligence is manifested in the heart. (The withdrawal in question is attributed to the self) simply because the activities of the intellect and so forth are at rest. The Ātman by itself cannot move, or undergo changes such as the stopping of activities, for it has been said, 'It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were' (IV. iii. 7). It is through its limiting adjuncts such as the intellect that all changes

are attributed to the self. When does it withdraw the particles of light? This is being answered: *The presiding deity of the eye*—lit. the being associated with the eye—who is a part of the sun, being directed by the experiencer's past work, goes on helping the functions of the eye as long as he lives, but he ceases to help the eye and is merged in his own self, the sun, when the man is about to die. This has been stated in the passage, 'When the vocal organ of the dead man has been merged in fire, the vital force in Vāyu, the eye in the sun,' etc. (III. ii. 13). They will again occupy (their respective places) when the man takes another body. This (dual phenomenon) takes place when a man is fast asleep, and when he wakes up. This is expressed by the text: *When the presiding deity of the eye turns back from all sides*, the dying *man fails to notice colour*. At this time the self completely withdraws the particles of light, the eye and other organs, as in the dream state.

एकीभवति, न पश्यतीत्याहुः; एकीभवति, न जिघ्रतीत्याहुः; एकीभवति, न रसयत इत्याहुः; एकीभवति, न वदतीत्याहुः; एकीभवति, न शृणोतीत्याहुः; एकीभवति, न मनुत इत्याहुः; एकीभवति, न स्पृशतीत्याहुः; एकीभवति, न विजानातीत्याहुः; तस्य हैतस्य हृदयस्याग्रं प्रद्योतते; तेन प्रद्योतेनैष आत्मा निष्क्रामति—चक्षुष्टो वा, मूर्ध्नो वा, अन्येभ्यो वा शरीरदेशेभ्यः; तमुत्क्रामन्तं प्राणोऽनूत्क्रामति; प्राणमनूत्क्रामन्तं सर्वे प्राणा अनूत्क्रामन्ति;

सविज्ञानो भवति, सविज्ञानमेवान्ववक्रामति। तं विद्याकर्मणी समन्वारभेते पूर्वप्रज्ञा च ॥ २ ॥

2. (The eye) becomes united (with the subtle body); then people say, 'He does not see.' (The nose) becomes united; then they say, 'He does not smell.' (The tongue) becomes united; then they say, 'He does not taste.' (The vocal organ) becomes united; then they say, 'He does not speak.' (The ear) becomes united; then they say, 'He does not hear.' (The Manas) becomes united; then they say, 'He does not think.' (The skin) becomes united; then they say, 'He does not touch.' (The intellect) becomes united; then they say, 'He does not know.' The top of the heart brightens. Through that brightened top the self departs, either through the eye, or through the head, or through any other part of the body. When it departs, the vital force follows; when the vital force departs, all the organs follow. Then the self has particular consciousness, and goes to the body which is related to that consciousness. It is followed by knowledge, work and past experience.

Every organ *becomes united* with the subtle body of the dying man ; *then people* at his side *say* of him, *'He does not see.'* Similarly, when on the withdrawal of its presiding deity the nose *becomes united* with the

subtle body, *they say, 'He does not smell.'* The rest is to be similarly explained. The moon or Varuṇa is the deity of the tongue ; when he stops functioning, *they say, 'He does not taste.'* Similarly they say that *he does not speak, hear, think, touch* and *know*. This means that at that time the presiding deities cease to work, and the organs are united in the heart.[1] What takes place in the body after the organs have been united in the heart is now being stated: *The top of the heart* mentioned above, i.e. of the orifice of the heart—its 'top' here means the nerve-end, which is the exit for the self—*brightens,* as in the dream state, its own lustre due to the drawing in of the organs being revealed by its own light as the Ātman.[2] *Through that top brightened* by the light of the Ātman, *the* individual *self,* with the subtle body as its limiting adjunct, *departs*. As the Praśna Upaniṣad puts it: 'On whose departure must I depart, and on whose stay, must I stay?—He projected the vital force' (VI. 3).

In the subtle body the self-effulgent intelligence of the Ātman is always particularly manifest. It is because of this limiting adjunct that the self comes under relative existence involving all such changes as birth and death, and going and coming. The twelve organs, including the intellect, consist of it ; it is the Sūtra,[3] the life, and the inmost self of the movable and immovable universe. As the self departs with the

[1] That is, the subtle body with its seat in the heart.

[2] IV. iii. 9.

[3] III. vii. 2.

help of the light at the top of the heart, by which way does it leave the body? *Through the eye,* if it has a store of work or relative knowledge that would take it to the sun, *or through the head,* if they are such as would entitle it to go to the world of Hiraṇyagarbha, *or through any other part of the body,* according to its past work and knowledge. *When it,* the individual self, *departs* for the next world, i.e. when it has the intention to go there, *the vital force follows,* like the Prime Minister of a king; and *when the vital force departs, all the organs* such as that of speech *follow.* This simply denotes conformity to their respective leaders, not that the vital force and the organs go one after the other, as it happens in a party.[1]

Then the self has particular consciousness, as in dreams, in consequence of its past work, not independently. If it had this consciousness independently, everybody would achieve the end of his life; but it never has that. Hence Vyāsa says, '(A man attains whatever he thinks of at the moment of death) if he has always been imbued with that idea' (G. VIII. 6). As a matter of fact, everybody has at that moment a consciousness which consists of impressions in the form of particular modifications of his mind (regarding the next life) that are induced by his past work. *And goes to the body which is related to that consciousness,* i.e. is revealed by that particular consciousness. Therefore, in order to have freedom of action at the time of

[1] The particle 'anu' (after) here means 'according to.' Really they all go together.

death, those aspirants after the future life who have faith should be alert in the practice of the system of Yoga and right knowledge, and in the acquisition of particular merit (by doing good deeds). All the sacred books also carefully seek to dissuade men from doing evil ; for nothing can be done at the dying moment, as there is no independence for the man, who is carried away by his past work. It has been said, 'One indeed becomes good through good work and evil through evil work' (III. ii. 13). The aim of the Upaniṣads in all the recensions is to prescribe remedies for this evil. There is no other way to eradicate this evil completely except by following the course laid down by them. Therefore all should try to practise the remedies prescribed by the Upaniṣads ; this is the gist of the whole passage.

It has been stated that the departing self, loaded with materials, goes making noises like a cart. Now, as it starts for the next world, what is its food on the way or for consumption on reaching that world, corresponding to the carter's load, and what are the materials for building its new body and organs? The answer is being given: *It,* this self journeying to the next world, *is followed by knowledge* of all sorts, those that are enjoined or forbidden as well as those[1] that are neither enjoined nor forbidden; also *work,* enjoined or forbidden, and neither enjoined nor forbidden, *and past experience,* i.e. the impressions of experiences regarding the results of past actions. These impressions

[1] Regarding common or trivial things ; similarly with work.

take part in initiating fresh actions as well as in bringing past actions to fruition ; hence they too accompany. Without these impressions no action can be done, nor any results of past actions achieved, for the organs are not skilful in unpractised work. But when the organs are prompted to work by the impressions of past experience, they can easily attain skill even without practice in this life. It is frequently observed that some are clever in certain kinds of work such as painting from their very birth, even without practice in this life, while others are unskilful even in some very easy tasks. Similarly in the enjoyment of sense-objects also some are observed to be naturally skilful or dull. All this is due to the revival or non-revival of past experience. Therefore without past experience we cannot understand how anybody can proceed to do any work or to enjoy the results of past work. Hence these three—knowledge, work and past experience—are the food on the way to the next world, corresponding to the load of the carter. Since these three are the means of attaining another body and enjoying (the results of one's past work), therefore one should cultivate only the good forms of them, so that one may have a desirable body and desirable enjoyments. This is the purport of the whole passage.

Now the question is, when the self loaded with knowledge etc., is about to go to another body, does it leave the old body and go to another like a bird going to another tree? Or is it carried by another body serving as a vehicle to the place where, according

to its past work, it is to be born? Or does it stay here, while its organs become all-pervading and function as such? Or is it that so long as it remains in the body, its organs are contracted to the limits of that, but when it dies they become all-pervading—like the light of a lamp when the (enclosing) jar is broken—and contract again when a new body is made?[1] Or, as in the Vaiśeṣika system, does only the mind go to the place where the new body is to be made? Or is there any other theory in the Vedānta? This is being answered: We know from the Śruti text, 'These are all equal, and all infinite' (I. v. 13), that the organs are all-comprising.[2] Another reason for this is their resting on the vital force, which is all-comprising. Their limitation in the sphere of the body and the elements (as colour etc.) is due to the work, knowledge and past impressions of men. Therefore, although the organs are naturally all-pervading and infinite, since the new body is made in accordance with the person's work, knowledge and past impressions, the functions of the organs also contract or expand accordingly. As it has been said, 'Equal to a white ant, equal to a mosquito, equal to an elephant, equal to these three worlds, equal to this universe' (I. iii. 22). It is also supported by the following: 'He who meditates upon these as infinite,' etc. (I. v. 13), and '(One becomes) exactly as one meditates upon Him,' etc. (Ś. X. v. ii. 20).

[1] Of the different views given here, the first three are those of the Jains, the Devatāvādins (the upholders of the theory of angel-guides), and the Sāṁkhya and allied schools respectively, while the fourth represents the Vedāntic view.

[2] In their form relating to the gods.

Therefore the impressions called past experience, under the control of the person's knowledge and work, stretch out, like a leech, from the body, retaining their seat in the heart, as in the dream state, and build another body in accordance with his past work ; they leave their seat, the old body, when a new body is made. An illustration on this point is being given:

**तद्यथा तृणजलायुका तृणस्यान्तं गत्वान्यमाक्रममाक्रम्या-
त्मानमुपसंहरति, एवमेवायमात्मेदं शरीरं निहत्य, अविद्यां
गमयित्वा, अन्यमाक्रममाक्रम्यात्मानमुपसंहरति ॥ ३ ॥**

3. Just as a leech supported on a straw goes to the end of it, takes hold of another support and contracts itself, so does the self throw this body aside—make it senseless—take hold of another support, and contract itself.

Regarding this passing on to another body the following is an illustration: *Just as a leech supported on a straw goes to the end of it, takes hold of another* straw as *support and contracts itself,* i.e. one part of its body, to where the other part is, *so does the self,* the transmigrating self that is being discussed, *throw this body,* the one already taken, *aside,* as it does when entering the dream state—*make it senseless* by withdrawing itself from it—*take hold of another support* or body, as the leech does another straw, by stretching out its impressions, *and contract itself,* i.e. identify itself, at the place where the new

body is being formed, with that new body, movable or immovable—as in dreams the self creates a new body and dwells, as it were, in that dream body.

There the organs, under the sway of the person's past work, are combined so as to manifest their functions ; an external body, like one made of straw and clay, is also formed. When the organs have been arranged, the presiding deities such as fire come to the body to help the organ of speech and so forth. This is the process of the formation of a new body.

Now, in this formation of a new body does the self again and again crush the materials that are always there ready at hand and with them make a new body, or does it collect new materials every time? This is being answered through an illustration:

तद्यथा पेशस्कारी पेशसो मात्रामपादायान्यन्नवतरं कल्याणतरं रूपं तनुते, एवमेवायमात्मेदं शरीरं निहत्य, अविद्यां गमयित्वा, अन्यन्नवतरं कल्याणतरं रूपं कुरुते—पित्र्यं वा, गान्धर्वं वा दैवं वा, प्राजापत्यं वा, ब्राह्मं वा, अन्येषां वा भूतानाम् ॥ ४ ॥

4. Just as a goldsmith takes apart a little quantity of gold and fashions another—a newer and better—form, so does the self throw this body away, or make it senseless, and make another—a newer and better—form suited to

the Manes or the celestial minstrels, or the gods, or Virāj, or Hiraṇyagarbha, or other beings.

Just as a goldsmith takes apart a little quantity of gold and fashions another—a newer and better—form than the previous model, *so does the self*—these and the preceding words have been explained—again and again crush the five elements beginning with earth and ending with the ether that are always ready at hand, which have been described in the second chapter in the passage, 'Brahman has but two forms' (II. iii. 1), and stand for the gold—and *make another—a newer and better—form,* or body, *suited to the Manes,* i.e. fit for enjoyments in the world of the Manes, *or the celestial minstrels,* i.e. fit for their enjoyments, *or the gods, or Virāj, or Hiraṇyagarbha, or other beings,* according to its past work and knowledge.

All those things which are the limiting adjuncts of the self and are styled its bonds, and connected with which it is considered identified with them, are here gathered together and pointed out in a group:

स वा अयमात्मा ब्रह्म विज्ञानमयो मनोमयः प्राणमयश्चक्षुर्मयः श्रोत्रमयः पृथिवीमय आपोमयो वायुमय आकाशमयस्तेजोमयोऽतेजोमयः काममयोऽकाममयः क्रोधमयोऽक्रोधमयो धर्ममयोऽधर्ममयः सर्वमयस्तद्यदेतदिदंमयोऽदोमय इति ; यथाकारी यथाचारी तथा भवति—साधुकारी साधुर्भवति, पापकारी पापो भवति ; पुण्यः पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति, पापः पापेन। अथो खल्वाहुः काममय

एवायं पुरुष इति ; स यथाकामो भवति तत्क्रतुर्भवति, यत्क्रतुर्भवति तत्कर्म कुरुते, यत्कर्म कुरुते तदभिसंपद्यते ॥५॥

5. That self is indeed Brahman, as well as identified with the intellect, the Manas and the vital force, with the eyes and ears, with earth, water, air and the ether, with fire, and what is other than fire, with desire and the absence of desire, with anger and the absence of anger, with righteousness and unrighteousness, with everything—identified, as is well known, with this (what is perceived) and with that (what is inferred). As it does and acts, so it becomes; by doing good it becomes good, and by doing evil it becomes evil—it becomes virtuous through good acts and vicious through evil acts. Others, however, say, 'The self is identified with desire alone. What it desires, it resolves; what it resolves, it works out; and what it works out, it attains.'

That self which thus transmigrates *is indeed Brahman,* the Supreme Self that is beyond hunger etc., *as well as identified with the intellect* (Vijñānamaya), being noticed through it ; for it has been said, 'Which is the self? This infinite entity (Puruṣa) that is identified with the intellect and is in the midst of the organs,' etc. (IV. iii. 7). The self is called Vijñānamaya, resembling the intellect, because it is conceived as possessing the attributes of the intellect, as in the passage, 'It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were' (Ibid.). Likewise identified with *the Manas,* because

of its proximity to that. Also identified with *the vital force* that has the fivefold function ; for which reason the individual self is observed as moving, as it were. Similarly identified *with the eyes,* when it sees forms. Likewise identified with the *ears,* when it hears sounds. Thus as each particular organ functions, the self becomes identified with that.

Similarly, being identified with the eyes and other organs through the intellect and vital force, the self becomes identified with the elements such as earth. When a body preponderating in elements of earth has to be made, it becomes identified *with earth.* Similarly, when creating a watery body in the world of Varuṇa and so forth, it becomes identified with *water.* Likewise, when an aerial body has to be made, it becomes identified with *air.* Similarly, when making an ethereal body, it is identified with *the ether.* Thus when it makes bodies for the gods, which preponderate in elements of fire, it becomes identified *with fire.* As opposed to these, the bodies of animals, of denizens of hell, of ghosts, and so forth, are composed of materials other than fire ; with regard to them the text says, identified with *what is other than fire.* Similarly, being identified with the body and organs, the self, on seeing something to be attained, forms the false notion that it has got this one, and has to get that one, and setting its heart on that, becomes identified *with desire.* When on seeing evil in that thing its longing for it ceases, and the mind becomes serene, pure and calm, then it becomes identified with *the absence of desire.*

Likewise, when that desire is somehow frustrated, it takes the form of anger, and the self becomes identified *with anger.* When that anger is appeased by some means, and the mind becomes serene and peaceful, it is called *the absence of anger ;* the self becomes identified with that. Thus the self, becoming identified with desire and anger as well as with the absence of them, becomes identified *with righteousness and unrighteousness,* for without desire, anger, etc. the tendency to righteousness and so forth cannot arise. Witness the Smṛti: 'Whatever action a man does, is the outcome of desire' (M. II. 4).

Being identified with righteousness and unrighteousness it becomes identified *with everything.* Everything is the effect of righteousness and unrighteousness: whatever is differentiated is the result of these two. The self, on attaining it, becomes identified with that. In short, *identified, as is well known, with this,* i.e. with objects that are perceived, *and* therefore *with that.* 'That' refers to imperceptible objects that are indicated only by their perceptible effects. The mind has an infinite number of thoughts, which cannot be definitely specified ; they are known at particular moments through their effects, which lead us to infer that this or that particular thought is in one's mind. Through that perceptible effect—which marks the identification of the self with 'this' or the perceptible—its remote or internal activity is indicated, and it is therefore designated as identified at present with 'that' or the imperceptible. To put it briefly, *as it* habitually *does and acts, so it becomes.* 'Doing'

refers to prescribed conduct as indicated, for instance, by injunctions and prohibitions, while 'action' is not so prescribed ; this is the distinction between them. *By doing good it becomes good :* This amplifies the idea of 'As it does,' and *by doing evil it becomes evil*, the idea of 'As it acts.'

The use of a suffix denoting habit (in four words of the text) may lead to a notion that the identification with good and evil actions consists in intense association with them, not in merely doing them. To remove this it is said, *it becomes virtuous through good acts and vicious through evil acts.* The identification comes of merely doing good and evil acts, and does not require habitual performance. This last only intensifies the identification ; this is the difference. The long and short of it is, that doing good and bad deeds under the impulse of desire, anger, etc., is the cause of the Ātman's identification with everything, its undergoing transmigration and passing from one body to another ; for, impelled by this, the self takes one body after another. Therefore good and bad deeds are the cause of its transmigratory existence. Scriptural injunctions and prohibitions are directed to this. Herein lies the utility of the scriptures.

Others, other authorities on bondage and liberation, *however, say :* It is true that good and bad deeds prompted by desire etc. are the cause of a man's taking a body ; still it is under the influence of desire that he accumulates these deeds. When desire is gone, work, although present, does not lead to the accumulation of merit or demerit. Even if he

goes on doing good and bad deeds, these, bereft of the desire, produce no results ; therefore desire is the root of transmigratory existence. As the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad says, 'He who longs for objects of desire, making much of them, is born along with those desires in places where he will realise them' (III. ii. 2). Therefore *the self is identified with desire alone.* Its identification with other things, although it may be present, does not produce any results ; hence the text emphatically says, 'Identified with desire alone.' Being identified with desire, *what it desires, it resolves.* That desire manifests itself as the slightest longing for a particular object, and, if unchecked, takes a more definite shape and becomes resolve. Resolve is determination, which is followed by action. *What it resolves* as a result of the desire, *it works out* by doing the kind of work that is calculated to procure the objects resolved upon. *And what it works out, it attains,* i.e. its results. Therefore desire is the only cause of its identification with everything as well as of undergoing transmigration.

तदेष श्लोको भवति ।
तदेव सक्तः सह कर्मणैति
लिङ्गं मनो यत्र निषक्तमस्य ।
प्राप्यान्तं कर्मणस्तस्य यत्किंचेह करोत्ययम् ।
तस्माल्लोकात्पुनरैत्यस्मै लोकाय कर्मणे ॥
इति नु कामयमानः ; अथाकामयमानः—योऽकामो निष्काम आप्तकाम आत्मकामो न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति, ब्रह्मैव सन्ब्रह्माप्येति ॥ ६ ॥

6. Regarding this there is the following verse: 'Being attached, he, together with the work, attains that result to which his subtle body or mind is attached. Exhausting the results of whatever work he did in this life, he returns from that world to this for (fresh) work.' Thus does the man who desires (transmigrate). But the man who does not desire (never transmigrates). Of him who is without desires, who is free from desires, the objects of whose desire have been attained, and to whom all objects of desire are but the Self—the organs do not depart. Being but Brahman, he is merged in Brahman.

Regarding this subject *there is* also *the following verse: Being attached,* i.e. with his desire for it roused, *he,* the man who transmigrates, *together with the work* that he did with attachment to its result, *attains that result to which his subtle body or mind is* firmly *attached,* i.e. for which it yearns, since he did the work out of a desire for that.—The mind is called the subtle body, Liṅga, because it is the principal part of the latter ; or the word 'Liṅga' may mean a sign, that which indicates the self.—Therefore, only on account of this attachment of his mind, he attains the result through that action. This proves that desire is the root of transmigratory existence. Hence a knower of Brahman who has rooted out his desires may work, but it will produce no (baneful) result ; for

the Śruti says, 'For one who has completely attained the objects of his desire and realised the Self, all desires dissolve in this very life' (Mu. III. ii. 2).

Further, *exhausting the results of* work—what kind of work?—*whatever work he did in this life,* by experiencing them, *he returns from that world to this for work,* for work holds the foremost place in this world. Hence the text says, 'For work,' i.e. to work again. After working again, he, owing to attachment to results, again goes to the next world, and so on. *Thus does the man who desires* transmigrate. Since it is this man of desire that transmigrates thus, therefore *the man who does not desire,* does not transmigrate anywhere.

It has been said that only the man who is attached to results transmigrates. Since one who has no desires cannot perform (ritualistic) work, the man who does not desire necessarily attains liberation. How does a man cease to desire? He *who is without desires* is the man who does not desire. How is this absence of desire attained? This is being explained: *Who is free from desires,* i.e. whom desires have left. How do they leave? *The objects of whose desire have been attained.* How are they attained? Because he is one *to whom all objects of desire are but the Self*—who has only the Self, and nothing else separate from It that can be desired ; to whom the Self alone exists—the Pure Intelligence without interior or exterior, entire and homogeneous ; and neither above nor below nor in the middle is there anything else but the Self to be desired. What should a person desire who has

realised: 'When everything has become the Self to one, what should one see, hear, think or know, and through what? For a thing that is known as other than oneself may become an object of desire. But such a thing does not exist for the knower of Brahman, the objects of whose desire have all been attained. He to whom all objects of desire, being but the Self, are already attained, is alone free from desires, is without desires, and does not desire any more ; hence he attains liberation. For he to whom everything is the Self, has nothing else to desire. It is contradictory to say that he has something other than the Self to desire, and again, that to him everything is the Self. Since a man who has realised his identity with all has nothing to desire, he cannot perform rites.

Those who hold that even a knower of Brahman must perform rites in order to avoid evil,[1] cannot say that to him everything is the Self, for they regard the evil that they wish him to avoid as different from the Self. Whereas we call him a knower of Brahman who constantly knows the Self which is beyond hunger etc. and untouched by evil ; he constantly sees the Self which is beyond hunger and so forth. Work can never touch him who does not see anything other than the Self to be avoided or received. But one who is not a knower of Brahman must perform rites to avoid evil. Hence there is no contradiction. Therefore, having no

[1] Due to the non-performance of the regular rites.

desires, the person who does not desire is no more born ; he attains only liberation.

Since the man who does not desire has no work and therefore has no cause to go to the next world, his *organs* such as that of speech *do not depart* or go up from the body. That man of realisation who has attained all the objects of his desire, since they are but the Self to him, has become Brahman in this very life, for as an illustration of the Infinite Brahman the following form was pointed out: 'That is his form—in which all objects of desire have been attained and are but the Self, and which is free from desires' (IV. iii. 21.) Now that of which the above is an illustration is being concluded in the words, 'But the man who does not desire,' etc. How does such a man attain liberation? This is being stated: He who sees the Self, as in the state of profound sleep, as undifferentiated, one without a second, and as the constant light of Pure Intelligence—only this disinterested man has no work and consequently no cause for transmigration ; therefore his organs such as that of speech do not depart. Rather this man of realisation is Brahman in this very life, although he seems to have a body. *Being but Brahman, he is merged in Brahman.* Because he has no desires that cause the limitation of non-Brahmanhood, therefore 'being but Brahman he is merged in Brahman' in this very life, not after the body falls. A man of realisation, after his death, has no change of condition—something different from what he was in life, but he is only not connected with another body. This is what is meant by his becoming 'merged in

Brahman'; for if liberation was a change of condition, it would contradict the unity of the Self that all the Upaniṣads seek to teach. And liberation would be the effect of work, not of knowledge—which nobody would desire. Further, it would become transitory, for nothing that has been produced by an action is seen to be eternal, but liberation is admitted to be eternal, as the Mantra says, 'This is the eternal glory (of a knower of Brahman),' etc. (IV. iv. 23).

Moreover, nothing but the inherent nature of a thing can be regarded as eternal. If liberation is the nature of the self, like the heat of fire, it cannot be said to be a consequence of human activity. The heat or light of fire is surely not a consequence of the activity of fire; it is a contradiction in terms to say that they are, and yet that they are the natural properties of fire. If it be urged that they are an outcome of the activity of combustion, the answer is, no, because they depend on manifestation by the removal of obstructions to one's perception. That fire is manifested through its qualities of heat and light by the process of combustion etc., is due not to the fire itself, but to the fact that those qualities, not being connected with anybody's vision, were hidden, and are manifested when the obstructions to vision are removed by the process of combustion. This leads to the error that the qualities of heat and light are produced by the combustion. If heat and light are not admitted as the natural properties of fire, well then, we shall cite as examples whatever be its

natural properties. Nobody can say that things have no natural properties at all.

Nor can liberation be a mere negative something—the cessation of bondage, like the breaking of fetters, for the Supreme Self is supposed to be the only entity that exists. As the Śruti says, 'One only without a second' (Ch. VI. ii. 1.). And there is no other entity that is bound, whose freedom from bondage, as from fetters, would be liberation, for we have spoken at length of the absence of any other entity but the Supreme Self.[1] Therefore, as we have also said, the cessation of ignorance[2] alone is commonly called liberation, like the disappearance of the snake, for instance, from the rope when the erroneous notion about its existence has been dispelled.

Those who hold that in liberation a new[3] knowledge and bliss are manifested, should explain what they mean by manifestation. If it means ordinary perception or the cognition of objects, they should state whether the knowledge or bliss that is manifested is existent or non-existent. If it is existent, it is the very self of that liberated man to whom it is manifested; hence, there being possibly no bar to the perception, it will always be manifest, and for this reason it is meaningless to specify its being manifest to the liberated man. If, however, it is manifest only at certain times,[4] then because of the obstacles to its perception, it is

[1] See, for instance, pp. 116, 147, 298.

[2] Which is the cause of the idea of bondage.

[3] That is, different from those arising from sense-contact.

[4] That is, in the state of relative existence, being frequently obstructed by iniquity etc.

different from the self, and therefore there arises the question of its manifestation through some other means ; hence there will be the necessity of these means also.[1] But if the knowledge and bliss in question have the same support as the perception, then, there being no possibility of obstacles, they will either be always manifest or always hidden ; there is no warrant for conceiving an intermediate stage between the two. Now attributes that have the same support, and are a part and parcel of the same substance, cannot have the relation of subject and object to one another. Besides, the entity that is subject to transmigration before the manifestation of knowledge and bliss, and liberated after it, must be different from the Supreme Self, the eternally manifest Knowledge Absolute, for the two are totally different from each other, like heat and cold ; and if differences are admitted in the Supreme Self, the Vedic position will be abandoned.

Objection : If liberation makes no difference from the present state, it is unreasonable to make a particular effort for it, and the scriptures too become useless.

Reply : No, for both are necessary to remove the delusion created by ignorance. Really there is no such distinction as liberation and bondage in the self, for it is eternally the same ; but the ignorance regarding it is removed by the knowledge arising from the teachings of the scriptures, and prior to the receiving of these

[1] Which will make liberation akin to relative existence.

teachings, the effort to attain liberation is perfectly reasonable.

Objection : There will be some difference in the self that is under ignorance, due to the cessation or continuance of that ignorance.

Reply : No ; we have already (p. 477) said that it is admitted to be the creation of ignorance, like a rope, a desert, a mother-of-pearl and the sky appearing as a snake, water, silver, and blue respectively.

Objection : But there will be some difference in the self due to its being or not being the cause of ignorance, as in the case of man affected with the eye-disease called Timira[1] or free from it.

Reply : No, for the Śruti denies that the Ātman by itself is the cause of ignorance, as in the passage, 'It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were' (IV. iii. 7) ; and the error we call ignorance is due to a combination of diverse activities. Another reason is that ignorance is an object witnessed by the self.[2] He who visualises the error of ignorance as something distinct from his own self, like a jar etc., is not himself under that error.

Objection : Surely he is under that error, for one feels that one sometimes has the notion, 'I do not know, I am confused.'

Reply : No, for that too is distinctly perceived. He who distinctly perceives a thing cannot surely be said to be mistaken about it ; it is self-contradictory to

[1] Causing distorted vision.

[2] Therefore it cannot be an integral part of the subject.

say that he perceives it distinctly, and at the same time, that he is mistaken about it.

You say that a person feels, 'I do not know, I am confused': thereby you admit that he visualises his ignorance and confusion, in other words, that these become the objects of his experience. So how can the ignorance and confusion, which are objects, be at the same time a description of the subject, the perceiver? If, on the other hand, they are a description of the subject, how can they be objects and be perceived by the subject? An object is perceived by an act of the subject. The object is one thing, and the subject another; it cannot be perceived by itself. Tell me how under such circumstances the ignorance and confusion can be a description of the subject. Moreover, a person who sees ignorance as something distinct—perceives it as an object of his own cognition—does not regard it as an attribute of the perceiver, as is the case with thinness, colour, and so forth in the body. (Similarly the effects of ignorance also are not attributes of the self).

Objection: But everybody perceives pleasure, pain, desire, effort, etc. (as belonging to himself).

Reply: Even then the man who perceives them is admittedly different from them.

Objection: Well, we have referred to the person who says, 'I do not know what you say, I am confused.' What do you say to that?

Reply: Let him regard himself as ignorant and confused; we, however, accept one who sees like this as knowing and possessed of a clear perception. For instance, Vyāsa has said that the owner of the field

(the self) reveals the entire field (body and mind), including desire.[1] And there are hundreds of texts like the following: '(He truly sees who) sees the Supreme Lord living the same in all beings—the immortal Principle in the midst of things perishable' (G. XIII. 27). Therefore the Ātman by itself has no difference due to bondage or liberation, knowledge or ignorance, for it is admitted to be always the same and homogeneous by nature.

Those, however, who, considering the reality of the self to be different, reduce the scriptures dealing with bondage and liberation to mere plausible statements, would dare to find the foot prints of birds in the sky, to pull it with their clenched hands, or to cover it as with a skin. But we can do no such thing. We hold that it is the definite conclusion of all the Upaniṣads that we are nothing but the Ātman, the Brahman that is always the same, homogeneous, one without a second, unchanging, birthless, undecaying, immortal, deathless and free from fear. Therefore the statement, 'He is merged in Brahman' (this text), is but a figurative one, meaning the cessation, as a result of knowledge, of the continuous chain of bodies for one who has held an opposite view.

Transmigration, which was the thing that was sought to be explained by the example of going into the waking and dream states, has been described; so also its causes—knowledge, work and past experience. Those limiting adjuncts, the elements comprising the body and organs, surrounded by which the self

[1] An adaptation of Gītā XIII. 33.

experiences the transmigratory existence, have also been mentioned. After stating, as a *prima facie* view, that their immediate causes are good and bad deeds, the cause has finally been decided to be desire. Having described bondage and its cause by showing that the decision of the Brāhmaṇa on this point agrees with that of the Mantra, the Śruti has concluded the topic with the words, ' Thus does the man who desires (transmigrate)' (IV. iv. 6). Then beginning with, ' But the man who does not desire (never transmigrates)' (Ibid.), liberation consisting in the identity with all, which is the thing that was sought to be explained by the example of the state of profound sleep, has been described. And the cause of liberation has been stated to be the attainment of all objects of desire through their becoming the Self. But since this state is unattainable without Self-knowledge, the cause of liberation has by implication been stated to be the knowledge of Brahman. Therefore, although desire has been said to be the root of bondage, it is ignorance that, being the opposite of what leads to liberation (knowledge), has virtually been stated to be the cause of bondage. Here also liberation and its means have been dealt with by the Brāhmaṇa. To strengthen that, a Mantra, called Śloka, is being quoted:

तदेष श्लोको भवति ।

यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः ।

अथ मर्त्योऽमृतो भवत्यत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुत ॥ इति ।

तद्यथाहिनिर्ल्वयनी वल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीत,

एवमेवेदं शरीरं शेते, अथायमशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव ; सोऽहं भगवते सहस्रं ददामीति होवाच जनको वैदेहः ॥ ७ ॥

7. Regarding this there is this verse: 'When all the desires that dwell in his heart (mind) are gone, then he, having been mortal, becomes immortal, and attains Brahman in this very body.' Just as the lifeless slough of a snake is cast off and lies in the ant-hill, so does this body lie. Then the self becomes disembodied and immortal, (becomes) the Prāṇa (Supreme Self), Brahman, the Light. 'I give you a thousand (cows), sir,' said Janaka, Emperor of Videha.

Regarding this very theme *there is this verse* or Mantra: *When all the desires,* forms of yearning, of the knower of Brahman all the objects of whose desire are the Self, *are gone,* are destroyed together with their root. *That dwell in his heart,* those well-known desires concerning this and the next life, viz. the desire for children, wealth and worlds, that abide in the intellect (mind) of the ordinary man. *Then he, having been mortal, becomes immortal,* being divested of desires together with their root. It is virtually implied that desires concerning things other than the Self fall under the category of ignorance, and are but forms of death. Therefore, on the cessation of death, the man of realisation becomes immortal. *And attains Brahman,* the identity with Brahman, i.e. liberation, living

in this very body. Hence liberation does not require such things as going to some other place. Therefore the organs of a man of realisation do not depart ; they are merged in their cause, the self, just where they are. As has been said (III. ii. 12), only their names remain.

But how is it that when the organs have been merged, and the body also has dissolved in its cause, the liberated sage lives in the body identified with all, but does not revert to his former embodied existence, which is subject to transmigration? The answer is being given: Here is an illustration in point. *Just as* in the world *the lifeless slough of a snake is cast off* by it as no more being a part of itself, *and lies in the ant-hill,* or any other nest of a snake, *so does this body,* discarded as non-self by the liberated man, who corresponds to the snake, *lie* like dead.

Then the other, the liberated man identified with all—who corresponds to the snake—although he resides just there like the snake, *becomes disembodied,* and is no more connected with the body. Because formerly he was embodied and mortal on account of his identification with the body under the influence of his desires and past work ; since that has gone, he is now disembodied, *and* therefore *immortal. Prāṇa* means that which lives. It will be said in a succeeding verse, 'The Vital Force of the vital force' (IV. iv. 18): and another Śruti says, 'The mind (individual self), my dear, is tethered to the Prāṇa (Supreme Self).' (Ch. VI. viii. 2). From the context and the sentence also it is clear that the word 'Prāṇa' here means the

Supreme Self. *Brahman,* the same as the Supreme Self. What is that? *The Light* of Pure Intelligence, the light of the Ātman, illumined by which the universe gets its eye of knowledge, and beaming with intelligence, remains unshaken in its path.

That wished-for question for the purpose of liberation, about which Yājñavalkya gave Janaka a boon, has been elaborately answered by the Śruti, taking the form of the story of Janaka and Yājñavalkya. It deals with bondage and liberation together with their causes, by means of themes and illustrations. The way of deliverance from relative existence has been told to all. Now the Śruti itself states that Janaka said such and such to compensate for the instructions he had received. What was it? 'Thus delivered, *I give you a thousand cows, sir,* as a requital for the instructions received,' *said Janaka, Emperor of Videha.* Now, since the meaning of liberation has been ascertained, why does he not offer himself as well as the empire of Videha, but merely give a thousand cows, as when only a part of liberation was explained? What is the idea behind it?

Here some say, Janaka, who takes delight in the knowledge of the Self, wants to hear again through Mantras what he has already heard ; hence he does not offer everything. He thinks he will do it at the end, after he has heard what he wants to from Yājñavalkya. He is afraid lest, in case he offers everything now, the sage should think that he does not want to hear any more, and withhold the Mantras. So he gives a

thousand cows to intimate his desire to hear more. All this is wrong, for the Śruti, being trustworthy authority, can never have recourse to a subterfuge like a man. Besides there is something more to be explained; although liberation, which is attainable through Self-knowledge, has been explained, a part of the latter, viz. the relinquishment of desires that is called renunciation, is yet to be described. Therefore the view that the Emperor merely wishes to hear the Mantras is not sound. A resort to repetition can be made only when there is no other way out, and should be avoided when there is an alternative; and we have already said (p. 486) that renunciation is not a mere eulogy on Self-knowledge. It may be urged that in that case the Emperor should say, '(Please instruct me) further about liberation itself.' To this we reply: The objection does not hold. The Emperor thinks that renunciation is not a direct cause of liberation like Self-knowledge; accordingly it can go in like a subsidiary act in a sacrifice.[1] For the Smṛti says, 'One should give up the body through renunciation.' Even if renunciation were a means to liberation, it would not necessitate the request, '(Please instruct me) further about liberation itself,' because it merely serves to mature Self-knowledge, which is the means of liberation.

तदेते श्लोका भवन्ति ।

अणुः पन्था विततः पुराणो

मां स्पृष्टोऽनुवित्तो मयैव ।

[1] *Pratipatti-karma.* See footnote on p. 488.

तेन धीरा अपियन्ति ब्रह्मविदः
स्वर्गं लोकमित ऊर्ध्वं विमुक्ताः ॥ ८ ॥

8. Regarding this there are the following verses: The subtle, extensive, ancient way has touched (been reached by) me. (Nay) I have realised it myself. Through that sages—the knowers of Brahman—(also) go to the heavenly sphere (liberation) after the fall of this body, being freed (even while living).

Regarding this subject, that liberation is attained by the knower of Brahman all the objects of whose desire are the Self—a subject that has been dealt with by both Mantra and Brāhmaṇa in the preceding portion—*there are the following verses* showing the details: *The subtle,* being difficult to comprehend; *extensive,* or on account of another reading, 'Vitara,' effectively leading to liberation; *ancient* primeval, being revealed by the eternal Śrutis, not modern like the misleading paths emanating from the intellect of the logicians; *way,* the path of knowledge that conduces to liberation; *has touched me,* i.e. has been reached by me. That which is attained by somebody is connected with him as if it touched him; hence the path of liberation consisting in the knowledge of Brahman, having been attained by me, is said to have touched me. *I* have not merely attained it, but *have realised it myself.* Realisation (Anuvedana) is that attainment which, as knowledge ripens, culminates in

the ultimate results, as eating culminates in satiety. In the previous clause only a contact with knowledge is meant. This is the difference.

Objection: Is this seer of the Mantras the only person who has achieved the result of the knowledge of Brahman, and has none else done it, so that he asserts, 'I have realised it myself'?

Reply: There is nothing wrong in it. It is a eulogy on the knowledge of Brahman, inasmuch as its result is unique—it is subjective. Such indeed is Self-knowledge: it gives one the conviction that one is completely blessed, and it requires no other witness than the testimony of one's own experience; so what can be better than this? Thus it is a glorification of the knowledge of Brahman; not that no other knower of Brahman attains that result. For the Śruti says, 'Whoever among the gods (knew It also became That)' (I. iv. 10), which shows that the knowledge of Brahman is accessible to all. This is expressed by the text: *Through that* path of the knowledge of Brahman *sages,* men of illumination, i.e. other *knowers of Brahman* also, *go to the heavenly sphere,* or liberation, which is the result of the knowledge of Brahman—'Heavenly sphere' generally means heaven, the abode of the gods, but here from the context it means liberation—*after the fall of this body, being freed* even while living.

तस्मिञ्छुक्लमुत नीलमाहुः
पिङ्गलं हरितं लोहितं च ।
एष पन्था ब्रह्मणा हानुवित्तः,
तेनैति ब्रह्मवित्पुण्यकृत्तैजसश्च ॥ ९ ॥

9. Some speak of it as white, others as blue, grey, green, or red. This path is realised by a Brāhmaṇa (knower of Brahman). Any other knower of Brahman who has done good deeds and is identified with the Supreme Light, (also) treads this path.

Seekers after liberation are at variance regarding this path leading to liberation. How? *Some* aspirants *speak of it as white,* pure or limpid, *others as blue,* others as *grey, green, or red,* according to their experience. In reality, however, they are the nerves Suṣumnā and so forth, filled with phlegm and other liquids, for they have been mentioned in the words, '(Filled) with white, blue, grey,' etc. (IV. iii. 20). Or they consider the sun to be this path of liberation, because of the reference in another Śruti, 'He is white, he is blue,' etc. (Ch. VIII. vi. 1). Besides, the path of realisation cannot have any colour, white or any other. In either case these white and other colours refer to some other path than that of knowledge of Brahman, which is the one under consideration.

It may be urged that the word 'white' refers to the pure monistic path. To this we reply: Not so, for it is enumerated along with the words, 'blue,' 'yellow,'[1] etc., denoting colour. The white and other paths that the Yogins designate as the paths of liberation, are not really such, for they fall within the range of relative existence. They merely lead to the world of Hiraṇyagarbha and so on, for they relate to the exit

[1] This word does not occur in the above text.

through particular parts of the body: 'Through the eye, or through the head, or through any other part of the body' (IV. iv. 2). Therefore the path of liberation is the absorption of the body and the organs such as the eye in this very life, like the going out of a lamp—when transmigration is impossible, owing to the exhaustion of all desires through their attainment by the transformation of all objects of desire as the Self. *This path* of knowledge *is realised by a Brāhmaṇa* who has given up all his desires, and become one with the Supreme Self. *Any other knower of Brahman* also *treads this path* of the knowledge of Brahman. What kind of knower of Brahman? *Who* first of all *has done good deeds* and then given up the desire for children etc., *and is identified with the Supreme Light*—by connecting himself with the Light of the Supreme Self, is metamorphosed into that, that is, has become the Ātman in this very life. Such a knower of Brahman treads this path.

One who combines good work with knowledge is not meant here, for we have said that these are contradictory. The Smṛti too says, 'Salutation to that Embodiment of Liberation whom serene monks, fearless about rebirth, attain after the cessation of the effects of their good and bad deeds' (Mbh. XII. xlvi. 56). There is also the exhortation to relinquish merit and demerit: 'Give up doing good and evil' (Mbh. XII. cccxxxvii. 40). And there are the following Smṛti passages: 'The gods consider him a knower of Brahman who has no desires, who undertakes no work, who does not salute or praise anybody, and whose

work has been exhausted, but who himself is unchanged' (Mbh. XII. cclxix. 34), and 'For a knower of Brahman there is no wealth comparable to unity, sameness, truthfulness, virtue, steadfastness, non-injury, candour, and withdrawal from all activities' (Mbh. XII. clxxiv. 37). Here also the Śruti, a little further on, after giving the reason why work will be unnecessary, in the passage, 'This is the eternal glory of a knower of Brahman: it neither increases nor decreases through work' (IV iv. 23), will advise the giving up of all activities in the words, 'Therefore he who knows it as such becomes self-controlled, calm,' etc. (Ibid.). Therefore the clause, 'Who has done good deeds,' should be explained as we have done. Or the sentence may mean: The knower of Brahman who treads this path is a doer of good deeds and a Yogin who has controlled his senses.[1] Thus it is a eulogy on the knowledge of Brahman. A doer of good and a Yogin of this type are considered highly fortunate people in the world. Hence these two epithets serve to glorify the knower of Brahman.[2]

अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति येऽविद्यामुपासते ।
ततो भूय इव ते तमो य उ विद्यायां रताः ॥ १० ॥

10. Into blinding darkness (ignorance) enter those who worship ignorance (rites).

[1] Through meditation on the Ḍahara (the ether in the heart) etc., and attained extraordinary powers. This is Ānandagiri's explanation of the word 'Taijasa.' 'Tejas' according to him means the organs.

[2] By describing him as being of equal status to the other two.

Into greater darkness, as it were, than that enter those who are devoted to knowledge (the ceremonial portion of the Vedas).[1]

Into blinding darkness, i.e. darkness that obstructs one's vision, or ignorance that regulates transmigration, *enter those who worship,* i.e. follow *ignorance,* the opposite of knowledge, i.e. work consisting of ends and means, in other words, those who practise rites. *Into greater darkness, as it were, than* even *that enter those who are devoted,* or attached, *to knowledge,* that portion of the Vedas which deals with things that are the outcome of ignorance, i.e. the ritualistic portion, in other words, those who disregard the teachings of the Upaniṣads, saying that that portion alone which deals with the injunctions and prohibitions is the Vedas, and there is none other.

अनन्दा नाम ते लोका अन्धेन तमसावृताः ।
तांस्ते प्रेत्याभिगच्छन्त्यविद्वांसोऽबुधो जनाः ॥ ११ ॥

11. Miserable are those worlds enveloped by (that) blinding darkness (ignorance). To them, after death, go those people who are ignorant and unwise.

What is the harm if they enter into the darkness that obstructs one's vision? This is being answered: *Miserable are those worlds enveloped by* that *blinding darkness* which obstructs one's vision; that is, they are the province of that darkness of ignorance. *To them, after death, go*—who?—*those people who are ignorant.* The word 'people' means common folk, or

[1] Same as verse 9 of the Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad.

those subject to repeated births. Will only ignorance in general take one there? No, they must be *unwise* (Abudh) too. The word is formed from the root 'budh,' meaning, to know, by the addition of the suffix 'kvip'; that is, devoid of the knowledge of the Self.

आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयादयमस्मीति पूरुषः ।
किमिच्छन्कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत् ॥ १२ ॥

12. If a man knows the Self as 'I am this,' then desiring what and for whose sake will he suffer in the wake of the body?

If a man, one in a thousand, *knows the Self,* which is his own as well as the Supreme Self, which knows the desires of all beings, which is in the heart (intellect), and is beyond the attributes of hunger etc. The word 'if' shows the rarity of Self-knowledge. Knows how? *As 'I am this'* Supreme Self, the witness of the perception of all beings, which has been described as 'Not this, not this,' and so on, than which there is no other seer, hearer, thinker and knower, which is always the same and is in all beings, and which is naturally eternal, pure, enlightened and free; *desiring what* other thing, of the nature of a result, distinct from his own Self, *and for whose sake,* for the need of what other person distinct from himself: Since he as the Self has nothing to wish for, and there is none other than himself for whose sake he may wish it, he being the Self of all, therefore desiring what and for whose sake *will he suffer in the wake of the body*

—deviate from his nature, or become miserable, following the misery created by his limiting adjunct, the body, i.e. imbibe the afflictions of the body? For this is possible for the man who does not see the Self and consequently desires things other than It. He struggles desiring something for himself, something else for his son, a third thing for his wife, and so on, goes the round of births and deaths, and is diseased when his body is diseased. But all this is impossible for the man who sees everything as the Self. This is what the Śruti says.

यस्यानुवित्तः प्रतिबुद्ध आत्मा-
स्मिन्संदेह्ये गहने प्रविष्टः ।
स विश्वकृत्, स हि सर्वस्य कर्ता,
तस्य लोकः, स उ लोक एव ॥ १३ ॥

13. He who has realised and intimately known the Self that has entered this perilous and inaccessible place (the body), is the maker of the universe, for he is the maker of all, (all is) his Self, and he again is indeed the Self (of all).

Further, *he*, the knower of Brahman, *who has realised and intimately known the Self*—how?—known himself as the innermost Self, as 'I am the Supreme Brahman,' the Self *that has entered this place* (the body) which is *perilous*, beset with numerous dangers, *and inaccessible* with hundreds and thousands of obstacles to enlightenment through discrimination—this knower of Brahman who has realised this Self

through intuition *is the maker of the universe.* How? Is it only in name? This is being answered: No, not in name merely, *for he is the maker of all:* He is not such under the influence of any extraneous agency. What then? All is *his Self.* Is the Self something different from him? The answer is: *He again is indeed the Self* (Loka). The word 'Loka' here means the Self. That is to say, all is his Self, and he is the Self of all. This innermost Self which has entered this body, beset with dangers and inaccessible, and which the knower of Brahman realises through intuition, is not the individual self, but the Supreme Self, because It is the maker of the universe, the Self of all, and all is Its Self. One should meditate upon one's identity with the Supreme Self, the one only without a second: This is the gist of the verse.

इहैव सन्तोऽथ विद्मस्तद्वयम्,
न चेदवेदिर्महती विनष्टिः।
ये तद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति,
अथेतरे दुःखमेवापियन्ति ॥ १४ ॥

14. Being in this very body we have somehow known that (Brahman). If not, (I should have been) ignorant, (and) great destruction (would have taken place). Those who know It become immortal, while others attain misery alone.

Further, *being in this very body,* so full of dangers, i.e. being under the spell of the long sleep of ignorance, *we have somehow known that* Brahman which

is under consideration as our own self; oh, blessed are we—this is the idea. *If* we had *not* known that Brahman which we have known, I should have been *ignorant* (Avedi). 'Vedi' is one who has knowledge; hence 'Avedi' means ignorant. The shortening of the last vowel does not affect the meaning. What harm would there have been had I been ignorant? *Great,* of infinite magnitude; *destruction,* consisting in births, deaths, etc., *would have taken place.* Oh, blessed are we that we have been saved from this great destruction by knowing Brahman, the one without a second; this is the idea. As we have escaped this great destruction by knowing Brahman, so *those who know It become immortal, while* those *others,* people other than the knowers of Brahman, who do not thus know Brahman, *attain misery alone,* consisting in births, deaths, etc. That is to say, the ignorant never escape from them, for they regard misery itself (the body) as the Self.

यदैतमनुपश्यत्यात्मानं देवमञ्जसा ।
ईशानं भूतभव्यस्य, न ततो विजुगुप्सते ॥ १५ ॥

15. When a man after (receiving instructions from a teacher) directly realises this effulgent Self, the Lord of all that has been and will be, he no longer wishes to hide himself from it.

But *when a man,* somehow meeting a highly merciful teacher and receiving his grace, afterwards *directly realises this effulgent* (Deva) *Self,* or, the

Self that bestows on all the respective results of their deeds, *the Lord of all that has been and will be,* i.e. of the past, present and future, *he no longer wishes* particularly *to hide himself from It,* this Lord. Everyone who sees diversity wishes to hide himself from God. But this man sees unity, hence he is not afraid of anything. Therefore he does not want to hide himself any more. Or the meaning may be: When he directly realises the effulgent Lord as identical with his own self, he no longer blames anybody, for he sees all as his self, and for that reason whom should he blame?

यस्मादर्वाक्संवत्सरोऽहोभिः परिवर्तते ।
तद्देवा ज्योतिषां ज्योतिरायुर्होपासतेऽमृतम् ॥ १६ ॥

16. Below which the year with its days rotates, upon that immortal Light of all lights the gods meditate as longevity.

Also, *below which* Lord, i.e. in a different category from it, *the year,* representing time which limits everything that is born, *with its* own parts, the *days* and nights, *rotates,* occupies a lower position without being able to limit It—*upon that immortal Light of all lights,* which is the revealer of even such luminaries as the sun, *the gods meditate as longevity.* Things other than that perish, but not this Light, for it is the longevity of all. Because the gods meditate upon this Light through its attribute of longevity, therefore they are long-lived. Hence one who desires a long life should meditate upon Brahman through Its attribute of longevity.

यस्मिन्पञ्च पञ्चजना आकाशश्च प्रतिष्ठितः ।
तमेव मन्य आत्मानं विद्वान्ब्रह्मामृतोऽमृतम् ॥ १७ ॥

17. That in which the five groups of five and the (subtle) ether are placed, that very Ātman I regard as the immortal Brahman. Knowing (Brahman) I am immortal.

Moreover, *that* Brahman *in which the five groups of five,* the celestial minstrels etc., who are five in number, viz. the celestial minstrels, the Manes, the gods, the Asuras and the Rākṣasas—or the four castes with the Caṇḍālas as the fifth—*and the ether* called the Undifferentiated, which pervades the Sūtra, *are placed*—it has been said, 'By this Immutable, O Gārgī, is the (unmanifested) ether pervaded' (III. viii. 11)—*that very Ātman I regard as the immortal Brahman.* I do not consider the Self as different from that. What then is it? *Knowing* Brahman, *I am immortal.* I was mortal only through ignorance. Since that is gone, I, the knowing one, am indeed immortal.

प्राणस्य प्राणमुत चक्षुषश्चक्षुरुत
श्रोत्रस्य श्रोत्रं मनसो ये मनो विदुः ।
ते निचिक्युर्ब्रह्म पुराणमग्र्यम् ॥ १८ ॥

18. Those who have known the Vital Force of the vital force, the Eye of the eye, the Ear of the ear, and the Mind of the mind, have realised the ancient, primordial Brahman.

Further it is by being revealed by the light of

the Ātman that is Pure Intelligence, its own Self, that the vital force functions ; therefore It is the Vital Force of the vital force. *Those who have known the Vital Force of the vital force,* as also *the Eye of the eye, the Ear of the ear :* The eye and the other organs receive their powers of vision and so forth only by being inspired by the energy of Brahman ; by themselves, divested of the light of the Ātman that is Pure Intelligence, they are like wood or clods of earth ; *and the Mind of the mind*—in other words, those who have known the Self not as a sense-object, but as the innermost Self whose existence is inferred from the functions of the eye etc., *have realised,* known with certainty, *the ancient* or eternal, and *primordial Brahman ;* for the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad says, 'That which the knowers of the Self realise' (II. ii. 19).

मनसैवानुद्रष्टव्यम् , नेह नानास्ति किंचन ।
मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ॥ १९ ॥

19. Through the mind alone (It) is to be realised. There is no difference[1] whatsoever in It. He goes from death to death, who sees difference, as it were, in It.

The means of the realisation of that Brahman is being described. *Through the mind alone,* purified by the knowledge of the supreme Truth, and in accordance with the instructions of the teacher, (It) *is to be realised. There is no difference whatsoever in It,* Brahman, the object of the realisation. Although

[1] Separateness or diversity.

there is no difference, one superimposes it through ignorance. *He goes from death to death.* Who? *Who sees difference, as it were, in It.* That is to say, really there is no duality apart from the superimposition of ignorance.

एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्यमेतदप्रमयं ध्रुवम् ।
विरजः पर आकाशादज आत्मा महान्ध्रुवः ॥ २० ॥

20. It should be realised in one form only, (for) It is unknowable and eternal. The Self is taintless, beyond the (subtle) ether, birthless, infinite and constant.

Since It is such, therefore *It should be realised in one form only,* viz. as homogeneous Pure Intelligence, without any break in it, like the ether ; for *It,* this Brahman, *is unknowable,* owing to the unity of everything (in Brahman). One is known by another ; but It is one, hence unknowable. *Eternal,* unchangeable, or immovable. It may be objected: Surely this is contradictory—to say that It is unknowable, and also that It is known ; 'It is known,' means, that It is cognised by the means of knowledge, and 'unknowable' is the denial of that. To this we reply: It is all right, for only this much is denied that It, like other things, is known by any other means than scriptural evidence. Other things are cognised by the ordinary means independent of scriptural evidence ; but the truth of the Self cannot thus be known by any other means of knowledge but that. The scriptures too describe It merely by the negation of the activities of the subject, the evidences of knowledge, and so on, in such terms

as these: When everything is the Self, what should one see, . . . know, and through what?[1]—and not by resorting to the usual function of a sentence in which something is described by means of names. Therefore even in the scriptures the Self is not presented like heaven or Mount Meru, for instance, for it is the very Self of those that present it. A presentation by someone has for its object something to be presented, and this is possible only when there is difference.

The knowledge of Brahman too means only the cessation of the identification with extraneous things (such as the body). The relation of identity with It has not to be directly established, for it is already there. Everybody always has that identity with It, but it appears to be related to something else. Therefore the scriptures do not enjoin that identity with Brahman should be established, but that the false identification with things other than That should stop. When the identification with other things is gone, that identity with one's own Self which is natural, becomes isolated ; this is expressed by the statement that the Self is known. In Itself It is unknowable—not comprehended through any means. Hence both statements are consistent.

The Self is taintless, i.e. free from the impurities of good and evil, *beyond the ether, subtler,* or more pervasive, than even the unmanifested ether, *birthless* —the negation of birth implies that of the five succeeding changes[2] of condition also, for these originate from

[1] An adaptation of II. iv. 14 and IV. v. 15.

[2] According to Yāska a thing comes into being, exists, grows, begins to decline, decays and dies.

birth—*infinite,* vaster than anything else, *and constant,* indestructible.

तमेव धीरो विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत ब्राह्मणः ।
नानुध्यायाद्बहूञ्छब्दान्, वाचो विग्लापनं
हि तत् ॥ इति ॥ २१ ॥

21. The intelligent aspirant after Brahman, knowing about this alone, should attain intuitive knowledge. (He) should not think of too many words, for it is particularly fatiguing to the organ of speech.

The intelligent aspirant after Brahman, knowing about this kind of Self *alone,* from the instructions of a teacher and from the scriptures, *should attain intuitive knowledge* of what has been taught by the teacher and the scriptures, so as to put an end to all questioning—i.e. practise the means of this knowledge, viz. renunciation, calmness, self-control, withdrawal of the senses, fortitude and concentration. (He) *should not think of too many words.* This restriction on too many words implies that a few words dealing exclusively with the unity of the Self are permissible. The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad has it: 'Maditate upon the Self with the help of the syllable Om' (II. ii. 6), and 'Give up all other speech' (II. ii. 5). *For it,* this thinking of too many words, *is particularly fatiguing to the organ of speech.*

स वा एष महानज आत्मा योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु य एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिञ्छेते, सर्वस्य वशी

सर्वस्येशानः सर्वस्याधिपतिः ; स न साधुना कर्मणा भूयान्, नो एवासाधुना कनीयान् ; एष सर्वेश्वरः ; एष भूताधिपतिः, एष भूतपालः, एष सेतुर्विधरण एषां लोकानामसंभेदाय ; तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेन ; एतमेव विदित्वा मुनिर्भवति । एतमेव प्रव्राजिनो लोकमिच्छन्तः प्रव्रजन्ति । एतद्ध स्म वै तत् पूर्वे विद्वांसः प्रजां न कामयन्ते, किं प्रजया करिष्यामो येषां नोऽयमात्मायं लोक इति ; ते ह स्म पुत्रैषणायाश्च वित्तैषणायाश्च लोकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति ; या ह्येव पुत्रैषणा सा वित्तैषणा, या वित्तैषणा सा लोकैषणा, उभे ह्येते एषणे एव भवतः । स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा, अगृह्यो नहि गृह्यते, अशीर्यो नहि शीर्यते, असङ्गो नहि सज्यते, असितो न व्यथते, न रिष्यति; एतमु हैवैते न तरत इति—अतः पापमकरवमिति, अतः कल्याणमकरवमिति ; उभे उ हैवैष एते तरति, नैनं कृताकृते तपतः ॥ २२ ॥

22. That great, birthless Self which is identified with the intellect and is in the midst of the organs, lies in the ether that is within the heart. It is the controller of all, the lord of all, the ruler of all. It does not become better through good work nor worse through bad work. It is the lord of all, It is the ruler of all beings, It is the protector of all beings. It is the bank that serves as the boundary to keep the different worlds apart. The Brāhmaṇas seek to know

It through the study of the Vedas, sacrifices, charity, and austerity consisting in a dispassionate enjoyment of sense-objects. Knowing It alone one becomes a sage. Desiring this world (the Self) alone monks renounce their homes. This is (the reason for it): The ancient sages, it is said, did not desire children (thinking), 'What shall we achieve through children, we who have attained this Self, this world (result).' They, it is said, renounced their desire for sons, for wealth and for the worlds, and lived a mendicant life. That which is the desire for sons is the desire for wealth, and that which is the desire for wealth is the desire for the worlds, for both these are but desires. This self is That which has been described as 'Not this, not this.' It is imperceptible, for It is never perceived; undecaying, for It never decays; unattached, for It is never attached; unfettered —It never feels pain, and never suffers injury. (It is but proper) that the sage is never overtaken by these two thoughts, 'I did an evil act for this,' and 'I did a good act for this.' He conquers both of them. Things done or not done do not trouble him.

Bondage and liberation together with their causes have been described by the preceding portion consisting of the Mantras as well as the Brāhmaṇa. The nature of liberation has again been elaborately set forth by the quotation of verses. Now it has to be shown how the whole of the Vedas is applicable to this sub-

ject of the Self ; hence the present paragraph is introduced. By recapitulating the topic of Self-knowledge with its results in the way it has been dealt with in this chapter, it is sought to show that the entire Vedas, except the portion treating of ceremonies having material ends, are applicable to this. Hence the words, 'That great,' etc., recapitulating what has been stated. *That* refers to something already mentioned. What is it? It is pointed out by the words, 'Which is identified with the intellect,' etc., which are intended to preclude any reference to the Self just mentioned (verse 20). Which one is meant then? The answer is: *Which is identified with the intellect and is in the midst of the organs.* The passage is quoted for settling the doubt, for at the beginning of Janaka's questions it has been stated, 'Which is the self?—This (infinite entity) that is identified with the intellect and is in the midst of the organs,' etc. (IV. iii. 7). The idea is this: By the demonstration of desire, work and ignorance as attributes of the non-Self, the self-effulgent Ātman that has been set forth in the passage in question is here freed from them and transformed into the Supreme Self, and it is emphatically stated, 'It *is* the Supreme Self, and nothing else'; it is directly spoken of as the *great, birthless Self.* The words, 'Which is identified with the intellect and is in the midst of the organs,' have been already explained and have the same meaning here. *Lies in the ether that is within* the lotus of *the heart,* the ether (Ākāśa) that is the seat of the intellect. The Ātman lives in that ether containing the intellect. Or the meaning may be that the

individual self in the state of profound sleep dwells in that unconditioned Supreme Self, called Ākāśa, which is its very nature. This has been explained in the second chapter by way of answer to the question, 'Where was it then?' (II. i. 16).

It is[1] *the controller of all,* Hiraṇyagarbha, Indra, and the rest, for all live under It. As has been said, 'Under the mighty rule of this Immutable (O Gārgī),' etc. (III. viii. 9). Not only the controller, but *the lord of all,* Hiraṇyagarbha, Indra and others. Lordship may sometimes be due to birth, like that of a Prince over his servants. although they are stronger than he. To obviate this the text says, *the ruler of all,* the supreme protector, i.e. independent, not swayed by ministers and other servants like a Prince. The three attributes of control etc. are interdependent. Because the Self is the ruler of all, therefore It is the lord of all, for it is well known that one who protects another as the highest authority, wields lordship over him ; and because It is the lord of all, therefore It is the controller of all. Further *It,* the infinite entity identified with the intellect, the light within the heart (intellect), being one with the Supreme Self, *does not become better,* or improve from the previous state by the accession of some attributes, *through good work* enjoined by the scriptures, *nor worse,* i.e. does not fall from its previous state, *through bad work* forbidden by the scriptures. Moreover, everyone doing these

[1] From here up to 'worlds apart', the results accruing to one who realises one's identity with Brahman are being described.

functions of presiding, protection, etc. is attended with merit and demerit consequent on bestowing favours and inflicting pains on others; why is the Self alone absolved from them? The answer is: Because 'It is the lord of all,' and accustomed to rule over work also, therefore It is not connected with work. Further 'It is the ruler of all beings,' from Hiraṇyagarbha down to a clump of grass. The word 'ruler' has already been explained. *It is the protector of all* those *beings. It is the bank*—what kind of bank?—*that serves as the boundary* among the divisions of caste and order of life. This is expressed by the words '*to keep the different worlds,*' beginning with the earth and ending with the world of Hiraṇyagarbha, *apart,* distinct from one another. If the Lord did not divide them like a bank, their limits would be obliterated. Therefore, in order to keep the worlds apart, the Lord, from whom the self-effulgent Ātman is not different, acts as the embankment.

One who knows it thus becomes 'the controller of all,' and so on—this sets forth the results of the knowledge of Brahman. The whole of the ceremonial portion of the Vedas, except that dealing with rites having material ends, is applicable as a means to this knowledge of Brahman as delineated, with the results described above, in the present chapter beginning with, 'What serves as the light for a man?' (IV. iii. 2-6). How this can be done is being explained: *The Brāhmaṇas*—the word 'Brāhmaṇa' implies the Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas, for all the three castes are equally entitled to the study of the Vedas—*seek to*

know It, this infinite entity as described above, that can be known only from the Upaniṣads, *through the study of the Vedas* consisting of the Mantras and Brāhmaṇas—by daily reading them. Or the passage may mean, 'They seek to know It through the Mantras and Brāhmaṇas relating to the ceremonial portion.' How do they seek to know It? 'Through sacrifices,' etc.

Some,[1] however, explain the passage as follows: 'They seek to know that which is revealed by the Mantras and Brāhmaṇas.' According to them the word 'Vedānuvacana' would mean only the Āraṇyakas,[2] since the ceremonial portion does not speak of the Supreme Self; for the Śruti distinctly says, 'That Being who is to be known only from the Upaniṣads' (III. ix. 26). Besides, the word 'Vedānuvacana,' making no specification, refers to the whole of the Vedas; and it is not proper to exclude one portion of them.

Objection: Your interpretation is also one-sided, since it excludes the Upaniṣads.

Reply: No, the objection does not apply to our first explanation, in which there is no contradiction. When the word 'Vedānuvacana' means daily reading, the Upaniṣads too are of course included; hence no part of the meaning of the word is abandoned. Besides it is used along with the words, 'sacrifices,' etc. It is to introduce sacrifices and other rites that the word 'Vedānuvacana' has been used. Therefore we under-

[1] The reference is to Bhartṛprapañca.

[2] Which include among others the Upaniṣads.

stand that it means the rites, because the daily reading of the Vedas is also a rite.

Objection : But how can they seek to know the Self through such rites as the daily reading of the Vedas, for they do not reveal the Self as the Upaniṣads do?

Reply : The objection does not hold, for the rites are a means to purification. It is only when the rites have purified them, that people, with their minds pure, can easily know the Self that is revealed by the Upaniṣads. As the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad says, 'But his mind being purified, he sees through meditation that Self which has no parts' (III. i. 8). The Smṛti also says, 'A man attains knowledge only when his evil work has been destroyed,' etc. (Mbh. XII. ccii. 9).

Objection : How do you know that the regular rites are for purification?

Reply : From such Śruti texts as the following: 'He indeed sacrifices to the Self who knows that this particular part of his body is being purified by this (rite), and that particular part of his body is being improved by that (rite),' etc. (Ś. XI. II. vi. 13). All the Smṛtis too speak of rites as being purificatory, as, for instance, the passage, 'The forty-eight acts of purification,' etc. (cf. Gau. VIII. 22). The Gītā also says, 'Sacrifices, charity and austerity are purifying to the intelligent aspirant' (XVIII. 5), and 'All these knowers of sacrifices have their sins destroyed by the sacrifices' (IV. 30).

Through *sacrifices,* viz. those performed with things and those consisting in knowledge, both of

which conduce to purity ; and one who, being cleansed, has a pure mind, will spontaneously attain knowledge. Hence it is said, 'They seek to know through sacrifices.' *Charity,* for this too destroys one's sins and increases one's merits. *And austerity.* The word meaning without distinction all forms of austerity including (even extreme forms like) the Kṛcchra, Cāndrāyaṇa, etc., it is qualified by the phrase: *consisting in a dispassionate enjoyment of sense-objects.* This absence of unrestrained enjoyment is the real meaning of the word 'Anāśaka,' not starvation, which will only lead to death, but not to Self-knowledge. The words, 'study of the Vedas,' 'sacrifices,' 'charity' and 'austerity,' refer to all regular rites without exception. Thus the entire body of regular rites—not rites that have material ends—serves as a means to liberation through the attainment of Self-knowledge. Hence we see that the section of the Vedas dealing with knowledge has the same import as that dealing with rites.

Similarly, *knowing It alone,* the Self as described in the preceding portion, in the above-mentioned way, *one becomes a sage,* a man of reflection, i.e. a Yogin. Knowing It alone, and none other, one becomes a sage. It may be urged that one can become a sage by knowing other things also ; so how is it asserted, 'It alone'? To which we reply: True, one can become a sage by knowing other things too, but not exclusively a sage ; he may also become a ritualist. But knowing this Being that is to be known only from the Upaniṣads, one becomes a sage alone, and not a

ritualist. Therefore it is to indicate his unique feature of becoming a sage that the text asserts, 'It alone.' Since action is impossible when the Self is known, as is expressed in the words, 'What should one see and through what?'—only reflection can then take place. Further, *desiring*, or seeking, *this world alone,* their own Self, *monks renounce their homes,* lit. depart in the most effective way, i.e. relinquish all rites.

Because of the assertion, 'Desiring this world alone,' we understand that those who seek the three external worlds[1] are not entitled to the monastic life, for an inhabitant of the region of Banaras who wishes to reach Hardwar does not travel eastward. Therefore, for those who desire the three external worlds, sons, rites and meditation on the conditioned Brahman are the means, since the Śruti says, 'This world of men is to be won through the son alone, and by no other rite,' etc. (I. v. 16). Hence those who want them should not reject such means as the son and embrace the monastic life, for it is not a means to them. Therefore the assertion, 'Desiring this world alone monks renounce their homes,' is quite in order. The attainment of the world of the Self is but living in one's own Self after the cessation of ignorance. Therefore, should a person desire that world of the Self, for him the chief and direct means of that would be the withdrawal from all activities, just as the son and the like are the means of the three external worlds ; for such acts as would secure the birth of a son, and so

[1] The earth, the world of the Manes and heaven.

on, are not means to the attainment of the Self. And we have already mentioned the contradiction involved in them on the ground of impossibility. Therefore, desiring to attain the world of the Self, they do renounce their homes, that is to say, must abstain from all rites. Just as for a man seeking the three external worlds, a son and so forth are enjoined as the requisite means, so for one who has known about Brahman and desires to realise the world of the Self, the monastic life consisting in the cessation of all desires is undoubtedly enjoined.

Why do those seekers after the world of the Self particularly renounce their homes? The text gives the reason in the form of a laudatory passage. *This is* the reason for that monastic life: *The ancient sages,* ancient knowers of the Self, *it is said, did not desire children,* as also rites and the meditation on the conditioned Brahman.—The word 'children' suggests all these three means to the three external worlds.—In other words, they did not try for sons etc. as means to those three worlds. It may be objected that they must practise the meditation on the conditioned Brahman, since they could renounce desires on the strength of that alone. The answer is: No, because it is excluded. To be explicit: In the passages, 'The Brāhmaṇa ousts one who knows him as different from the Self' (II. iv. 6 ; IV. v. 7), and 'All ousts one,' etc. (Ibid.), even the meditation on the conditioned Brahman is excluded, for this Brahman too is included in the word 'all.' Also, 'Where one sees nothing else,'

etc. (Ch. VII. xxiv. 1). Also because it has been forbidden to see in Brahman differences about prior or posterior, and interior or exterior, in the passage, 'Without prior or posterior, without interior or exterior' (II. v. 19). And, 'Then what should one see, . . . know, and through what?' (II. iv. 14 ; IV. v. 15). Therefore there is no other reason for the renunciation of desires except the realisation of the Self.

What was their intention? They thought: *'What* object or result *shall we achieve through* the instrumentality of *children,* for they are definitely known to be the means of attaining an external world, and that world does not exist apart from our own Self, since everything is our own Self, and we are the Self of everything ; and just because It is our Self, It cannot be produced, attained, modified or improved by any means. Acts that purify the performer of sacrifices to the Self merely concern his identification with the body and organs, for the Śruti speaks of the relation between the whole and part, etc., regarding them, "This particular part of my body is being purified by this (rite)," etc. (Ś. XI. II. vi. 13). One who sees the Self as Pure Intelligence, homogeneous and without a break cannot meditate upon purification or improvement based on a relation between the whole and part. Therefore we shall achieve nothing through means such as children. It is only the ignorant man who has to attain results through them. Because a man who sees water in a mirage proceeds to drink from it, another who sees no

water there, but a desert, cannot certainly be so inclined. Similarly we who see the Truth, the world of the Self, cannot run after things to be achieved through children etc.—things that are like a mirage and so forth, and are the objects of the defective vision of ignorant people.' This was their idea.

This is expressed as follows: *We* beholders of the Truth, *who have attained this Self* that is free from hunger etc. and is not to be modified by good or bad deeds, *this world,* this desired result. There are no means to be desired for realising this Self that is free from all such relative attributes as ends and means. It is only with regard to a thing which is attainable that means are looked for. If a search is made for means to secure something that is unattainable, it would be like swimming on land under the impression that it is water, or like looking for the footprints of birds in the sky. Therefore the knowers of Brahman, after realising this Self, should only renounce their homes, and not engage in rites ; because the ancient knowers of Brahman, knowing this, did not want children. What they did after condemning this dealing with the world of ends and means as being the concern of the ignorant, is being described: *They, it is said, renounced their desire for sons, for wealth and for the worlds, and lived a mendicant life,* etc. All this has been explained (III. v. 1).

Therefore, desiring the world of the Self monks renounce their homes, i.e. should renounce. Thus it is an injunction, and harmonises with the eulogy (that

follows). The sentence, which is provided with a eulogy (immediately after), cannot itself have the force of glorifying the world of the Self, for the verb 'renounce' has for its eulogy the succeeding passage, 'This is (the reason),' etc. If the previous sentence were a eulogy, it would not require another eulogy; but the verb 'renounce' (as interpreted above) does require the eulogy, 'This is (the reason),' etc.

Because ancient sages, desisting from rites directed towards obtaining children etc., did renounce their homes, therefore people of to-day also renounce them, i.e. should renounce them. If we thus construe the passage, the verb 'renounce' cannot have the force of glorifying the world of the Self. We have explained this (III. v. 1) on the ground that the verb is connected by the Śruti with the same subject as that of 'knowing.' Moreover, the verb 'renounce' is here used along with 'the study of the Vedas,' etc. As the study of the Vedas and other such acts, which have been enjoined as means to the realisation of the Self, are to be taken literally, and not as eulogies, so also the renunciation of home, which has been mentioned along with them as a means to the attainment of the world of the Self, cannot be a eulogy. Besides, a distinction in the results has been made by the Śruti. The words, 'Knowing[1] It—this world of the Self—alone' (this text), divide the Self as a result distinct from the other results, the external worlds, as a similar division has

[1] The renunciation in question follows this indirect knowledge so as to mature it into actual realisation.

been made in the passage, 'This world is to be won through the son alone, and by no other rite ; the world of the Manes through rites' (I. vi. 16, adapted). Nor is the verb 'renounce' eulogistic of the world of the Self, as if this were something already known. Besides, like a principal sacrifice, it itself requires a eulogy. Moreover, were it a eulogy it would occur in the text only once.[1] Therefore it is purely a mistake to consider it as a tribute to the world of the Self.

Nor can renunciation as an act to be performed be regarded as a eulogy. If, in spite of its being such an act, it is considered to be a eulogy, then rites such as the new and full moon sacrifices, which are to be performed, would also become eulogies. Nor is renunciation clearly known to have been enjoined elsewhere outside of the present topic, in which case it might be construed here as being eulogistic. If, however, renunciation be supposed to be enjoined anywhere, it should primarily be here ; it is not possible anywhere else. If, again, renunciation is conceded to be enjoined on those who are not qualified for any rite, in that case acts such as the climbing of trees may also be considered as equally appropriate injunctions, for both are alike unknown as obligatory under the circumstances. Therefore there is not the least chance of the passage in question being a eulogy.

It may be asked: If this world of the Self alone is desired, why do they not undertake work as a means

[1] As a matter of fact, there are several verbs in the passage that repeat the idea.

to its attainment? What is the good of renunciation? The answer is: Because this world of the Self has no connection with work. That Self, desiring which they should renounce their homes, is not connected, either as a means or as an end, with any of the four kinds of work, viz. those that are produced, etc. (p. 448). Therefore *this self is That which has been described as 'Not this, not this'; It is imperceptible, for it is never perceived,* etc.—this is the description of the Self. Since it has been established through scriptural evidence as well as reasoning, specially in this dialogue between Janaka and Yājñavalkya, that the Self as described above is not connected with work, its results and its means, is different from all relative attributes, beyond hunger etc., devoid of grossness and so on, birthless, undecaying, immortal, undying, beyond fear, by nature homogeneous Intelligence like a lump of salt, self-effulgent, one only without a second, without prior or posterior, and without interior or exterior—therefore after this Self is known as one's own Self work can no more be done. Hence the Self is undifferentiated. One who has eyes surely does not fall into a well or on thorns while going along the way. Besides, the entire results of work are included in those of knowledge. And no wise man takes pains for a thing that can be had without any effort. 'If one gets honey near at hand, why go to a mountain for it? If the desired object is already attained, what sensible man would struggle for it?' The Gītā too says, 'All work, O Arjuna, together with its factors is finished with the attainment of knowledge' (IV. 33). Here also (IV. iii. 32)

it has been stated that all other beings live on particles of this very Supreme Bliss that is accessible to the knower of Brahman. Hence the latter cannot undertake work.

Because this sage, desisting from all desires, after realising the Ātman that has been described as 'Not this, not this' as his own Self, lives identified with That, therefore it is but proper—these words are to be supplied to complete the sentence—that he who has this knowledge and is identified with that Self *is never overtaken by these two thoughts* that are just going to be mentioned. Which are they? The following ones: *'I did an evil act for this* reason, for example, the maintenance of the body. Oh, my action was wretched. This sinful act will take me to hell.' This repentance that comes to one who has done something wrong, does not overtake this sage who has become identified with the Self, described as 'Not this, not this.' Similarly *'I did a good act,* such as the performance of a sacrifice or charity, *for this* reason, owing to the desire for results. So I shall enjoy the happiness that comes of it in another body.' This joy also does not overtake him. *He,* this knower of Brahman, *conquers both of them,* both these actions, good and bad. Thus for a monk who has known Brahman, both kinds of action, whether done in the past or in the present life, are destroyed, and no new ones are undertaken. Also, *things done,* such as the regular rites, *or* those very things *not done*—the omission of them—*do not trouble him.* It is the man who is ignorant of the Self that is

troubled by the actions done, by having to receive their results, and by those not done, by being visited with their adverse consequences. But this knower of Brahman burns all work to ashes with the fire of Self-knowledge. As the Smṛti says, 'Just as a blazing fire (burns) the fuel (to ashes),' etc. (G. IV. 37). As to those actions that caused the present body, they are worked out through actual experience. Hence the knower of Brahman has no connection with work.

तदेतदृचाभ्युक्तम् ।
एष नित्यो महिमा ब्राह्मणस्य
न वर्धते कर्मणा नो कनीयान् ।
तस्यैव स्यात्पदवित्, तं विदित्वा
न लिप्यते कर्मणा पापकेन ॥ इति ।

तस्मादेवंविच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्यति, सर्वमात्मानं पश्यति; नैनं पाप्मा तरति, सर्वं पाप्मानं तरति; नैनं पाप्मा तपति, सर्वं पाप्मानं तपति; विपापो विरजोऽविचिकित्सो ब्राह्मणो भवति; एष ब्रह्मलोकः सम्राट्, एनं प्रापितोऽसीति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः; सोऽहं भगवते विदेहान् ददामि, मां चापि सह दास्यायेति ॥ २३ ॥

23. This has been expressed by the following hymn: This is the eternal glory of a knower of Brahman: it neither increases nor decreases through work. (Therefore) one should know the nature of that alone. Knowing it one is not touched by evil action. Therefore he who knows it as such becomes self-controlled,

calm, withdrawn into himself, enduring and concentrated, and sees the Self in his own self (body); he sees all as the Self. Evil does not overtake him, but he transcends all evil. Evil does not trouble him, (but) he consumes all evil. He becomes sinless, taintless, free from doubts, and Brāhmaṇa (knower of Brahman). This is the world of Brahman, O Emperor, and you have attained it—said Yājñavalkya. 'I give you, sir, the empire of Videha, and myself too with it, to wait upon you.'

This, what has been stated by the Brāhmaṇa, *has been expressed by the following hymn*: *This*, what is described as 'Not this, not this,' etc., *is the eternal glory of a knower of Brahman* who has given up all desires. Other glories are due to work, hence they are not permanent ; but this glory is distinct from them—it is eternal, for it is natural. Why is it eternal? The reason is being given: *It neither increases nor decreases through work*—it does not undergo the change called growth through good work done, nor does it undergo the change called decay through evil work. Since all changes are due to growth or decay, they are all negated by these two epithets. Hence this glory, being changeless, is eternal. Therefore *one should know the nature of that* glory *alone*. The word 'Pada' literally means that which is attained or known ; hence it means only the nature of this glory ; one should know

that. What would come of knowing it? The answer is being given: *Knowing it,* this glory, *one is not touched by evil action,* comprising both good and evil, for both are evil to a knower of Brahman.

Since this glory of the knower of Brahman is thus unconnected with work, and is described as 'Not this, not this,' *therefore he who knows it as such becomes self-controlled,* desisting from the activities of the external organs ; also *calm,* averse to the desires of the internal organ or mind ; *withdrawn into himself,* free from all desires, a monk ; *enduring,* indifferent to the pairs of opposites (pleasure and pain, etc.); *concentrated,* attaining one-pointedness by the dissociation from the movements of the organs and mind. This has been stated before in the words, 'Having known all about the strength that comes of knowledge, as well as scholarship,' etc. (III. v. 1). *And sees the Self,* the inner Intelligence, *in his own self,* the body and organs. Does he see only the Self limited to the body? No, *he sees all as the Self,* he sees that there is nothing different even by a hair's breadth from the Self. By reason of his reflection he becomes a sage, giving up the three states of waking, dream and profound sleep. *Evil,* comprising merit and demerit, *does not overtake him,* the knower of Brahman who has this sort of realisation, *but he,* this knower of Brahman, transcends *all evil,* by realising it as his Self. *Evil,* consisting in what has been done or not done, *does not trouble him,* by producing the desired result or generating sin, but *he,* this knower of Brahman, *consumes all evil,* burns it to ashes with the fire of the realisation of the Self

of all. *He,* who knows It as such, *becomes sinless,* i.e. devoid of merit and demerit, *taintless,* i.e. free from desires, *free from doubts, and a Brāhmaṇa* (knower of Brahman), with the firm conviction that he is the Self of all, the Supreme Brahman.

Such a man becomes in this state a Brāhmaṇa (lit. a knower of Brahman) in the primary sense of the word. Before living in this state of identity with Brahman, his Brāhmaṇahood was but figurative. *This* identity with the Self of all *is the world of Brahman,* the world that is Brahman, in a real, not figurative, sense, *O Emperor, and you have attained it,* this world of Brahman, which is fearless, and is described as 'Not this, not this'—*said Yājñavalkya.*

Janaka, thus identified with Brahman—helped on to this state by Yājñavalkya—replied, 'Since you have helped me to attain the state of Brahman, *I give you, sir, the empire of Videha,* the whole of my dominion, *and myself too with it,* i.e. Videha, *to wait upon you* as a servant.' The conjunction 'and' shows that the word 'myself' is connected with the verb 'give.'

The topic of the knowledge of Brahman is finished, together with its offshoots and procedure as well as renunciation. The highest end of man is also completely dealt with. This much is to be attained by a man, this is the culmination, this is the supreme goal, this is the highest good. Attaining this one achieves all that has to be achieved and becomes a knower of Brahman. This is the teaching of the entire Vedas.

स वा एष महानज आत्माऽन्नादो वसुदानः ; विन्दते वसु य एवं वेद ॥ २४ ॥

24. That great, birthless Self is the eater of food and the giver of wealth (the fruits of one's work). He who knows It as such receives wealth (those fruits).

That great, birthless Self which has been expounded in the story of Janaka and Yājñavalkya, *is the eater of* all *food,* living in all beings, *and the giver of wealth,* i.e. the fruits of the actions of all, in other words, he connects all beings with the results of their respective actions. *He who knows It,* this birthless Self that is the eater of food and the giver of 'wealth,' *as such,* as described above, i.e. as endowed with these two attributes, eats food, as the Self of all beings, and *receives wealth,* the entire fruits of everybody's actions, being their very Self. Or the meaning may be, the Self is to be meditated upon as endowed with these attributes even by a man who wants visible results. By that meditation he becomes the eater of food and the receiver of wealth ; that is to say, he is thereby connected with visible results, viz. with the power to eat (plenty of) food and with cows, horses, etc.

स वा एष महानज आत्माजरोऽमरोऽमृतोऽभयो ब्रह्म ; अभयं वै ब्रह्म ; अभयं हि वै ब्रह्म भवति य एवं वेद ॥ २५ ॥
इति चतुर्थं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

25. That great, birthless Self is undecaying, immortal, undying, fearless and Brahman (infinite). Brahman is indeed fearless. He who knows It as such becomes the fearless Brahman.

Now the import of the whole Upaniṣad is being summed up in this paragraph, as much as to say that this is the gist of the entire Upaniṣad. *That great, birthless Self is undecaying,* i.e. It does not wear off ; *immortal,* because It is undecaying. That which is born and decays also dies; but because It is indestructible on account of Its being birthless and undecaying, therefore It is *undying.* That is to say, since It is free from the three changes of condition—birth and so on, It is also free from the other three changes of condition and their effects—desire, work, delusion, etc., which are but forms of death. Hence also It is *fearless :* Since It is possessed of the preceding attributes, It is devoid of fear. Besides, fear is an effect of ignorance ; by the negation of that effect as well as of the six changes of condition, it is understood that ignorance too is negated. What is the fearless Self that is possessed of the above-mentioned attributes? *Brahman,* i.e. vast, or infinite. *Brahman is indeed fearless :* It is a well-known fact. Therefore it is but proper to say that the Self endowed with the above attributes is Brahman.

He who knows It, the Self described above, *as such,* as the fearless Brahman, *becomes the fearless Brahman.* This is the purport of the whole Upániṣad

put in a nutshell. It is to bring home this purport that the ideas of projection, maintenance, dissolution, etc., as well as those of action, its factors and its results were superimposed on the Self. Again, by their negation—by the elimination of the superimposed attributes through a process of 'Not this, not this'—the truth has been made known. Just as, in order to explain the nature of numbers from one up to a hundred thousand billions, a man superimposes them on certain lines (digits), calling one of them one, another ten, another hundred, yet another thousand, and so on,[1] and in so doing he only expounds the nature of numbers but he never says that the numbers *are* the lines ; or just as, in order to teach the alphabet, he has recourse to a combination of leaf,[2] ink, lines, etc., and through them explains the nature of the letters, but he never says that the letters are the leaf, ink, lines, etc., similarly in this exposition the one entity, Brahman, has been inculcated through various means such as the projection (of the universe). Again, to eliminate the differences created by those hypothetical means, the truth has been summed up as 'Not this, not this.' In the end, that knowledge, further clarified so as to be undifferentiated, together with its result, has been concluded in this paragraph.

[1] According to place.
[2] Serving for paper.

SECTION V

In the Madhukāṇḍa, which predominates in scriptural statements, the truth about Brahman has been ascertained. In the chapters relating to Yājñavalkya, which predominate in reasoning, by setting up opposing sides, the same subject has been discussed more by way of a debate. In the fourth chapter, by means of questions and answers between the teacher and his disciple, it has again been discussed at length and brought to a conclusion. Now the present section relating to Maitreyī is being introduced as a conclusion of the proposition regarding the same topic. And this is the method adopted by the authorities on logic, as stated in the following definition, 'The restatement of a proposition after stating the reason is conclusion' (Gau. N. I. i. 39). Or it may be like this: That Self-knowledge together with renunciation which has been described as the means of immortality in the Madhukāṇḍa, is also established as such by argument, for the chapters relating to Yājñavalkya preponderate in that. Therefore it is decided by both scripture and argument that Self-knowledge together with renunciation is the means of immortality. Hence those seekers after immortality who believe in the scriptures should adopt this means, for a thing that is ascertained by the scriptures and reasoning deserves credence on account of its proving universally true. As for the explanation of the words in this section, it is to be understood the

same as in the second chapter. We shall explain only those portions that have not been explained.

अथ ह याज्ञवल्क्यस्य द्वे भार्ये बभूवतुः—मैत्रेयी च कात्यायनी च ; तयोर्ह मैत्रेयी ब्रह्मवादिनी बभूव, स्त्रीप्रज्ञैव तर्हि कात्यायनी ; अथ ह याज्ञवल्क्योऽन्यद्वृत्तमुपाकरिष्यन् ॥ १ ॥

1. Now Yājñavalkya had two wives, Maitreyī and Kātyāyanī. Of these Maitreyī used to discuss Brahman, (while) Kātyāyanī had then an essentially feminine outlook. One day Yājñavalkya, with a view to embracing another life—

The word 'now' (Atha) indicates sequence after the furnishing of reasons, for the preceding portion predominates in reasons. Then in this section relating to Maitreyī, which consists mainly of scriptural statements, the theme put forward in the preceding portion is concluded. The particle 'ha' (meaning, it is said)[1] refers to a past incident. The sage *Yājñavalkya*, it is said, *had two wives :* one was named *Maitreyī, and* the other, *Kātyāyanī. Of these* two wives, *Maitreyī used to discuss Brahman,* (while) *Kātyāyanī had then an essentially feminine outlook,* minding household needs. *One day Yājñavalkya, with a view to embracing*

[1] Omitted in the running translation to avoid clumsiness, as in some other places.

another life from the householder's life that he was then living, i.e. the monastic life[1]—

मैत्रेयीति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः, प्रव्रजिष्यन्वा अरेऽहमस्मात्स्थानादस्मि, हन्त तेऽनया कात्यायन्यान्तं करवाणीति ॥ २ ॥

2. 'Maitreyī, my dear,' said Yājñavalkya, 'I am going to renounce this life for monasticism. Allow me to finish between you and Kātyāyanī.'

He addressed his older wife by name and said, *'I am going to renounce this householder's life for monasticism, O Maitreyī.* Please permit me. *Allow me,* if you wish, *to finish between you and Kātyāyanī.'* All this has been explained.

सा होवाच मैत्रेयी, यन्नु म इयं भगोः सर्वा पृथिवी वित्तेन पूर्णा स्यात्, स्यां न्वहं तेनामृताहो३ नेति; नेति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः, यथैवोपकरणवतां जीवितं तथैव ते जीवितं स्यात्, अमृतत्वस्य तु नाशास्ति वित्तेनेति ॥ ३ ॥

3. Maitreyī said, 'Sir, if indeed this whole earth full of wealth be mine, shall I be immortal through that, or not?' 'No,' replied Yājñavalkya, 'your life will be just like that of people who have plenty of things, but there is no hope of immortality through wealth.'

[1] The sentence is carried over to the next paragraph.

सा होवाच मैत्रेयी, येनाहं नामृता स्यां किमहं तेन कुर्याम्? यदेव भगवान्वेद तदेव मे ब्रूहीति ॥ ४ ॥

4. Then Maitreyī said, 'What shall I do with that which will not make me immortal? Tell me, sir, of that alone which you know (to be the only means of immortality).'

Being thus addressed, *Maitreyī said, 'If indeed this whole earth full of wealth be mine, shall I be immortal through that,* i.e. rites to be performed through wealth, *or not?' 'No,' replied Yājñavalkya,* etc.—already explained.

स होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः, प्रिया वै खलु नो भवती सती प्रियमवृधत्, हन्त तर्हि भवत्येतद्व्याख्यास्यामि ते, व्याचक्षाणस्य तु मे निदिध्यासस्वेति ॥ ५ ॥

5. Yājñavalkya said, 'You have been my beloved (even before), and you have magnified what is after my heart. If you wish, my dear, I will explain it to you. As I explain it, meditate (upon its meaning).'

He said, 'You have been my beloved even before, *and you have magnified* determined *what is after my heart.* Hence I am pleased with you. *If you wish to* know the means of immortality, *my dear, I will explain it to you.'*

स होवाच, न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति। न वा अरे जायायै कामाय जाया प्रिया भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय जाया प्रिया भवति। न वा अरे पुत्राणां

कामाय पुत्राः प्रिया भवन्ति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय पुत्राः प्रिया भवन्ति। न वा अरे वित्तस्य कामाय वित्तं प्रियं भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय वित्तं प्रियं भवति। न वा अरे पशूनां कामाय पशवः प्रिया भवन्ति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय पशवः प्रिया भवन्ति। न वा अरे ब्रह्मणः कामाय ब्रह्म प्रियं भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय ब्रह्म प्रियं भवति। न वा अरे क्षत्रस्य कामाय क्षत्रं प्रियं भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय क्षत्रं प्रियं भवति। न वा अरे लोकानां कामाय लोकाः प्रिया भवन्ति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय लोकाः प्रिया भवन्ति। न वा अरे देवानां कामाय देवाः प्रिया भवन्ति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय देवाः प्रिया भवन्ति। न वा अरे वेदानां कामाय वेदाः प्रिया भवन्ति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय वेदाः प्रिया भवन्ति। न वा अरे भूतानां कामाय भूतानि प्रियाणि भवन्ति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय भूतानि प्रियाणि भवन्ति। न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति। आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः—श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यो मैत्रेयि; आत्मनि खल्वरे दृष्टे श्रुते मते विज्ञात इदं सर्वं विदितम्॥ ६॥

6. He said, 'It is not for the sake of the husband, my dear, that he is loved, but for one's own sake that he is loved. It is not for the sake of the wife, my dear, that she is loved, but for one's own sake that she is loved. It is not for the sake of the sons, my dear, that they are loved, but for one's own sake that they are

loved. It is not for the sake of wealth, my dear, that it is loved, but for one's own sake that it is loved. It is not for the sake of the animals, my dear, that they are loved, but for one's own sake that they are loved. It is not for the sake of the Brāhmaṇa, my dear, that he is loved, but for one's own sake that he is loved. It is not for the sake of the Kṣatriya, my dear, that he is loved, but for one's own sake that he is loved. It is not for the sake of the worlds, my dear, that they are loved, but for one's own sake that they are loved. It is not for the sake of the gods, my dear, that they are loved, but for one's own sake that they are loved. It is not for the sake of the Vedas, my dear, that they are loved, but for one's own sake that they are loved. It is not for the sake of the beings, my dear, that they are loved, but for one's own sake that they are loved. It is not for the sake of all, my dear, that all is loved, but for one's own sake that it is loved. The Self, my dear Maitreyī, should be realised—should be heard of, reflected on and meditated upon. When the Self, my dear, is realised by being heard of, reflected on and meditated upon, all this is known.

When the Self, my dear Maitreyī, is realised. How? *By being* first *heard of* from the teacher and

the scriptures, then *reflected on,* discussed through argument or reasoning—the hearing is from the scriptures (and the teacher) alone, the reflection through reasoning—*and* lastly *meditated upon* (lit. known), ascertained to be such and such and not otherwise. What happens then? *All this* that is other than the Self *is known,* for there is nothing else but the Self.

ब्रह्म तं परादाद्योऽन्यत्रात्मनो ब्रह्म वेद, क्षत्रं तं परादाद्योऽन्यत्रात्मनः क्षत्रं वेद, लोकास्तं परादुर्योऽन्यत्रात्मनो लोकान्वेद, देवास्तं परादुर्योऽन्यत्रात्मनो देवान्वेद, वेदास्तं परादुर्योऽन्यत्रात्मनो वेदान्वेद, भूतानि तं परादुर्योऽन्यत्रात्मनो भूतानि वेद, सर्वं तं परादाद्योऽन्यत्रात्मनः सर्वं वेद ; इदं ब्रह्म, इदं क्षत्रम्, इमे लोकाः, इमे देवाः, इमे वेदाः, इमानि भूतानि, इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा ॥ ७ ॥

7. The Brāhmaṇa ousts one who knows him as different from the Self. The Kṣatriya ousts one who knows him as different from the Self. The worlds oust one who knows them as different from the Self. The gods oust one who knows them as different from the Self. The Vedas oust one who knows them as different from the Self. The beings oust one who knows them as different from the Self. All ousts one who knows it as different from the Self. This Brāhmaṇa, this Kṣatriya, these worlds, these gods, these Vedas, these beings and this all—are the Self.

They oust this person who does not see rightly—bar him from the absolute aloofness of the Self—for his offence of looking on them as different from the Self. This is the idea.

स यथा दुन्दुभेर्हन्यमानस्य न बाह्याञ्छब्दाञ्छक्नुयाद्ग्रहणाय, दुन्दुभेस्तु ग्रहणेन—दुन्दुभ्याघातस्य वा—शब्दो गृहीतः ॥ ८ ॥

8. As when a drum is beaten one cannot distinguish its various particular notes, but they are included in the general note of the drum or in the general sound produced by different kinds of strokes.

स यथा शङ्खस्य ध्मायमानस्य न बाह्याञ्छब्दाञ्छक्नुयाद्ग्रहणाय, शङ्खस्य तु ग्रहणेन—शङ्खध्मस्य वा—शब्दो गृहीतः ॥ ९ ॥

9. As when a conch is blown one cannot distinguish its various particular notes, but they are included in the general note of the conch or in the general sound produced by different kinds of blowing.

स यथा वीणायै वाद्यमानायै न बाह्याञ्छब्दाञ्छक्नुयाद्ग्रहणाय, वीणायै तु ग्रहणेन—वीणावादस्य वा—शब्दो गृहीतः ॥ १० ॥

10. As When a Vīṇā is played on one cannot distinguish its various particular notes, but they are included in the general note of the Vīṇā or

in the general sound produced by different kinds of playing.

स यथार्द्रैधाग्नेरभ्याहितस्य पृथग्धूमा विनिश्चरन्ति, एवं वा अरेऽस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद्यदृग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्वाङ्गिरस इतिहासः पुराणं विद्या उपनिषदः श्लोकाः सूत्राण्यनुव्याख्यानानि व्याख्यानानीष्टं हुतमाशितं पायितम्, अयं च लोकः, परश्च लोकः, सर्वाणि च भूतानि ; अस्यैवैतानि सर्वाणि निःश्वसितानि ॥ ११ ॥

11. As from a fire kindled with wet faggot diverse kinds of smoke issue, even so, my dear, the Ṛg-Veda, Yajur-Veda, Sāma-Veda, Atharvāṅgirasa, history, mythology, arts, Upaniṣads, verses, aphorisms, elucidations, explanations, sacrifices, oblations in the fire, food, drink, this world, the next world, and all beings are all (like) the breath of this infinite Reality. They are (like) the breath of this (Supreme Self).

In the second chapter, by a description of words as the breath of the Supreme Self it has virtually been stated through implication that objects (denoted by words) such as the worlds are also Its breath. Hence they have not been separately mentioned. But since the import of the entire scriptures is being summarised here, it is necessary to make the implied meaning explicit. Hence the worlds and the rest are separately mentioned.

स यथा सर्वासामपां समुद्र एकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां

स्पर्शानां त्वगेकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां गन्धानां नासिके एकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां रसानां जिह्वैकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां रूपाणां चक्षुरेकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां शब्दानां श्रोत्रमेकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां संकल्पानां मन एकायनम्, एवं सर्वासां विद्यानां हृदयमेकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां कर्मणां हस्तावेकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषामानन्दानामुपस्थ एकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां विसर्गाणां पायुरेकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषामध्वनां पादावेकायनम्, एवं सर्वेषां वेदानां वागेकायनम् ॥ १२ ॥

12. As the ocean is the one goal of all sorts of water, as the skin is the one goal of all kinds of touch, as the nostrils are the one goal of all odours, as the tongue is the one goal of all savours, as the eye is the one goal of all colours, as the ear is the one goal of all sounds, as the Manas is the one goal of all deliberations, as the intellect is the one goal of all knowledge, as the hands are the one goal of all sorts of work, as the organ of generation is the one goal of all kinds of enjoyment, as the anus is the one goal of all excretions, as the feet are the one goal of all kinds of motion, as the organ of speech is the one goal of all Vedas.

स यथा सैन्धवघनोऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नो रसघन एव, एवं वा अरेऽयमात्मानन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघन एव ; एतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानुविनश्यति, न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्तीत्यरे ब्रवीमीति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः ॥ १३ ॥

13. As a lump of salt is without interior or exterior, entire, and purely saline in taste, even so is the Self without interior or exterior, entire, and Pure Intelligence alone. (The self) comes out (as a separate entity) from these elements, and (this separateness) is destroyed with them. After attaining (this oneness) it has no more (particular) consciousness. This is what I say, my dear. So said Yājñavalkya.

When through knowledge all the effects have been merged, the one Self remains like a lump of salt, *without interior or exterior, entire, and Pure Intelligence.* Formerly it possessed particular consciousness owing to the particular combinations with the elements. When that particular consciousness and its cause, the combination with the elements, have been dissolved through knowledge—*after attaining* (this oneness) *it has no more* (particular) *consciousness*—this is what Yājñavalkya says.

सा होवाच मैत्रेयी, अत्रैव मा भगवान्मोहान्तमापीपिपत्, न वा अहमिमं विजानामीति ; स होवाच, न वा अरेऽहं मोहं ब्रवीमि, अविनाशी वा अरेऽयमात्मानुच्छित्तिधर्मा ॥ १४ ॥

14. Maitreyī said, 'Just here you have led me into the midst of confusion, sir, I do not at all comprehend this.' He said, 'Certainly I am not saying anything confusing. This

self is indeed immutable and indestructible, my dear.'

She said, 'Just here, in this very thing, i.e. Pure Intelligence, *you have led me into the midst of confusion,* i.e. confounded me, by saying, "After attaining (oneness) it has no more consciousness." Hence *I do not at all comprehend*—clearly understand—*this* Self that you have described.' *He said, 'Certainly I am not saying anything confusing ;* for *this self* that is under consideration *is indeed immutable* (lit. undying) and indestructible, *my dear* Maitreyī.' That is to say, it is not subject to destruction either in the form of change or of extinction.

यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति, तदितर इतरं जिघ्रति, तदितर इतरं रसयते, तदितर इतरमभिवदति, तदितर इतरं शृणोति, तदितर इतरं मनुते, तदितर इतरं स्पृशति, तदितर इतरं विजानाति ; यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्, तत्केन कं पश्येत्, तत्केन कं जिघ्रेत्, तत्केन कं रसयेत्, तत्केन कमभिवदेत्, तत्केन कं शृणुयात्, तत्केन कं मन्वीत, तत्केन कं स्पृशेत्, तत्केन कं विजानीयात्? येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात्? स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा, अगृह्यो न हि गृह्यते, अशीर्यो न हि शीर्यते, असङ्गो न हि सज्यते, असितो न व्यथते, न रिष्यति ; विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात्, इत्युक्तानुशासनासि मैत्रेयि, एतावदरे खल्वमृतत्वमिति होक्त्वा याज्ञवल्क्यो विजहार ॥ १५ ॥

इति पञ्चमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

15. Because when there is duality, as it were, then one sees something, one smells something, one tastes something, one speaks something, one hears something, one thinks something, one touches something, one knows something. But when to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should one see and through what, what should one smell and through what, what should one taste and through what, what should one speak and through what, what should one hear and through what, what should one think and through what, what should one touch and through what, what should one know and through what? Through what should one know that owing to which all this is known? This self is That which has been described as 'Not this, not this.' It is imperceptible, for It is never perceived; undecaying, for It never decays; unattached, for It is never attached; unfettered—it never feels pain, and never suffers injury. Through what, O Maitreyī, should one know the Knower? So you have got the instruction, Maitreyī. This much indeed is (the means of) immortality, my dear. Saying this Yājñavalkya left.

In all the four chapters one and the same self has been ascertained to be the Supreme Brahman. But the

means to Its attainment are various. The goal of all of them, however, is that Self which has been pointed out in the second chapter in the words, 'Now therefore the description: Not this, not this' (II. iii. 6). The same has also been ascertained in the third chapter, in the dialogue between Śākalya and Yājñavalkya, where death (the falling off of the head) was mentioned as the wager; then at the end of the third chapter, next in the dialogue between Janaka and Yājñavalkya, and again here at the conclusion of the Upaniṣad. In order to show that all the four chapters are exclusively devoted to this Self, and that no other meaning is intended in between, the conclusion has been made with the words, 'This self is That which has been described as "Not this, not this," ' etc.

Since, in spite of the truth being presented in a hundred ways, the Self is the last word of it all, arrived at by the process of 'Not this, not this,' and nothing else is perceived either through reasoning or through scriptural statement, therefore the knowledge of this Self by the process of 'Not this, not this' and the renunciation of everything are the only means of attaining immortality. To bring out this conclusion the text says: *This much indeed*—this realisation of the Self, the one without a second, by the eliminating process of 'Not this, not this,' *is* (the means of) *immortality, my dear* Maitreyī, and this is independent of any auxiliary means. That of which you asked me saying, 'Tell me, sir, of that alone which you know (to be the only means of immortality),' is just this much. So you have

known it. *Saying this,* describing this Self-knowledge, the means of immortality, to his beloved wife Maitreyī, *Yājñavalkya*—what did he do?—did what he had first proposed saying, 'I am going to renounce this life'—*left,* i.e. became a monk. The discussion of the knowledge of Brahman, culminating in renunciation, is finished. This much is the instruction, this is the teaching of the Vedas, this is the ultimate goal, this is the end of what a man should do to achieve his highest good.

Now we are going to have a discussion in order to get a clear conception of the meaning of the scriptures, for we see various conflicting statements in them. For instance, the following texts indicate that there is only one order of life (the householder's): 'One should perform the Agnihotra for life' (Ba.), 'One should perform the new and full moon sacrifices for life' (Ibid.), 'One should wish to live a hundred years on earth only performing rites' (Īś. 2), 'This Agnihotra is a sacrifice that must be continued till decay and death come' (Ś. XII. iv. ii. 1), and so on. There are also statements establishing another order of life (monasticism): 'Knowing (the Self) . . . they give up desires . . . and renounce their homes,'[1] 'After finishing the student life he should be a householder, from that he should pass on to the life of a hermit in the forest, and then become a monk. Or he may do otherwise—he should renounce the world from the student

[1] Adapted from III. v. 1 and IV. iv. 22.

life itself, or from the householder's life, or from the hermit life' (Np. 77 ; Jā. 4, adapted), 'There are but two outstanding paths—first the path of rites, and next monasticism ; of these the latter excels' (cf. Tai. Ā. X. lxii. 12), and 'Neither through rites, nor through progeny, nor through wealth, but through renunciation some attained immortality' (Mn. X. 5 ; Kai. 2). Similarly the Smṛtis: 'One who leads the student life renounces' (Āp. II. xxi. 8, 19), 'One who leads a perfectly celibate life may enter into any order of life' (Va. VIII. 2), 'Some say he has an option of choosing his order of life' (Gau. III. 1); also, 'After studying the Vedas as a student, he should seek to have sons and grandsons to purify his ancestors. Lighting the sacred fires and making sacrifices according to the injunctions, he should retire into the forest and then seek to become a monk' (Mbh. XII. clxxiv. 6), 'The Brāhmaṇa, after performing the sacrifice to Prajāpati and giving all his wealth to the priests as remuneration, should place the fires within himself and renounce his home' (M. VI. 38), and so on.

Thus hundreds of contradictory passages from the Śrutis and Smṛtis are found, inculcating an option with regard to renunciation, or a succession among the orders of life, or the adoption of any one of them at will. The conduct of those who are versed in these scriptures has also been mutually conflicting. And there is disagreement even among great scholars who understand the meaning of the scriptures. Hence it is impossible for persons of shallow understanding clearly to grasp the meaning of the scriptures. It is only those

who have a firm hold on the scriptures and logic, that can distinguish the particular meaning of any of those passages from that of the others. Therefore, in order to indicate their exact meaning, we shall discuss them according to our understanding.

Prima facie view: The Vedas inculcate only rites, for the Śruti passages such as, '(One should perform the Agnihotra) for life' (Ba.), admit of no other meaning. The Śruti speaks of the last rite of a man in these terms, 'They burn him with the sacrificial vessels.' There is also the statement about the rites being continued till decay and death come. Besides there is this hint, '(This) body, reduced to ashes,' etc. (V. xv. 1 ; Īś. 17). If he were a monk, his body should not be reduced to ashes. The Smṛti also says, 'He alone should be considered entitled to the study of these scriptures, whose rites from conception to the funeral ground are performed with the utterance of sacred formulæ, and no one else' (M. II. 16). The rites that are enjoined by the Vedas to be performed in this life with the utterance of sacred formulæ, are shown by the Smṛti to terminate only on the funeral ground. And because a man who does not perform those rites is not entitled (to the study of the Smṛtis), he is absolutely debarred from having any right to the study of the Vedas. Besides, it is forbidden to extinguish the sacred fire, as in the passage, 'He who extinguishes the sacred fire destroys the power of the gods' (Tai. S. I. v. ii. 1).

Question: Since renunciation etc. are also enjoined, is not the import of the Vedas as inculcating rites only optional?

The opponent's answer: No, for the Śruti texts inculcating renunciation etc. have a different meaning. To be explicit: Since such Śruti texts as, 'One should perform the Agnihotra for life' (Ba.), 'One should perform the new and full moon sacrifices for life' (Ibid.), make such rites depend on life itself, and for that reason cannot be interpreted differently, whereas the passages inculcating renunciation etc. are applicable to those who are unfit for rites, therefore there is no option (with regard to the meaning of the Vedas as inculcating rites). Besides, since the Śruti says, 'One should wish to live a hundred years on earth only performing rites' (Īś. 2), and the passage, 'One is absolved (from rites) either by extreme old age or by death' (Ś. XII. IV. i. 1), leaves no room for the ritualist to quit the rites except in the event of extreme old age or death, the injunction regarding their being continued in these cases up to the funeral ground, is not optional. Moreover, the blind, the hump-backed, and so forth, who are unfit for rites, surely deserve the compassion of the Śruti; hence the injunction about other orders of life such as monasticism are not out of place (as being applicable to them).

Question: But there will be no room for the injunction regarding the sequence of monasticism.

The opponent's answer: Not so, for the Viśvajit and Sarvamedha sacrifices will be an excep-

tion[1] to the rule about the lifelong performance of sacrifices. In other words, these two sacrifices are the only exceptions to the injunction about the lifelong performance of sacrifices, and the succession referred to in the passage, 'After finishing the student life he should be a householder, from that he should pass on to the life of a hermit in the forest, and then become a monk' (Np. 77 ; Jā. 4, adapted), is applicable to these cases. There will thus be no contradiction. That is to say, if the injunction relating to the sequence of monasticism applies to such cases, then there is no contradiction, for the sequence holds good. But if it is regarded as applicable to other cases, the injunction about the lifelong performance of sacrifices is restricted in its scope. Whereas, if the sequence is applicable to the Viśvajit and Sarvamedha sacrifices, there is no such contradiction.

The Advaitin's reply: Your view is wrong, for you have admitted Self-knowledge to be the means of immortality. To be explicit: You have admitted the Self-knowledge that has been introduced with the words, 'The Self alone is to be meditated upon' (I iv. 7), and concluded with, 'This self is That which has been described as "Not this, not this," ' (III. ix. 26). So you are only reluctant to admit that this much alone is the means of immortality, independ-

[1] Because one has to part with all one's wealth in them. Hence any more performance of sacrifices would be impossible for want of wealth. These persons alone are then entitled to monasticism etc.

ently of anything else. Now I ask you why you are intolerant of Self-knowledge.

Objection : Here is my reason. As, to a person who wants heaven, but does not know the means of its attainment, the Vedas inculcate such means as the Agnihotra, so here also, to one who wants to attain immortality, but does not know the means of it, they inculcate the instruction desired—'Tell me, sir, of that alone which you know (to be the only means of immortality, (II. iv. 3 ; IV. v. 4)—in the words, 'This much . . . my dear' (IV. v. 15).

Reply : In that case, just as you admit the Agnihotra etc., inculcated by the Vedas, to be the means of attaining heaven, so also you should do with Self-knowledge. You should admit it to be the means of immortality exactly as it is inculcated, for in either case the authority is the same.

Objection : What would happen if it is admitted?

Reply : Since Self-knowledge destroys the cause of all actions, the awakening of knowledge would terminate them. Now rites such as the Agnihotra, which are connected with the wife and fire, can be performed only if there are agencies for whom they are meant, and this entails an idea of difference. In other words, they cannot be performed unless there are the gods—Fire, etc.—for whose sake they are undertaken, and this last depends on the sacrificer's regarding the gods as different from himself. That notion of difference regarding the deities to be honoured, in view of which such deities are recommended by the Vedas as means to sacrifices, is destroyed in the state of enlightenment by knowledge, as we know from

such Śruti passages as, 'He (who worships another god thinking), "He is one, and I am another," does not know' (I. iv. 10), 'The gods oust one who knows them as different from the Self' (II. iv. 6 ; IV. v. 7), 'He goes from death to death who sees difference, as it were, in It' (IV. iv. 19; Ka. IV. 10), 'It should be realised in one form only' (IV. iv. 20), and 'He sees all as the Self' (IV. iv. 23). Nor is Self-knowledge dependent on place, time, circumstances, etc., for it relates to the Self, which is an eternal verity. It is rites which, being bound up with persons (i.e. subjective), may depend on place, time, circumstances, etc.; but knowledge, being bound up with reality (i.e. objective), never depends on them. As fire is hot, and as the ether is formless (independently of place, time, etc.), so also is Self-knowledge.

Objection : If this is so, the Vedic injunctions about rites, which are an unquestionable authority, are nullified ; and of two things possessing equal authority, one should not nullify the other.

Reply : Not so, for Self-knowledge only destroys one's natural idea of difference. It does not nullify other injunctions ; it only stops the idea of difference ingrained in us.

Objection : Still, when the cause of rites is removed, they are impossible, and it virtually means that the injunctions regarding them are gone.

Reply : No, it is not open to the charge, for it is analogous to the cessation of our tendency to perform rites having material ends, when desire itself has been removed. Just as a man, induced to perform a

sacrifice leading to heaven by the injunction, 'One who desires heaven must perform sacrifices' (Tā. XVI. iii. 3), gives up his inclination to perform this kind of sacrifice with a material end when his desire has been removed by the injunctions forbidding desires. His action does not nullify the injunctions regarding rites with material ends.

Objection: The injunction forbidding desires leads to an impression about the uselessness of them, and consequently the injunctions advocating rites with material ends cannot operate. So these injunctions are virtually nullified.

Reply: If Self-knowledge nullifies the injunctions about rites in the same way, we admit this.

Objection: But this would take away the authority of the injunctions about rites, just as the injunctions about rites with material ends are null and void when desire is forbidden. In other words, if rites are not to be undertaken, with the result that there is no one to perform them, then the injunctions about their performance become useless, and consequently the whole section of the Vedas dealing with such injunctions necessarily loses its authority.

Reply: No, it will be operative prior to the awakening of Self-knowledge. Our natural consciousness of difference regarding action, its factors and its results, will, previous to the awakening of Self-knowledge, certainly continue to be an incentive to the performance of rites, just as, before the idea about the harmful nature of desires arises, our natural craving for heaven etc. will certainly induce us to engage in rites having material ends.

Objection : In that case the Vedas are a source of evil.

Reply : No, good and evil depend on one's intentions, for except liberation alone everything else comes within the province of ignorance. Good and evil are matters of personal whims, for we find that sacrifices are performed with death as their objective.[1] Therefore the injunctions about rites are operative only until one is confronted with those about Self-knowledge. Hence rites do not go hand in hand with Self-knowledge, which proves that this alone is the means of immortality, as set forth in the words, 'This much indeed is (the means of) immortality, my dear' (IV. v. 15), for knowledge is independent of rites. Hence, even without any explicit injunction to that effect, the enlightened sage can, for reasons already stated,[2] embrace the monastic life simply through his strong conviction about the identity of the individual self with Brahman that is devoid of the factors of an action such as the deity to whom it is performed as well as caste etc., and is immutable.

Since the ancient sages, not caring for children, renounced their homes on the ground stated in the clause, 'We who have attained this Self, this world' (IV. iv. 22), therefore, as it has been explained, this renunciation of their homes by the sages can take place simply by their knowing[3] the world of the Self.

[1] The Mahābhārata tells of King Yudhiṣṭhira's performing a sacrifice in advance concerning 'the great exit.'

[2] In IV. iv. 23.

[3] That is, indirectly, from the teacher and the scriptures ; direct realisation is not meant.

Similarly it is proved that the man who seeks illumination can also renounce the world, for there is the statement, 'Desiring this world alone monks renounce their homes' (Ibid.). And we have said that rites are for the unenlightened. That is to say, because so long as ignorance persists there is scope for rites intended to produce, attain, modify, or purify, therefore rites, as we have stated, are also the means of Self-knowledge through the purification of the mind, as the Śruti says that the Brāhmaṇas seek to know It through sacrifices, etc.

Under the circumstances, if we examine the comparative efficacy, for bringing forth Self-knowledge, of the duties pertaining to the different orders of life, which concern only the unenlightened, we find that virtues such as the absence of pride which are mainly intended for the control of the senses, and meditation, discrimination, non-attachment, etc., which deal with the mind, are the direct aids. The others, owing to the predominance of injury, attachment, aversion, etc. in them, are mixed up with a good deal of evil work. Hence the monastic life is recommended for seekers after liberation, as in the following passages, 'The giving up of all duties that have been described (as belonging to particular orders of life) is (best). Renunciation, again, is the culmination of this giving up of the duties,' 'O Brāhmaṇa, what will you do with wealth, or friends, or a wife, for you shall have to die? Seek the Self that has entered the cave of your intellect. Where are your grandfather and other ancestors gone, as well as your father?' (Mbh. XII. clxxiv. 38). In

the Sāṁkhya and Yoga systems also renunciation is spoken of as a direct means of knowledge. The absence of the impulsion of desire is another reason (why the seeker after liberation renounces the world). For all the scriptures tell us that the impulsion of desire is antagonistic to knowledge. Therefore, for a seeker after liberation who is disgusted with the world, the statement, 'He should renounce the world from the student life itself,' etc. (Np. 77), is quite reasonable, even if he is without knowledge.

Objection : But we have said that renunciation is for the man who is unfit for rites, for there alone is the scope for them ; otherwise the dictum of the Śruti about the lifelong performance of rites would be contradicted.

Reply : The objection does not hold, for there is enough scope for those statements of the Śruti. We have already (p. 758) said that all rites are for the unenlightened man with desire. It is not absolutely that rites are enjoined for life. For men are generally full of desires, which concern various objects and require the help of many rites and their means. The Vedic rites are the means of various results and are to be performed by a man related to a wife and the fire ; they produce many results, being performed again and again, like agriculture etc., and take a hundred years to finish, either in the householder's life or in the forest life. Hence in view of them the Śruti texts enjoin lifelong rites. The Mantra also says, 'One should wish to live a hundred years on earth only performing rites'

(Īś. 2). The giving up of rites after the Viśvajit and Sarvamedha sacrifices refers to such a man ; while in the case of those on whom lifelong rites are enjoined, these should be continued right up to the funeral ground, and the body consumed in fire. Or it may be that the injunctions of the Śruti about the lifelong performance of rites concern the other two castes except the Brāhmaṇa, for the Ksatriya and the Vaiśya are not entitled to the monastic life. In that case, texts such as, 'Whose rites . . . are performed with the utterance of sacred formulæ' (M. II. 16), and 'The teachers speak of only one order of life,' etc. (Gau. III. 36 ; Bau. II. vi. 29), would refer to the Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas. Therefore in accordance with a person's capacity, knowledge, non-attachment, desire, etc., the various methods of an option with regard to renunciation, or a succession among the orders of life, or the embracing of the monastic life are not contradictory. And since monasticism has been separately enjoined on those who are unfit for rites, in the passage, 'Whether he has completed his course of study or not, whether he has discarded[1] the fire or been released[2] from it,' etc. (Jā. 4), (the above injunctions about monasticism refer to normal people qualified for rites). Therefore it is proved that the other three orders of life (besides the householder's life) are surely meant for those who are qualified for rites.

[1] Wilfully, even when his wife is living.

[2] By the scriptures, on the death of his wife.

SECTION VI

अथः वंशः—पौतिमाष्यो गौपवनात्, गौपवनः पौतिमाष्यात्, पौतिमाष्यो गौपवनात्, गौपवनः कौशिकात्, कौशिकः कौण्डिन्यात्, कौण्डिन्यः शाण्डिल्यात्, शाण्डिल्यः कौशिकाच्च गौतमाच्च, गौतमः ॥ १ ॥

1. Now the line of teachers: Pautimāṣya (received it) from Gaupavana. Gaupavana from another Pautimāṣya. This Pautimāṣya from another Gaupavana. This Gaupavana from Kauśika. Kauśika from Kauṇḍinya. Kauṇḍinya from Śāṇḍilya. Śāṇḍilya from Kauśika and Gautama. Gautama—

आग्निवेश्यात्, आग्निवेश्यो गार्ग्यात्, गार्ग्यो गार्ग्यात्, गार्ग्यो गौतमात्, गौतमः सैतवात्, सैतवः पाराशर्यायणात्, पाराशर्यायणो गार्ग्यायणात्, गार्ग्यायण उद्दालकायनात्, उद्दालकायनो जाबालायनात्, जाबालायनो माध्यन्दिनायनात्, माध्यन्दिनायनः सौकरायणात्, सौकरायणः काषायणात्, काषायणः सायकायनात, सायकायनः कौशिकायनेः, कौशिकायनिः ॥ २ ॥

2. From Āgniveśya. Āgniveśya from Gārgya. Gārgya from another Gārgya. This Gārgya from another Gautama. This Gautama from Saitava. Saitava from Pārāśaryāyaṇa. Pārāśaryāyaṇa from Gārgyāyaṇa. Gārgyāyaṇa

from Uddālakāyana. Uddālakāyana from Jābālāyana. Jābālāyana from Mādhyandināyana. Mādhyandināyana from Saukarāyaṇa. Saukarāyaṇa from Kāṣāyaṇa. Kāṣāyaṇa from Sāyakāyana. Sāyakāyana from Kauśikāyani. Kauśikāyani—

घृतकौशिकात्, घृतकौशिकः पाराशर्यायणात्, पाराशर्यायणः पाराशर्यात्, पाराशर्यो जातूकर्ण्यात्, जातूकर्ण्य आसुरायणाच्च यास्काच्च, आसुरायणस्त्रैवणेः, त्रैवणिरौपजन्धनेः, औपजन्धनिरासुरेः, आसुरिर्भारद्वाजात्, भारद्वाज आत्रेयात्, आत्रेयो माण्टेः, माण्टिर्गौतमात्, गौतमो गौतमात्, गौतमो वात्स्यात्, वात्स्यः शाण्डिल्यात्, शाण्डिल्यः कैशोर्यात्काप्यात्, कैशोर्यः काप्यः कुमारहारितात्, कुमारहारितो गालवात्, गालवो विदर्भीकौण्डिन्यात्, विदर्भीकौण्डिन्यो वत्सनपातो बाभ्रवात्, वत्सनपाद्बाभ्रवः पथः सौभरात्, पन्थाः सौभरोऽयास्यादाङ्गिरसात्, अयास्य आङ्गिरस आभूतेस्त्वाष्ट्रात्, आभूतिस्त्वाष्ट्रो विश्वरूपात्त्वाष्ट्रात्, विश्वरूपस्त्वाष्ट्रोऽश्विभ्याम्, अश्विनौ दधीच आथर्वणात्, दध्यङ्ङाथर्वणोऽथर्वणो दैवात्, अथर्वा दैवो मृत्योः प्राध्वंसनात्, मृत्युः प्राध्वंसनः प्रध्वंसनात्, प्रध्वंसन एकर्षेः, एकर्षिर्विप्रचित्तेः, विप्रचित्तिर्व्यष्टेः, व्यष्टिः सनारोः, सनारुः सनातनात्, सनातनः सनगात्, सनगः परमेष्ठिनः, परमेष्ठी ब्रह्मणः ; ब्रह्म स्वयंभु, ब्रह्मणे नमः ॥ ३ ॥ इति षष्ठं ब्राह्मणम् ॥
इति चतुर्थोऽध्यायः ॥

3. From Ghṛtakauśika. Ghṛtakauśika from Pārāśaryāyaṇa. Pārāśaryāyaṇa from Pārāśarya. Pārāśarya from Jātūkarṇya. Jātūkarṇya from Âsurāyaṇa and Yāska. Âsurāyaṇa from Traivaṇi. Traivaṇi from Aupajandhani. Aupajandhani from Āsuri. Āsuri from Bhāradvāja. Bhāradvāja from Ātreya. Ātreya from Māṇṭi. Māṇṭi from Gautama. Gautama from another Gautama. This Gautama from Vātsya. Vātsya from Śāṇḍilya. Śāṇḍilya from Kaiśorya Kāpya. Kaiśorya Kāpya from Kumārahārita. Kumārahārita from Gālava. Gālava from Vidarbhīkauṇḍinya. He from Vatsanapāt Bābhrava. He from Pathin Saubhara. He from Ayāsya Āṅgirasa. He from Ābhūti Tvāṣṭra. He from Viśvarūpa Tvāṣṭra. He from the two Aśvins. The Aśvins from Dadhyac Ātharvaṇa. He from Atharvan Daiva. He from Mṛtyu Prādhvaṁsana. He from Pradhvaṁsana. Pradhvaṁsana from Ekarṣi. Ekarṣi from Viprachitti. Viprachitti from Vyaṣṭi. Vyaṣṭi from Sanāru. Sanāru from Sanātana. Sanātana from Sanaga. Sanaga from Parameṣṭhin (Virāj). Parameṣṭhin from Brahman (Hiraṇyagarbha). Brahman is self-born. Salutation to Brahman!

Now the line of teachers for the two chapters relating to Yājñavalkya is being enumerated, like that

of the Madhukāṇḍa. The explanation is the same as before. *Brahman is self-born. Salutation to Brahman!* Om.

CHAPTER V

SECTION I

ॐ । पूर्णमदः पूर्णमिदं पूर्णात्पूर्णमुदच्यते ।
पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ॥

ॐ खं ब्रह्म । खं पुराणम्, वायुरं खमिति ह स्माह कौरव्यायणीपुत्रः; वेदोऽयं ब्राह्मणा विदुः; वेदैनेन यद्वेदितव्यम् ॥ १ ॥ इति प्रथमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

1. Om. That (Brahman) is infinite, and this (universe) is infinite. The infinite proceeds from the infinite. (Then) taking the infinitude of the infinite (universe), it remains as the infinite (Brahman) alone.

Om is the ether-Brahman—the eternal ether. 'The ether containing air,' says the son of Kauravyāyaṇī. It is the Veda, (so) the Brāhmaṇas (knowers of Brahman) know; (for) through it one knows what is to be known.

The supplement to the Upaniṣad is being introduced with the words, 'That is infinite,' etc. That Brahman which is immediate and direct, the Self that is within all, unconditioned, beyond hunger etc., and is described as 'Not this, not this,' and the realisation of which is the sole means of immortality, has been presented in the last four chapters. Now certain

meditations, not mentioned before, of that same Self as conditioned and coming within the scope of words, their meanings, and so on—meditations that do not clash with rites, lead to great prosperity, and take one through a gradual process of liberation, have to be mentioned ; hence the present chapter. It is also the intention of the Śruti to enjoin the meditation on Om as forming a part of all other meditations, and the practice of self-control, charity and compassion.

That is infinite, not limited by anything, i.e. all-pervading. The suffix 'kta' in the word 'Pūrṇa' (lit. complete) has a subjective force. 'That' is a pronoun denoting something remote ; it means the Supreme Brahman. It is complete, all-pervading like the ether, without a break, and unconditioned. So also is *this* conditioned Brahman, manifesting through name and form and coming within the scope of relativity (the universe), *infinite* or all-pervading indeed in its real form as the Supreme Self, not in its differentiated form circumscribed by the limiting adjuncts. This differentiated Brahman, the effect, *proceeds* or emanates *from the infinite,* or Brahman as cause. Although it emanates as an effect, it does not give up *its nature, infinitude,* the state of the Supreme Self ; it emanates as but the infinite. *Taking the infinitude of the infinite,* or Brahman as effect, i.e. attaining perfect unity with its own nature by removing through knowledge its apparent otherness that is created by ignorance through the contact of limiting adjuncts, the elements; *it remains as the* unconditioned *infinite*

Brahman *alone,* without interior or exterior, the homogeneous Pure Intelligence.

What has been said before, viz. 'This (self) was indeed Brahman in the beginning. It knew only Itself. Therefore It became all' (I. iv. 10), is the explanation of this Mantra. 'Brahman' in that sentence is the same as, 'That is infinite'; and 'This is infinite' means, 'This (universe) was indeed Brahman in the beginning.' Similarly another Śruti says, 'Whatever is here is there, and whatever is there is here' (Ka. IV. 10). Hence the 'Infinite,' denoted by the word 'That,' is Brahman. That again is 'this infinite' (universe)—Brahman manifested as effect, connected with the limiting adjuncts of name and form, projected by ignorance, and appearing as different from that real nature of its own. Then knowing itself as the supreme, infinite Brahman, so as to feel, 'I am that infinite Brahman,' and thus taking its infinitude, i.e. removing by means of this knowledge of Brahman its own limitation created by ignorance through the contact of the limiting adjuncts of name and form, it remains as the unconditioned infinite alone. So it has been said, 'Therefore It became all.'

Brahman, which is the theme of all the Upaniṣads, is described once more in this Mantra to introduce what follows; for certain aids, to be presently mentioned, viz. Om, self-restraint, charity and compassion, have to be enjoined as steps to the knowledge of Brahman—aids that, occurring in this supplementary portion, form part of all meditations.

Some[1] explain the Mantra thus: From the infinite cause the infinite effect is manifested. The manifested effect is also infinite or real at the present moment, even in its dualistic form. Again, at the time of dissolution, taking the infinitude of the infinite effect into itself, the infinite, causal form alone remains. Thus in all the three stages of origin, continuance and dissolution, the cause and the effect are infinite. It is just one infinity spoken of as divided into cause and effect. Thus the same Brahman is both dual and monistic. For instance, an ocean consists of water, waves, foam, bubbles, etc. As the water is real, so also are its effects, the waves, foam, bubbles, etc.—which appear and disappear, but are a part and parcel of the ocean itself—real in the true sense of the word. Similarly the entire dual universe, corresponding to the waves etc. on the water, are absolutely real, while the Supreme Brahman stands for the ocean water. If the universe is thus real, the ceremonial portion of the Vedas is also valid. If, however, the dual world is but apparently so—if it be a creation of ignorance, false like a mirage—and is in reality the one without a second, then the ceremonial portion, having nothing to work upon, becomes invalid. This would only mean a conflict, for one portion of the Vedas, viz. the Upaniṣads, would be valid, since they deal with the Reality, the one without a second, but the ceremonial portion would be invalid, since it deals with duality, which is unreal. To avoid this conflict, the Śruti

[1] The reference is to Bhartṛprapañca.

speaks of the reality of both cause and effect, like that of the ocean, in the Mantra, 'That is infinite,' etc.

All this is wrong, for neither an exception nor an option—which are applicable to qualified objects—is possible with Brahman. It is not a well-considered view. Why? Because an exception can be made with regard to some part of an action, where the general rule would otherwise apply. For example, in the dictum, 'Killing no animal except in sacrifices,' (Ch. VIII. xv. 1), the killing of animals prohibited by the general rule is allowed in a special case, viz. a sacrifice such as the Jyotiṣṭoma. But that will not apply to Brahman, the Reality. You cannot establish Brahman, the one without a second, by the general rule, and then make an exception in one part of It ; for It cannot have any part, simply because It is the one without a second. Similarly an option also is inadmissible. For example, in the injunctions, 'One should use the vessel Ṣoḍaśī in the Atirātra sacrifice,' and 'One should not use the vessel Ṣoḍaśī in the Atirātra sacrifice,' an option is possible, as using or not using the vessel depends on a person's choice. But with regard to Brahman, the Reality, there cannot be any option about Its being either dual or monistic, for the Self is not a matter depending on a person's choice. Besides there is a contradiction involved in the same thing being both one and many. Therefore this is not, as we said, a well-considered view.

Moreover, it contradicts the Śruti as well as reason. For instance, Śruti passages that describe Brahman as Pure Intelligence, homogeneous like a

lump of salt, without a break, devoid of such differences as prior or posterior, interior or exterior, including the external and internal, birthless, 'Not this, not this,' neither gross nor minute, not short, undecaying, fearless and immortal—passages that are definite in their import and leave no room for doubt or mistake—would all be thrown overboard as mere trash. Similarly it would clash with reason, for a thing that has parts, is made up of many things and has activity, cannot be eternal ; whereas the eternity of the Self is inferred from remembrance etc.—which will be contradicted if the Self be transitory. Your own assumption[1] too will be useless, for if the Self be transitory, the ceremonial portion of the Vedas will clearly be useless, since it will mean that a man will be getting the reward for something he has not done, and be deprived of the reward for what he has actually done.

Objection : There are the illustrations of the ocean etc. to show the unity and plurality of Brahman. So how do you say that the same thing cannot be both one and many?

Reply : Not so, for they refer to something quite different. We have said that unity and plurality are contradictory only when applied to the Self, which is eternal and without parts, but not to effects, which have parts. Therefore your view is untenable as it contradicts the Śruti, the Smṛti[2] and reason. Rather than accept this, it is better to abandon the Upaniṣads.

[1] About the validity of the ceremonial portion of the Vedas.

[2] This has not been particularly touched upon here.

Besides, your view is not in accordance with the scriptures, for such a Brahman is not fit for meditation. A Brahman that is teeming with differences comprising thousands of evils in the shape of births, deaths, etc., has parts like an ocean, a forest, and so forth, and is heterogeneous, has never been presented by the Śrutis either as an object of meditation or as a truth to be realised. Rather they teach Its being Pure Intelligence ; also, 'It should be realised in one form only' (IV. iv. 20). There is also the censure on seeing It as multiple: 'He goes from death to death who sees difference, as it were, in It' (IV. iv. 19 ; Ka. IV. 10). What is deprecated by the Śrutis is not to be practised; and that which is not practised (as being forbidden) cannot be the import of the scriptures. Since the multiple aspect of Brahman, in which It is regarded as heterogeneous and manifold is condemned, it is not to be sought after with a view to realisation ; hence it cannot be the import of the scriptures. But the homogeneity of Brahman is what is to be sought after, and is therefore good, and for that reason it ought to be the import of the scriptures.

You said that one part of the Vedas would be invalid in the sphere of ceremonials because of the absence of the dual world, while another part would be valid in the realm of unity. This is wrong, for the scriptures seek to instruct merely according to existing circumstances. They do not teach a man, as soon as he is born, either the duality or the unity of existence, and then instruct him about rites or the knowledge of Brahman. Nor does duality require to be taught ; it

is understood by everyone as soon as he is born ; and nobody thinks from the very outset that duality is false, in which case the scriptures would first have to teach the reality of the dual world and then establish their own validity. (The unreality of the universe is no bar to the validity of the scriptures, for) even the disciples of those who deny the Vedas (and do not believe in an objective universe)[1] would not hesitate to accept the authority of their scriptures when they are directed (to do something helpful in accordance with them) by their teachers. Therefore the scriptures, taking the dualistic world as it is—created by ignorance and natural to everybody—first advise the performance of rites calculated to achieve the desired ends to those who are possessed of that natural ignorance and defects such as attachment and aversion ; afterwards, when they see the well-known evils of actions, their factors and their results, and wish to attain their real state of aloofness, which is the opposite of duality, the scriptures teach them, as a means to it, the knowledge of Brahman, consisting in the realisation of the unity of the Self. So when they have attained that result—their real state of aloofness, their interest in the validity of the scriptures ceases. And in the absence of that the scriptures too just cease to be scriptures to them. Hence, the scriptures having similarly fulfilled their mission with regard to every person, there is not the least chance of a conflict with them ; for such dualistic

[1] Certain schools of Buddhism, for instance. Even they would act up to such teachings of their scriptures as, 'Those who desire heaven should worship sepulchres of Buddhist saints.'

differences as scripture, disciple and discipline terminate with the knowledge of unity. If any of these survived the others, there might be a conflict with regard to it. But since scripture, disciple and discipline are interdependent, not one of them survives the rest ; and when all duality is over, and only unity, the one without a second, the Good, alone stands, with whom is conflict apprehended? Hence also there is no non-contradiction either.

Even taking your position for granted, we have to say that it is useless, for even if Brahman be both one and many, there will be the same conflict with the scriptures. That is to say, supposing we admit that the same Brahman has both unity and plurality like the ocean etc., and that there is no other thing, even then we cannot escape the charge of a conflict with the scriptures that you have levelled against us. How? For one and the same Supreme Brahman has both unity and plurality ; being beyond grief, delusion, etc., It would not seek instruction ; nor would the teacher be different from Brahman, for you have admitted the same Brahman to be both one and many. If you say, since the dual world is manifold, one can teach another, and it will not be instruction imparted to or by Brahman, we reply that you contradict your own statement that Brahman in Its twofold aspect of unity and plurality is one and the same, and that there is nothing else. Since that world of duality in which one teaches another is one thing, and unity[1] is of

[1] 'Advaitam': This seems to be the correct reading, and not 'Dvaitam.'

course another thing, your example of the ocean is inappropriate. Nor can we presume that Brahman, if It is one consciousness, as the ocean is one mass of water, will either receive instruction from, or instruct, anyone else. If Devadatta is both one and manifold, consisting of the hands etc., it is absurd to think that between his tongue and ear—both parts of him—the tongue will instruct and the ear only receive the instruction, while Devadatta himself will neither instruct nor receive any instruction ; for he has only one consciousness, as the ocean is made up of the same volume of water. Therefore such an assumption will clash with the Śruti and reason, and frustrate your own object. Hence our interpretation of the Mantra, 'That is infinite,' etc., is the correct one.

Om is the ether-Brahman, is a Mantra. No direction for its use has been given elsewhere ; the Brāhmaṇa here directs that it is to be used in meditation. 'Brahman' in this Mantra is the entity specified, and 'ether' is its description. In the term 'ether-Brahman' the entity specified and the description are co-ordinate, as in the expression, 'A blue lotus.' The word 'Brahman' without any qualifying word would mean any vast object ; hence it is specified as the 'ether-Brahman.' The ether-Brahman is either the import of the word 'Om,' or identical with it. In either case the co-ordinate relation holds good.

Here the word 'Om' is used to serve as a means to the meditation on Brahman. As other Śrutis say, 'This is the best help (to the realisation of Brahman) and the highest' (Ka. II. 17), 'One should concentrate

on the Self, uttering Om' (Mn. XXIV. 1), 'One should meditate upon the Supreme Being only through the syllable Om' (Pr. V. 5), 'Meditate upon the Self with the help of the syllable Om' (Mu. II. ii. 6), and so on. Besides, the instruction can have no other meaning. For instance, elsewhere, in such passages as, 'He recites the praise with Om, he chants the Udgītha with Om' (Ch. I. i. 9), we know from the directions for use that the syllable Om is used at the beginning and end of the reading of the Vedas. But we do not see any such different meaning here. Therefore the instruction of the word Om here is for the purpose of presenting it as a means to meditation only. Although the words 'Brahman,' 'Ātman,' etc. are names of Brahman, yet on the authority of the Śrutis we know that Om is Its most intimate appellation. Therefore it is the best means for the realisation of Brahman. It is so in two ways—as a symbol and as a name. As a symbol: Just as the image of Viṣṇu or any other god is regarded as identical with that god (for purposes of worship), so is Om to be treated as Brahman. (Why?) Because Brahman is pleased with one who uses Om as an aid ; for the Śruti says, 'This is the best help and the highest. Knowing this help one is glorified in the world of Brahman (Hiraṇyagarbha)' (Ka. II. 17).

Now, lest 'ether' should mean the material ether, the text says, *the eternal ether,* i.e. the ether which is the Supreme Self. Because the latter, being beyond the reach of the eye and other organs, cannot be perceived without some help, therefore the aspirant superimposes it with faith, devotion and great rapture on

the syllable Om, as people superimpose Viṣṇu on images of stone etc. with carvings of His features. *'The ether containing air*, just the ordinary ether, not the eternal ether,' *says*—who?—*the son of Kauravyāyaṇī*. The word 'ether' is primarily used in the sense of the ether containing air; so he thinks that should be taken. Now, whether it is 'the eternal ether,' meaning the unconditioned Brahman, or it is 'the ether containing air,' meaning the conditioned Brahman, in either case the syllable Om, as a symbol, becomes a means of realising It, like an image. For another Śruti has it, 'The syllable Om, O Satyakāma, is the higher and lower Brahman' (Pr. V. 2). The only difference is over the meaning of the word 'ether.'

It, this Om, *is the Veda*, (for) *through it one knows what is to be known*. Therefore Om is the Veda or name (of Brahman). Through that name the aspirant knows or realises what is to be known, viz. Brahman, which is the object signified or designated by the name. Therefore *the Brāhmaṇas know* that it is the Veda: They mean that as a name it is intended as a means to the realisation of Brahman. Or the passage, 'It is the Veda,' etc., may be a eulogy. How? Om is enjoined as a symbol of Brahman, for it is co-ordinated with the word 'Brahman' in the sentence, 'Om is the ether-Brahman.' Now it is being praised as the Veda, for the entire Vedas are but Om: They all issue out of it and consist of it; this Om is differentiated into the divisions of Ṛc, Yajus, Sāman, etc., for another Śruti says, 'As by a stick all leaves

(are pierced, so all speech is pierced by Om), (Ch. II. xxiii. 4). Here is another reason why Om is the Veda—'through it,' this Om, 'one knows whatever is to be known'; hence this Om is the Veda. The other Vedas owe their Vedahood to this. Therefore Om, being so important, should be used as a means to self-realisation. Or the passage in question may be thus interpreted: It is 'the Veda.'[1] What is it? That Om 'which the Brāhmaṇas know'; for it should be known by the Brāhmaṇas in various forms such as Praṇava and Udgītha. If it is used as a means to realisation, the entire Vedas are practically used.

[1] In this interpretation the inarticulate A is dropped from the text, the reading being, *Vedo yam*, etc.

SECTION II

त्रयाः प्राजापत्याः प्रजापतौ पितरि ब्रह्मचर्यमूषुः—देवा मनुष्या असुराः ; उषित्वा ब्रह्मचर्यं देवा ऊचुः, ब्रवीतु नो भवानिति ; तेभ्यो हैतदक्षरमुवाच द इति ; व्यज्ञासिष्टा३ इति; व्यज्ञासिष्मेति होचुः, दाम्यतेति न आत्थेति; ओमिति होवाच, व्यज्ञासिष्टेति ॥ १ ॥

1. Three classes of Prajāpati's sons lived a life of continence with their father, Prajāpati (Virāj)—the gods, men and Asuras. The gods, on the completion of their term, said, 'Please instruct us.' He told them the syllable 'Da' (and asked), 'Have you understood?' (They) said, 'We have. You tell us: Control yourselves.' (He) said, 'Yes, you have understood.'

The present section is introduced to prescribe the three disciplines of self-control etc. *Three classes of Prajāpati's sons lived a life of continence,* i.e. lived as students, since continence is the most important part of a student's life, *with their father, Prajāpati.* Who were they? *The gods, men and Asuras,* in particular. Of them, *the gods, on the completion of their term*—what did they do?—*said* to their father, Prajāpati, *'Please instruct us.'* When they thus sought his instruction, *he told them* only *the syllable 'Da'*; and saying it the father asked them, *'Have you understood*

the meaning of the syllable I told you by way of instruction, or not?' The gods *said, 'We have.'* 'If so, tell me what I said.' The gods said, *'You tell us : Control yourselves,* for you are naturally unruly.' The other *said, 'Yes, you have understood* rightly.'

अथ हैनं मनुष्या ऊचुः, ब्रवीतु नो भवानिति ; तेभ्यो हैतदेवाक्षरमुवाच द इति ; व्यज्ञासिष्टा३ इति ; व्यज्ञासिष्मेति होचुः, दत्तेति न आत्थेति ; ओमिति होवाच, व्यज्ञासिष्टेति ॥ २ ॥

2. Then the men said to him, 'Please instruct us.' He told them the same syllable 'Da' (and asked), 'Have you understood?' (They) said, 'We have. You tell us: Give.' (He) said, 'Yes, you have understood.'

The common portions are to be explained as before. *'You tell us : Give*—distribute your wealth to the best of your might, for you are naturally avaricious. What else would you say for our benefit?' —so said the men.

अथ हैनमसुरा ऊचुः, ब्रवीतु नो भवानिति ; तेभ्यो हैतदेवाक्षरमुवाच द इति ; व्यज्ञासिष्टा३ इति ; व्यज्ञासिष्मेति होचुः, दयध्वमिति न आत्थेति ; ओमिति होवाच, व्यज्ञासिष्टेति ; तदेतदेवैषा दैवी वागनुवदति स्तनयित्नुर्द द द इति—दाम्यत दत्त दयध्वमिति; तदेतत्त्रयं शिक्षेत्—दमं दानं दयामिति ॥ ३ ॥ इति द्वितीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

3. Then the Asuras said to him, 'Please instruct us.' He told them the same syllable

'Da' (and asked), 'Have you understood?' (They) said, 'We have. You tell us: Have compassion.' (He) said, 'Yes, you have understood.' That very thing is repeated by the heavenly voice, the cloud, as 'Da,' 'Da,' 'Da': 'Control yourselves,' 'Give,' and 'Have compassion.' Therefore one should learn these three —self-control, charity and compassion.

Similarly the Asuras took it as, *'Have compassion,* be kind to all, for you are cruel, given to injuring others, and so on.' *That very* instruction of Prajāpati continues to this day. Prajāpati, who formerly taught the gods and others, teaches us even to-day through the heavenly voice of the cloud. How? Here is *the heavenly voice* heard. Which is it? *The cloud. As 'Da,' 'Da,' 'Da': 'Control yourselves,' 'Give,'* and *'Have compassion.'* The syllable 'Da' is repeated thrice to represent in imitation the above three terms, not that a cloud produces three notes only, for we know of no such limitation as to number. Because to this day Prajāpati gives the same instructions, 'Control yourselves,' 'Give' and 'Have Compassion,' *therefore one should learn these three* of Prajāpati. What are they? *Self-control, charity and compassion.* Men should think, 'We must carry out the instructions of Prajāpati.' The Smṛti too says, 'Lust, anger and greed—these are the three gateways to hell, destructive to the self; therefore one should renounce these three' (G. XVI. 21). The preceding portion is but a part of this injunction, 'One should learn,' etc. Still those who can guess the motives of others hold different views on

why Prajāpati spoke the same syllable 'Da' thrice to the gods etc., who wanted separate instructions, and how they too discriminatingly understood his intention from the same syllable 'Da.'

Regarding this some say: The gods, men and Asuras, considering themselves guilty of a lack of self-control, charitableness and compassion respectively, lived as students with Prajāpati, apprehensive of what he might say to them ; and as soon as they heard the syllable 'Da,' their own fears led them to understand its meaning. It is a well-known principle in life that sons and pupils are to be dissuaded from evil through instruction. Hence Prajāpati was right in uttering just the syllable 'Da,' and so too were the gods etc. in understanding it differently according to their respective defects, for the syllable 'Da' occurs in all the three words denoting 'self-control' etc. From this it is clear that when one is conscious of one's faults, one can be weaned from them through the briefest advice, as the gods etc. were through the mere syllable 'Da.'

Objection : Well, this instruction was for the three classes, the gods and the rest, and even they were to adopt only one instruction apiece. It is not that even to-day men should learn all the three.

Reply : In ancient times these three were practised by the gods etc.—distinguished people. So men indeed should practise all of them.

Objection : But should not compassion be excluded from the list, because it was practised by the Asuras—very undesirable people?

Reply : No, for all the three are equally good instructions. Hence there is some other meaning to it. All the three classes, the gods and the rest, were Prajāpati's sons, and a father would teach his sons only what is good for them ; so Prajāpati, who knew what was good for them, would not teach them otherwise. Therefore this instruction of his to his sons is exceedingly beneficent. Hence men indeed should learn all the three.

Or, there are no gods or Asuras other than men. Those among men who are wanting in self-control, but are otherwise endowed with many good qualities, are the gods ; those who are particularly greedy are men ; while those who are cruel and given to injuring others are the Asuras. So the same species, men, according to their lack of self-control and the other two defects, as well as to their tendencies of balance, activity and inertia, are given the titles of gods etc. Hence it is men who should learn all the three instructions, for Prajāpati meant his advice for them alone ; because men are observed to be wild, greedy and cruel. The Smṛti too says, 'Lust, anger and greed (are the three gateways to hell) ; . . . therefore one should renounce them' (G. XVI. 21).

SECTION III

The three disciplines, self-control etc., which are a part of all meditations have been enjoined. One is qualified for all meditations by becoming self-controlled, unavaricious and compassionate. The topic of the realisation of the unconditioned Brahman has been finished with the third and fourth chapters. Now meditations on Its conditioned aspect, resulting in prosperity, have to be described. Hence the following sections.

एष प्रजापतिर्यद्धृदयम्; एतद्ब्रह्म, एतत्सर्वम्; तदेतत्त्र्यक्षरम्—हृदयमिति; हृ इत्येकमक्षरम्; अभिहरन्त्यस्मै स्वाश्चान्ये च य एवं वेद; द इत्येकमक्षरम्; ददत्यस्मै स्वाश्चान्ये च य एवं वेद; यमित्येकमक्षरम्; एति स्वर्गं लोकं य एवं वेद ॥ १ ॥ इति तृतीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

1. This is Prajāpati—this heart (intellect). It is Brahman, it is everything. 'Hṛdaya' (heart) has three syllables. 'Hṛ' is one syllable. To him who knows as above, his own people and others bring (presents). 'Da' is another syllable. To him who knows as above, his own people and others give (their powers). 'Ya' is another syllable. He who knows as above goes to heaven.

It has just been said that Prajāpati instructs. Now who is this instructor, Prajāpati? This is being

answered: *This is prajāpati.* Who? *This heart,* i.e. the intellect, which has its seat in the heart. That heart in which, at the end of the section relating to Śākalya (III. ix.), name, form and work have been stated to merge by way of the divisions of the quarters, which resides in all beings and is identified with them all, is Prajāpati, the projector of all beings. *It is Brahman,* being vast and identified with all. *It is everything.* It has been stated in the third chapter that the intellect is everything. Since it is everything, the intellect that is Brahman should be meditated upon. Now, first of all, meditation on the syllables of the name 'Hṛdaya' is being described. The name *'Hṛdaya' has three syllables.* Which are they— *'Hṛ' is one syllable. To him,* this sage, *who knows as above,* knows that 'Hṛ' is the same as the root 'Hṛ,' meaning 'to bring,' *his own people,* relatives, *and others* not related to him *bring* presents. This last word must be supplied to complete the sentence. Because the organs, which are a part of the intellect (its 'own'), and the objects, sound etc., which are not so related to it ('others'), bring their respective functions as offerings to the intellect that is Brahman, which in its turn passes them on to the Self, therefore he who knows that 'Hṛ' is a syllable of the name 'Hṛdaya' also receives presents. This result is in accordance with the meditation. Similarly *'Da'* too *is another syllable.* This too is a form of the root 'Dā,' meaning 'to give,' inserted in the name 'Hṛdaya' as one of its syllables. Here also, *to him who knows as above,* knows that because the organs, which are

a part of the intellect, and the objects, which are not so related to it, give their respective powers to the intellect that is Brahman, which too gives its own power to the Self, therefore the syllable is called 'Da,' *his own people and others give* their powers. Similarly *'Ya'* too *is another syllable. He who knows as above,* that the form 'Ya,' derived from the root 'In,' meaning, to go, has been inserted in this name, *goes to heaven.* Thus one gets such conspicuous results from the meditation even on the syllables of its name ; what should one say of the meditation on the reality of the heart itself? Thus the introduction of the syllables of its name is for the purpose of eulogising the heart (intellect).

SECTION IV

तद्वै तदेतदेव तदास—सत्यमेव ; स यो हैतं महद्यक्षं प्रथमजं वेद सत्यं ब्रह्मेति, जयतीमाँल्लोकान् ; जित इन्न्वसावसत् , य एवमेतं महद्यक्षं प्रथमजं वेद सत्यं ब्रह्मेति ; सत्यं ह्येव ब्रह्म ॥ १ ॥ इति चतुर्थं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

1. That[1] (intellect-Brahman) was but this—Satya (gross and subtle) alone. He who knows this great, adorable, first-born (being) as the Satya-Brahman, conquers these worlds, and his (enemy) is thus conquered and becomes non-existent—he who knows this great, adorable, first-born (being) thus, as the Satya-Brahman, for Satya is indeed Brahman.

In order to enjoin a meditation on that Brahman called Hṛdaya (intellect) as Satya, the present section is being introduced. *That* refers to the intellect-Brahman. The particle 'vai' is a reminder. That intellect-Brahman who may be recalled—is the meaning of the first 'Tat' (that). He is being described in another way—is the meaning of the second 'Tat.' What is that way? He *was but this.* With this last word the third 'Tat' is connected. 'This' refers to something in the mind that will presently be stated.

[1] The pronoun 'Tat' (that or it) occurs thrice in the text. The last two (as well as the particle 'vai') have been omitted in the translation to avoid confusion. They are explained in the commentary.

Who 'was but this'? He who has been described as the intellect-Brahman ; here the third 'Tat' comes in. What is he? This is being specified as *Satya alone*—the Satya-Brahman, or Brahman that is 'Sat' and 'Tyat,' the gross and subtle elements, in other words, consisting of the five elements. *He,* any one, *who knows this* being identified with Satya—*great,* because of his vastness, *adorable, first-born,* since this Brahman was born before all other relative beings—*as the Satya-Brahman,* gets the following result: As the Satya-Brahman has made all these worlds a part of himself, or conquered them, so he who knows the great, adorable, first-born Brahman identified with Satya, *conquers these worlds.* Also *his* enemy—this word is understood—*is thus conquered,* as the worlds are by Brahman, *and becomes non-existent,* i.e. is conquered. Who gets this result? To answer this the text concludes: *He who knows this great, adorable, first-born* (being) *thus—as the Satya-Brahman.* Hence the result is aptly in accordance with the meditation, *for Satya is indeed Brahman.*

SECTION V

आप एवेदमग्र आसुः, ता आपः सत्यमसृजन्त, सत्यं ब्रह्म, ब्रह्म प्रजापतिम्, प्रजापतिर्देवान्; ते देवाः सत्यमेवोपासते; तदेतत्त्र्यक्षरम्—सत्यमिति; स इत्येकमक्षरम्, तीत्येकमक्षरम्, यमित्येकमक्षरम्; प्रथमोत्तमे अक्षरे सत्यम्, मध्यतोऽनृतम्; तदेतदनृतमुभयतः सत्येन परिगृहीतम्, सत्यभूयमेव भवति; नैवं विद्वांसमनृतं हिनस्ति ॥ १ ॥

1. This (universe) was but water (liquid oblations connected with sacrifices) in the beginning. That water produced Satya. Satya is Brahman. Brahman (produced) Prajāpati, and Prajāpati the gods. Those gods meditate upon Satya. This (name) 'Satya' consists of three syllables: 'Sa' is one syllable, 'Tī' is another syllable, and 'Ya' is the third syllable. The first and last syllables are truth. In the middle is untruth. This untruth is enclosed on either side by truth. (Hence) there is a preponderance of truth. One who knows as above is never hurt by untruth.

This section is in praise of the Satya-Brahman. He has been called great, adorable and first-born (V. iv. 1). How is he the first-born? This is being explained: *This was but water in the beginning.*

'Water' here means the oblations that are connected with rites such as the Agnihotra. They are called water because they are liquid. This 'water,' after the rites are finished, maintains its connection with them in some invisible, subtle form, and is not alone, but united with the other elements ; but it is given prominence on account of its connection with the rites. All the elements, which before their manifestation remain in an undifferentiated state, are together with the agent designated as water. That water, which is the seed of the universe, remains in its undifferentiated form, *This* entire universe, differentiated into name and form, *was* just this water *in the beginning*, and there was no other manifested object. Then *that water produced Satya ;* therefore the Satya-Brahman is the first-born. The manifestation of the undifferentiated universe is what is spoken of here as the birth of Hiraṇyagarbha or Sūtrātman. *Satya is Brahman.* Why? Because of his greatness. How is he great? This is being explained: Because he is the projector of everything. How? The Saty-*Brahman* (produced) *Prajāpati*, the lord of all beings, Virāj, of which the sun etc. are the organs. The verb 'produced' is understood. *Prajāpati, Virāj,* produced *the gods*. Since everything was produced in this order from the Satya-Brahman, therefore he is great. But how is he adorable? This is being explained: *Those gods* who were thus produced *meditate upon* that *Satya*-Brahman, even superseding their father Virāj. Hence this first-born great one is adorable. Therefore he should be meditated upon with one's whole heart. The name of the Satya-

Brahman also is *Satya*. This *consists of three syllables.* What are they? *'Sa' is one syllable, 'Tī'* is another syllable. The *ī* has been added to *t* for facility of indication. *'Ya' is the third syllable.* Of these, *the first and last syllables,* 'Sa' and 'Ya,' *are truth,* being free from the form of death. *In the middle is untruth.* Untruth is death, for the words 'Mṛtyu' (death) and 'Anṛta' (untruth) have both a *t* in them. This untruth, the letter *t,* which is a form of death, *is enclosed* or encompassed *on either side by truth,* by the two syllables 'Sa' and 'Ya,' which are forms of truth. Hence it is negligible, and *there is a preponderance of truth. One who knows as above,* knows the preponderance of truth and the insignificance of all death or untruth, *is never hurt by untruth* that he may have uttered unawares.

तद्यत्तत्सत्यमसौ स आदित्यः—य एष एतस्मिन्मण्डले पुरुषः, यश्चायं दक्षिणेऽक्षन्पुरुषः ; तावेतावन्योन्यस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठितौ ; रश्मिभिरेषोऽस्मिन्प्रतिष्ठितः, प्राणैरयममुष्मिन् ; स यदोत्क्रमिष्यन्भवति शुद्धमेवैतन्मण्डलं पश्यति ; नैनमेते रश्मयः प्रत्यायन्ति ॥ २ ॥

2. That[1] which is Satya is that sun—the being who is in that orb and the being who is in the right eye. These two rest on each other. The former rests on the latter through the rays, and the latter rests on the former through the function of the eyes. When a man is about to

[1] The translation of this sentence and its commentary is slightly condensed for the sake of clarity.

leave the body, he sees the solar orb as clear. The rays no more come to him.

Now a meditation on different parts of the body of the Satya-Brahman is being described: *That which is Satya,* the first-born Satya-Brahman, *is that sun.* Who is he? *The being who is in that orb,* who thinks he is the sun, *and the being who is in the right eye.* They are both Satya-Brahman; the word 'and' shows this connection. Because *these two,* the beings in the sun and the eye, are but different forms of the Satya-Brahman, therefore they *rest on each other,* the solar being rests on the ocular being and *vice versa,* for there is a relation of mutual helpfulness between the self as identified with different parts of the body and the presiding deities. How they rest on each other is being explained: *The former,* the solar being, *rests on the latter,* the being (individual self) who is identified in this body with the eye, *through the rays,* helping the other with his light. *And the latter,* the being who is in the eye, *rests on the former,* the being who is identified among the gods with the sun, *through the function of the eyes,* helping that deity (by revealing him). *When a man,* the individual self or the experiencer inhabiting this body, *is about to leave the body,* the solar being, who is the presiding deity of the eye, withdraws his rays and maintains a blank, indifferent pose. Then *he,* the individual self, *sees the solar orb as clear,* shorn of its beams, like the moon. This portent of death is incidentally mentioned, so that a man may be careful and take necessary steps. *The*

rays no more come to him: In the discharge of their master's duties, they used to do so before with regard to the being who is identified with the eye, in order to help him ; but considering those duties finished, as it were, they no more come to him. Hence this mutual helpfulness between them shows that both are parts of the same Satya-Brahman.

य एष एतस्मिन्मण्डले पुरुषस्तस्य भूरिति शिरः ; एकं शिरः, एकमेतदक्षरम् ; भुव इति बाहू, द्वौ बाहू, द्वे एते अक्षरे ; स्वरिति प्रतिष्ठा ; द्वे प्रतिष्ठे, द्वे एते अक्षरे ; तस्योपनिषदहरिति ; हन्ति पाप्मानं जहाति च य एवं वेद ॥ ३ ॥

3. Of this being who is in the solar orb, the syllable 'Bhūr' is the head, for there is one head, and there is this one syllable; the word 'Bhuvar' is the arms, for there are two arms, and there are these two syllables; the word 'Svar' is the feet, for there are two feet, and there are these two syllables. His secret name is 'Ahar.' He who knows as above destroys and shuns evil.

Now, *of this being who is in the solar orb,* called Satya, the Vyāhṛtis (Bhūr, Bhuvar and Svar) are the limbs. How? The Vyāhṛti called *'Bhūr' is his head,* because it comes first. The Śruti itself points out the similarity between them: *There is one head, and there is this one syllable,* Bhūr. Each is one in number. *The word 'Bhuvar' is the arms,* because both are two in number. *There are two arms, and*

there are these two syllables. Similarly *the word 'Svar' is the feet, for there are two feet, and there are these two syllables.* The word 'Pratiṣṭhā' means the feet, for they help one to stand. The *secret name* of this Satya-Brahman who has the Vyāhṛtis as his limbs —that name, called by which that Brahman turns to us, as it happens with us—*is 'Ahar.' He who knows as above,* that 'Ahar' is derived from the root 'Han' or 'Hā,' meaning, 'to kill or to shun,' *destroys and shuns evil.*

योऽयं दक्षिणेऽक्षन्पुरुषस्तस्य भूरिति शिरः; एकं शिरः, एकमेतदक्षरम्; भुव इति बाहू; द्वौ बाहू, द्वे एते अक्षरे; स्वरिति प्रतिष्ठा; द्वे प्रतिष्ठे, द्वे एते अक्षरे; तस्योपनिषदहमिति; हन्ति पाप्मानं जहाति च य एवं वेद ॥ ४ ॥

इति पञ्चमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

4. Of this being who is in the right eye, the syllable 'Bhūr' is the head, for there is one head, and there is this one syllable; the word 'Bhuvar' is the arms, for there are two arms, and there are these two syllables; the word 'Svar' is the feet, for there are two feet, and there are these two syllables. His secret name is 'Aham.' He who knows as above destroys and shuns evil.

Similarly *of this being who is in the right eye,* the syllable *'Bhūr' is the head,* etc.—to be explained as before. *His secret name is 'Aham'* (I), because he is the inner self. *He who knows,* etc.—already explained.

SECTION VI

Since Brahman has many limiting adjuncts, each with diverse forms, a meditation on the same Brahman as possessed of the limiting adjunct of the mind, is being enjoined.

मनोमयोऽयं पुरुषो भाःसत्यस्तस्मिन्नन्तर्हृदये, यथा व्रीहिर्वा यवो वा ; स एष सर्वस्येशानः, सर्वस्याधिपतिः, सर्वमिदं प्रशास्ति यदिदं किंच ॥ १ ॥ इति षष्ठं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

1. This being identified with the mind and resplendent (is realised by the Yogins) within the heart like a grain of rice or barley. He is the lord of all, the ruler of all, and governs whatever there is.

This being identified with the mind, because he is perceived there ; also he perceives through the mind ; *and resplendent,* lit. having lustre as his real state or nature. Since the mind reveals everything, and he is identified with the mind, therefore he is resplendent, i.e. is realised by the Yogins—we must supply these words—*within the heart like a grain of rice or barley* in size. *He is the lord of all* things, which are but variations of him. Even with lordship, one may be under the sway of ministers etc., but he is not like that. What then is he? He is *the ruler,* independent protector, *and governs whatever there is*—the whole universe. The result of this meditation on Brahman identified with the mind is the attainment of identity

with him as such, for the Brāhmaṇa says, 'One becomes exactly as one meditates upon Him' (Ś. X. v. ii. 20).

SECTION VII

विद्युद्ब्रह्मेत्याहुः ; विदानाद्विद्युत् ; विद्यत्येनं पाप्मनो य एवं वेद विद्युद्ब्रह्मेति ; विद्युद्ध्येव ब्रह्म ॥ १ ॥ इति सप्तमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

1. They say *lightning* is Brahman. *It* is called lightning (Vidyut) because it scatters (darkness). He who knows it as such—that lightning is Brahman—scatters evils (that are ranged against) him, for lightning is indeed Brahman.

Another meditation on the same Satya-Brahman, with particular result, is being introduced. *They say lightning is Brahman.* The derivation of lightning as Brahman is being given: *It is called lightning* (Vidyut) *because it scatters* darkness. Really lightning flashes cleaving the darkness due to clouds. *He who knows it as such,* knows *that lightning is Brahman* as possessed of the above attributes, *scatters* or dispels all the *evils* that are ranged against *him.* It is a fitting result for one who knows it as such—that lightning is Brahman, *for lightning is indeed Brahman.*

SECTION VIII

वाचं धेनुमुपासीत; तस्याश्चत्वारः स्तनाः—स्वाहाकारो वषट्कारो हन्तकारः स्वधाकारः ; तस्य द्वौ स्तनौ देवा उपजीवन्ति—स्वाहाकारं च वषट्कारं च, हन्तकारं मनुष्याः, स्वधाकारं पितरः ; तस्याः प्राण ऋषभः, मनो वत्सः ॥ १ ॥

इत्यष्टमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

1. One should meditate upon speech (the Vedas) as a cow (as it were). She has four teats— the sounds 'Svāhā,' 'Vaṣaṭ,' 'Hanta' and 'Svadhā.' The gods live on two of her teats—the sounds 'Svāhā' and 'Vaṣaṭ,' men on the sound 'Hanta,' and the Manes on the sound 'Svadhā.' Her bull is the vital force, and her calf the mind.

Still another meditation on the same Brahman is being mentioned—that speech is Brahman. 'Speech' here means the Vedas. *One should meditate upon* that speech (the Vedas) *as,* i.e. as if she was, *a cow.* Just as a cow secretes milk through her four teats for her calf to suck, so does this cow, speech, secrete through her four teats, to be presently mentioned, food for the gods etc. that is comparable to milk. Now what are those teats, and who are those for whom she secretes the food? *The gods,* corresponding to a calf, *live on two of* the *teats* of this cow, speech. Which are they? *The sounds 'Svāhā and 'Vaṣaṭ,' for* through them oblations are offered to the gods. *Men*

on the sound 'Hanta': Food is given to men with the use of the word 'Hanta' (if you want). *The Manes on the sound 'Svadhā,'* for food is offered to the Manes to the utterance of this word. *Her bull,* the bull for that cow, speech, *is the vital force,* for the Vedas are rendered fruitful by the vital force, *and her calf the mind,* for she is stimulated to secretion by the mind ; because the Vedas are applied to a subject that has been thought over by the mind, therefore the mind stands for the calf. He who meditates upon this cow, speech, as such, attains identity with her.

SECTION IX

अयमग्निर्वैश्वानरो योऽयमन्तः पुरुषे, येनेदमन्नं पच्यते यदिदमद्यते ; तस्यैष घोषो भवति यमेतत्कर्णावपिधाय शृणोति ; स यदोत्क्रमिष्यन्भवति नैनं घोषं शृणोति ॥ १ ॥
इति नवमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

1. This fire that is within a man and digests the food that is eaten, is Vaiśvānara. It emits this sound that one hears by stopping the ears thus. When a man is about to leave the body, he no more hears this sound.

Here is another meditation like the preceding ones. *This fire is Vaiśvānara.* Which fire? This *that* is *within a man.* Is it the element fire that is one of the components of the body? No, it is the one called Vaiśvānara, which *digests the food.* Which food? The food *that is eaten* by men. That is to say, the heat in the stomach. For direct sign of it the text says: As that fire digests the food, *it emits this sound.* What is it? *That one hears by stopping the ears thus,* with one's fingers. The word 'Etat' is an adverb (meaning 'thus'). One should meditate upon that fire as Vaiśvānara, or Virāj. Here too the result is identification with it. Incidentally a death omen is being described: *When a man,* the experiencer in this body *is about to leave the body, he no more hears this sound.*

SECTION X

यदा वै पुरुषोऽस्माल्लोकात्प्रैति स वायुमागच्छति ; तस्मै स तत्र विजिहीते यथा रथचक्रस्य खं, तेन स ऊर्ध्व आक्रमते ; स आदित्यमागच्छति, तस्मै स तत्र विजिहीते यथा लम्बरस्य खं, तेन स ऊर्ध्व आक्रमते ; स चन्द्रमसमागच्छति, तस्मै स तत्र विजिहीते यथा दुन्दुभेः खं, तेन स ऊर्ध्व आक्रमते ; स लोकमागच्छत्यशोकमहिमं, तस्मिन्वसति शाश्वतीः समाः ॥ १ ॥ इति दशमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

1. When a man departs from this world, he reaches the air, which makes an opening there for him like the hole of a chariot-wheel. He goes upwards through that and reaches the sun, who makes an opening there for him like the hole of a tabor. He goes upwards through that and reaches the moon, who makes an opening there for him like the hole of a drum. He goes upwards through that and reaches a world free from grief and from cold. He lives there for eternal years.

This section describes the goal and the result of all meditations. *When a man* who knows those meditations *departs from this world*, gives up the body, *he reaches the air*, which remains crosswise in the sky, motionless and impenetrable. The air *makes an opening there*, in its own body—separates the parts of its own body, i.e. makes a hole in it—*for him*, as he

comes. What is the size of that hole? *Like the hole of a chariot-wheel,* which is of a well-known size. *He,* the sage, *goes upwards* (lit. upward-bound) *through that and reaches the sun.* The sun stands blocking the way for the prospective traveller to the world of Brahman ; he too lets a sage with this kind of meditation pass. He *makes an opening there for him like the hole of a tabour* (Lambara), a kind of musical instrument. *He goes upwards through that and reaches the moon.* She too *makes an opening there for him like the hole a drum,* the size of which is well known. *He goes upwards through that and reaches a world,* that of Hiraṇyagarbha. What kind of world? *Free from grief,* i.e. mental troubles, *and from cold,* i.e. physical sufferings. Reaching it, *he lives there for eternal years,* i.e. for many cycles of ours, which constitute the lifetime of Hiraṇyagarbha.

SECTION XI

एतद्वै परमं तपो यद्व्याहितस्तप्यते, परमं हैव लोकं जयति य एवं वेद ; एतद्वै परमं तपो यं प्रेतमरण्यं हरन्ति ; परमं हैव लोकं जयति य एवं वेद ; एतद्वै परमं तपो यं प्रेतमग्नावभ्यादधति, परमं हैव लोकं जयति य एवं वेद ॥ १ ॥ इति एकादशं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

1. This indeed is excellent austerity that a man suffers when he is ill. He who knows as above wins an excellent world. This indeed is excellent austerity that a man after death is carried to the forest. He who knows as above wins an excellent world. This indeed is excellent austerity that a man after death is placed in the fire. He who knows as above wins an excellent world.

This indeed is excellent austerity. What is it? *That a man suffers when he is ill,* attacked with fever etc. One should think that this is excellent austerity, for both entail suffering. For a sage who thinks like that, without either condemning the disease or being dejected over it, that austerity itself serves to wipe out his evils. *He who knows as above* has his evils burnt by this austerity in the form of meditation, and *wins an excellent world*. Similarly a dying man thinks from the very beginning—what?—*this indeed is excellent austerity that after death* he *is carried to the*

forest by the priests for the funeral ceremony. He thinks that it will be an excellent austerity for him, because in both there is this journey from the village to the forest ; for it is well known that retirement from the village to the forest is excellent austerity. *He who knows as above wins an excellent world.* Similarly, *this indeed is excellent austerity that man after death is placed in the fire,* because in both there is this entering into the fire. *He who knows as above wins an excellent world.*

SECTION XII

अन्नं ब्रह्मेत्येक आहुः तन्न तथा, पूयति वा अन्नमृते प्राणात्; प्राणो ब्रह्मेत्येक आहुः, तन्न तथा, शुष्यति वै प्राण ऋतेऽन्नात्; एते ह त्वेव देवते एकधाभूयं भूत्वा परमतां गच्छतः; तद्ध स्माह प्रातृदः पितरम्, किं स्विदेवैवं विदुषे साधु कुर्याम्, किमेवास्मा असाधु कुर्यामिति; स ह स्माह पाणिना, मा प्रातृद, कस्त्वेनयोरेकधाभूयं भूत्वा परमतां गच्छतीति; तस्मा उ हैतदुवाच वीति; अन्नं वै वि, अन्ने हीमानि सर्वाणि भूतानि विष्टानि; रमिति; प्राणो वै रम्, प्राणे हीमानि सर्वाणि भूतानि रमन्ते; सर्वाणि ह वा अस्मिन्भूतानि विशन्ति, सर्वाणि भूतानि रमन्ते, य एवं वेद ॥ १ ॥ इति द्वादशं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

1. Some say that food is Brahman. It is not so, for food rots without the vital force. Others say that the vital force is Brahman. It is not so, for the vital force dries up without food. But these two deities being united attain their highest. So Prātṛda said to his father, 'What good indeed can I do to one who knows like this, and what evil indeed can I do to him either? The father, with a gesture of the hand, said, 'Oh, no, Prātṛda, for who would attain his highest by being indentified with them?' Then he said to him this: 'It is "Vi." Food is "Vi,"

for all these creatures rest on food. It is "Ram." The vital force is "Ram," for all these creatures delight if there is the vital force.' On him who knows as above all creatures rest, and in him all creatures delight.

Similarly, in order to enjoin another meditation the text says: *Some* teachers *say that food*—lit. what is eaten—*is Brahman. It is not so*—one must not understand that food is Brahman. *Others say that the vital force is Brahman. It is not so*—that too should not be taken as true. But why is not food to be understood as Brahman? *For food rots* or is decomposed *without the vital force ;* so how can it be Brahman? For Brahman is that which is indestructible. Let the vital force then be Brahman. Not so either, *for the vital force dries up without food.* The vital force is the eater ; hence it cannot live without eatables. Therefore it dries up without food. Since neither of them can singly be Brahman, therefore *these two deities,* food and the vital force, *being united attain their highest,* i.e. Brahmanhood.

So, having thus decided it in his mind, one whose name was *Prātṛda said to his father, 'What good indeed can I do to one who knows like this,* knows Brahman as I have conceived it? That is, what worship can I offer him? *And what evil indeed can I do to him either?'* That is to say, he has achieved

the goal of his life. The man who knows that food and the vital force together constitute Brahman, is not slighted by any offence done to him, nor is he magnified by honours done to him. When he said this, his *father,* stopping him *with a gesture of the hand, said,* *'Oh, no, Prātṛda,* do not say so, *for who would attain his highest by being identified with them,* i.e. food and the vital force? No aspirant would attain perfection through this realisation of Brahman. Therefore you must not say that such a man has achieved the goal of his life.' 'If this is so, please tell me how he attains perfection.' *Then he said to him this,* the following. What was it? *It is 'Vi.'* What is that? The answer is being given: *Food is 'Vi,' for all these creatures rest on food*[1], hence food is called 'Vi.' Also *it is 'Ram,'* the father said. What is that? *The vital force is 'Ram.'* Why? *For all these creatures delight if there is the vital force,* which is the abode of strength. Hence the vital force is 'Ram.' Food (i.e. the body) has the virtue of being the abode of all creatures, and the vital force that of affording delight to all, for none who is without a body as his abode is pleased, nor is any one, even if he has a body, pleased if he lacks vitality or strength. When a person has a body and strength, then only he is pleased, considering himself exceptionally fortunate, for the Śruti says, 'It should be youth, a virtuous youth, and studious,' etc. (Tai. II. viii. 1). Now the results attained by one who knows as above are being stated: *On him who*

[1] 'Food' here means the body, which is a modification of the food we eat.

knows as above all creatures rest, because of his knowledge of the virtue of food, *and in him all creatures delight,* because of his knowledge of the virtue of the vital force.

SECTION XIII

उक्थम् ; प्राणो वा उक्थम्, प्राणो हीदं सर्वमुत्थापयति ; उद्धास्मादुक्थविद्वीरस्तिष्ठति, उक्थस्य सायुज्यं सलोकतां जयति, य एवं वेद ॥ १ ॥

1. (One should meditate upon the vital force as) the Uktha (a hymn of praise). The vital force is the Uktha, for it raises this universe. From him who knows as above rises a son who is a knower of the vital force, and he achieves union with and abode in the same world as the Uktha.

The Uktha—is another meditation. The Uktha is a hymn of praise. It is the principal feature of the Mahāvrata sacrifice (Somayāga). What is that Uktha? *The vital force is the Uktha.* The vital force is chief among the organs, as the Uktha is among hymns of praise. Hence one should meditate upon the vital force as the Uktha. How is the vital force the Uktha? This is being explained: *For it raises this universe;* because of this raising it is called the Uktha. No lifeless man ever rises. The result of the meditation on it is being stated: *From him who knows as above rises a son who is a knower of the vital force*—this is the visible result ; *and he achieves union with and abode in the same world as the Uktha*—this is the invisible result.

यजुः ; प्राणो वै यजुः, प्राणे हीमानि सर्वाणि भूतानि

युज्यन्ते ; युज्यन्ते हास्मै सर्वाणि भूतानि श्रैष्ठ्याय, यजुषः सायुज्यं सलोकतां जयति, य एवं वेद ॥ २ ॥

2. (One should meditate upon the vital force as) the Yajus. The vital force is the Yajus, for all these beings are joined with one another if there is the vital force. All beings are joined for the eminence of him who knows as above, and he achieves union with and abode in the same world as the Yajus (vital force).

One should meditate upon the vital force as *the Yajus* too. *The vital force is the Yajus.*[1] How is the vital force the Yajus? *For all (these) beings are joined with one another if there is the vital force.* None has the strength to unite with another unless he has life ; hence the vital force is called the Yajus—because it joins. The result that accrues to one who knows as above is being stated: *All beings are joined for the eminence of him who knows as above*—they try to make him their chief. *And he achieves union with and abode in the same world as the Yajus* or the vital force. These words have already been explained.

साम ; प्राणो वै साम, प्राणे हीमानि सर्वाणि भूतानि सम्यञ्चि ; सम्यञ्चि हास्मै सर्वाणि भूतानि, श्रैष्ठ्याय कल्पन्ते, साम्नः सायुज्यं सलोकतां जयति, य एवं वेद ॥ ३ ॥

3. (One should meditate upon the vital

[1] The name of one of the Vedas ; but here it is given a figurative meaning. The same with 'Sāman' in the next paragraph.

force as) the Sāman. The vital force is the Sāman, for all these beings are united if there is the vital force. For him who knows as above all beings are united, and they succeed in bringing about his eminence, and he achieves union with and abode in the same world as the Sāman.

One should also meditate upon the vital force as *the Sāman. The vital force is the Sāman.* How is the vital force the Sāman? *For all beings are united if there is the vital force.* The vital force is called Sāman because of this union—causing them to unite. *For him who knows as above all beings are united,* and not only that, *they succeed in bringing about his eminence.* The rest is to be explained as before.

क्षत्रम् ; प्राणो वै क्षत्रम्, प्राणो हि वै क्षत्रम्, त्रायते हैनं प्राणः क्षणितोः ; प्र क्षत्रमत्रमाप्नोति, क्षत्रस्य सायुज्यं सलोकतां जयति, य एवं वेद ॥४॥ इति त्रयोदशं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

4. (One should meditate upon the vital force as) the Kṣatra. The vital force is the Kṣatra, for it is indeed the Kṣatra. The vital force protects the body from wounds. He who knows as above attains this Kṣatra (vital force) that has no other protector, and achieves union with and abode in the same world as the Kṣatra.

One should meditate upon the vital force as *the Kṣatra. The vital force is the Kṣatra, for it is indeed*

the Kṣatra, as is well known. How? This is being explained: Because *the vital force protects the body from wounds,* injuries inflicted with weapons etc., by filling them up with new flesh, therefore it is well known as the Kṣatra, on account of this healing of the wounds. The result that accrues to one who knows this is being stated: *He who knows as above attains this Kṣatra,* or the vital force, *that has no other protector,* is not protected by anything else (Atra). Or the word may be 'Kṣatra-mātra,' as another (the Mādhyandina) recension has it ; in which case the meaning will be, ' Attains identity with the Kṣatra, or becomes the vital force.' *And achieves union with and abode in the same world as the Kṣatra.*

SECTION XIV

भूमिरन्तरिक्षं द्यौरित्यष्टावक्षराणि ; अष्टाक्षरं ह वा एकं गायत्र्यै पदम् , एतदु हैवास्या एतत् ; स यावदेषु त्रिषु लोकेषु तावद्ध जयति योऽस्या एतदेवं पदं वेद ॥ १ ॥

1. 'Bhūmi' (the earth), 'Antarikṣa' (sky) and 'Dyaus' (heaven) make eight syllables, and the first foot of the Gāyatrī[1] has eight syllables. So the above three worlds constitute the first foot of the Gāyatrī. He who knows the first foot of the Gāyatrī to be such wins as much as there is in those three worlds.

The meditation on Brahman as possessed of different limiting adjuncts such as the heart has been stated. Now the meditation on it as possessing the limiting adjunct of the Gāyatrī has to be stated ; hence the present section. Gāyatrī is the chief of the metres. It is called Gāyatrī because, as will be said later on, it protects the organs of those who recite it. Other metres have not this power. The verse Gāyatrī is identical with the vital force, and the latter is the

[1] Gāyatrī (or Sāvitrī) is the most sacred verse of the Vedas. It reads as follows: *Tat saviturvareṇyam, bhargo devasya dhīmahi, dhiyo yo naḥ pracodayāt*—'We meditate on the adorable glory of the radiant sun. May he direct our intellect!' (Ṛ. III. lxii. 10). There is also a metre called Gāyatrī which has three feet, of eight syllables each. It will be seen that the verse Gāyatrī is in this metre. Śaṅkara seems to have both these senses in mind.

soul[1] of all metres. The vital force, as has been said, is called the Kṣatra on account of its protecting the body by healing its wounds ; (and Gāyatrī saves the organs of its reciters. So) Gāyatrī is identical with the vital force. Hence the meditation on Gāyatrī is being particularly enjoined. There is another reason. It is the cause of the birth of the Brāhmaṇas, the noblest among the twice-born. From the passage, 'He created the Brāhmaṇa through Gāyatrī, the Kṣatriya through Triṣṭubh, and the Vaiśya through Jagatī' (Va. IV. 3, adapted), we know that the second birth[2] of the Brāhmaṇa is due to Gāyatrī. Therefore it is chief among the metres. The passages, 'The Brāhmaṇas, renouncing their desires,' etc. (III. v. 1), 'The Brāhmaṇas speak of (that Immutable),' etc. (III. viii. 8), 'He is a Brāhmaṇa' (III. viii. 10), 'He becomes sinless, taintless, free from doubts, and a knower of Brahman' (IV. iv. 23), show that a Brāhmaṇa attains the highest end of his life ; and that Brāhmaṇahood is due to his second birth through Gāyatrī. Hence the nature of Gāyatrī should be described. Since the best among the twice-born (the Brāhmaṇa) who is created by Gāyatrī is entitled to the achievement of his life's ends without any obstruction, therefore this achievement is due to Gāyatrī. Hence with a view to enjoining a meditation on it the text says: *'Bhūmi,' 'Antarikṣa' and 'Dyaus' make eight syllables, and the first foot of the Gāyatrī has eight*

[1] Because it helps their utterance.

[2] At the time of his initiation into the student life with the holy thread etc.

syllables. The syllable 'Ya' (in the word 'Vareṇya') should be separated to supply the eighth syllable. The particles 'ha' and 'vai' indicate some well-known fact. *So the above three worlds,* the earth etc., *constitute the first foot of the Gāyatrī,* because both have eight syllables. The result accruing to one who knows the first foot of the Gāyatrī consisting of the three worlds is as follows: *He who knows the first foot of the Gāyatrī to be such wins as much as there is* to be won *in those three worlds.*

ऋचो यजूंषि सामानीत्यष्टावक्षराणि ; अष्टाक्षरं ह वा एकं गायत्र्यै पदम् ; एतदु हैवास्या एतत् ; स यावतीयं त्रयी विद्या तावद्ध जयति योऽस्या एतदेवं पदं वेद ॥ २ ॥

2. 'Ṛcaḥ,' Yajūmṣi' and 'Sāmāni'[1] make eight syllables, and the second foot of the Gāyatrī has eight syllables. So the above three Vedas constitute the second foot of the Gāyatrī. He who knows the second foot of the Gāyatrī to be such wins as much as that treasury of knowledge, the three Vedas, has to confer.

Similarly *'Ṛcaḥ,' 'Yajūmṣi,' and 'Sāmāni,'* the syllables of the names of that treasury of knowledge, the three Vedas, are also eight in number, *and the second foot of the Gāyatrī has* likewise *eight syllables. So the above three Vedas,* Ṛc, Yajus and Sāman, *constitute the second foot of the Gāyatrī,* just because both have eight syllables. *He who knows the second*

[1] The plural forms of the names of the three Vedas.

foot of the Gāyatrī to be such, consisting of the three Vedas, *wins as much as that treasury of knowledge, the three Vedas, has to confer* as result.

प्रणोऽपानो व्यान इत्यष्टावक्षराणि ; अष्टाक्षरं ह वा एकं गायत्र्यै पदम् ; एतदु हैवास्या एतत् ; स यावदिदं प्राणि तावद्ध जयति योऽस्या एतदेवं पदं वेद ; अथास्या एतदेव तुरीयं दर्शतं पदं परोरजा य एष तपति ; यद्वै चतुर्थं तत्तुरीयम् ; दर्शतं पदमिति ददृश इव ह्येषः ; परोरजा इति सर्वमु ह्येवैष रज उपर्युपरि तपति ; एवं हैव श्रिया यशसा तपति योऽस्या एतदेवं पदं वेद ॥ ३ ॥

3. 'Prāṇa,' 'Apāna' and 'Vyāna'[1] make eight syllables, and the third foot of the Gāyatrī has eight syllables. So the above three forms of the vital force constitute the third foot of the Gāyatrī. He who knows the third foot of the Gāyatrī to be such wins all the living beings that are in the universe. Now its Turīya, apparently visible, supramundane foot is indeed this—the sun that shines. 'Turīya' means the fourth. 'Apparently visible foot,' because he is seen, as it were. 'Supramundane,' because he shines on the whole universe as its overlord. He who knows the fourth foot of the Gāyatrī to be such shines in the same way with splendour and fame.

[1] This word must be split so as to make three syllables.

Similarly *'Prāṇa,' 'Apāna' and 'Vyāna,'* these names of the vital force etc., have also *eight syllables*, and they *constitute the third foot of the Gāyatrī. He who knows the third foot of the Gāyatrī to be such wins all the living beings that are in the universe.* The Gāyatrī, as consisting of words, has only three feet. Now its fourth foot, which is the import of the verse, is being described: *Now* the *Turīya apparently visible, supramundane foot* of that Gāyatrī *is indeed this,* viz. *the sun that shines.* The Śruti itself explains the meaning of the words in the above passage. The word *'Turīya' means* what is generally known as *the fourth.* What is the meaning of the words *'apparently visible foot'?* This is being answered: *Because he,* the being who is in the solar orb, *is seen, as it were ;* hence he is so described. What is the meaning of the word *'supramundane'?* This is being explained: *Because he,* this being in the solar orb, *shines on the whole universe as its overlord.* The word 'Rajas' means the universe produced out of Rajas, or activity. The word 'upari' (lit. above) has been repeated twice to indicate his suzerainty over the whole universe. It may be urged that since the word 'whole' serves that purpose, it is useless to repeat the word 'upari.' The answer to this is that it is all right, because the word 'whole' may be taken to refer only to those worlds above which the sun is observed to shine, and the repetition of the word 'upari' removes this possibility. As another Śruti says, 'He rules the worlds that are beyond the sun and commands the enjoyments of the gods as well' (Ch. I. vi. 8). Therefore the repetition

serves to include all. As the sun shines with splendour, in the form of suzerainty and fame, so *he who knows the fourth,* apparently visible *foot of the Gāyatrī to be such shines with splendour and fame.*

सैषा गायत्र्येतस्मिंस्तुरीये दर्शते पदे परोरजसि प्रतिष्ठिता ; तद्वै तत्सत्ये प्रतिष्ठितम् ; चक्षुर्वै सत्यम्, चक्षुर्हि वै सत्यम्; तस्माद्यदिदानीं द्वौ विवदमानावेयाताम्, अहमदर्शम्, अहमश्रौषमिति, य एवं ब्रूयादहमदर्शमिति, तस्मा एव श्रद्दध्याम ; तद्वै तत्सत्यं बले प्रतिष्ठितम् ; प्राणो वै बलम्, तत्प्राणे प्रतिष्ठितम् ; तस्मादाहुर्बलं सत्यादोगीय इति ; एवं वैषा गायत्र्यध्यात्मं प्रतिष्ठिता ; सा हैषा गयांस्तत्रे ; प्राणा वै गयाः, तत्प्राणांस्तत्रे ; तद्यद्गयांस्तत्रे तस्माद्गायत्री नाम ; स यामेवामूं सावित्रीमन्वाह, एषैव सा ; स यस्मा अन्वाह तस्य प्राणांस्त्रायते ॥ ४ ॥

4. That Gāyatrī rests on this fourth, apparently visible, supramundane foot. That again rests on truth. The eye is truth, for the eye is indeed truth. Therefore if even to-day two persons come disputing, one saying, 'I saw it,' and another, 'I heard of it,' we believe him only who says, 'I saw it.' That truth rests on strength. The vital force is strength. (Hence) truth rests on the vital force. Therefore they say strength is more powerful than truth. Thus the Gāyatrī rests on the vital force within the

body. That Gāyatrī saved the Gayas. The organs are the Gayas; so it saved the organs. Now, because it saved the organs, therefore it is called the Gāyatrī. The Sāvitrī that the teacher communicates to the pupil is no other than this. It saves the organs of him to whom it is communicated.

That Gāyatrī with three feet which has been described, which comprises the three worlds, the three Vedas and the vital force, *rests on this fourth, apparently visible, supramundane foot,* because the sun is the essence of the gross and subtle universe. Things deprived of their essence become lifeless and unstable, as wood and so forth are when their pith is burnt. So the three-footed Gāyatrī, consisting of the gross and subtle universe, rests with its three feet on the sun. *That* fourth foot (the sun) *again rests on truth.* What is that truth? *The eye is truth.* How? *For the eye is indeed truth*—it is a well-known fact. How? *Therefore if even to-day two persons come disputing,* giving contradictory accounts, *one saying, 'I saw it,' and another, 'I heard of it*—the thing is not as you saw it,' of the two *we believe him only who says, 'I saw it,'* and not him who says, 'I heard of it.' What a man hears of may sometimes be false, but not what he sees with his own eyes. So we do not believe the man who says, 'I heard of it.' Therefore the eye, being the means of the demonstration of truth, is truth. That is to say, the fourth foot of the Gāyatrī with the other three feet rests on the eye. It has also been

stated: 'On what does that sun rest?—On the eye' (III. ix. 20).

That truth which is the support of the fourth foot of the Gāyatrī *rests on strength.* What is that strength? *The vital force is strength. Truth rests on* that strength or *the vital force.* So it has been stated that everything is pervaded by the Sūtra (III. vii. 2). Since truth rests on strength, *therefore they say strength is more powerful than truth.* It is also a well-known fact that a thing which supports another is more powerful than the latter. We never see anything weak being the support of a stronger thing. *Thus,* in the above-mentioned way, *the Gāyatrī rests on the vital force within the body.* That Gāyatrī is the vital force; hence the universe rests on the Gāyatrī. The Gāyatrī is that vital force in which all the gods, all the Vedas, and rites together with their results are unified. So, as the vital force, it is the self, as it were, of the universe. *That Gāyatrī saved the Gayas.* What are they? *The organs* such as that of speech *are the Gayas,* for they produce sound.[1] *So it saved the organs. Because it saved the organs* (of the priests using them), *therefore it is called the Gāyatrī;* owing to this saving of the organs it came to be known as the Gāyatrī. *The Sāvitrī* or hymn to the sun *that the teacher communicates*—first a quarter of it, then half, and finally the whole—*to the pupil,* after investing him with the holy thread at the age of eight, *is no other than this* Gāyatrī, which is identical with the vital force, and is the self,

[1] This is primarily true of the vocal organ, but the whole group is named after it.

as it were, of the universe. What the child receives from him is now explained here. *It saves the organs of him,* the child, *to whom it is communicated,* from falling into hell and other dire fates.

तां हैतामेके सावित्रीमनुष्टुभमन्वाहुः ; वागनुष्टुप्, तद्वाचमनुब्रूम इति ; न तथा कुर्यात् ; गायत्रीमेव सावित्रीमनुब्रूयात् ; यदि ह वा अप्येवंविद्बह्विव प्रतिगृह्णाति, न हैव तद्गायत्र्या एकंचन पदं प्रति ॥ ५ ॥

5. Some communicate (to the pupil) the Sāvitrī that is Anuṣṭubh (saying), 'Speech is anuṣṭubh; we shall impart that to him.' One should not do like that. One should communicate that Sāvitrī which is the Gāyatrī. Even if a man who knows as above accepts too much as gift, as it were, it is not (enough) for even one foot of the Gāyatrī.

Some, the followers of certain recensions of the Vedas, *communicate* to the initiated pupil *the Sāvitrī that is* produced from, or composed in, the metre called *Anuṣṭubh.* Their intention is being stated: They say, *'Speech is Anuṣṭubh,* and it is also Sarasvatī in the body. *We shall impart that* speech—Sarasvatī—*to* the boy.' *One should not do,* or know, *like that.* What they say is totally wrong. What then should one do? *One should communicate that Sāvitrī which is the Gāyatrī.* Why? Because it has already been said that the Gāyatrī is the vital force. If the child is taught about the vital force, he will be automatically

taught about speech, and Sarasvatī, and the other organs as well. Having stated this incidentally, the text goes on to praise the knower of the Gāyatrī: *Even if a man who knows as above accepts too much as gift, as it were*—really there is no such thing as too much for him, for he is identified with the universe—*it*, the whole amount of gift received, *is not* enough *for even one foot of the Gāyatrī.*

स य इमांस्त्रीँल्लोकान्पूर्णान्प्रतिगृह्णीयात्, सोऽस्या एतत्प्रथमं पदमाप्नुयात्; अथ यावतीयं त्रयी विद्या यस्तावत्प्रतिगृह्णीयात्, सोऽस्या एतद्द्वितीयं पदमाप्नुयात्; अथ यावदिदं प्राणि यस्तावत्प्रतिगृह्णीयात् सोऽस्या एतत्तृतीयं पदमाप्नुयात्; अथास्या एतदेव तुरीयं दर्शतं पदं परोरजा य एष तपति, नैव केनचनाप्यम्; कुत उ एतावत्प्रतिगृह्णीयात् ॥ ६ ॥

6. He who accepts these three worlds replete (with wealth), will be receiving (the results of knowing) only the first foot of the Gāyatrī. He who accepts as much as this treasury of knowledge, the Vedas, (has to confer), will receive (the results of knowing) only its second foot. And he who accepts as much as (is covered by) all living beings, will receive (the results of knowing) only its third foot. While its fourth, apparently visible, supramundane foot—the sun that shines—is not to be counterbalanced by any

gift received. Indeed how could any one accept so much as gift?

He, that knower of the Gāyatrī, *who accepts these three worlds,* the earth etc., *replete* with wealth such as cattle and horses, *will be receiving only the first foot of the Gāyatrī,* which has been explained. That acceptance will counterbalance the results of knowing only its first foot, but will not produce any additional sin. *He who accepts as much as this treasury of knowledge, the Vedas,* (has to confer), *will receive only its second foot.* It will set off the results of knowing only its second foot. Similarly *he who accepts as much as* (is covered by) *all living beings, will receive only its third foot.* It will match the results of knowing only its third foot. All this is said merely as a supposition. Should any one accept gifts equivalent even to all the three feet, it will wipe out the results of knowing only those three feet, but cannot lead to a new fault. Of course there is no such donor or recipient; it is imagined only to extol the knowledge of the Gāyatrī. Supposing such a donor and recipient were available, this acceptance of gifts would not be considered a fault. Why? Because there would still be left the knowledge of the fourth foot of the Gāyatrī, which is among the highest achievements of a man. This is pointed out by the text: *While its fourth, apparently visible, supramundane foot—the sun that shines—is not to be counterbalanced by any gift received,* as the other three feet mentioned above are. Even these three are not to

be thus counterbalanced. All this has been said as a mere hypothetical proposition. *Indeed how could any one accept so much as gift*—equivalent to the three worlds, and so on? Hence the Gāyatrī should be meditated upon in this (entire) form.

तस्या उपस्थानम्—गायत्र्यस्येकपदी द्विपदी त्रिपदी चतुष्पद्यपदसि, न हि पद्यसे। नमस्ते तुरीयाय दर्शताय पदाय परोरजसे; असावदो मा प्रापदिति; यं द्विष्यात्, असावस्मै कामो मा समृद्धीति वा—न हैवास्मै स कामः समृद्ध्यते यस्मा एवमुपतिष्ठते—अहमदः प्रापमिति वा ॥ ७ ॥

7. Its salutation: 'O Gāyatrī, thou art one-footed, two-footed, three-footed and four-footed, and thou art without any feet, for thou art unattainable. Salutation to thee, the fourth, apparently visible, supramundane foot! May the enemy never attain his object!' (Should the knower of the Gāyatrī) bear hatred towards anybody, (he should) either (use this Mantra): 'Such and such—may his desired object never flourish!'—in which case that object of the person against whom he thus salutes the Gāyatrī, never flourishes—or (he may say), 'May I attain that (cherished object) of his!'

Its salutation, the salutation of the Gāyatrī—literally, the word 'Upasthāna' means going near and staying, or saluting—with the following sacred formula:

'O Gāyatrī, thou art one-footed, with the three worlds as thy first foot, *two-footed,* with the three Vedas as thy second foot, *three-footed,* with the three forms of the vital force as thy third foot, *and four-footed,* with the sun as thy fourth foot. Thus thou art attained or known by the meditating aspirants. Beyond that *thou art without any feet,* in thy own supreme, unconditioned form. Thou hast no foot (Pada), that is, means of attainment, *for thou art unattainable,* being the Self described as 'Not this, not this.' Hence *salutation to thee, the fourth, apparently visible, supramundane foot*—in thy relative aspect! *May the enemy,* the evil that stands in the way of my realisation of thee, *never attain his object,* of obstructing this realisation! The word 'iti' marks the close of the sacred formula. Should the knower of the Gāyatrī himself *bear hatred towards anybody,* he should *either* use the following sacred formula against him in his salutation to the Gāyatrī: *'Such and such*—naming him—*may his,* Devadatta's, *desired object never flourish !—in which case that object of the person,* Devadatta, *against whom he thus salutes the Gāyatrī, never flourishes. Or* he may salute the Gāyatrī saying, *'May I attain that* cherished object *of* Devadatta.' Of the three Mantras given above—'May the enemy never attain,' etc.—anyone may be used at option according to the intention of the aspirant.

एतद्ध वै तज्जनको वैदेहो बुडिलमाश्वतराश्विमुवाच, यन्नु हो तद्गायत्रीविद्ब्रूथा अथ कथं हस्तीभूतो वहसीति ; मुखं ह्यस्याः सम्राण्न विदांचकारेति होवाच ; तस्या

अग्निरेव मुखम्, यदि ह वा अपि बह्विवाग्नावभ्यादधति,
सर्वमेव तत्संदहति ; एवं हैवैवंविद्यपि बह्विव पापं कुरुते,
सर्वमेव तत्संप्साय शुद्धः पूतोऽजरोऽमृतः संभवति ॥ ८ ॥
इति चतुर्दशं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

8. On this Janaka, Emperor of Videha, is said to have told Buḍila, the son of Aśvatarāśva, 'Well, you gave yourself out as a knower of the Gāyatrī; then why, alas, are you carrying (me) as an elephant?' He replied, 'Because I did not know its mouth, O Emperor.' 'Fire is its mouth. Even if they put a large quantity of fuel into the fire, it is all burnt up. Similarly, even if one who knows as above commits a great many sins, he consumes them all and becomes pure, cleansed, undecaying and immortal.'

In order to enjoin the mouth of the Gāyatrī a eulogistic story is being narrated in this paragraph.—The particles 'ha' and 'vai' refer to a past incident.—*On this* subject of the knowledge of the Gāyatrī, *Janaka, Emperor of Videha, is said to have told Buḍila, the son of Aśvatarāśva, 'Well, you gave yourself out as a knower of the Gāyatrī*—said you were one—then why are you acting contrary to that statement? If you really were a knower of the Gāyatrī, *then why, alas,* as a result of your sin in accepting gifts, *are you carrying* (me) *as an elephant?'*—The adverb 'nu' indicates deliberation.—Thus reminded by the Emperor, *he replied, 'Because I did not know its*

mouth, O Emperor. My knowledge of the Gāyatrī, being deficient in one part, has been fruitless.' (The Emperor said), 'Listen then, *fire is its mouth. Even if they,* common people, *put a large quantity of fuel into the fire, it,* that fuel, *is all burnt up. Similarly, even if one who knows as above,* that fire is the mouth of the Gāyatrī—who himself is identified with the Gāyatrī and has fire as his mouth—*commits a great many sins* such as those due to the acceptance of gifts etc., *he consumes all* those sins *and becomes pure* like the fire, *cleansed* of those sins due to the acceptance of gifts etc., *undecaying and immortal,'* because he is identified with the Gāyatrī.

SECTION XV

हिरण्मयेन पात्रेण सत्यस्यापिहितं मुखम् ।
तत् त्वं पूषन्नपावृणु सत्यधर्माय दृष्टये ।
पूषन्नेकर्षे यम सूर्य प्राजापत्य व्यूह रश्मीन् ।
समूह तेजः ; यत्ते रूपं कल्याणतमं तत्ते पश्यामि ।
योऽसावसौ पुरुषः सोऽहमस्मि ।
वायुरनिलममृतमथेदं भस्मान्तं शरीरम् ।
ॐ क्रतो स्मर कृतं स्मर, क्रतो स्मर कृतं स्मर ।
अग्ने नय सुपथा राये अस्मान्,
विश्वानि देव वयुनानि विद्वान् ।
युयोध्यस्मज्जुहुराणमेनः,
भूयिष्ठां ते नमउक्तिं विधेम ॥ १ ॥
इति पञ्चदशं ब्राह्मणम् ॥ इति पञ्चमोऽध्यायः ॥

1. The face (nature) of Satya (Brahman) is hidden (as it were) with a golden vessel. O Pūṣan (nourisher of the world—the sun), remove it, so that I, whose reality is Satya, may see (the face). O Pūṣan, O solitary Ṛṣi (seer or traveller), O Yama (controller), O Sūrya (sun), O son of Prajāpati (God or Hiraṇya-garbha), take away thy rays, curb thy brightness. I wish to behold that most benignant form of thine. I myself am that person; and I am immortal. (When my body falls) may my vital force return to the air (cosmic force), and this body too, reduced to ashes, (go to the

earth)! O Fire, who art the syllable 'Om,' O Deity of deliberations, recollect, recollect all that I have done, O Deity of deliberations, recollect, recollect all that I have done. O Fire, lead us along the good way towards our riches (deserts). O Lord, thou knowest everybody's mental states; remove the wily evil from us. We utter repeated salutations to thee.[1]

The man who has combined meditation with rites is praying to the sun in his dying moments. This is topical too, for the sun is the fourth foot of the Gāyatrī, and the salutation to him is under consideration; hence he is being prayed to. *The face,* or real nature, *of Satya,* or the Satya-Brahman, *is hidden,* as it were, *with a golden* or shining *vessel,* the solar orb, as something held dear is kept hidden with a vessel. 'Hidden,' because no one whose mind is not concentrated can see it. *O Pūṣan*—the sun is so called because he nourishes the world—*remove it,* that vessel serving as a cover, as it were, because of its obstructing vision, i.e. remove the cause of obstruction to the vision, *so that I, whose reality is Satya* (Satya-Brahman), in other words, who am identical with thee, *may see* (the face). The names Pūṣan etc. are for addressing the sun. *O solitary Ṛṣi,* or seer, because of his vision, for he is the soul of the universe and as the eye sees everything. Or the word may mean 'O solitary traveller,' for the Śruti says, 'The sun roams alone' (Tai. S. VII. iv. xviii. 1). *O Yama* (controller),

[1] These verses form the last four verses of the Iśāvāsya Upaniṣad also.

for the control of the whole world is due to thee. *O Sūrya,* literally, one who efficiently directs the liquids, or his rays, or the vital force or intellect of all beings. *O son of Prajāpati* or God, who is the Lord of all beings, or of Hiraṇyagarbha. *Take away thy rays, curb thy brightness,* so that I may see thee ; for I cannot see thee as thou art, being blinded by thy dazzling light, as one cannot see things when it lightens. Hence withdraw thy radiance. *I wish to behold that most benignant form of thine.* 'I wish' should be changed into 'we wish.' *I myself am that person* whose limbs are the syllables of the Vyāhṛtis, 'Bhūr' (earth), 'Bhuvar' (sky) and 'Svar' (heaven), called 'person' (Puruṣa) because of his having the form of a man. 'Ahar' (day) and 'Aham' (I) have been mentioned (V. v. 3, 4) as the secret names of the being in the sun and the being in the eye respectively (who are identical). That is referred to here. *And I am immortal.* The word 'immortal' should be thus construed. When my body falls—while I am immortal and identified with the Satya-Brahman—*may my vital force* in the body *return to the* external *air* (cosmic force). Similarly, may the other deities return to their respective sources. *And this body too,* being *reduced to ashes,* go to the earth!

Now he is praying to the deity, Fire, who is identified with his deliberations and presides over the mind: *O Fire, who art the syllable 'Om'*—the words 'Om' and 'Krato' are both used here as vocatives—for 'Om' is his symbol, *O Deity of deliberations,* being identified

with the mind, *recollect* what is to be recollected, for a desirable goal is attained through thy recollection at the time of death ; hence I pray to thee: *Recollect all that I have done.* The repetition is expressive of earnestness. Also, *O Fire, lead us along the good way towards our riches,* i.e. for receiving the fruits of our work ; not along the southern, dark way that leads to return, but along the good, bright way. *O Lord, thou knowest everybody's mental states. Remove* all *the wily evil from us.* Freed from it through thy grace, we shall go along the northern way. But we are unable to serve thee ; *we* only *utter repeated salutations to thee.* That is to say, we shall serve thee through the utterance of salutations, for we are too weak to do anything else.

CHAPTER VI

SECTION I

ॐ। यो ह वै ज्येष्ठं च श्रेष्ठं च वेद ज्येष्ठश्च श्रेष्ठश्च स्वानां भवति ; प्राणो वै ज्येष्ठश्च श्रेष्ठश्च ; ज्येष्ठश्च श्रेष्ठश्च स्वानां भवति, अपि च येषां बुभूषति, य एवं वेद ॥ १ ॥

1. Om. He who knows that which is the oldest and greatest, becomes the oldest and greatest among his relatives. The vital force is indeed the oldest and greatest.[1] He who knows it to be such becomes the oldest and greatest among his relatives as well as among those of whom he wants to be such.

It has been stated that Gāyatrī is the vital force. But why is Gāyatrī the vital force, and not the organs such as that of speech? Because the vital force is the oldest and greatest, which the organs are not. How is it the oldest and greatest? The present section is introduced to settle this point. Or, meditation on the vital force alone as the 'Uktha,' 'Yajus,' 'Sāman,' 'Kṣatra,' etc., has been described, although there are other things such as the eye. The present section gives only the reason, which is its connection with the preceding chapter, on account of its immediate sequence. But this section is not a part of that chapter. These

[1] The same topic also occurs in the first two sections of the fifth chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

two chapters being of the nature of a supplement, such meditations on the vital force, with specific results of their own, as have not been mentioned before, have to be described ; this is what the Śruti intends to do.

He who knows that which is the oldest and greatest, i.e. has the attributes of priority in age and greatness—what it is will be presently mentioned—surely *becomes the oldest and greatest among his relatives.* The particles 'ha' and 'vai' are emphatic. The pupil, tempted by this mention of the result, is eager to put his question, when the teacher says to him: *The vital force is indeed the oldest and greatest.* But how is one to know that it is such, since at conception all the organs (of the embryo) are equally connected with the formative elements contributed by the parents? The answer is that nevertheless the seed, if lifeless, will not develop ; which means that the vital force begins to function earlier than the eye and other organs ; hence it is the oldest in age. Besides, the vital force goes on fostering the embryo from the moment of conception, and it is only after it (the vital force) has begun to function that the eye and other organs begin their work. Hence the vital force is legitimately the oldest of the organs. But one may be the oldest member in a family without being the greatest, because of his lack of good qualities ; and the second, or the youngest member may be the greatest by reason of his superior qualities, but not the oldest. Not so, however, with the vital force. It is indeed the oldest and greatest. How is it known to be the greatest ? It will be shown through the ensuing conversation. In any

case, *he who knows*, or meditates upon, the vital force as the oldest and greatest, *becomes the oldest and greatest among his relatives*, by virtue of meditation on a thing that is oldest and greatest, *as well as among those* other than his relatives, *of whom he wants to be* the oldest and greatest. The man who meditates upon the vital force as the oldest and greatest attains this result. It may be questioned how a person can be the oldest at will, since it depends on age. But the answer is that there is nothing wrong in it, since 'being the oldest' here means functioning (before the rest) as the vital force does.

यो ह वै वसिष्ठां वेद वसिष्ठः स्वानां भवति ; वाग्वै वसिष्ठा ; वसिष्ठः स्वानां भवति, अपि च येषां बुभूषति, य एवं वेद ॥ २ ॥

2. He who knows the Vasiṣṭhā (that which best helps to dwell or cover) becomes the Vasiṣṭha among his relatives. The organ of speech is indeed the Vasiṣṭhā. He who knows it as such becomes the Vasiṣṭha among his relatives as well as among those of whom he wants to be such.

He who knows the Vasiṣṭhā becomes the Vasiṣṭha among his relatives. The result is according to the meditation. He also becomes the Vasiṣṭha *among those* other than his relatives, *of whom he wants to be* the Vasiṣṭha. 'Then please tell me what this Vasiṣṭhā is.' *The organ of speech is indeed the Vasiṣṭhā*. The derivative meaning of the word is 'that which helps

one to dwell, or covers one splendidly.' For people who have the gift of speech become rich and live in splendour ; or the word may be derived from the root 'Vas,' meaning 'to cover,' for speakers overcome others through their eloquence. Hence by realising the organ of speech as the Vasiṣṭhā one becomes such. The result is in accordance with the realisation.

यो ह वै प्रतिष्ठां वेद प्रतितिष्ठति समे, प्रतितिष्ठति दुर्गे ; चक्षुर्वै प्रतिष्ठा, चक्षुषा हि समे च दुर्गे च प्रतितिष्ठति ; प्रतितिष्ठति समे, प्रतितिष्ठति दुर्गे य एवं वेद ॥३॥

3. He who knows Pratiṣṭhā (that which has steadiness) lives steadily in difficult as well as smooth places and times. The eye indeed is Pratiṣṭhā, for through the eye one lives steadily in difficult as well as smooth places and times. He who knows it as such lives steadily in difficult as well as smooth places and times.

He who knows Pratiṣṭhā, that which has the attribute of steadiness—lit. that by means of which one lives steadily—has this result: He *lives steadily in smooth places and times,* as also *in difficult* or inaccessible places and difficult times such as those of famine. 'If it is so, please tell me what that Pratiṣṭhā is.' *The eye indeed is Pratiṣṭhā.* How? *For* by seeing them *through the eye one lives steadily in difficult as well as smooth places and times.* Hence the results are quite appropriate: *He who knows it as*

such lives steadily in difficult as well as smooth places and times.

यो ह वै संपदं वेद सं हास्मै पद्यते यं कामं कामयते ; श्रोत्रं वै संपत्, श्रोत्रे हीमे सर्वे वेदा अभिसंपन्नाः ; सं हास्मै पद्यते यं कामं कामयते य एवं वेद ॥ ४ ॥

4. He who knows Sampad (prosperity) attains whatever object he desires. The ear indeed is Sampad, for all these Vedas are acquired when one has the ear (intact). He who knows it to be such attains whatever object he desires.

He who knows Sampad, that which has the attribute of prosperity, gets this result: He *attains whatever object he desires.* But what is it that has got this attribute? *The ear indeed is Sampad.* How is the ear endowed with this attribute? *For all Vedas are acquired when one has the ear,* because only one who has the organ of hearing can study them, and objects of desire depend on the performance of rites that are enjoined by the Vedas. Therefore the ear is possessed of prosperity. Hence the result is in accordance with the meditation: *He who knows it to be such attains whatever object he desires.*

यो ह वा आयतनं वेदायतनं स्वानां भवति, आयतनं जनानाम् ; मनो वा आयतनम् ; आयतनं स्वानां भवति, आयतनं जनानां, य एवं वेद ॥ ५ ॥

5. He who knows the abode becomes the abode of his relatives as well as of (other) people.

The Manas indeed is the abode. He who knows it to be such becomes the abode of his relatives as well as of (other) people.

He who knows the abode becomes the abode of his relatives as well as of other *people.* What is that abode? *The Manas indeed is the abode* of the organs and objects. The latter become objects of enjoyment for the self only when they get an abode in the Manas ; and the organs start and stop their work in accordance with the deliberations of the Manas. Hence it is the abode of the organs. Therefore the results are according to the meditation: *He who knows it to be such becomes the abode of his relatives as well as of* (other) *people.*

यो ह वै प्रजातिं वेद प्रजायते ह प्रजाय पशुभिः ; रेतो वै प्रजातिः ; प्रजायते ह प्रजया पशुभिर्य एवं वेद ॥ ६ ॥

6. He who knows Prajāti (that which has the attribute of generation) is enriched with children and animals. The seed (organ) has this attribute. He who knows it to be such is enriched with children and animals.

He who knows Prajāti is enriched with children and animals. The seed has this attribute ; the word 'seed' refers to the organ of generation. The result is in keeping with the meditation: *He who knows it to be such is enriched with children and animals.*

ते हेमे प्राणा अहंश्रेयसे विवदमाना ब्रह्म जग्मुः, तद्धोचुः, को नो वसिष्ठ इति ; तद्धोवाच, यस्मिन्व उत्क्रान्त इदं शरीरं पापीयो मन्यते स वो वसिष्ठ इति ॥ ७ ॥

7. These organs, disputing over their respective greatness, went to Brahman and said to him, 'Which of us is the Vasiṣṭha?' He said, 'That one of you will be the Vasiṣṭha, who departing from among yourselves, people consider this body far more wretched.'

These organs, that of speech and the rest, *disputing over*—lit. giving contradictory accounts of—*their respective greatness,* each claiming that it was the greatest, *went to Brahman,* or Prajāpati denoted by the word 'Brahman,' *and said to him, 'Which of us is the Vasiṣṭha,*—(best) lives and overcomes others?' *He,* Brahman, being asked by them, *said, 'That one of you will be the Vasiṣṭha, who departing* from the body *from among yourselves, people consider this body far more wretched* than before'—for the body, being an aggregate of many impure things, is wretched even while a person is alive; it will be more so then. This is said for creating a feeling of disgust in us. Prajāpati, although he knew it, did not say, 'This is the Vasiṣṭha,' to avoid offending the rest.

वाग्घोच्चक्राम ; सा संवत्सरं प्रोष्यागत्योवाच, कथमशकत मदृते जीवितुमिति ; ते होचुः, यथाकला अवदन्तो वाचा, प्राणन्तः प्राणेन, पश्यन्तश्चक्षुषा, शृण्वन्तः श्रोत्रेण, विद्वांसो मनसा, प्रजायमाना रेतसा, एवमजीविष्मेति ; प्रविवेश ह वाक् ॥ ८ ॥

8. The organ of speech went out. After staying a whole year out it came back and said, 'How did you manage to live without me?' They said, 'We lived just as dumb people do, without speaking through the organ of speech, but living through the vital force, seeing through the eye, hearing through the ear, knowing through the mind and having children through the organ of generation.' So the organ of speech entered.

Being thus addressed by Brahman, the organs went out one by one to try their power. Of them *the organ of speech went out* of the body first. Then *after staying a whole year out it came back and said, 'How did you manage to live without me?'* Thus addressed, *they said, 'We lived just as* in the world *dumb people do, without speaking through the organ of speech, but living,* doing the vital function, *through the vital force, seeing,* doing the function of vision, *through the eye,* similarly, *hearing through the ear, knowing,* considering what should or should not be done, and so on, *through the mind and having children through the organ of generation.'* Being thus answered by the organs, *the organ of speech,* realising that it was not the Vasiṣṭha in the body, *entered.*

चक्षुर्होच्चक्राम ; तत्संवत्सरं प्रोष्यागत्योवाच, कथम-शक्त मदृते जीवितुमिति ; ते होचुः, यथान्धा अपश्यन्त-श्चक्षुषा, प्राणन्तः प्राणेन, वदन्तो वाचा, शृण्वन्तः श्रोत्रेण,

विद्वांसो मनसा, प्रजायमाना रेतसा, एवमजीविष्मेति ; प्रविवेश ह चक्षुः ॥९॥

9. The eye went out. After staying a whole year out it came back and said, 'How did you manage to live without me?' They said, 'We lived just as blind people do, without seeing through the eye, but living through the vital force, speaking through the organ of speech, hearing through the ear, knowing through the mind and having children through the organ of generation.' So the eye entered.

श्रोत्रं होच्चक्राम ; तत्संवत्सरं प्रोष्यागत्योवाच, कथमशकत मदृते जीवितुमिति ; ते होचुः, यथा बधिरा अशृण्वन्तः श्रोत्रेण, प्राणन्तः प्राणेन, वदन्तो वाचा, पश्यन्तश्चक्षुषा, विद्वांसो मनसा, प्रजायमाना रेतसा, एवमजीविष्मेति ; प्रविवेश ह श्रोत्रम् ॥ १० ॥

10. The ear went out. After staying a whole year out it came back and said, 'How did you manage to live without me?' They said, 'We lived just as deaf people do, without hearing through the ear, but living through the vital force, speaking through the organ of speech, seeing through the eye, knowing through the mind and having children through the organ of generation.' So the ear entered.

मनो होच्चक्राम ; तत्संवत्सरं प्रोष्यागत्योवाच, कथमशकत मदृते जीवितुमिति ; ते होचुः, यथा मुग्धा अविद्वांसो

मनसा, प्राणन्तः प्राणेन, वदन्तो वाचा, पश्यन्तश्चक्षुषा, शृण्वन्तः श्रोत्रेण, प्रजायमाना रेतसा, एवमजीविष्मेति ; प्रविवेश ह मनः ॥ ११ ॥

11. The mind went out. After staying a whole year out it came back and said, 'How did you manage to live without me?' They said, 'We lived just as idiots do, without knowing through the mind, but living through the vital force, speaking through the organ of speech, seeing through the eye, hearing through the ear and having children through the organ of generation.' So the mind entered.

रेतो होच्चक्राम ; तत्संवत्सरं प्रोष्यागत्योवाच, कथमशकत मदृते जीवितुमिति ; ते होचुः, यथा क्लीबा अप्रजायमाना रेतसा, प्राणन्तः प्राणेन, वदन्तो वाचा, पश्यन्तश्चक्षुषा, शृण्वन्तः श्रोत्रेण, विद्वांसो मनसा, एवमजीविष्मेति ; प्रविवेश ह रेतः ॥ १२ ॥

12. The organ of generation went out. After staying a whole year out it came back and said, 'How did you manage to live without me?' They said, 'We lived just as eunuchs do, without having children through the organ of generation, but living through the vital force, speaking through the organ of speech, seeing through the eye, hearing through the ear and knowing through the mind.' So the organ of generation entered.

Likewise *the eye went out,* etc. All this is to be explained as before. *The ear, the mind, the organ of generation.*

अथ ह प्राण उत्क्रमिष्यन्यथा महासुहयः सैन्धवः पड्वीशशंकून्संवृहेत्, एवं हैवेमान्प्राणान्संववर्ह; ते होचुः, मा भगव उत्क्रमीः, न वै शक्ष्यामस्त्वदृते जीवितुमिति; तस्यो मे बलिं कुरुतेति; तथेति ॥ १३ ॥

13. Then as the vital force was about to go out, it uprooted those organs just as a great, fine horse from Sind pulls out the pegs to which his feet are tied. They said, 'Please do not go out, sir, we cannot live without you.' 'Then give me tribute.' 'All right.'

Then as the vital force was about to go out, the vocal and other organs were immediately dislodged from their places. This is being illustrated by an example: *It uprooted those organs* from their places, *just as* in life *a great,* large-sized *fine,* noble-featured, *horse from Sind,* the place of his origin, simultaneously *pulls out the pegs to which his feet are tied, when the* rider mounts on him to test him. *They,* the organ of speech etc., *said, 'Please do not go out, sir, for we cannot live without you.'* (The vital force said:) 'If you have thus understood my eminence, *then,* as I am the chief here, *give me tribute.'* This conversation among the organs is an imaginary one devised to teach how a wise man should test the greatness of his peers. It is thus that a wise man finds out who is the greatest among them. That mode of testing is presented in the

form of a conversation; for otherwise it is absurd to think that each one of the organs, which work together, can actually go out by turns for the space of a year, and so on. Therefore, only the wise man who wants to know, for purposes of meditation, which is the greatest of the organs, reasons in this way. The organs, when demanded tribute, agreed saying, '*All right.*'

सा ह वागुवाच, यद्वा अहं वसिष्ठास्मि त्वं तद्वसिष्ठोऽसीति ; यद्वा अहं प्रतिष्ठास्मि त्वं तत्प्रतिष्ठोऽसीति चक्षुः ; यद्वा अहं संपदस्मि त्वं तत्संपदसीति श्रोत्रम् ; यद्वा अहमायतनमस्मि त्वं तदायतनमसीति मनः ; यद्वा अहं प्रजातिरस्मि त्वं तत्प्रजातिरसीति रेतः ; तस्यो मे किमन्नं, किं वास इति ; यदिदं किंचा श्वभ्य आ कृमिभ्य आ कीटपतङ्गेभ्यस्तत्तेऽन्नम्, आपो वास इति ; न ह वा अस्यानन्नं जग्धं भवति, नानन्नं परिगृहीतम्, य एवमेतदनस्यान्नं वेद ; तद्विद्वांसः श्रोत्रिया अशिष्यन्त आचामन्ति, अशित्वाचामन्ति ; एतमेव तदनमनग्नं कुर्वन्तो मन्यन्ते ॥ १४ ॥ इति प्रथमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

14. The organ of speech said, 'That attribute of the Vasiṣṭha which I have is yours.' The eye: 'That attribute of steadiness which I have is yours.' The ear: 'That attribute of prosperity which I have is yours.' The mind: 'That attribute of abode which I have is yours.' The organ of generation: 'That attribute of generation which I have is yours.' (The vital

force said:) 'Then what will be my food and my dress?' (The organs said:) 'Whatever is (known as) food, including dogs, worms, insects and moths, is your food, and water your dress.' He who knows the food of the vital force to be such, never happens to eat anything that is not food, or to accept anything that is not food. Therefore wise men who are versed in the Vedas sip a little water just before and after eating. They regard it as removing the nakedness of the vital force.

The organ of speech came forward first to offer the tribute and *said, 'That attribute of the Vasiṣṭha which I have is yours.* With that you are the Vasiṣṭha.' *The eye: 'That attribute of steadiness which I have is yours.* You are that steadiness.' The rest is similar. The other organs gave one by one their attributes of *prosperity, abode and generation.* (the vital force said:) 'If it is so, you have handsomely paid me tribute. Now tell me, endowed with such attributes that I am, *what will be my food and my dress?'* The others said, *'Whatever is* known in the world as *food, including dogs, worms, insects and moths*—whatever is food for dogs etc., and with that every food that is eaten by other creatures—*is* all *your food.'* We are here enjoined to look upon everything as the food of the vital force.

Some say that he who knows the food of the vital force can eat anything with impunity. This is wrong, for it has been forbidden by other scriptures.

Objection: May this not be an alternative to them?[1]

Reply: No, for this is not an injunction in favour of promiscuous eating. The passage, 'He never happens to eat anything that is not food,' is merely a eulogy on the meditation enjoined about regarding everything as the food of the vital force, for it should be treated as a part of that injunction. It has no power to contradict what has been enjoined by other scriptures, for it has quite a different meaning (viz. to extol the above meditation). What is sought to be enjoined here is the idea that everything is the food of the vital force, not that one should eat everything. Your assumption that the eating of everything is allowable is totally false, for there is no authority to support it.

Objection: The man who knows about the food of the vital force is identified with the latter, and as such everything can be regarded as his food; hence the eating of everything is surely allowable in his case.

Reply: No, for anything and everything cannot be one's food. It is true that this sage is identified with the vital force, but he possesses a body through which he has attained his knowledge, and the eating of every kind of food such as those of worms, insects and gods is incongruous with it.[2] Hence it is meaning-

[1] Meaning that ordinary people must abide by that restriction, but he who knows the food of the vital force may eat anything.

[2] Nobody can possibly want to eat anything and everything.

less to declare in that connection that the eating of all sorts of food is free from blame, for the blame in question would never arise.

Objection : But as identified with the vital force, he does eat the food of even worms, insects, etc.

Reply : True, but there is no scriptural prohibition regarding it. So it would be quite in order, like the Palāśa flower (*Butea Frondosa*), which is naturally red. Hence it would be meaningless to say that he is allowed to eat everything as the vital force, for the eating of everything would not in that case amount to a blame. But the prohibition is with regard to the sage in relation to a particular body, and no exception has been made in his favour. Therefore he will certainly incur blame if he transgresses that prohibition, for the passage, 'He never happens to eat anything that is not food,' has a different meaning.

Moreover, the meditation on everything as the food of the vital force is being enjoined here not for the vital force as associated with the body of a Brāhmaṇa etc., but for the vital force in general. Just as, although everything may be food for the vital force in a general way, some kind of food helps to sustain the life of certain creatures, as poison does for the worm born in it, but it would do palpable harm in the form of death etc. to others in spite of its being the food of the vital force, similarly, although everything is food for the vital force, yet, if it eats forbidden food while associated with the body of a Brāhmaṇa etc., it will certainly incur blame. Therefore it is entirely mis-

leading to think that the eating of forbidden food is harmless.

'And water that is drunk will stand for your dress.' Here too we are enjoined to look upon water as the dress of the vital force. It cannot of course be used as dress. Therefore the natural act of drinking water should be meditated upon as dressing the vital force. *He who knows the food of the vital force to be such*—that everything is its food—*never happens to eat anything that is not food.* Even if he eats something that should not be eaten, that too becomes regular food, and he is not touched by the blame due to it. It is a eulogy on this meditation, as we have said. Similarly he never happens *to accept anything that is not food.* Even if he accepts something that is forbidden, an elephant, for example, that too becomes the kind of food that it is allowable to accept. There too he is not touched by the blame of accepting something that is unacceptable—which is also said by way of eulogy. The result of the meditation, however, is identification with the vital force, for what has just been stated is not meant to be a result of the meditation, but simply a eulogy on it.

Objection: Why should not this itself be the result?

Reply: It cannot, for he who sees the vital force as his own self attains identity with it as its result. And since he is identified with the vital force, and has thus become the self of all, even a forbidden food becomes allowable food; similarly even unacceptable

gifts become acceptable. This is a eulogy[1] on the meditation, taking the acts just as they occur in life. Hence that passage has not the force of an injunction directed to a definite result.

Since water is the dress of the vital force, *therefore wise men,* Brāhmaṇas, *who are versed in the Vedas sip a little water just before and after eating.* What do they mean by it? This is being stated: *They regard it as removing the nakedness of the vital force.* It is a fact that a person giving a dress to another thinks that he is removing the nakedness of the latter ; and it has already been said that water is the dress of the vital force. The passage means that while drinking water one should think that one is giving a dress to the vital force.

Objection : But a person sips water just before and after meals with the object of purification. If that also means removing the nakedness of the vital force, the act of sipping would have a double effect. But one and the same act of sipping should not have a double effect. If it is for purification, it is not for dressing the vital force, and *vice versa.* Under the circumstances there should be another sipping of water to dress the vital force.

Reply : No, for it can be explained by the twofoldness of the action. These are two separate actions. The sipping of water by one before and after eating enjoined by the Smṛti is for the sake of purification, and is simply an act ; there the purification does not

[1] As a matter of fact, such acts are just as much forbidden for this sage as for any other person.

require any meditation etc. Here we are enjoined to look upon the water that forms part of the act of sipping as dress for the vital force. But if that is done, it will not contradict the purpose of purification attaching to the act of sipping, for it will be a different act (from meditation). Therefore in the act of sipping water before and after eating, we are simply enjoined to meditate upon the water as being the dress of the vital force. It is an injunction, since it is not known from any other source.

SECTION II

The connection of the present section beginning with, 'Śvetaketu, the grandson of Aruṇa, came,' etc., with the preceding portion of the book is this: This is a supplementary section, and what was left out before is now being stated. At the end of the fifth chapter, the person who combines rites and meditation is begging the fire for a passage: 'O Fire, lead us along the good way,' etc. Now the Mantra seems to suggest that there are many ways, for it has specified 'the good way'; and these ways are the routes by which one obtains the results of one's deeds. It will be said later on, 'Doing which,' etc. (VI. ii. 2). Naturally one may ask how many these routes are. Hence the present section is introduced to bring together all the different ways of transmigration, to show that they are just so many, and that these are the results of one's natural actions, as well as of rites combined with meditation that are enjoined by the scriptures. Although in the passage, 'Two classes of Prajāpati's sons,' etc. (I. iii. 1), the natural form of evil has been indicated, yet its results have not been particularly pointed out. Only the results of rites performed in accordance with the scriptures have been shown there in the passage concluding with the identification with the three kinds of food ; for in commencing the pursuit of the knowledge of Brahman, an aversion to these also is considered necessary. Even there it has only

been said that mere rites lead to the world of the Manes, and meditation as well as rites combined with it leads to heaven. It has not been stated which way leads to the world of the Manes, and which to heaven. That too has to be fully stated in this supplementary section, which is therefore being taken up. It is also desirable to bring all things together at the conclusion of the Upaniṣad.

Moreover, it has been said that 'this much is (the means of) immortality' (IV. v. 15, adapted), and that there is no hope of immortality through rites (II. iv. 2 and IV. v. 3, adapted). But no reason has been given for it. For that purpose too the present section is introduced. It suggests a reason through implication. Because such is the goal of rites, which have nothing to do with immortality, therefore this much (i.e. Self-knowledge), alone is the means of attaining it. Besides, it has been stated elsewhere in the portion dealing with the Agnihotra, 'But certainly you do not know the departure of these two oblations, or their route, or stay, or enjoyment, or return to this world, or the person who is about to depart for the next world' (Ś. XI. vi. ii. 4). In the answer to them, the effects of the oblations have been described in the words, 'These two oblations, after being offered, depart,' etc. (Ibid. 6-7). These are in reality the results of the offering of oblations by the agent, the performer of the Agnihotra ; for without being connected with the agent, the act of offering oblations cannot be presumed independently to produce those effects such as departure, since an act produces effects only for the benefit of the

agent, and it also depends on certain factors (of which the agent is the chief one). The passage in question being a eulogy on the Agnihotra, the sixfold effect has there been attributed to that. But here all that is stated to belong to the agent, for the topic to be expounded here is the knowledge of the results of rites; and through that the Śruti wishes to enjoin here the meditation on the five fires that are the means of getting access to the northern way. Thus the different ways of transmigration will all be summed up. This is the highest result of rites. Hence with a view to showing these two the Śruti introduces the following story.

श्वेतकेतुर्ह वा आरुणेयः पञ्चालानां परिषदमाजगाम ; स आजगाम जैवलिं प्रवाहणं परिचारयमाणम् ; तमुदीक्ष्याभ्युवाद, कुमारा३ इति ; स भो३ इति प्रतिशुश्राव ; अनुशिष्टोऽन्वसि पित्रेति ; ओमिति होवाच ॥ १ ॥

1. Śvetaketu, the grandson of Aruṇa, came to the assembly of the Pañcālas.[1] He approached Pravāhaṇa, the son of Jīvala, who was being waited on (by his servants). Seeing him the King addressed him, 'Boy!' He replied, 'Yes.' 'Have you been taught by your father?' He said, 'Yes.'

Śvetaketu, the grandson of Aruṇa, after being taught by his father, *came to the assembly of the Pañcālas* to display his learning. The Pañcālas were

[1] The same topic is also discussed in sections three to ten of the fifth chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

famous (for their learning). With the proud idea of conquering first their assembly, and then the royal court, *he approached Pravāhaṇa, the son of Jīvala,* and the King of Pañcāla, *who was being waited on* by his servants. The particle 'ha' refers to a past incident, and 'vai' indicates certainty. The King had already heard of his pride of learning, and wished to teach him a lesson. *Seeing him,* he *addressed him* as soon as he arrived, *'Boy!'* The prolongation of the accent in the address is expressive of censure. Thus addressed, *he replied, 'Yes, sir.'*[1] Though a Kṣatriya is not entitled to this form of address, he used it in anger. The King said, *'Have you been taught by your father?'* The other *said,* 'Yes, I have. If you are in doubt, you can question me.'

वेत्थ यथेमाः प्रजाः प्रयत्यो विप्रतिपद्यन्ता३ इति; नेति होवाच; वेत्थो यथेमं लोकं पुनरापद्यन्ता३ इति; नेति हैवोवाच; वेत्थो यथासौ लोक एवं बहुभिः पुनः पुनः प्रयद्भिर्न संपूर्यता३ इति; नेति हैवोवाच; वेत्थो यतिथ्यामाहुत्यां हुतायामापः पुरुषवाचो भूत्वा समुत्थाय वदन्ती३ इति; नेति हैवोवाच; वेत्थो देवयानस्य वा पथः प्रतिपदम्, पितृयाणस्य वा—यत्कृत्वा देवयानं वा पन्थानं प्रतिपद्यन्ते, पितृयाणं वा? अपि हि न ऋषेर्वचः श्रुतम्—

द्वे सृती अशृणवं पितृणा-
महं देवानामुत मर्त्यानाम्,

[1] The word 'Bhoḥ' (sir) is used in addressing a Brāhmaṇa teacher.

ताभ्यामिदं विश्वमेजत्समेति,
यदन्तरा पितरं मातरं च ॥ इति ;
नाहमत एकंचन वेदेति होवाच ॥ २ ॥

2. 'Do you know how these people diverge after death?' 'No,' said he. 'Do you know how they return to this world?' 'No,' said he. 'Do you know how the other world is never filled by so many people dying thus again and again?' 'No,' said he. 'Do you know after how many oblations are offered water (the liquid offerings) rises up possessed of a human voice (or under the name of man) and speaks?' 'No,' said he. 'Do you know the means of access to the way of the gods, or that to the way of the Manes—doing which people attain either the way of the gods or the way of the Manes? We have heard the words of the Mantra: "I have heard of two routes for men, leading to the Manes and the gods. Going along them all this is united. They lie between the father and the mother (earth and heaven)."[1]' He said, 'I know not one of them.'

'Well then, *do you know how these* familiar *people diverge after death?* The prolongation of the final accent in the verb suggests deliberation. 'While going along the same route they come to a point where the roads split ; some take the one, and some the other ; this is the divergence. Do you know how these people are divided?'—this is the idea. *'No,'*

[1] Ṛ X. lxxxviii. 15.

said the other. 'Then *do you know how they return to this world?*' '*No,*' *said* Śvetaketu. '*Do you know how the other world is never filled by so many people dying thus,* in the familiar way, *again and again?*' '*No,*' *said he.* '*Do you know after how many oblations are offered water rises up,* appears perfectly, *possessed of a human voice* (or *under the name of man*) *and speaks?*' This happens when it takes a human form. '*No,*' *said he.* 'Very well. But *do you know the means of access to the way of the gods, or that to the way of the Manes*—in other words, the kind of (ritualistic) work *doing which people attain either the way of the gods or the way of the Manes?*' The latter part of the sentence explains the word 'Pratipad' (means of access). That is to say, do you know the means of attaining the two worlds?

'*We have heard the words of the Mantra* that express this sense.' That is, there is a Mantra too expressing this idea. What is that Mantra? It is this: *I have heard of two routes.* One of them leads *to the Manes,* is connected with the world of the Manes; that is, one attains the world of the Manes through that way.—The word 'Aham' (I) agrees with the verb 'Aśṛṇavam' (have heard), which is separated by the word 'Pitṛṇām.'—And another is related *to the gods;* it leads to the gods. Who go by those two routes to the Manes and the gods? This is being answered: *For,* or relating to, *men.* That is, men only go by those routes. *Going along* those two routes *all this*[1] *is*

[1] The universe as means and end. The routes connect this world with the next world, and departed spirits travel along them to their destination.

united; and those two routes *lie between the father and the mother.* Who are they? The two halves of the shell of the universe consisting of heaven and earth. The Brāhmaṇa gives the following explanation of the words: 'This (earth) is the mother, and that (heaven) is the father' (Ś. XIII. ii. ix. 7; Tai. B. III. viii. ix. 1). These two routes are within the two halves of the universe and hence belong to the relative world. They cannot lead to absolute immortality. Śvetaketu *said, 'I know not one of* this set of questions.'

अथैनं वसत्योपमन्त्रयांचक्रे ; अनादृत्य वसतिं कुमारः प्रदुद्राव ; स आजगाम पितरम् ; तं होवाच, इति वाव किल नो भवान्पुरानुशिष्टानवोच इति ; कथं सुमेध इति ; पञ्च मा प्रश्नान् राजन्यबन्धुरप्राक्षीत्, ततो नैकंचन वेदेति ; कतमे त इति ; इम इति ह प्रतीकान्युदाजहार ॥ ३ ॥

3. Then the King invited him to stay. The boy, disregarding the invitation to stay, hurried away. He came to his father and said to him, 'Well, did you not tell me before that you had (fully) instructed me?' 'How (did you get hurt), my sagacious child?' 'That wretch of a Kṣatriya asked me five questions, and I knew not one of them.' 'Which are they?' 'These,' and he quoted their first words.

Then, after he had removed his pride of learning, *the King invited him,* Śvetaketu, who is being discussed, *to stay,* saying, 'Please stay here. Let water be brought for washing your feet, and the customary

offering to respected guests be *made.' The boy,* Śvetaketu, *disregarding the invitation to stay, hurried away* to his father. *He came to his father and said to him, 'Well, did you not tell me before,* at the time of my finishing the study, *that you had instructed me* in every branch of learning?' Hearing the reproachful words of his son, the father said, *'How* did you get hurt, i.e. come by your grief, *my sagacious child?'* He said, 'Listen what happened to me. *That wretch of a Kṣatriya*—lit. an associate of the Kṣatriyas; a term of reproach—*asked me five questions, and I knew not one of them. 'Which are they*—those questions asked by the King?' inquired the father. To which the son replied, *'These,' and he quoted* the *first words* of those questions.

स होवाच, तथा नस्त्वं तात जानीथा यथा यदहं किंच वेद सर्वमहं तत्तुभ्यमवोचम्; प्रेहि तु तत्र प्रतीत्य ब्रह्मचर्यं वत्स्याव इति; भवानेव गच्छत्विति; स आजगाम गौतमो यत्र प्रवाहणस्य जैवलेरास; तस्मा आसनमाहृत्योदकमाहारयांचकार, अथ हास्मा अर्घ्यं चकार; तं होवाच, वरं भगवते गौतमाय दद्म इति ॥ ४ ॥

4. The father said, 'My child, believe me, whatever I knew I told you every bit of it. But come, let us go there and live as students.' 'You go alone, please.' At this Gautama came to where King Pravāhaṇa, the son of Jīvala, was giving audience. The King gave him a seat, had water brought for him, and made him the

reverential offering. Then he said, 'We will give revered Gautama, a boon.'

The father, to soothe his angry child, *said, 'My child, believe me, whatever* of meditations *I knew, I told you every bit of it.* Who is dearer to me than you, for whom I would withhold anything? I too do not know what the King asked about. Therefore *come, let us go there and live as students* with the King, to learn it.' The boy said, *'You go alone, please,* I do not care to see his face.' *At this Gautama,* i.e. Āruṇi, who was descended from the line of Gotama, *came to where King Pravāhaṇa, the son of Jīvala,* was holding a sitting, or *giving audience.* Or the genitive case in the two words in the text (denoting the King's name) should be changed into the nominative. *The King gave him a* respectable *seat, had water brought for him,* his guest Gautama, through servants, *and made him the reverential offering* (Arghya) through his priest, as also the Madhuparka[1] with sacred texts uttered. Having thus worshipped him, *he said* to him, *'We will give to revered Gautama a boon,'* consisting of cows, horses, etc.

स होवाच, प्रतिज्ञातो म एष वरः, यां तु कुमारस्यान्ते वाचमभाषथास्तां मे ब्रूहीति ॥ ५ ॥

5. Āruṇi said, 'You have promised me this boon. Please tell me what you spoke to my boy about.'

[1] An offering consisting of honey, curds, etc.

Gautama *said, 'You have promised me this boon.* Make yourself firm in this promise. *Please tell me what you spoke to my boy,* or son, *about*—those questions. This is my boon.'

स होवाच, दैवेषु वै गौतम तद्वरेषु, मानुषाणां ब्रूहीति ॥ ६ ॥

6. The King said, 'This comes under heavenly boons, Gautama. Please ask some human boon.'

The King said, 'This, what you ask, *comes under heavenly boons. Please ask some human boon.'*

स होवाच, विज्ञायते हास्ति हिरण्यस्यापात्तं गोअश्वानां दासीनां प्रवाराणां परिधानस्य, मा नो भवान्बहोरनन्तस्यापर्यन्तस्याभ्यवदान्यो भूदिति ; स वै गौतम तीर्थेनेच्छासा इति ; उपैम्यहं भवन्तमिति ; वाचा ह स्मैव पूर्व उपयन्ति, स होपायनकीर्त्योवास ॥ ७ ॥

7. Āruṇi said, 'You know that I already have gold, cattle and horses, maid-servants, retinue, and dress. Be not ungenerous towards me alone regarding this plentiful, infinite and inexhaustible (wealth).' 'Then you must seek it according to form, Gautama.' 'I approach you (as a student).' The ancients used to approach a teacher simply through declaration. Āruṇi lived as a student by merely announcing that he was at his service.

Gautama *said, 'You* too *know that* I have them. So the human boon that you propose to give me will do me no good. Because *I* too *already have* plenty of *gold, cattle and horses, maid-servants, retinue, and dress.'* The words 'Apāttam asti' (there is attainment) should be connected with all the terms. 'And what I already have, neither I should ask of you, nor you should give me. You have promised me a boon. You alone know what is proper under the circumstances—that you should keep your promise. I have also another thing on my mind: Having been generous everywhere, *be not ungenerous,* stingy, *towards me alone regarding this wealth—plentiful, infinite,* i.e. producing such results, *and inexhaustible,* i.e. reaching down to one's sons and grandsons. You should not deny such wealth to me alone. You will not deny it to anybody else.' Thus addressed, the King said, *'Then you must seek* to have this learning *according to form,* that prescribed by the scriptures.' At this Gautama said, *'I approach you* as a student.' *The ancients*—Brāhmaṇas seeking instruction from Kṣatriyas or Vaiśyas, or Kṣatriyas seeking it from Vaiśyas, as a matter of necessity—*used to approach a teacher simply through declaration,* not by actually approaching his feet or serving him. Hence Gautama *lived as a student by merely announcing that he was at his service,* without actually approaching the King's feet.

स होवाच, तथा नस्त्वं गौतम मापराधास्तव च पितामहा यथा, इयं विद्येतः पूर्वं न कस्मिंश्चन ब्राह्मण

उवास ; तां त्वहं तुभ्यं वक्ष्यामि, को हि त्वैवं ब्रुवन्तमर्हति प्रत्याख्यातुमिति ॥ ८ ॥

8. The King said: Please do not take offence with us, Gautama, as your paternal grandfathers did not (with ours). Before this, this learning never rested with a Brāhmaṇa. But I shall teach it to you; for who can refuse you when you speak like this?

When Gautama thus declared his preference for this unavoidable humiliation to ignorance, *the King,* thinking that he was hurt, *said* begging his pardon: *Please do not take offence with us, Gautama, as your paternal grandfathers did not* with ours. That is to say, you should observe that attitude of your grandfathers towards us. Know that *before this* transmission to you, *this learning* that you have asked for *never rested with a Brāhmaṇa.* It has all along come down through a line of Kṣatriya teachers. I too should, if possible, maintain that tradition. Hence I said, 'This comes under heavenly boons, Gautama. Please ask some human boon' (VI. ii. 6). But it cannot be maintained any more, for your boon cannot be withheld. *I shall teach* even this learning *to you ; for who* else even *can refuse you when you speak like this?* Then why should I not teach it to you?

असौ वै लोकोऽग्निर्गौतम ; तस्यादित्य एव समित्, रश्मयो धूमः, अहरर्चिः, दिशोऽङ्गाराः, अवान्तरदिशो विस्फुलिङ्गाः ; तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन्नग्नौ देवाः, श्रद्धां जुह्वति ; तस्या आहुत्यै सोमो राजा संभवति ॥ ९ ॥

9. That world (heaven), O Gautama, is fire, the sun is its fuel, the rays its smoke, the day its flame, the four quarters its cinder, and the intermediate quarters its sparks. In this fire the gods offer faith (liquid oblations in subtle form). Out of that offering King Moon is born (a body is made in the moon for the sacrificer).

'That world, O Gautama, is fire,' etc. The fourth question is being answered first. The order of the question is broken, because on the solution of this question depends that of the others. *That world,* heaven, *O Gautama, is fire.* We are enjoined to look upon heaven, which is not fire, as fire, as in the case of man and woman later on. Of that fire, heaven, *the sun is the fuel,* because of the kindling, for heaven is illumined by the sun. *The rays its smoke,* because of the similarity of rising from the fuel, for the rays emanate from the sun, and smoke, as we know, comes out of the fuel. *The day its flame,* because both are bright. *The four quarters its cinder,* because both represent a pacified state.[1] *The intermediate quarters its sparks,* because they are scattered like sparks. *In this fire* of heaven, possessed of such attributes, *the gods,* Indra etc., *offer faith* as an oblation. *Out of that offering King Moon,* King of the Manes and Brāhmaṇas, *is born.*

Now who are the gods, how do they offer oblations, and what is this oblation called faith? We have just touched on this point elsewhere in our introductory

[1] Space, like cinder, has no heat or lustre.

remarks on this section (p. 886). In order to ascertain the six things referred to by the words, 'But certainly you do not know the departure of these two oblations,' etc., certain things have been stated in the portion dealing with the Agnihotra. These are some of the statements: 'These two oblations of the Agnihotra, after being offered, depart. They enter the sky, of which they make an Āhavanīya fire,[1] with air as its fuel, and the sun's rays its white oblation. They offer libations to the sky and depart from there. They enter heaven, of which they make an Āhavanīya fire, with the sun as its fuel,' and so on (Ś. XI. vi. ii. 6-7). Of course these oblations of the Agnihotra depart together with their accessories. Whatever accessories they are known to possess here, such as the Āhavanīya fire, fuel, smoke, cinder, sparks and the articles of oblation, they take along with them as they leave this world for heaven. There, although everything is in an undifferentiated state during the dissolution of the world, those ingredients retain their separate existence in an extremely subtle form—the fire remaining as fire, the fuel as fuel, the smoke as smoke, the cinder as cinder, the sparks as sparks and the articles of oblation as articles of oblation such as milk. That ceremony of the Agnihotra with its accessories, which never ceases to exist, but remains in a subtle form known as the Apūrva,[2] reappears in its old form at the time of manifestation, by making use of the sky etc. as the

[1] The chief of the three Vedic sacrificial fires which the upper three castes are regularly required to tend. The oblations to the *gods* are offered in it.

[2] See footnote on p. 387.

Āhavanīya fire and so on as before. The ceremony of the Agnihotra is like that even to-day.

Thus the nature of those six things beginning with the departure of the oblations and ending with the departure of the sacrificer for the next world, has been ascertained earlier in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, in the portion dealing with rites, and it has been stated that it is with a view to eulogising those two oblations of the Agnihotra that the whole universe has been described as being the development of the Apūrva of those oblations. But here the object is to describe the results of the sacrificer's rites and to enjoin meditation on the five fires beginning with the fire of heaven, as a means to attaining the northern way, in order that he may enjoy the results of specific rites; hence the meditation on heaven as fire etc. is introduced. It should be noted that those forms of the vital force in the body that serve as priests in the Agnihotra here, become Indra etc. on attaining their form relating to the gods, and they serve as priests there, offering oblations in the fire of heaven. They (as a part of the sacrificer) performed the Agnihotra here with a view to attaining its results, and it is they who, at the time of reaping the results, also become priests in different places in the next world, assuming suitable forms, and being called by the name of gods. The liquid substances too, which, forming a part of the Agnihotra ceremony, are here poured into the Āhavanīya fire and are devoured by it, assume an invisible, subtle form

and accompany the agent, the sacrificer, to the other world, going through smoke etc. first to the sky and thence to heaven. When those subtle liquid substances —which are the effects of the act of offering. form a part of the Agnihotra, and are known as 'faith'—enter heaven with the agent, to construct a new body for him in the lunar sphere, they are said to be offered as oblations. Entering heaven, they produce a body for the agent in the lunar sphere. This is referred to in the passage: *The gods offer faith. Out of that offering King Moon is born;* for the Śruti says, 'Faith is water' (Tai. S. I. vi. viii. i).

The question was, 'Do you know after how many oblations are offered water rises up possessed of a human voice and speaks?' (par. 2). In order to answer it, the statement has been made: 'That world is fire.' Therefore it is clear that the liquid substances which form a part of the sacrifice and produce the body of the agent are designated as 'faith.' 'Water' only is mentioned as rising up possessed of a human voice, on account of the preponderance of liquid elements in the body, not that the other four elements are absent in it. The formation of the body is due to the performance of the Agnihotra, and liquid substances are a part of it. Hence water (as typifying liquids) is the most important factor in the formation of the body. This is another reason why it is spoken of as 'rising up possessed of a human voice,' for everywhere it is the sacrificer who has a rebirth. So, although in the portion dealing with the Agnihotra the six things such

as the departure of the two oblations have been mentioned so as to glorify the oblations of the Agnihotra alone, yet all Vedic rites such as the Agnihotra are meant ; for after introducing rites with five factors, which are connected with the wife and fire, it has been said, 'The world of the Manes (is to be won) through rites' (I. v. 16.). It will also be stated later on, 'While those who conquer the worlds through sacrifices, charity and austerity,' etc. (par. 16).

पर्जन्यो वा अग्निर्गौतम ; तस्य संवत्सर एव समित्, अभ्राणि धूमः, विद्युदर्चिः, अशनिरङ्गाराः, ह्रादुनयो विस्फुलिङ्गाः ; तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन्नग्नौ देवाः सोमं राजानं जुह्वति ; तस्या आहुत्यै वृष्टिः संभवति ॥ १० ॥

10. Parjanya (the god of rain), O Gautama, is fire, the year is its fuel, the clouds its smoke, lightning its flame, thunder its cinder, and the rumblings its sparks. In this fire the gods offer King Moon. Out of that offering rain is produced.

Parjanya, O Gautama, is fire, the second receptacle of the two oblations in the order of their return. Parjanya is a god identifying himself with the materials of rain. *The year is its fuel,* for this fire of Parjanya is kindled by that as it revolves with its parts commencing with autumn and ending with summer. *The clouds its smoke,* being produced from smoke, or because of its cloudy appearance. *Lightning its flame,* since

both are luminous. *Thunder its cinder,* because both represent a pacified state and are hard. *The rumblings* of the clouds *its sparks,* because both scatter and are numerous. *In this* receptacle of the two oblations *the gods,* those very priests mentioned above, *offer King Moon,* who was produced out of the offering of 'faith' in the fire of heaven ; he is offered in the second fire, that of Parjanya, and *out of that offering* of the moon *rain is produced.*

अयं वै लोकोऽग्निर्गौतम ; तस्य पृथिव्येव समित्, अग्निर्धूमः, रात्रिरर्चिः, चन्द्रमा अङ्गाराः, नक्षत्राणि विस्फुलिङ्गाः ; तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन्नग्नौ देवा वृष्टिं जुह्वति ; तस्या आहुत्या अन्नं संभवति ॥ ११ ॥

11. This world, O Gautama, is fire, the earth is its fuel, fire its smoke, the night its flame, the moon its cinder, and the stars its sparks. In this fire the gods offer rain. Out of that offering food is produced.

This world, O Gautama, is fire. 'This world' means the abode where all creatures are born and experience the results of their past work, and which consists of action, its factors and its results ; it is the third fire. *The earth is* the *fuel* of that fire, for this world[1] is kindled by the earth, which is provided with numerous materials for the enjoyment of living beings.

[1] 'This world' and 'the earth' stand to each other in the relation of a person and his body.

Fire its smoke, for both rise from their abode, earth ; because fire is produced out of the fuel, which preponderates in earth, and smoke too arises from the same source. *The night its flume,* because both originate from the contact of fuel. As a flame is produced by the contact of fuel with fire, so is the night by the contact of the fuel of the earth, for the earth's shadow is called the darkness of night.[1] *The moon its cinder,* both being produced from flames ; for cinder is produced from flames, and so is the moon in the night ; or because both represent a pacified state. *The stars its sparks,* because both scatter. *In this,* etc. —to be explained as before—(*the gods*) *offer rain. Out of that offering food is produced,* for it is well-known fact that food such as rice and barley is produced from rain.

पुरुषो वा अग्निर्गौतम ; तस्य व्यात्तमेव समित्, प्राणो धूमः, वागर्चिः, चक्षुरङ्गाराः, श्रोत्रं विस्फुलिङ्गाः ; तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन्नग्नौ देवा अन्नं जुह्वति ; तस्या आहुत्यै रेतः संभवति ॥ १२ ॥

12. Man, O Gautama, is fire, the open mouth is its fuel, the vital force its smoke, speech its flame, the eye its cinder, and the ear its sparks. In this fire the gods offer food. Out of that offering the seed is produced.

Man, O Gautama, is fire. The familiar human

[1] Which is caused by a part of the earth obstructing the sun's rays.

being with a head, hands, etc., is the fourth fire. *The open mouth is its fuel,* for through it a man is kindled (shines) in speech, study of the Vedas, etc., as fire is with fuel. *The vital force its smoke,* both rising from the same source, for the vital force rises from the mouth. *Speech* or the word *its flame, for both reveal.* A flame reveals things, and speech or the word signifies its object. *The eye its cinder,* because both represent a pacified state, or are the sources of light. *The ear its sparks,* owing to the similarity of scattering. *In this fire (the gods) offer food.* One may say, we do not see any gods here offering food. The answer is, that is no objection, for the forms of the vital force can be taken as gods. With reference to the deities, Indra and others are the gods; in the body the same are the forms of the vital force and they put food into a man. *Out of that offering the seed is produced,* for it is the outcome of food.

योषा वा अग्निर्गौतम ; तस्या उपस्थ एव समित्, लोमानि धूमः, योनिरर्चिः, यदन्तः करोति तेऽङ्गाराः, अभिनन्दा विस्फुलिङ्गाः ; तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन्नग्नौ देवा रेतो जुह्वति ; तस्या आहुत्यै पुरुषः संभवति ; स जीवति यावज्जीवति, अथ यदा म्रियते ॥ १३ ॥

13. Woman, O Gautama, is fire. In this fire the gods offer the seed. Out of that offering a man is born. He lives as long as he is destined to live. Then, when he dies—

Woman, O Gautama, is fire, the fifth one to serve as the receptacle of the sacrifice. *In that fire the gods*

offer the seed. Out of that offering a man is born. Thus water (liquids), designated as 'faith,' being successively offered in the fires of heaven, rain-god, this world, man and woman, in the increasingly grosser forms of faith, moon, rain, food and seed respectively, produce what we call man. The fourth question, 'Do you know after how many oblations are offered water rises up possessed of a human voice and speaks?' (par. 2), has been thus answered, viz. that when the fifth oblation is offered in the fire of woman, water, transformed into the seed, becomes possessed of a human voice. *He,* that man, born in this order, *lives.* How long? *As long as he is destined to live,* i.e. as long as the resultant of his past work, which makes him stay in this body, lasts. *Then,* on the exhaustion of that, *when he dies*—

अथैनमग्नये हरन्ति ; तस्याग्निरेवाग्निर्भवति, समित्समित्, धूमो धूमः, अर्चिरर्चिः, अङ्गारा अङ्गाराः, विस्फुलिङ्गा विस्फुलिङ्गाः ; तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन्नग्नौ देवाः पुरुषं जुह्वति ; तस्या आहुत्यै पुरुषो भास्वरवर्णः संभवति ॥ १४ ॥

14. They carry him to be offered in the fire. The fire becomes his fire, the fuel his fuel, the smoke his smoke, the flame his flame, the cinder his cinder, and the sparks his sparks. In this fire the gods offer the man. Out of that offering the man emerges radiant.

Then the priests *carry him,* the dead man, *to be offered in the fire. The* well-known *fire becomes his*

fire, the receptacle for the sacrifice in which he himself is to be the oblation ; no new fire is to be imagined. *The* familiar *fuel his fuel, the smoke his smoke, the flame his flame, the cinder his cinder, and the sparks his sparks.* All these familiar objects are meant. *In this fire the gods offer the man* as the last oblation. *Out of that offering the man emerges radiant,* exceedingly bright, having been purified by all the rites performed from conception to the funeral ceremony.

ते य एवमेतद्विदुः, ये चामी अरण्ये श्रद्धां सत्यमुपासते, तेऽर्चिरभिसंभवन्ति, अर्चिषोऽहः, अह्न आपूर्यमाणपक्षम्, आपूर्यमाणपक्षाद्यान्षण्मासानुदङ्ङादित्य एति ; मासेभ्यो देवलोकम्, देवलोकादादित्यम्, आदित्याद्वैद्युतम् ; तान्वैद्युतान्पुरुषो मानस एत्य ब्रह्मलोकान् गमयति ; ते तेषु ब्रह्मलोकेषु पराः परावतो वसन्ति ; तेषां न पुनरावृत्तिः ॥ १५ ॥

15. Those who know this as such, and those others who meditate with faith upon the Satya-Brahman in the forest, reach the deity identified with the flame, from him the deity of the day, from him the deity of the fortnight in which the moon waxes, from him the deities of the six months in which the sun travels northward, from them the deity identified with the world of the gods, from him the sun, and from the sun the deity of lightning. (Then) a being created from the mind (of Hiraṇyagarbha) comes and conducts

them to the worlds of Hiraṇyagarbha. They attain perfection and live in those worlds of Hiraṇyagarbha for a great many superfine years. They no more return to this world.

Now in order to answer the first question it is being stated: *Those who know this* meditation on the five fires *as such,* as described above—the word 'such' refers to the five fires described in terms of fire, fuel, smoke, flame, cinder, sparks, faith (liquid offerings), etc., so the meaning is—those who know these five fires as above.

Objection: Is not this meditation the same as that on the two oblations of the Agnihotra? For there, in the course of the discussion on the six things such as the departure of the two oblations, it has been stated, 'They make heaven itself the Āhavanīya fire,' etc. Here too there are many points of similarity, as for example the other world is fire, the sun is the fuel, and so on. Therefore this meditation is just a part of that.

Reply: No, because this is an answer to the question, 'After how many oblations are offered,' etc. So the word 'such' must refer to that much only which is covered by the answer to this question. Otherwise the question would be useless. Now, since the number of the fires is already known,[1] the fires themselves are to be described here.

Objection: Suppose we say that the fires and so forth are known, but are merely repeated here.

[1] In the portion dealing with the Agnihotra.

Reply: In that case, they must be repeated as they occur there, not in such terms as, 'That world is fire.'[1]

Objection: The mention of heaven etc. is suggestive of the remaining items.

Reply: Even then the first and last items should be quoted to suggest the rest. Another Śruti bears out our contention. In a section of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad treating of the same subject there are the words, 'Those who know the five fires,' (V. x. 10), which shows that the number of the fires is fixed as five. Therefore this meditation on the five fires cannot be a part of the Agnihotra.[2] The similarity as regards the fire, fuel, etc., to which you referred is, as we have said, only for the sake of extolling the Agnihotra. Therefore a mere knowledge of the six things such as the departure of the oblations will not lead to the attainment of the deities of the flame etc., for this has been enjoined through a knowledge of the five fires that are being discussed, as is evident from the use of the word 'such' in the text.

But who are 'those who know this as such'? The householders,[3] of course. One may object: Is it not the purpose of the Śruti to enjoin that they by

[1] There are discrepancies. The sky, for instance, is omitted, and so on.

[2] Because in that case the fire in which the first offerings are made would begin the series, thus making the number six.

[3] Representing the second of the four orders of life. The other three orders are represented by students (who come first), hermits and monks.

means of sacrifices etc. are to attain the southern way characterised by the deity of smoke and so on? The answer is: Not so; for there may be householders not knowing the five fires for whom sacrifices etc. are enjoined as means. Besides, the hermit and the monk have been indirectly mentioned, for they are connected with the forest; and the meditation on the five fires is connected with rites that only a householder can perform. Hence students also are meant by the words, 'Who know this as such.' They enter the northern way, as we know on the authority of the Smṛti, 'Eighty-eight thousand sages who led a celibate life attained (relative) immortality through the northern route of the sun' (cf. Viṣ. II. viii. 92, 94). Therefore those householders who know as above, that they are born of fire, are children of fire—who know that they have been born out of a number of fires in this order, and are but another form of fire, *and those others who meditate with*—not upon—*faith upon the Satya-Brahman,*[1] or Hiraṇyagarbha, *in the forest,* in other words, the hermits and monks who constantly live in the forest, all *reach the deity identified with the flame.*

As long as the householders do not know either the meditation on the five fires or the Satya-Brahman, they are born from the fire of woman when the fifth oblation beginning with that of faith (the liquids) has been offered in order, and again perform rites like the Agnihotra, with a view to attaining the other world. Through those rites they again go to the world of the Manes, passing in order the deity of smoke etc., and

[1] See V. iv. 1 and V. v. 1-2.

again return, passing in order the rain-god and so forth. Then they are again born of the fire of woman, again perform rites, and so on, thus rotating constantly like a Persian wheel[1] by their comings and goings between this world and the next. But when they know the meditation on the five fires, they are freed from this rotation and *reach the flame*. The 'flame' here does not mean a tongue of fire, but the deity identified with the flame and called by that name, who is stationed in the northern route. They reach him, for monks have no direct relation to the flame. Hence the word means the deity of that name. *From him the deity of the day.* Since there can be no restriction with regard to the time of death, the word 'day' also means the deity of the day. Death occurs as soon as the term of life is over ; one cannot make the rule that a knower of this meditation must die at daytime ; so the day cannot be fixed as such time. Nor do those who die at night wait for the day, for another Śruti says, 'He reaches the sun as quickly as the glance of the mind' (Ch. VIII. vi. 5).

From him the fortnight in which the moon waxes: That is, being conducted by the deity of the day, they reach the deity of the bright fortnight. *From him*, being conducted by the deity of the bright fortnight, they reach *the six months in which the sun travels northward*. The plural in the word 'months' indicates

[1] Ghaṭīyantra, a contrivance for drawing water from a well, in which a series of bowls are fixed to an endless chain which, when pulled, makes each bowl come up filled with water and get emptied at the top.

that a group of six deities identified with the northward journey of the sun is meant. *From them the world of the gods*: Being conducted by this group of deities, they reach the deity identified with the world of the gods. *From him* they reach *the sun, and from the sun the deity of, or* identified with, *lightning*. As they reach the deity of lightning, *a being created from the mind* of Hiraṇyagarbha, a denizen of his world, *comes and conducts them to the worlds of Hiraṇyagarbha*. The plural in the word 'worlds' indicates that there are higher and lower planes in that world, which is possible, as there may be differences of grade in meditations. Being conducted there by that being, *they attain perfection and live in those worlds of Hiraṇyagarbha for a great many superfine years*, i.e. many human cycles, which constitute the lifetime of Hiraṇyagarbha.[1] *They*, after reaching the world of Hiraṇyagarbha, *no more return to this world*, for the word 'here' occurs in the Mādhyandina recension.

Objection: The word 'here' just indicates a type, meaning this and similar worlds, as in the passage, 'The full-moon sacrifice should be performed on the next day.'

Reply: No, for then the qualifying word 'here' would be redundant. That is to say, if they did not return at all, the use of the word 'here' would be meaningless. In the passage cited, the fact that the sacrifice has to be performed on the next day would not be known, were it not mentioned; so the specifica-

[1] A human cycle or Kalpa consists of 432 million years and constitutes a day of Hiraṇyagarbha. He lives a hundred years according to this scale.

tion is all right. The term 'next day' has not been used there superfluously, on the ground (adduced by you) that it represents a type.[1] Only where the relevancy of a qualifying word is not to be found after investigation, is it proper to discard it as redundant; but not where the significance of the word is patent. Therefore we understand that they return after the lapse of the present cycle.

अथ ये यज्ञेन दानेन तपसा लोकाञ्जयन्ति ते धूममभिसंभवन्ति, धूमाद्रात्रिम्, रात्रेरपक्षीयमाणपक्षम्, अपक्षीयमाणपक्षाद्यान्षण्मासान्दक्षिणादित्य एति, मासेभ्यः पितृलोकम्, पितृलोकाच्चन्द्रम्; ते चन्द्रं प्राप्यान्नं भवन्ति, तांस्तत्र देवा यथा सोमं राजानमाप्यायस्वापक्षीयस्वेति, एवमेनांस्तत्र भक्षयन्ति; तेषां यदा तत्पर्यवैत्यथेममेवाकाशमभिनिष्पद्यन्ते, आकाशाद्वायुम्; वायोर्वृष्टिम्, वृष्टेः पृथिवीम्; ते पृथिवीं प्राप्यान्नं भवन्ति, ते पुनः पुरुषाग्नौ हूयन्ते, ततो योषाग्नौ जायन्ते लोकान्प्रत्युत्थायिनः; त एवमेवानुपरिवर्तन्ते; अथ य एतौ पन्थानौ न विदुस्ते कीटाः पतङ्गा यदिदं दन्दशूकम् ॥ १६ ॥ इति द्वितीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

16. While those who conquer the worlds through sacrifices, charity and austerity, reach the deity of smoke, from him the deity of the night, from him the deity of the fort-

[1] Meaning, any day. The question is, the Cāturmāsya sacrifice being performed on the full-moon day, when is the full-moon sacrifice to be performed? The Śruti decides it by saying that it should be performed on the next day. This

night in which the moon wanes, from him the deities of the six months in which the sun travels southward, from them the deity of the world of the Manes, and from him the moon. Reaching the moon they become food. There the gods enjoy them as the priests drink the shining Soma juice (gradually, saying, as it were), 'Flourish, dwindle.' And when their past work is exhausted, they reach (become like) this ether, from the ether air, from air rain, and from rain the earth. Reaching the earth they become food. Then they are again offered in the fire of man, thence in the fire of woman, whence they are born (and perform rites) with a view to going to other worlds. Thus do they rotate. While those others who do not know these two ways become insects and moths, and these frequently biting things (gnats and mosquitoes).

While those who do not know as above, who, knowing only the six things such as the departure of the two oblations connected with the Agnihotra, are mere ritualists, *who conquer the worlds*—the plural in 'worlds' suggests here also varieties of results—*through sacrifices* such as the Agnihotra, *charity,* the distribution of gifts among beggars outside the altar,

applies to all cases. Hence the term 'next day,' assuming that it represents a type, demarcates that particular day from all other days, and is therefore not superfluous. Similarly the word 'here' is significant, meaning that they return in another cycle.

and austerity such as Kṛcchra and Cāndrāyaṇa[1] without initiation etc.—also outside the altar—*reach smoke.* Here too, as in the northern route, the words 'smoke' etc. refer to deities. That is, they reach the deity of smoke. Here also the deities are conductors, as before. *From him the deity of the night, from him the deity of the fortnight in which the moon wanes, from him the deities of the six months in which the sun travels southward, from them the deity of the world of the Manes, and from him the moon. Reaching the moon they become food. There the gods enjoy them,* these ritualists who reaching the moon have become food, as masters do their servants—*as the priests* here *drink* in sacrifices *the shining Soma juice* (saying, as it were), *'Flourish, dwindle.'* The words 'flourish, dwindle' are not a sacred formula, but simply mean that priests frequently cheer up the Soma juice that is in the bowl, and gradually finish it by drinking—in other words, they drink it at intervals (not all at once). Similarly the gods too enjoy the ritualists who have got new bodies in the moon and have become the materials of their luxury, giving them frequent intervals of rest by rewarding them according to their past work. That is cheering them like cheering the Soma juice. *And when their past work*—sacrifices, charity, etc., that led them to the moon—*is exhausted, they reach this* well-known *ether.* The liquids called faith which were offered in the fire of heaven and took the form of the moon—with which a new watery body was built for

[1] Both these are penances consisting in fasting according to certain rules.

the ritualists, in the moon, for their enjoyment—melt on the expiry of the momentum of their past work, like a lump of ice in contact with sunshine. In that state they become fine and look like the ether. This is expressed by the words, 'They reach this ether.'

Then those ritualists, living with that kind of body in the sky, are blown hither and thither by the east-wind etc. This is what is meant by the words, *'From the ether air.' From air* they reach *rain.* This has been stated in the passage, 'They offer King Moon in the fire of the rain-god' (par. 10, adapted). Then they drop on *the earth* as rain. *Reaching the earth they become food* such as rice and barley. This has been expressed in the passage, 'In the fire of this world they offer rain. Out of that food is produced' (par. 11, adapted). *Then they* as food *are again offered in the fire of man,* an adult. *Thence* as the seed they are offered *in the fire of woman, whence they are born,* and perform rites such as the Agnihotra, *with a view to going to other worlds.* Then they move repeatedly between the moon and this world, passing in order the deity of smoke etc. *Thus do they,* these ritualists, continuously *rotate* in a circle like the Persian wheel, until they know Brahman so as to attain the northern way,[1] or immediate liberation. As it has been said, 'Thus does the man who desires (transmigrate)' (IV. iv. 6).

While those others who do not know these two ways, the northern and southern, i.e. do not practise

[1] Which leads to gradual liberation, depending on the continued spiritual practice of the aspirants.

either meditation or rites to attain the northern or the southern way—what do they become?—*become insects and moths, and these frequently biting things,* i.e. gnats and mosquitoes. Thus this last transmigratory existence is very painful, and it is extremely difficult for one who has fallen into it to get out of it again. So another Śruti says, 'They become these tiny creatures that come and go repeatedly, of which it has been said, as it were: Be born and die' (Ch. V. x. 8). The purport of the entire passage is that we must therefore try our best to give up our natural pursuit of work and knowledge, and practise those rites or meditations which are enjoined by the scriptures and are the means of attaining the southern or the northern way. So it has been stated in another Śruti, 'The deliverance from this (the state of becoming rice etc.) is indeed much more difficult' (Ch. V. x. 6). 'Therefore one should cultivate a disgust (for return to the world)' (Ibid. 8), i.e. strive for liberation. It is clear that between these two even, greater care should be taken to secure the means of attaining the northern way, for it has been said, 'Thus do they rotate' (this text).

So all the questions have been answered. The fourth question, 'After how many oblations,' etc., has been first answered in the passage beginning with, 'That world' (par. 9), and ending with, 'A man is born' (par. 13). The fifth question, concerning the means of attaining the way of the gods or the way of the Manes, has been answered next by a description of the means of attaining the northern and southern ways. This has also answered the first question by

saying that starting with fire some reach the deity of the flame, and some the deity of smoke, and here is the divergence. The answer to the second question, concerning the return to this world, has been given by the statement that they return to this world, passing successively through the stages of the ether etc.; and that has also dealt with the third question by stating that the other world is not filled up for that very reason, as also owing to the fact that some become insects, moths, etc.

SECTION III

स यः कामयेत महत्प्राप्नुयामिति, उदगयन आपूर्यमाणपक्षस्य पुण्याहे द्वादशाहमुपसद्व्रती भूत्वौदुम्बरे कंसे चमसे वा सर्वौषधं फलानीति संभृत्य परिसमुह्य परिलिप्याग्निमुपसमाधाय परिस्तीर्यावृताऽऽज्यं संस्कृत्य पुंसा नक्षत्रेण मन्थं संनीय जुहोति ।

यावन्तो देवास्त्वयि जातवेद-
स्तिर्यञ्चो घ्नन्ति पुरुषस्य कामान्,
तेभ्योऽहं भागधेयं जुहोमि, ते
मा तृप्ताः सर्वैः कामैस्तर्पयन्तु—स्वाहा ।
या तिरश्ची निपद्यतेऽहं विधरणी इति,
तां त्वा घृतस्य धारया यजे संराधनीमहम्—
स्वाहा ॥ १ ॥

1. He who wishes to attain greatness (should perform) on an auspicious day in a fortnight in which the moon waxes, and under a male constellation, during the northward march of the sun, (a sacrifice in the following manner): He should undertake for twelve days a vow connected with the Upasads (i.e. live on milk), collect in a cup or bowl made of fig wood all herbs and their grains, sweep and plaster (the ground), purify the offerings in the prescribed manner, interpose the Mantha (paste made of

those things), and offer oblations with the following Mantras: 'O Fire, to all those gods under you, who spitefully frustrate men's desires, I offer their share. May they, being satisfied, satisfy me with all objects of desire! Svāhā. To that all-procuring deity who turns out spiteful under your protection, thinking she is the support of all, I offer this stream of clarified butter. Svāhā.'

The results of meditation and rites have been stated. Of these, meditation is independent, but rites depend on both divine and human wealth. So for the sake of rites wealth must be acquired, and that in a harmless way. Hence for that purpose the ceremony called Mantha (paste) is being inculcated as a means to attaining greatness ; for if greatness is attained, wealth follows as a matter of course. So the text says: *He who wishes to attain greatness,* i.e. wants to be great. The reference is to one who desires wealth and is qualified for the performance of rites. The time for the ceremony of Mantha which is sought to be enjoined, is being stated: *During the northward march of the sun.* This covers a large extent of time, so it is being restricted to *a fortnight in which the moon waxes,* i.e. the bright fortnight. That too is a long period; hence, *on an auspicious* or favourable *day,* i.e. one calculated to bring success to one's undertaking. *He should undertake for twelve days,* counting back from the auspicious day on which he intends to perform the rites and including it, *a vow connected with the Upasads.*

These are well-known rites in connection with the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, in which the sacrificer has to drink cow's milk according to the yield of an increasing and decreasing number of teats of the animals. But since those rites are not to be combined here, only the drinking of milk, without any restriction as to details, is meant.

Objection : If the compound in 'Upasad-vrata' is expounded so as to mean 'the vow that consists of the Upasads,' then all the details of procedure have to be observed. So why not observe them?

Reply : Because it is a ceremony according to the Smṛti. This ceremony of Mantha is enjoined by the Smṛti (and not the Śruti).

Objection : How can a ceremony that is enjoined by the Śruti be one in accordance with the Smṛti?

Reply : The Śruti here is merely repeating the Smṛti. Were it a Vedic ceremony, it would be related to the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice as a part is to a whole, and as such must conform to all the characteristics of the main sacrifice. But it is not a Vedic ceremony. For this reason it is also to be performed in the Āvasathya (household) fire[1]; and the entire procedure is to be in accordance with the Smṛti. So the vow in question is that of living on milk.

Collect in a cup or bowl made of fig wood, in a vessel of this wood, whether shaped like a cup or a bowl—the option being with regard to the shape, and not the material, which must be fig wood—*all herbs*

[1] Which is not lighted or maintained according to Vedic rites.

that are available and within one's means: The ten cultivated species such as rice and barley, to be enumerated later on, must be included; there is no harm in having more. *And their grains,* as far as available and within one's means. The word 'iti' is suggestive of the collection of all the materials, that is to say, including all other things that are to be collected. The order of procedure should be understood to be in accordance with the Gṛhya[1] Sūtras. *Sweep and plaster:* These are cleaning the ground. *Bring in the fire:* It is implied that the sacrifice is to be performed in the Āvasathya fire, for the word is in the singular, and there is mention of the fire being brought in, which is only possible of a fire that already exists.[2] *Spread* the Kuśa grass. *Purify the offerings in the prescribed manner:* Since the ceremony is in accordance with the Smṛti, the manner referred to is that of the 'Sthālīpāka.'[3] *Under a male constellation,* one having a masculine name, associated with the auspicious day. *Interpose the Mantha:* Having crushed all those herbs and grains, soaked them in curd, honey and clarified butter in that fig bowl, and rubbed them up with a rod, place the paste between himself and the fire. *And offer oblations,* with a fig ladle, in a part of the fire prescribed for this purpose, *with the following Mantras,* beginning with, *'O Fire, to all those gods,'* etc.

[1] Not Śrauta Sūtras.

[2] The three fires, Gārhapatya, Āhavanīya and Dakṣiṇa, connected with Vedic sacrifices, have to be lighted each time.

[3] A religious ceremony observed by householders. The word literally means 'cooking in a pot.'

ज्येष्ठाय स्वाहा, श्रेष्ठाय स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रव-
मवनयति ; प्राणाय स्वाहा, वसिष्ठायै स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा
मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; वाचे स्वाहा, प्रतिष्ठायै स्वाहेत्यग्नौ
हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; चक्षुषे स्वाहा, संपदे स्वाहे-
त्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; श्रोत्राय स्वाहा, आय-
तनाय स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; मनसे
स्वाहा, प्रजात्यै स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति,
रेतसे स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ॥ २ ॥

2. Offering oblations in the fire saying, 'Svāhā to the oldest, Svāhā to the greatest,' he drips the remnant adhering to the ladle into the paste. Offering oblations in the fire saying, 'Svāhā to the vital force, Svāhā to the Vasiṣṭhā,' he drips the remnant, etc. Offering oblations saying, 'Svāhā to the organ of speech, Svāhā to that which has steadiness,' he drips, etc. Offering oblations saying, 'Svāhā to the eye, Svāhā to prosperity,' he drips, etc. Offering oblations saying, 'Svāhā to the ear, Svāhā to the abode,' he drips, etc. Offering oblations saying, 'Svāhā to the Manas, Svāhā to Prajāti,' he drips, etc. Offering oblations saying, 'Svāhā to the organ of generation,' he drips, etc.

Offering two *oblations* each time beginning with, *'Svāhā to the oldest, Svāhā to the greatest,' he drips the remnant adhering to the ladle into the paste.* The words 'oldest,' 'greatest,' etc., which are characteristics

of the vital force, indicate that only the knower of the vital force is entitled to this ceremony.

अग्नये स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; सोमाय स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; भूः स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; भुवः स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; स्वः स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; भूर्भुवः स्वः स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; ब्रह्मणे स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; क्षत्राय स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; भूताय स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; भविष्यते स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; विश्वाय स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; सर्वाय स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ; प्रजापतये स्वाहेत्यग्नौ हुत्वा मन्थे संस्रवमवनयति ॥ ३ ॥

3. Offering an oblation in the fire saying, 'Svāhā to fire,' he drips the remnant adhering to the ladle into the paste. Offering an oblation saying, 'Svāhā to the moon,' he drips, etc. Offering an oblation saying, 'Svāhā to the earth,' he drips, etc. Offering an oblation saying, 'Svāhā to the sky,' he drips, etc. Offering an oblation saying, 'Svāhā to heaven,' he drips, etc. Offering an oblation saying, 'Svāhā to the earth, sky and heaven,' he drips, etc. Offering an oblation saying, 'Svāhā to the Brahmaṇa,' he drips, etc. Offering an oblation saying, 'Svāhā

to the Kṣatriya,' he drips, etc. Offering an oblation saying, 'Svāhā to the past,' he drips, etc. Offering an oblation saying, 'Svāhā to the future,' he drips, etc. Offering an oblation saying, 'Svāhā to the whole,' he drips, etc. Offering an oblation saying, 'Svāhā to all,' he drips, etc. Offering an oblation saying, 'Svāhā to Prajāpati', he drips, etc.

Beginning with, *'Svāhā to the organ of generation,' he* offers one oblation each time, and *drips the remnant adhering to the ladle into the paste.* Then he stirs the paste again with another rod.

अथैनमभिमृशति—भ्रमदसि, ज्वलदसि, पूर्णमसि, स्तब्धमसि, एकसभमसि, हिंकृतमसि, हिंक्रियमाणमसि, उद्गीथमसि, उद्गीयमानमसि, श्रावितमसि, प्रत्याश्रावितमसि, आर्द्रे संदीप्तमसि, विभूरसि, प्रभूरसि, अन्नमसि, ज्योतिरसि, निधनमसि, संवर्गोऽसीति ॥ ४.॥

4. Then he touches the paste saying,[1] 'You move (as the vital force), you burn (as fire), you are infinite (as Brahman), you are still (as the sky). You combine everything in yourself. You are the sound 'Hiṁ,' and are uttered as 'Hiṁ' (in the sacrifice by the Prastotṛ). You are the Udgītha and are chanted (by the Udgātṛ). You are recited (by the Adhvaryu) and recited

[1] The paste is identified with its deity, the cosmic vital force. Hence epithets applicable to the latter are used with reference to it.

back (by the Agnīdhra). You are fully ablaze in a humid (cloud). You are omnipresent, and master. You are food (as the moon), and light (as fire). You are death, and you are that in which all things merge.'

Then he touches the paste uttering the Mantra, *'You move,'* etc.

अथैनमुद्यच्छति—आमंसि, आमंहि ते महि, स हि राजेशानोऽधिपतिः, स मां राजेशानोऽधिपतिं करोत्विति ॥५॥

5. Then he takes it up saying, 'You know all (as the vital force); we too are aware of your greatness. The vital force is the king, the lord, the ruler. May it make me king, lord and ruler!'

Then he takes it up with the vessel, in his hand, *saying, 'You know all,'* etc.

अथैनमाचामति—तत्सवितुर्वरेण्यम् । मधु वाता ऋतायते, मधु क्षरन्ति सिन्धवः । माध्वीर्नः सन्त्वोषधीः । भूः स्वाहा । भर्गो देवस्य धीमहि । मधु नक्तमुतोषसः, मधुमत्पार्थिवं रजः । मधु द्यौरस्तु नः पिता । भुवः स्वाहा । धियो यो नः प्रचोदयात् । मधुमान्नो वनस्पतिः, मधुमाँ अस्तु सूर्यः । माध्वीर्गावो भवन्तु नः । स्वः स्वाहेति । सर्वां च सावित्रीमन्वाह, सर्वाश्च मधुमतीः ; अहमेवेदं सर्वं भूयासम्, भूर्भुवः स्वः स्वाहा, इत्यन्तत आचम्य पाणी प्रक्षाल्य जघनेनाग्निं प्राक्शिराः संविशति ; प्रातरादित्यमुपतिष्ठते—दिशामेकपुण्डरीकमसि, अहं मनु-

ष्याणामेकपुण्डरीकं भूयासमिति ; यथेतमेत्य जघनेनाग्निमासीनो वंशं जपति ॥ ६ ॥

6. Then he drinks it saying, 'The radiant sun is adorable—; The winds are blowing sweetly, the rivers are shedding honey, may the herbs be sweet unto us! Svāhā to the earth. Glory we meditate upon; May the nights and days be charming, and the dust of the earth be sweet, may heaven, our father, be gracious! Svāhā to the sky. May he direct our intellect; May the Soma creeper be sweet unto us, may the sun be kind, may the quarters be helpful to us! Svāhā to heaven.' Then he repeats the whole Gāyatrī and the whole Madhumatī,[1] and says at the end, 'May I be all this! Svāhā to the earth, sky and heaven.' Then he drinks the whole remnant, washes his hands, and lies behind the fire with his head to the east. In the morning he salutes the sun saying, 'Thou art the one lotus of the quarters; may I be the one lotus of men!' Then he returns the way he went, sits behind the fire, and repeats the line of teachers:

Then he drinks it. He drinks the first draught, uttering the first foot of the Gāyatrī, one portion of the Madhumatī and the first Vyāhṛti.[2] Similarly he

[1] Hymn to sweet things.

[2] The Vyāhṛtis are the three syllables 'Bhūr,' 'Bhuvar' and 'Svar,' meaning respectively the earth, sky and heaven.

drinks the second draught, uttering the second foot of the Gāyatrī, the second portion of the Madhumatī and the second Vyāhṛti. Likewise he drinks the third draught, uttering the third foot of the Gāyatrī, the third portion of the Madhumatī and the third Vyāhṛti. *Then he repeats the whole Gāyatrī and the whole Madhumatī, and says at the end, 'May I be all this! Svāhā to the earth, sky and heaven.' Then he drinks the whole remnant.* He should arrange beforehand so that the whole quantity of paste may be finished in four draughts. What adheres to the vessel, he should scrape and drink quietly. He *washes his hands, and lies behind the fire with his head to the east.* After saying his morning prayers, *he salutes the sun* with the Mantra: *'Thou art the one lotus of the quarters,'* etc. *Then he returns the way he went, sits behind the fire, and repeats the line of teachers:*

तं हैतमुद्दालक आरुणिर्वाजसनेयाय याज्ञवल्क्याया-न्तेवासिन उक्त्वोवाच, अपि य एनं शुष्के स्थाणौ निषि-ञ्चेत्, जायेरञ्छाखाः, प्ररोहेयुः पलाशानीति ॥ ७ ॥

7. Uddālaka, the son of Aruṇa, taught this to his pupil Yājñavalkya, the Vājasaneya,[1] and said, 'Should one sprinkle it even on a dry stump, branches would grow and leaves sprout.'

एतमु हैव वाजसनेयो याज्ञवल्क्यो मधुकाय पैङ्ग्याया-न्तेवासिन उक्त्वोवाच, अपि य एनं शुष्के स्थाणौ निषि-ञ्चेत्, जायेरञ्छाखाः, प्ररोहेयुः पलाशानीति ॥ ८ ॥

[1] Founder of the White Yajur-Veda derived from the sun.

8. Then Yājñavalkya, the Vājasaneya, taught this to his pupil Madhuka, the son of Paiṅgī, and said, 'Should one sprinkle it even on a dry stump, branches would grow and leaves sprout.'

एतमु हैव मधुकः पैङ्ग्यश्चूलाय भागवित्तयेऽन्तेवासिन उक्त्वोवाच, अपि य एनं शुष्के स्थाणौ निषिञ्चेत्, जायेरञ्छाखाः, प्ररोहेयुः पलाशानीति ॥ ९ ॥

9. Madhuka, the son of Paiṅgī, again taught this to his pupil Chūla, the son of Bhagavitta, and said, ' Should one sprinkle it even on a dry stump, branches would grow and leaves sprout.'

एतमु हैव चूलो भागवित्तिर्जानकय आयस्थूणायान्तेवासिन उक्त्वोवाच, अपि य एनं शुष्के स्थाणौ निषिञ्चेत्, जायेरञ्छाखाः, प्ररोहेयुः पलाशानीति ॥ १० ॥

10. Then Chūla, the son of Bhagavitta, taught this to his pupil Jānaki, the son of Ayasthūṇa, and said, 'Should one sprinkle it even on a dry stump, branches would grow and leaves sprout.'

एतमु हैव जानकिरायस्थूणः सत्यकामाय जाबालायान्तेवासिन उक्त्वोवाच, अपि य एनं शुष्के स्थाणौ निषिञ्चेत् जायेरञ्छाखाः, प्ररोहेयुः पलाशानीति ॥ ११ ॥

11. Jānaki, the son of Ayasthūṇa, again taught this to Satyakāma, the son of Jabālā,

and said, 'Should one sprinkle it even on a dry stump, branches would grow and leaves sprout.'

एतमु हैव सत्यकामो जाबालोऽन्तेवासिभ्य उक्त्वोवाच, अपि य एनं शुष्के स्थाणौ निषिञ्चेत्, जायेरञ्छाखाः, प्ररोहेयुः पलाशानीति ; तमेतन्नापुत्राय वानन्तेवासिने वा ब्रूयात् ॥ १२ ॥

12. And Satyakāma, the son of Jabālā, in his turn, taught this to his pupils and said, 'Should one sprinkle it even on a dry stump, branches would grow and leaves sprout.' One must not teach this to any one but a son or a pupil.

(He repeats the line of teachers) beginning with, *Uddālaka, the son of Aruṇa, taught this,* and ending with, *Satyakāma, the son of Jabālā, taught this to his pupils and said, 'Should one sprinkle it even on a dry stump, branches would* surely *grow and leaves sprout.'* The teacher Satyakāma taught this doctrine of the Mantha, handed down by a single line of teachers beginning with Uddālaka, to a large number of pupils and said. What did he say? *Should one sprinkle it,* this paste, purified for the purpose of drinking, *even on a dry* or dead *stump, branches would* surely *grow* on that tree, *and leaves sprout,* as on a living stump. So it goes without saying that this ceremony will fulfil one's desires. It is a eulogy on this ceremony, mean-

ing that it is infallible in its results. There are six[1] qualified recipients of learning. Of them only two, viz. the son and pupil, are being declared as eligible for this doctrine of the Mantha together with the meditation on the vital force.

चतुरौदुम्बरो भवति—औदुम्बरः स्रुवः, औदुम्बरश्चमसः, औदुम्बर इध्मः, औदुम्बर्या उपमन्थन्यौ; दश ग्राम्याणि धान्यानि भवन्ति—व्रीहियवास्तिलमाषा अणुप्रियङ्गवो गोधूमाश्च मसूराश्च खल्वाश्च खलकुलाश्च; तान्पिष्टान्दधनि मधुनि घृत उपसिञ्चति, आज्यस्य जुहोति ॥ १३ ॥ इति तृतीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

13. Four things are made of fig wood: the ladle, the bowl, the fuel and the two mixing rods. The cultivated grains are ten in number: Rice, barley, sesamum, beans, Aṇu, Priyaṅgu, wheat, lentils, pulse and vetches. They should be crushed and soaked in curds, honey and clarified butter, and offered as an oblation.

Four things are made of fig wood. This has been explained (p. 920). *The cultivated grains are ten in number.* We have already said that the ten species of cultivated grains must be included. They are being enumerated: *rice, barley, sesamum, beans, Aṇu,* called by that name, *Priyaṅgu,* called in some parts 'Kaṅgu,' *pulse* (Khalva), or Niṣpāva, popularly called 'Valla,' and *vetches* (Khalakula), or Kulattha. In addition to

[1] A pupil, a knower of the Vedas, an intelligent person, one who pays, a dear son, and one who exchanges another branch of learning.

these all other herbs and grains should be procured as far as possible, as we have said, barring only those that are unfit for sacrificial purposes.

SECTION IV

एषां वै भूतानां पृथिवी रसः, पृथिव्या आपः, अपामोषधयः, ओषधीनां पुष्पाणि, पुष्पाणां फलानि, फलानां पुरुषः, पुरुषस्य रेतः ॥ १ ॥

1. The earth is the essence of all these beings, water the essence of the earth, herbs of water, flowers of herbs, fruits of flowers, man of fruits, and the seed of man.

The present section is introduced to lay down the method by which to obtain the kind of son who, by the manner of his birth and conception and by his good qualities, will help to achieve the worlds both for himself and for his father. Only a person who knows the meditation on the vital force and has performed the ceremony of the Mantha leading to prosperity, is entitled to this ceremony of the Mantha leading to the birth of a son. When a man wants to perform this ceremony, he should, after performing the former ceremony, wait for the right time of his wife. This we understand from the mention of the seed being the quintessence of the herbs etc. *The earth is the essence of all these beings,* moving and stationary, for it has been stated that it 'is like honey to all beings' (II. v. 1, adapted). *Water* is *the essence of the earth,* for it is pervaded by water. *Herbs* are the essence *of water,* for the herbs etc. are the effects of water. *Flowers of herbs, fruits of flowers, man of fruits, and*

the seed of man, for another Śruti says, 'It is the essence emanating from all parts of the body' (Ai. IV. 1).

स ह प्रजापतिरीक्षांचक्रे, हन्तास्मै प्रतिष्ठां कल्पयानीति ; स स्त्रियं ससृजे ; तां सृष्ट्वाध उपास्त ; तस्मात्स्त्रियमध उपासीत ; स एतं प्राञ्चं ग्रावाणमात्मन एव समुदपारयत्, तेनैनामभ्यसृजत् ॥ २ ॥

2. Prajāpati thought, 'Well, let me make an abode for it,' and he created woman.

Prajāpati, the Creator, *thought,* 'Since the seed is thus the quintessence of all beings, what can be a fit abode for it'? Thinking thus *he created woman.*

तस्या वेदिरुपस्थः, लोमानि बर्हिः, चर्माधिषवणे—समिद्धो मध्यतः—तौ मुष्कौ ; स यावान् ह वै वाजपेयेन यजमानस्य लोको भवति, तावानस्य लोको भवति य एवं विद्वानधोपहासं चरति ; आसां स्त्रीणां सुकृतं वृङ्क्ते ; अथ य इदमविद्वानधोपहासं चरति, अस्य स्त्रियः सुकृतं वृञ्जते ॥ ३ ॥

एतद्ध स्म वै तद्विद्वानुद्दालक आरुणिराह ; एतद्ध स्म वै तद्विद्वान्नाको मौद्गल्य आह ; एतद्ध स्म वै तद्विद्वान्कुमारहारित आह, बहवो मर्या ब्राह्मणायना निरिन्द्रिया विसुकृतोऽस्माल्लोकात्प्रयन्ति, य इदमविद्वांसोऽधोपहासं चरन्तीति ; बहु वा इदं सुप्तस्य वा जाग्रतो वा रेतः स्कन्दति ॥ ४ ॥

तदभिमृशेत्, अनु वा मन्त्रयेत—

यन्मेऽद्य रेतः पृथिवीमस्कान्त्सीत्,
यदोषधीरप्यसरद्यदपः ।

इदमहं तद्रेत आददे पुन-
र्मामैत्विन्द्रियं पुनस्तेजः पुनर्भगः ।
पुनरग्निर्धिष्ण्या यथास्थानं कल्पन्ताम्,
इत्यनामिकाङ्गुष्ठाभ्यामादायान्तरेण स्तनौ वा भ्रुवौ वा निमृज्यात् ॥ ५ ॥

अथ यद्युदक आत्मानं पश्येत्तदभिमन्त्रयेत — मयि तेज इन्द्रियं यशो द्रविणं सुकृतमिति ; श्रीर्ह वा एषा स्त्रीणां यन्मलोद्वासाः ; तस्मान्मलोद्वाससं यशस्विनीमभिक्रम्योपमन्त्रयेत ॥ ६ ॥

6. If man sees his reflection in water, he should recite the following Mantra: '(May the gods grant) me lustre, manhood, reputation, wealth and merits.' She (his wife) is indeed the goddess of beauty among women. Therefore he should approach this handsome woman and speak to her.

If perchance he *sees his reflection in water, he should recite the following Mantra : '(May the gods grant) me lustre,'* etc. *She is indeed the goddess of beauty among women. Therefore he should approach this handsome woman and speak to her,* when she has taken a bath after three nights.

सा चेदस्मै न दद्यात्, काममेनामवक्रीणीयात् ; सा चेदस्मै नैव दद्यात्, काममेनां यष्ट्या वा पाणिना वोपहत्यातिक्रामेत्, इन्द्रियेण ते यशसा यश आदद इति ; अयशा एव भवति ॥ ७ ॥

7. If she is not willing, he should buy her over; and if she is still unyielding, he should strike her with a stick or with the hand and proceed, uttering the following Mantra, 'I take away your reputation,' etc. She is then actually discredited.

If she is not willing, he should buy her over, press his wishes through ornaments etc.; *and if she is still unyielding, he should strike her with a stick or with the hand, and* announcing that he was going to curse her and make her unfortunate, he should *proceed, uttering the following Mantra: 'I take away your reputation,'* etc. As a result of that curse, *she* comes to be known as barren and unfortunate, and *is then actually discredited.*

सा चेदस्मै दद्यात्, इन्द्रियेण ते यशसा यश आदधामीति; यशस्विनावेव भवतः ॥ ८ ॥

8. If she is willing, he should proceed, uttering the following Mantra: 'I transmit reputation into you,' and they both become reputed.

If she is willing, or agreeable to her husband, then *he should proceed, uttering the following Mantra: 'I transmit reputation into you.'* Then *they both become reputed.*

स यामिच्छेत्कामयेत मेति, तस्यामर्थं निष्ठाय, मुखेन मुखं संधाय, उपस्थमस्या अभिमृश्य जपेत्—

अङ्गादङ्गात्संभवसि, हृदयादधिजायसे ।

स त्वमङ्गकषायोऽसि, दिग्धविद्धामिव
माद्येमाममूं मयीति ॥ ९ ॥

अथ यामिच्छेन्न गर्भं दधीतेति, तस्यामर्थं निष्ठाय, मुखेन मुखं संधाय, अभिप्राण्यापान्यात्, इन्द्रियेण ते रेतसा रेत आदद इति ; अरेता एव भवति ॥ १० ॥

अथ यामिच्छेद्दधीतेति, तस्यामर्थं निष्ठाय, मुखेन मुखं संधाय, अपान्याभिप्राण्यात्, इन्द्रियेण ते रेतसा रेत आदधामीति ; गर्भिण्येव भवति ॥ ११ ॥

अथ यस्य जायायै जारः स्यात्तं चेद्द्विष्यात्, आमपात्रेऽग्निमुपसमाधाय, प्रतिलोमं शरबर्हिस्तीर्त्वा, तस्मिन्नेताः शरभृष्टीः प्रतिलोमाः सर्पिषाक्ता जुहुयात्—मम समिद्धेऽहौषीः, प्राणापानौ त आददे—असाविति ; मम समिद्धेऽहौषीः, पुत्रपशूंस्त आददे—असाविति ; मम समिद्धेऽहौषीः, इष्टासुकृते त आददे—असाविति ; मम समिद्धेऽहौषीः, आशापराकाशौ त आददे—असाविति ; स वा एष निरिन्द्रियो विसुकृतोऽस्माल्लोकात्प्रैति, यमेवंविद्ब्राह्मणः शपति ; तस्मादेवंविच्छ्रोत्रियस्य दारेण नोपहासमिच्छेदुत, ह्येवंवित्परो भवति ॥ १२ ॥

12. If a man's wife has a lover whom he wishes to inujre, he should put the fire in an unbaked earthen vessel, spread stalks of reed and Kuśa grass in an inverse way, and offer the reed tips, soaked in clarified butter, in the fire in an inverse way, saying, 'Thou hast sacrificed in my kindled fire, I take away thy Prāṇa and

Apāna—such and such. Thou hast sacrificed in my kindled fire, I take away thy sons and animals—such and such. Thou hast sacrificed in my kindled fire, I take away thy Vedic rites and those done according to the Smṛti—such and such. Thou hast sacrificed in my kindled fire, I take away thy hopes and expectations—such and such'. The man whom a Brāhmaṇa with knowledge of this ceremony curses, departs from this world emasculated and shorn of his merits. Therefore one should not wish even to cut jokes with the wife of a Vedic scholar who knows this ceremony, for he who has such knowledge becomes an enemy.

If a man's wife has a lover whom he wishes to injure, i.e. to cast an evil spell on him, he should perform the following rite : *He should put the fire in an unbaked earthen vessel*—everything to be done in an inverse way—*and offer the reed tips, soaked in clarified butter, in the fire in an inverse way,* accompanied by the following Mantras, '*Thou hast sacrificed,*' etc., and at the end of each mention his name, '*such and such.*' *The man whom a Brāhmaṇa with knowledge of this ceremony curses, departs shorn of his merits. Therefore one should not wish even to cut jokes with the wife of a Vedic scholar who knows this ceremony,* much less give any more serious offence, *for* even *he who has such knowledge becomes an enemy.*

अथ यस्य जायामार्तवं विन्देत्, त्र्यहं कंसेन पिबेद्-हतवासाः, नैनां वृषलो न वृषल्युपहन्यात्; त्रिरात्रान्त आप्लुत्य व्रीहीनवघातयेत् ॥ १३ ॥

13. If anybody's wife has the monthly sickness, she should drink for three days out of a cup (Kaṁsa). No Śūdra man or woman should touch her. After three nights she should bathe, put on a new cloth, and be put to thresh rice.

If anybody's wife has, etc. This paragraph should precede the passage beginning with 'She is indeed the goddess of beauty among women' (par. 6), for the sake of consistency. *She should drink for three days out of a cup* (Kaṁsa). *No Śūdra man or woman should touch her. After three nights,* when she has finished the three nights' vow, *she should bathe, put on a new cloth*—these words, though at some distance, should be connected here—*and be put to thresh rice.*

स य इच्छेत्पुत्रो मे शुक्लो जायेत, वेदमनुब्रुवीत, सर्वमायुरियादिति, क्षीरौदनं पाचयित्वा सर्पिष्मन्तमश्नीयाताम्; ईश्वरौ जनयितवै ॥ १४ ॥

14. He who wishes that his son should be born fair, study one Veda and attain a full term of life, should have rice cooked in milk, and he and his wife should eat it with clarified butter. Then they would be able to produce such a son.

He who wishes that his son should be born fair in complexion, *study one Veda and attain a full term of life,* i.e. a hundred years, *should have,* etc.

अथ य इच्छेत्पुत्रो मे कपिलः पिङ्गलो जायेत, द्वौ वेदावनुब्रुवीत, सर्वमायुरियादिति, दध्योदनं पाचयित्वा सर्पिष्मन्तमश्नीयाताम्; ईश्वरौ जनयितवै ॥ १५ ॥

15. He who wishes that his son should be born tawny or brown, study two Vedas and attain a full term of life, should have rice cooked in curd, and he and his wife should eat it with clarified butter. Then they would be able to produce such a son.

Have rice cooked in curd. If he wishes his son to be versed in two Vedas, he should follow this rule about eating.

अथ य इच्छेत्पुत्रो मे श्यामो लोहिताक्षो जायेत, त्रीन्वेदाननुब्रुवीत, सर्वमायुरियादिति, उदौदनं पाचयित्वा सर्पिष्मन्तमश्नीयाताम्; ईश्वरौ जनयितवै ॥ १६ ॥

16. He who wishes that his son should be born dark with red eyes, study three Vedas and attain a full term of life, should have rice cooked in water, and he and his wife should eat it with clarified butter. Then they would be able to produce such a son.

Simple, natural rice is meant. The mention of water is for precluding other ingredients.

अथ य इच्छेद्दुहिता मे पण्डिता जायेत, सर्वमायु-

रियादिति, तिलौदनं पाचयित्वा सर्पिष्मन्तमश्नीयाताम्; ईश्वरौ जनयितवै ॥ १७ ॥

17. He who wishes that a daughter should be born to him who would be a scholar and attain a full term of life, should have rice cooked with sesamum, and he and his wife should eat it with clarified butter. Then they would be able to produce such a daughter.

The scholarship of the daughter is regarding domestic affairs only, for she is not entitled to read the Vedas. *Rice* and *sesamum* should be boiled together.

अथ य इच्छेत्पुत्रो मे पण्डितो विगीतः समितिंगमः शुश्रूषितां वाचं भाषिता जायेत, सर्वान्वेदाननुब्रुवीत, सर्वमायुरियादिति, मांसौदनं पाचयित्वा सर्पिष्मन्तमश्नीयाताम्; ईश्वरौ जनयितवै—औक्षेण वार्षभेण वा ॥ १८ ॥

18. He who wishes that a son should be born to him who would be a reputed scholar, frequenting the assemblies and speaking delightful words, would study all the Vedas and attain a full term of life, should have rice cooked with the meat of a vigorous bull or one more advanced in years, and he and his wife should eat it with clarified butter. Then they would be able to produce such a son.

'*Vigīta* (reputed) literally means 'variously praised.' *Frequenting the assemblies,* i.e. eloquent for scholarship has been separately mentioned. *Delightful,* lit.

pleasant to hear, i.e. words that are chaste and pregnant with meaning. *Rice cooked* together *with meat*. The meat is restricted to that of *a vigorous bull*, able to breed, *or one more advanced in years*.

अथाभिप्रातरेव स्थालीपाकावृताऽऽज्यं चेष्टित्वा स्थालीपाकस्योपघातं जुहोति—अग्नये स्वाहा, अनुमतये स्वाहा, देवाय सवित्रे सत्यप्रसवाय स्वाहेति ; हुत्वोद्धृत्य प्राश्नाति, प्राश्येतरस्याः प्रयच्छति ; प्रक्षाल्य पाणी, उदपात्रं पूरयित्वा तेनैनां त्रिरभ्युक्षति—उत्तिष्ठातो विश्वावसोऽन्यामिच्छ प्रपूर्व्याम्, सं जायां पत्या सहेति ॥ १९ ॥

19. In the very morning he purifies the clarified butter according to the mode of Sthālīpāka, and offers Sthālīpāka oblations again and again, saying, 'Svāhā to fire, Svāhā to Anumati, Svāhā to the radiant sun who produces infallible results.' After offering he takes up (the remnant of the cooked food), eats part of it and gives the rest to his wife. Then he washes his hands, fills the water-vessel and sprinkles her thrice with that water, saying, 'Get up from here, Viśvāvasu,[1] and find out another young woman (who is) with her husband.'

In the very morning he takes the rice produced by the threshing, *purifies the clarified butter according to the mode of Sthālīpāka,* boils the rice *and offers*

[1] A celestial minstrel.

Sthālīpāka oblations again and again, saying, 'Svāhā to fire,' etc. Here all the details must be understood as being in accordance with the Gṛhya Sūtras. *After offering he takes up* the remnant of the cooked food, *eats part of it and gives the rest to his wife. Then he washes his hands,* sips a little water, *fills the water-vessel and sprinkles his wife thrice with that water, saying* the following Mantra: *'Get up from here,'* etc. The Mantra is to be uttered once.

अथैनामभिपद्यते—अमोऽहमस्मि सा त्वम्, सा त्वमस्यमोऽहम्, सामाहमस्मि ऋक्त्वम्, द्यौरहं पृथिवी त्वम्; तावेहि संरभावहै, सह रेतो दधावहै पुंसे पुत्राय वित्तय इति ॥ २० ॥

20. He embraces her saying, 'I am the vital force, and you are speech; you are speech, and I am the vital force; I am Sāman, and you are Ṛc[1]; I am heaven,[2] and you are the earth; come, let us strive together so that we may have a male child.'

Then he purifies her with Mantras, and both eat the rice cooked in milk or other things according to the kind of child desired. This is the order to be followed. While retiring, *he embraces her, saying* the following Mantra: *'I am the vital force,'* etc.

अथास्या ऊरू विहापयति—विजिहीथां द्यावापृथिवी

[1] Sāman rests on Ṛc while it is chanted.

[2] Heaven is called father and the earth mother.

इति ; तस्यामर्थं निष्ठाय, मुखेन मुखं संधाय त्रिरेनामनु-
लोमामनुमार्ष्टि—

विष्णुर्योनिं कल्पयतु, त्वष्टा रूपाणि पिंशतु ।
आसिञ्चतु प्रजापतिर्धाता गर्भं दधातु ते ।
गर्भं धेहि सिनीवालि, गर्भं धेहि पृथुष्टुके ।
गर्भं ते अश्विनौ देवावाधत्तां पुष्करस्रजौ ॥ २१ ॥

हिरण्मयी अरणी याभ्यां निर्मन्थतामश्विनौ ।
तं ते गर्भं हवामहे दशमे मासि सूतये ।
यथाग्निगर्भा पृथिवी, यथा द्यौरिन्द्रेण गर्भिणी ।
वायुर्दिशां यथा गर्भ एवं गर्भं दधामि ते—
असाविति ॥ २२ ॥

सोष्यन्तीमद्भिरभ्युक्षति ।
यथा वायुः पुष्करिणीं समिङ्गयति सर्वतः ।
एवा ते गर्भ एजतु सहावैतु जरायुणा ।
इन्द्रस्यायं व्रजः कृतः सार्गलः सपरिश्रयः ।
तमिन्द्र निर्जहि गर्भेण सावरां सहेति ॥ २३ ॥

जातेऽग्निमुपसमाधाय, अङ्क आधाय, कंसे पृषदाज्यं संनीय पृषदाज्यस्योपघातं जुहोति—

अस्मिन्सहस्रं पुष्यासमेधमानः स्वे गृहे ।
अस्योपसंद्यां मा च्छैत्सीत् प्रजया च पशुभिश्च—स्वाहा ।
मयि प्राणांस्त्वयि मनसा जुहोमि—स्वाहा ।
यत्कर्मणात्यरीरिचम्, यद्वा न्यूनमिहाकरम् ।
अग्निष्टत्स्विष्टकृद्विद्वान्स्विष्टं सुहुतं करोतु नः—
स्वाहेति ॥ २४ ॥

24. When (the son) is born, he should bring in the fire, take him in his lap, put a mixture of curd and clarified butter in a cup, and offer oblations again and again with that, saying, 'Growing in this home of mine (as the son), may I maintain a thousand people! May (the goddess of fortune) never depart with children and animals from his line! Svāhā. The vital force that is in me, I mentally transfer to you. Svāhā. If I have done anything too much or too little in this ceremony, may the all-knowing beneficent fire make it just right for me—neither too much nor too little! Svāhā.'

Now the post-natal ceremony is being described. *When* the son *is born, he should bring in the fire, take* the son *in his lap, put a mixture of curd and clarified butter in a cup, and offer oblations again and again* (in little quantities) *with that* in the prescribed part of the fire, uttering the following Mantra: '*Growing in this,*' etc.

अथास्य दक्षिणं कर्णमभिनिधाय वाग्वागिति त्रिः ;, अथ दधि मधु घृतं संनीयानन्तर्हितेन जातरूपेण प्राशयति । भूस्ते दधामि, भुवस्ते दधामि, स्वस्ते दधामि, भूर्भुवः स्वः सर्वं त्वयि दधामीति ॥ २५ ॥

25. Then putting (his mouth) to the child's right ear, he should thrice repeat, 'Speech, speech.' Next mixing curd, honey and clarified butter, he feeds him with (a strip of) gold not

obstructed (by anything), saying, 'I put the earth into you, I put the sky into you, I put heaven into you, I put the whole of the earth, sky and heaven into you.'

Then putting his own mouth to *the child's right ear he should thrice repeat, 'Speech, speech.'*[1] *Next, mixing curd, honey and clarified butter, he feeds him with* (a strip of) *gold not obstructed* (by anything), uttering the following Mantras, one at a time: *'I put,'* etc.

अथास्य नाम करोति, वेदोऽसीति ; तदस्य तद्गुह्य-मेव नाम भवति ॥ २६ ॥

26. Then he gives him a name, 'You are Veda (knowledge).' That is his secret name.

Then he gives him a name. 'You are Veda.' That, the word 'Veda,' *is his secret name.*

अथैनं मात्रे प्रदाय स्तनं प्रयच्छति—
यस्ते स्तनः शशयो यो मयोभूः,
यो रत्नधा वसुविद्यः सुदत्रः ।
येन विश्वा पुष्यसि वार्याणि
सरस्वति तमिह धातवे कर् ॥ इति ॥ २७ ॥

27. Then he hands him to his mother to be suckled, saying, 'O Sarasvatī, that breast of thine which is stored with results, is the sustainer of all, full of milk, the obtainer of wealth (one's deserts) and generous, and through which thou nourishest all who are worthy of it (the gods etc.)

[1] Wishing that the Vedas may enter into him.

—transfer that here (to my wife, for my babe) to suck.'

Then he hands him, the child who is in his lap, *to his mother to be suckled* with the following Mantra: *'O Sarasvatī, that breast,'* etc.

अथास्य मातरमभिमन्त्रयते ।
इलासि मैत्रावरुणी, वीरे वीरमजीजनत् ।
सा त्वं वीरवती भव, यास्मान्वीरवतोऽकरत् ॥ इति ॥

तं वा एतमाहुः, अतिपिता बताभूः, अतिपितामहो बताभूः, परमां बत काष्ठां प्रापत्, श्रिया यशसा ब्रह्मवर्चसेन —य एवंविदो ब्राह्मणस्य पुत्रो जायत इति ॥ २८ ॥ इति चतुर्थं ब्राह्मणम् ॥

28. Then he addresses the mother: 'You are the adorable Arundhatī, the wife of Vasiṣṭha; you have brought forth a male child with the help of me, who am a man. Be the mother of many sons, for you have given us a son.' Of him who is born as the child of a Brāhmaṇa with this particular knowledge, they say, 'You have exceeded your father, and you have exceeded your grandfather. You have reached the extreme limit of attainment through your splendour, fame and Brāhmaṇical power.'

Then he addresses the mother as follows: *'You are the adorable,'* etc. *Of him who is born,* etc.—A son born in this way becomes the object of praise in such terms as the following: That he surpasses his

father and grandfather, and that he has *reached* the highest degree *of attainment through* his *splendour, fame and Brāhmaṇical power.* The Brāhmaṇa who possesses such knowledge and gets a son, also deserves similar tribute. This is understood.

SECTION V

अथ वंशः। पौतिमाषीपुत्रः कात्यायनीपुत्रात्, कात्यायनीपुत्रो गौतमीपुत्रात्, गौतमीपुत्रो भारद्वाजीपुत्रात्, भारद्वाजीपुत्रः पाराशरीपुत्रात्, पाराशरीपुत्र औपस्वस्तीपुत्रात्, औपस्वस्तीपुत्रः पाराशरीपुत्रात्, पाराशरीपुत्रः कात्यायनीपुत्रात्, कात्यायनीपुत्रः कौशिकीपुत्रात्, कौशिकीपुत्र आलम्बीपुत्राच्च वैयाघ्रपदीपुत्राच्च, वैयाघ्रपदीपुत्रः काण्वीपुत्राच्च कापीपुत्राच्च, कापीपुत्रः ॥ १ ॥

1. Now the line of teachers: The son of Pautimāṣī (received it) from the son of Kātyāyanī. He from the son of Gautamī. The son of Gautamī from the son of Bhāradvājī. He from the son of Pārāśarī. The son of Pārāśarī from the son of Aupasvastī. He from the son of another Pārāśarī. He from the son of Kātyāyanī. The son of Kātyāyanī from the son of Kauśikī. The son of Kauśikī from the son of Ālambī and the son of Vaiyāghrapadī. The son of Vaiyāghrapadī from the son of Kāṇvī and the son of Kāpī. The son of Kāpī—

आत्रेयीपुत्रात्, आत्रेयीपुत्रो गौतमीपुत्रात्, गौतमीपुत्रो भारद्वाजीपुत्रात्, भारद्वाजीपुत्रः पाराशरीपुत्रात्, पाराशरीपुत्रो वात्सीपुत्रात्, वात्सीपुत्रः पाराशरीपुत्रात्, पाराशरीपुत्रो वार्कारुणीपुत्रात्, वार्कारुणीपुत्रो वार्कारुणीपुत्रात्,

वार्कारुणीपुत्र आर्तभागीपुत्रात्, आर्तभागीपुत्रः शौङ्गीपुत्रात्, शौङ्गीपुत्रः सांकृतीपुत्रात्, सांकृतीपुत्र आलम्बायनीपुत्रात्, आलम्बायनीपुत्र आलम्बीपुत्रात्, आलम्बीपुत्रो जायन्तीपुत्रात्, जायन्तीपुत्रो माण्डूकायनीपुत्रात्, माण्डूकायनीपुत्रो माण्डूकी-पुत्रात्, माण्डूकीपुत्रः शाण्डिलीपुत्रात्, शाण्डिलीपुत्रो राथीतरीपुत्रात्, राथीतरीपुत्रो भालुकीपुत्रात्, भालुकीपुत्रः क्रौञ्चिकीपुत्राभ्याम्, क्रौञ्चिकीपुत्रौ वैदभृतीपुत्रात्, वैदभृती-पुत्रः कार्शकेयीपुत्रात्, कार्शकेयीपुत्रः प्राचीनयोगीपुत्रात्, प्राचीनयोगीपुत्रः सांजीवीपुत्रात्, सांजीवीपुत्रः प्राश्नीपुत्रा-दासुरिवासिनः, प्राश्नीपुत्र आसुरायणात्, आसुरायण आसुरेः, आसुरिः ॥ २ ॥

2. From the son of Ātreyī. The son of Ātreyī from the son of Gautamī. The son of Gautamī from the son of Bhāradvājī. He from the son of Pārāśarī. The son of Pārāśarī from the son of Vātsī. The son of Vātsī from the son of another Pārāśarī. The son of Pārāśarī from the son of Vārkāruṇī. He from the son of another Vārkāruṇī. This one from the son of Ārtabhāgī. He from the son of Śauṅgī. The son of Śauṇgī from the son of Sāṁkṛtī. He from the son of Ālambāyanī. He again from the son of Ālambī. The son of Ālambī from the son of Jāyantī. He from the son of Māṇḍūkāyanī. He in his turn from the son of Māṇḍūkī. The son of Māṇḍūkī from the son of Śāṇḍilī. The

son of Śāṇḍilī from the son of Rāthītarī. He from the son of Bhālukī. The son of Bhālukī from the two sons of Krauñcikī. They from the son of Vaidabhṛtī. He from the son of Kārśakeyī. He again from the son of Prācīnayogī. He from the son of Sāṁjīvī. The son of Sāṁjīvī from Āsurivāsin, the son of Prāśnī. The son of Prāśnī from Āsurāyaṇa. He from Āsuri. Asuri—

याज्ञवल्क्यात्, याज्ञवल्क्य उद्दालकात्, उद्दालकोऽरुणात्, अरुण उपवेशेः, उपवेशिः कुश्रेः, कुश्रिर्वाजश्रवसः, वाजश्रवा जिह्वावतो बाध्योगात्, जिह्वावान्बाध्योगोऽसिताद्वार्षगणात्, असितो वार्षगणो हरितात्कश्यपात्, हरितः कश्यपः शिल्पात्कश्यपात्, शिल्पः कश्यपः कश्यपान्नैध्रुवेः, कश्यपो नैध्रुविर्वाचः, वागम्भिण्याः, अम्भिण्यादित्यात्; आदित्यानीमानि शुक्लानि यजूंषि वाजसनेयेन याज्ञवल्क्येनाख्यायन्ते ॥ ३ ॥

3. From Yājñavalkya. Yājñavalkya from Uddālaka. Uddālaka from Aruṇa. Aruṇa from Upaveśi. Upaveśi from Kuśri. Kuśri from Vajaśravas. He from Jihvāvat, the son of Badhyoga. He from Asīta, the son of Varṣagaṇa. He from Harita Kaśyapa. He from Śilpa Kaśyapa. This one from Kaśyapa, the son of Nidhruva. He from Vāc. She from Ambhiṇī. She from the sun. These white

Yajuses received from the sun are explained by Yājñavalkya Vājasaneya.

समानमा सांजीवीपुत्रात्; सांजीवीपुत्रो माण्डूकायनेः, माण्डूकायनिर्माण्डव्यात्, माण्डव्यः कौत्सात्, कौत्सो माहित्थेः, माहित्थिर्वामकक्षायणात्, वामकक्षायणः शाण्डिल्यात्, शाण्डिल्यो वात्स्यात्, वात्स्यः कुश्रेः, कुश्रिर्यज्ञवचसो राजस्तम्बायनात्, यज्ञवचा राजस्तम्बायनस्तुरात्कावषेयात्, तुरः कावषेयः प्रजापतेः, प्रजापतिर्ब्रह्मणः, ब्रह्म स्वयंभु; ब्रह्मणे नमः ॥ ४ ॥ इति पञ्चमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥ इति षष्ठोऽध्यायः ॥

4. The same up to the son of Sāṁjīvī. The son of Sāṁjīvī from Māṇḍūkāyani. Māṇḍūkāyani from Māṇḍavya. Māṇḍavya from Kautsa. Kautsa from Māhitthi. He from Vāmakakṣāyaṇa. He from Śāṇḍilya. Śāṇḍilya from Vātsya. Vātsya from Kuśri. Kuśri from Yajñavacas, the son of Rājastamba. He from Tura, the son of Kavaṣi. He from Prajāpati (Hiraṇyagarbha). Prajāpati through his relation to Brahman (the Vedas).[1] Brahman is self-born. Salutation to Brahman.

Now the line of teachers of the whole Upaniṣad is being given. (They are here named after their mothers) because the wife holds the most important

[1] For another interpretation see commentary on II. vi. 3.

place (in this ceremony).[1] It has been mentioned that a gifted son is born. Hence the Upaniṣad is narrating the line of teachers by describing the son through the name of the mother. *These white Yajuses,* etc.—'White' because they are not mixed up (with human faults), or these Yajuses are pure or fresh. From Prajāpati down to the son of Pautimāṣī is a descending order (if we read it inversely), with the teacher always mentioned first. (The line is) *the same up to the son of Sāṁjīvī.*[2] *Prajāpati through his relation to Brahman* or the Vedas. That Brahman (the Vedas) has come down the line from Prajāpati and variously branched off among us. It is without beginning and end—*self-born,* or eternal. *Salutation to* that *Brahman* (the Vedas). And salutation to the teachers who have followed it.

[1] Because it is she who, being purified through sprinkling etc., produces a worthy son.

[2] Above him it bifurcates, to merge again at the top, the sun being identical with Prajāpati or Hiraṇyagarbha.

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